Most commentators (especially guyer and allison) assume kant's position on inner sense to follow the lockean model, With inner sense preceding outer sense. In a previous paper I argued that outer sense was primary. Here, On the basis of the newly discovered leningrad fragment and other texts, I argue that the establishment of temporal order requires outer-Sense priority, But in its use, Inner sense can be prior. I close with some remarks on embodiment.
For most commentators, Kant holds a basically lockean view of the order of knowledge acquisition: sensory affection produces inner-Sense representations from which outer objects are subsequently inferred; in particular, Outer time order is derived from inner time order in the second analogy. But kant actually holds that outer sense is prior to inner sense. This latter view is defended by distinguishing two senses of inner sense: inner sense in itself and inner sense as appearance. The first, If there is one, (...) Is prior to outer sense; but the second, The one kant meant, Is posterior. (shrink)
This is a facing-Page translation of a two-Page fragment of kant's on inner sense, Similar to the ""reflexionen"" collected in volumes 14-19 of the academy edition of kant's complete works. It is especially important because of its subject matter: inner sense plays a key role in kant's epistemology, But is discussed separately only in the "anthropology". The fragment has a number of points in common with a number of similar "reflexionen" on the refutation of idealism, But also differs from these (...) in important ways. Three articles dealing with the fragment's history and significance are published along with it. (shrink)
On one common reading, Kant's epistemology involves an "all-Or-Nothing" principle: the mind achieves either objective knowledge or nothing at all. But then we cannot account for dreams. L w beck maintains that the categories also function in non-Veridical contexts (including dreams), But do not serve to distinguish these from veridical contexts. I argue that the categories determine coherence both within and among different contexts of experience, And hence determine which are veridical.
Kant holds that the a human subject's free causation, as well as the deliberations and decision preceeding it, are literally timeless. This paper tries to defend this doctrine of timeless agency by first distinguishing three senses of "cause", then showing the relationship between cause and time-determination in the theoretical philosophy, and finally relating the timelessness of free agency to the status of the representations of perception. The result is that whereas agency has no time in isolation, it may borrow enough (...) time for its purposes from the theoretical realm. Kant meint, daß die freie Verursachung durch ein menschliches Subjekt, genauso wie die Überlegungen und die Entscheidung, die ihr vorausgehen, buchstäblich zeitlos sind. Der Beitrag versucht, diese Lehre von einem zeitlosen Handeln zu verteidigen. Zunächst wird zwischen drei verschiedenen Bedeutungen von "Ursache" unterschieden. Dann wird die Beziehung zwischen Ursache und Zeitbestimmung in der theoretischen Philosophie dargestellt. Schließlich wird die Zeitlosigkeit freien Handelns mit dem Status der Gegenstände der Wahrnehmung in eine Beziehung gesetzt. Das Ergebnis ist, daß das Handeln, während es für sich selbst betrachtet keine Zeit hat, für seine Zwecke doch genügend Zeit aus der theoretischen Sphäre entlehnen kann. (shrink)