CHAPTER ONE THE WORLD AS WILL TO POWER /. What there is for Nietzsche Any philosophical system which claims to be at all comprehensive must answer, ...

Johann Gottlieb Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1812 stellt die letzte umfassende Ausarbeitung der Grundlegung der Fichteschen Transzendentalphilosophie dar. Historisch handelt es sich um die 'Endgestalt' eines Projekts, das in Zürich und Jena knapp zwanzig Jahre zuvor begonnen worden war, systematisch um den wichtigsten Anwärter auf den Titel der 'Vollendungsgestalt' einer Philosophie, mit der Fichte eine ebenbürtige Alternative zu den Systemen Schellings und Hegels vorlegt. Die Autoren des vorliegenden Bandes tragen dem End- und Vollendungscharakter der 'Wissenschaftslehre' in ihrer Version aus dem Jahre (...) 1812 Rechnung. Dafür knüpfen sie etwa bei der neuen Nähe zu Kant an oder buchstabieren den transzendentallogisch so faszinierenden Versuch Fichtes durch, die Erscheinung als absoluten Ort des Wissens zu denken. Auch das Bild als das grosse Leitthema der Fichteschen Spätphilosophie wird verhandelt, während zugleich ältere Motive wie das 'Selbstbewusstsein' oder die 'Reflexion' in ein neues Licht gerückt werden. (shrink)

Ethical theories have been largely focused on finding and clarifying certain amoral principles. However fruitful the communication of moral principles for providing orientation in modern society might be, a serious omission has been made in that the problem of implementation is not addressed. Two fundamental question have neither been raised nor answered: Why should self‐interested individuals follow the proposed moral principles in their daily conduct? Are societal institutions of such a design that is in the power of the individuals to (...) follow these moral principles? It is shown in this article that an economic theory of morals does systematically address these two questions and therefore provides a firm basis for discussing the possibilities and boundaries of following the moral principles inherent in the long history of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Analyzing causation in terms of Woodward's interventionist theory and describing the structure of the world in terms of causal powers are usually regarded as quite different projects in contemporary philosophy. Interventionists aim to give an account of how causal relations can be empirically discovered and described, without committing themselves to views about what causation really is. Causal powers theorists engage in precisely the latter project, aiming to describe the metaphysical structure of the world. In this paper, I argue that interventionism (...) can benefit from incorporating considerations about causal powers. I describe a previously undiscussed problem for Woodward's definition of an intervention variable that arises when interventionist causal models include disjunctive variables. This problem is solved not by excluding disjunctive (or logically compound) variables per se, but by excluding variables whose values represent disjunctions of too different causal powers. This suggests that interventionism and causal powers theories may be less distant from each other than is often assumed. (shrink)

Ethical theories have been largely focused on finding and clarifying certain amoral principles. However fruitful the communication of moral principles for providing orientation in modern society might be, a serious omission has been made in that the problem of implementation is not addressed. Two fundamental question have neither been raised nor answered: (1) Why should self‐interested individuals follow the proposed moral principles in their daily conduct? (2) Are societal institutions of such a design that is in the power of the (...) individuals to follow these moral principles? It is shown in this article that an economic theory of morals does systematically address these two questions and therefore provides a firm basis for discussing the possibilities and boundaries of following the moral principles inherent in the long history of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Chemical structures are among the trademarks of our profession, as surely chemical as flasks, beakers and distillation columns. When someone sees one of us busily scribbling formulas or structures, he or she has no trouble identifying a chemist. Yet these familiar objects, which accompany our work from start to end, from the initial doodlings (Fig. I) to the final polished artwork in a publication (Fig. II), are deceptively simple. They raise interesting and difficult questions about representation. It is the intent (...) of this article to reflect upon molecular graphics. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the distinction between private and public and the difference between ‘public’ and ‘official’. Drawing on a comparative analysis of Asian cities, it looks at the ways in which the local, the national and the global levels, which serve different, sometimes contrasting, interests, are negotiated and reconciled in the city. The chapter suggests that different forms of reconciliation have brought about an alternative ‘insitutionalisation’ of the public space. Such an institutionalisation is reflected in the access to, and dissemination (...) of, information—e.g., access to the media—and, above all, in the control over the common goods. The public sphere is used to voice discontent, leading to a new definition of the ‘common good’; that is, the inclusion, or non-exclusion, of large sections of the population which, though initially marginal, can become significant in shaping urban politics. (shrink)

