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Terry Horgan [98]Terence Horgan [93]Terence E. Horgan [61]T. Horgan [9]
Terrence Horgan [2]Terence Edward Horgan [2]
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Profile: Terry Horgan (University of Arizona)
  1. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality.Terence Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oup Usa. pp. 520--533.
  2. From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - Mind 102 (408):555-86.
  3. What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism.Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson - 2005 - In Christina E. Erneling & D. Johnson (eds.), Mind As a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
     
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  4. Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2008 - MIT Press.
     
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  5.  79
    Metaethics After Moore.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Metaethics, understood as a distinct branch of ethics, is often traced to G. E. Moore's 1903 classic, Principia Ethica. Whereas normative ethics is concerned to answer first order moral questions about what is good and bad, right and wrong, metaethics is concerned to answer second order non-moral questions about the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of moral thought and discourse. Moore has continued to exert a powerful influence, and the sixteen essays here represent the most up-to-date work in metaethics after, and (...)
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  6. Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness.Terence Horgan, John Tienson & Graham George - 2006 - In Kriegel Uriah & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-representational Approaches to Consciousness. Bradford.
  7.  35
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 1996 - MIT Press.
    In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson articulate and defend a new view of cognition.
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  8. Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well?Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
    It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, self- knowledge has also encountered its (...)
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  9. Folk Psychology is Here to Stay.Terence E. Horgan & James F. Woodward - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (April):197-225.
  10. Supervenience and Microphysics.Terence E. Horgan - 1982 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (January):29-43.
     