Barsalou's theory of perceptual symbol systems is considered from a metacognitive perspective. Two examples are discussed in terms of the proposed perceptual symbol theory. First, recent results in research on feeling-of-knowing judgement are used to argue for a representation of familiarity with input cues. This representation should support implicit memory. Second, the ability of maintaining a theory of other people's beliefs (theory of mind) is considered and it is suggested that a purely simulation-based view is insufficient to explain the available (...) evidence. Both examples characterize areas where Barsalou's theory would benefit from additional detail. (shrink)

Diese Studie analysiert die Konzepte «Wissenskulturen» und «Experimentalkulturen», um sich dem Problem der Repräsentation mittels einer Mehrfaktoren-Analyse zu nähern.

The existence of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is not enough for philosophical purposes. On the other hand, there's more to NCC than meets the sceptic's eye. (I) NCC are useful for a better understanding of conscious experience, for instance: (1) NCC are helpful to explain phenomenological features of consciousness – e.g., dreaming. (2) NCC can account for phenomenological opaque facts – e.g., the temporal structure of consciousness. (3) NCC reveal properties and functions of consciousness which cannot be elucidated either (...) by introspective phenomenology or by psychological experiments alone – e.g., vision. (II) There are crucial problems and shortcomings of NCC: (1) Correlation implies neither causation nor identity. (2) There are limitations of empirical access due to the problem of other minds and the problem of self-deception, and (3) due to the restrictions provided by inter- and intraindividual variations. (4) NCC cannot be catched by neuroscience alone because of the externalistic content of representations. Therefore, NCC are not sufficient for a naturalistic theory of mind, (5) nor are they necessary because of the possibility of multiple realization. (III) Nevertheless, NCC are relevant and important for the mind-body problem: (1) NCC reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. (2) But NCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. (3) NCC restrict nomological identity accounts. (4) The investigation of NCC can refute empirical arguments for interactionism as a case study of John Eccles' dualistic proposals will show. (5) The discoveries of NCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone, for which, e.g., a principle of supervenience and a further condition – and therefore philosophical arguments – are required. (shrink)

We study model theory of actions of finite groups on substructures of a stable structure. We give an abstract description of existentially closed actions as above in terms of invariants and PAC structures. We show that if the corresponding PAC property is first order, then the theory of such actions has a model companion. Then, we analyze some particular theories of interest (mostly various theories of fields of positive characteristic) and show that in all the cases considered the PAC property (...) is first order. (shrink)

Martin Hoffmann bietet eine Grundlegung protestantischer Ethik im Schnittfeld von europäischer Ethiktradition und lateinamerikanischer Theologie. Orientiert an paulinischem Denken fragt er nach der ethischen Identität von Christen und Christinnen jenseits von Biblizismus und Relativismus. Er entwickelt den Weg zu einem adäquaten ethischen Urteil im jeweiligen Kontext und zeigt an ausgewählten Feldern materialer Ethik, wie eine ethische Hermeneutik im Horizont der globalen ethischen Herausforderungen der Gegenwart aussehen kann.

Over the last two decades, the capabilities approach has become an increasingly influential theory of development. It conceptualises human wellbeing in terms of an individual's ability to achieve functionings we have reason to value. In contrast, the African ethic of ubuntu views human flourishing as the propensity to pursue relations of fellowship with others, such that relationships have fundamental value. These two theoretical perspectives seem to be in tension with each other; while the capabilities approach focuses on individuals as the (...) locus of ethical value, an ubuntu ethic concentrates on the relations between individuals. In this article, we ask: to what extent is the capabilities approach compatible with this African ethical theory? We argue that, on reflection, relations play a much stronger role in the capabilities approach than often assumed. There is good reason to believe that relationality is part of the concept of a capability itself, where such relationality has intrinsic ethical value. This understanding of the ethical centrality of relations grounds new normative perspectives on the capabilities approach, and offers a more comprehensive grasp of the relevance of relationships to empirical enquiry. (shrink)

This article gives a basic account of Aquinas’s theory of “synderesis” and conscience. Aquinas understands synderesis as an infallible moral awareness and conscience as the fallible judgment that applies a general moral conviction to a concrete case. The article also compares Aquinas’s and his contemporaries’ theories of whether erring conscience is morally binding, that is, whether to act in accord with erring conscience or against erring conscience is sinful.

The existence of quantum correlates of consciousness (QCC) is doubtful from a scientific perspective. But even if their existence were verified, philosophical problems would remain. On the other hand, there could be more to QCC than meets the sceptic's eye: • QCC might be useful or even necessary for a better understanding of conscious experience or quantum physics or both. The main reasons for this are: the measurement problem (the nature of observation, the mysterious collapse of the wave function, etc.), (...) ostensibly shared features of quantum phenomena and conscious phenomena (e.g., complementarity, nonspatiality, acausality, spontaneity, and holism) and connections (ontology, causation, and knowledge), the qualia problem (subjectivity, explanatory gap etc.). But there are many problems, especially questions regarding realism and the nature and role of conscious observers; • QCC are conceptually challenging, because there are definitory problems and some crucial ontological and epistemological shortcomings. It is instructive to compare them with recent proposals for understanding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). QCC are not sufficient for a quantum theory of mind, nor might they be necessary except perhaps in a very broad sense; • QCC are also empirically challenging. Nevertheless, QCC could be relevant and important for the mindbody problem: QCC might reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. But QCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. QCC restrict accounts of nomological identity. The discovery of QCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone. But there are also problems with QCC in the framework of other ontologies. (shrink)

It is part of our self-understanding as humans to ascribe individuality to. But what our particular individuality consists of cannot be generally determined, because the concept of individuality aims precisely at the uniqueness and unmistakability of each individual. A philosophical theory of human individuality must therefore essentially be a theory of human self-understanding. The book substantiates this thesis both in philosophical-historical and in philosophical-systematical perspective. The author takes up problem descriptions from the founding phase of human sciences in the 19th (...) century and develops a proposal that identifies a specifically human type of epistemic access to oneself as an essential characteristic of human individuality. The epistemological foundation of philosophical anthropology presented in this study is thus simultaneously an innovative contribution to the hermeneutics of the human self. German description: Es gehort zu unserem Selbstverstandnis als Menschen, dass wir uns Individualitat zuschreiben. Worin aber unsere jeweilige Individualitat besteht, kann nicht allgemein bestimmt werden, weil der Begriff der Individualitat gerade auf das Einzigartige und Unverwechselbare eines jeden Individuums zielt. Eine philosophische Theorie menschlicher Individualitat muss deshalb wesentlich eine Theorie des menschlichen Sichselbstverstehens sein. Das Buch begrundet diese These sowohl in philosophiehistorischer als auch in philosophisch-systematischer Perspektive. Martin Hoffmann greift Problembeschreibungen aus der Grundungsphase der Humanwissenschaften im 19. Jahrhundert auf und entwickelt einen Vorschlag, der eine spezifisch menschliche Art des epistemischen Zugangs zu sich selbst als wesentliches Charakteristikum menschlicher Individualitat identifiziert. Die epistemologische Grundlegung der philosophischen Anthropologie, die damit vorliegt, ist so zugleich ein innovativer Beitrag zur Hermeneutik des menschlichen Selbst. (shrink)

A property is intrinsic iff individuals have it in virtue of how they themselves are, not in virtue of their relations to other individuals; a property is extrinsic iff it is not intrinsic. Being a cube and being an electron are intrinsic properties; being next to a cube, and being repelled by an electron are extrinsic properties. The debate about the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties revolves around the following two questions: (1) Can the distinction be analysed in terms (...) of other, better understood notions, and if so, what should such an analysis should look like? (2) What are the general characteristics of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction? I first describe several attempts to define the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction: the loneliness test proposed by Langton and Lewis, combinatorial accounts, and approaches based on the notion of grounding. I point out that any successful analysis of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction invokes notions based on substantial metaphysical assumptions, such as the notions of grounding or natural property. I then discuss the general features of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction and argue that the distinction is hyperintensional and vague. (shrink)

A property is intrinsic iff individuals have it in virtue of how they themselves are, not in virtue of their relations to other individuals; a property is extrinsic iff it is not intrinsic. Being a cube and being an electron are intrinsic properties; being next to a cube, and being repelled by an electron are extrinsic properties. The debate about the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties revolves around the following two questions: (1) Can the distinction be analysed in terms (...) of other, better understood notions, and if so, what should such an analysis should look like? (2) What are the general characteristics of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction? I first describe several attempts to define the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction: the loneliness test proposed by Langton and Lewis, combinatorial accounts, and approaches based on the notion of grounding. I point out that any successful analysis of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction invokes notions based on substantial metaphysical assumptions, such as the notions of grounding or natural property. I then discuss the general features of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction and argue that the distinction is hyperintensional and vague. (shrink)

Highlighting Hegel's conceptual realism Hoffmann focuses on an undervalued move in his dialectic: inversion. Easily proving completeness for Kant's table of categories, Hoffmann shows how metabolic dialectic substantiates Hegel's claim for his _Logic_: it is indeed the science of absolute form!

Excerpt from Rene Descartes Descartes zieht sich in die Niederlande zuruck. Naheres uber die dortigen Zustande. 2. Verwerfung aller dog matiscben Voraussetzungen. Allgemeine metaphysische Grundlegung. 3. Es fehlt ihr noch die systematische Durch bildung. 4. Beschaftigung mit den mannigfachsten natur wissenschaftlichen Problemen. Heitere Stimmung des Philo 80phen. 5. Ausarbeitung einer Weltbildungstheorie. Die Grunde, weswegen das _werk nicht veroffentlicht wird. 6. Uber Descartes' Beurteilung der wissenschaftlichen Ver dienste Galileis 7. Liebesverhaltnis zwischen Descartes und einer Hollanderin. 8. Herausgabe einer Reihe wissenschaft licher (...) Werke. Charakteristik der Abhandlung uber die Methode. 9 Die Dioptrik. Technische Begabung des Philo 80phen. 10. Uber die Meteore. Ll. Geometrie. Uber die Ausdehnung und Grenzen der mathematischen Wissenschaft. Hohere Analysis. Descartes' Verhaltnis zu den abstrakten Problemen der Mathematik. Unvollkommenheit der Natur philosophie. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The article presents Aquinas’s general conception of intellectual virtue and considers his account of the individual intellectual virtues, with a special focus on prudence.

Das anspruchsvolle Bibelepos des Alcimus Ecdicius Avitus verknüpft zentrale Stationen der Heilsgeschichte vom Sündenfall bis zum Durchzug durch das Rote Meer. Dieser erste ausführliche Kommentar zum dritten Buch spürt den vielfältigen Einflüssen nach, die auf das Herzstück des Werkes, die Vertreibung aus dem Paradies, eingewirkt haben. Neben dem Bibeltext und seiner Exegese sind dies vor allem pagane Epik und christliche Dichtung. Die patristische Literatur wird wesentlich stärker berücksichtigt als zuvor und Ambrosius als wichtiges Vorbild identifiziert.

Philippa Foots Natural Goodness (dt. Die Natur des Guten) ist eines der interessantesten Werke der Gegenwartsphilosophie. Ihr Ansatz stellt nicht nur wesentliche Annahmen in Frage, die moralphilosophische Debatten bis in die Gegenwart hinein bestimmen. Foot entwirft auch einen Begriff der menschlichen Natur, der die reduktiven Tendenzen des modernen Szientismus vermeidet. Praktische Rationalitat erscheint nicht als das Andere der menschlichen Natur, sondern als entscheidendes Merkmal unserer Lebensform. Naturlich gut dokumentiert erstmals die kritische Auseinandersetzung der deutschsprachigen Philosophie mit Foots ethischem Naturalismus.".

Welchen Status haben mentale Zustände, wie bewusste Empfindungen, Wünsche, Überzeugungen oder Emotionen, in einer physikalischen Welt? Lassen sich alle derartigen Zustände auf Hirnzustände reduzieren? Was genau zeichnet mentale Zustände aus, und was können wir über die mentalen Zustände unserer Mitmenschen wissen? Dieses Handbuch liefert einen systematischen Überblick über Positionen und Fragestellungen in der Philosophie des Geistes. Ein zentrales Themengebiet ist dabei das Verhältnis zwischen mentalen Zuständen und Hirnzuständen: physikalistische und nicht-physikalistische Ansätze sowie das Problem der mentalen Verursachung. Darüber hinaus werden (...) Fragestellungen zum Charakter des Mentalen und zu verschiedenen Typen mentaler Zustände in den Blick genommen, etwa die Debatten über Qualia, Intentionalität, Gedächtnis und das Verhältnis zwischen Denken und Sprache. Abgerundet wird das Bild durch Beiträge zum Thema Willensfreiheit, zur empirischen Erforschung mentaler Zustände sowie zu historischen Positionen in der Leib-Seele-Debatte. (shrink)