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  11. Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day.Terry Horgan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):10–21.
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  12. Cognitivist Expressivism.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. pp. 255--298.
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  13. New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:447-465.
    There have been times in the history of ethical theory, especially in this century, when moral realism was down, but it was never out. The appeal of this doctrine for many moral philosophers is apparently so strong that there are always supporters in its corner who seek to resuscitate the view. The attraction is obvious: moral realism purports to provide a precious philosophical good, viz., objectivity and all that this involves, including right answers to moral questions, and the possibility of (...)
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  14. Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):347-373.
    We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
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  15. Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy.Terry Horgan & George Graham - 2012 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. De Gruyter.
  16. Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Synthese 92 (2):221 - 260.
    J. L. Mackie argued that if there were objective moral properties or facts, then the supervenience relation linking the nonmoral to the moral would be metaphysically queer. Moral realists reply that objective supervenience relations are ubiquitous according to contemporary versions of metaphysical naturalism and, hence, that there is nothing especially queer about moral supervenience. In this paper we revive Mackie's challenge to moral realism. We argue: (i) that objective supervenience relations of any kind, moral or otherwise, should be explainable rather (...)
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  17.  35
    The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis.David K. Henderson & Terence Horgan - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Henderson and Horgan set out a broad new approach to epistemology. They defend the roles of the a priori and conceptual analysis, but with an essential empirical dimension. 'Transglobal reliability' is the key to epistemic justification. The question of which cognitive processes are reliable depends on contingent facts about human capacities.
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  18. Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The 'Open Question Argument' Revived.Terence Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1992 - Philosophical Papers 21 (3):153-175.
    (1992). TROUBLES FOR NEW WAVE MORAL SEMANTICS: THE ‘OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT’ REVIVED. Philosophical Papers: Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 153-175. doi: 10.1080/05568649209506380.
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  19. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.
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  20.  72
    Deconstructing New Wave Materialism.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 307--318.
    In the first post World War II identity theories (e.g., Place 1956, Smart 1962), mind brain identities were held to be contingent. However, in work beginning in the late 1960's, Saul Kripke (1971, 1980) convinced the philosophical community that true identity statements involving names and natural kind terms are necessarily true and furthermore, that many such necessary identities can only be known a posteriori. Kripke also offered an explanation of the a posteriori nature of ordinary theoretical identities such as that (...)
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  21.  47
    Mental Quausation.Terence E. Horgan - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:47-74.
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  22. Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2000 - Facta Philosophica 2:249-270.
  23. Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279-295.
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. (...)
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  24.  55
    Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem.Terry Horgan - 2007 - Analysis 67 (293):50–59.
  25. Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):56–77.
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  26. Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion.Terence E. Horgan - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):165-84.
  27.  18
    Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II.Terence Horgan - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.
    In “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Anna Mahtani and I offer a new argument for thirdism that relies on what we call “generalized conditionalization.” Generalized conditionalization goes beyond conventional conditionalization in two respects: first, by sometimes deploying a space of synchronic, essentially temporal, candidate-possibilities that are not “prior” possibilities; and second, by allowing for the use of preliminary probabilities that arise by first bracketing, and then conditionalizing upon, “old evidence.” In “Beauty and Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani,” (...)
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  28. Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality.Terence Horgan - 2013 - The Monist 96 (2):232-251.
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  29. Untying a Knot From the Inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of Supererogation.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):29-63.
    In his 1958 seminal paper “Saints and Heroes”, J. O. Urmson argued that the then dominant tripartite deontic scheme of classifying actions as being exclusively either obligatory, or optional in the sense of being morally indifferent, or wrong, ought to be expanded to include the category of the supererogatory. Colloquially, this category includes actions that are “beyond the call of duty” (beyond what is obligatory) and hence actions that one has no duty or obligation to perform. But it is a (...)
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  30.  56
    Consciousness and Intentionality.George Graham, Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. pp. 468--484.
  31.  8
    Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology.Terence E. Horgan & Matjaž Potrc - 2008 - MIT Press.
    The authors of Austere Realism describe and defend a provocative ontological-cum-semantic position, asserting that the right ontology is minimal or austere, in that it excludes numerous common-sense posits, and that statements employing such posits are nonetheless true, when truth is understood to be semantic correctness under contextually operative semantic standards. Terence Horgan and Matjaz [hacek over z] Potrc [hacek over c] argue that austere realism emerges naturally from consideration of the deep problems within the naive common-sense approach to truth and (...)
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  32.  60
    Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox.Terence Horgan - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):159-188.
    I distinguish two broad approaches to vagueness that I call "robust" and "wimpy". Wimpy construals explain vagueness as robust (i.e., does not manifest arbitrary precision); that standard approaches to vagueness, like supervaluationism or appeals to degrees of truth, wrongly treat vagueness as wimpy; that vagueness harbors an underlying logical incoherence; that vagueness in the world is therefore impossible; and that the kind of logical incoherence nascent in vague terms and concepts is benign rather than malignant. I describe some implications for (...)
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  33.  41
    From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed.Terry Horgan - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 57.
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  34. What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us About Moral Objectivity?Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):267-300.
    Moral phenomenology is concerned with the elements of one's moral experiences that are generally available to introspection. Some philosophers argue that one's moral experiences, such as experiencing oneself as being morally obligated to perform some action on some occasion, contain elements that (1) are available to introspection and (2) carry ontological objectivist purportargument from phenomenological introspection.neutrality thesisthe phenomenological data regarding one's moral experiences that is available to introspection is neutral with respect to the issue of whether such experiences carry ontological (...)
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  35. Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem.Terence E. Horgan - 2001 - Theoria 16 (40):95-116.
    Terry Horgan University of Memphis In this paper I address the problem of causal exclusion, specifically as it arises for mental properties (although the scope of the discussion is more general, being applicable to other kinds of putatively causal properties that are not identical to narrowly physical causal properties, i.e., causal properties posited by physics). I summarize my own current position on the matter, and I offer a defense of this position. I draw upon and synthesize relevant discussions in various (...)
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  36. Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2000 - Synthese 124 (1-2):139-152.
    In "Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth", David Copp explores some ways in which a defender of synthetic moral naturalism might attempt to get around our Moral Twin Earth argument. Copp nicely brings out the force of our argument, not only through his exposition of it, but through his attempt to defeat it, since his efforts, we think, only help to make manifest the deep difficulties the Moral Twin Earth argument poses for the synthetic moral naturalist.
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  37. Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s1):74-96.
    Is conceptual relativity a genuine phenomenon? If so, how is it properly understood? And if it does occur, does it undermine metaphysical realism? These are the questions we propose to address. We will argue that conceptual relativity is indeed a genuine phenomenon, albeit an extremely puzzling one. We will offer an account of it. And we will argue that it is entirely compatible with metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism is the view that there is a world of objects and properties that (...)
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  38.  40
    The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 323.
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  39.  84
    Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2000 - Philosophical Papers 29 (2):121-153.
    Abstract We propose a metaethical view that combines the cognitivist idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and moral utterances express genuine assertions with the idea that such beliefs and utterances are nondescriptive in their overall content. This sort of view has not been recognized among the standard metaethical options because it is generally assumed that all genuine beliefs and assertions must have descriptive content. We challenge this assumption and thereby open up conceptual space for a new kind of metaethical (...)
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  40.  97
    What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity?Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25-51.
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals (...)
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  41.  25
    Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind.Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.) - 1991 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    "A third of the papers in this volume originated at the 1987 Spindel Conference ... at Memphis State University"--Pref.
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  42.  65
    Transvaluationism: A Dionysian Approach to Vagueness.Terry Horgan - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):97-126.
    I advocate a two part view concerning vagueness. On one hand I claim that vagueness is logically incoherent; but on the other hand I claim that vagueness is also a benign, beneficial, and indeed essential feature of human language and thought. I will call this view transvaluationism, a name which seems to me appropriate for several reasons. First, the term suggests that we should move beyond the idea that the successive statements in a sorites sequence can be assigned differing truth (...)
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  43. Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2012 - In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 51--76.
     
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  44. Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia.Terence E. Horgan - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April):147-83.
  45. The A Priori Isn’T All That It Is Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):219-250.
    Alvin Goldman’s contributions to contemporary epistemology are impressive—few epistemologists have provided others so many occasions for reflecting on the fundamental character of their discipline and its concepts. His work has informed the way epistemological questions have changed (and remained consistent) over the last two decades. We (the authors of this paper) can perhaps best suggest our indebtedness by noting that there is probably no paper on epistemology that either of us individually or jointly have produced that does not in its (...)
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  46. Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 100.
     
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  47.  50
    Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics.Terence Horgan - 1991 - Erkenntnis 34 (3):297--322.
    I propose a metaphysical position I call 'limited metaphysical realism', and I link it to a position in the philosophy of language I call 'psychologistic semantics'. Limited metaphysical realism asserts that there is a mind-independent, discourse-independent world, but posits a sparse ontology. Psychologistic semantics construes truth not as direct word/world correspondence, and not as warranted assertibility (or Putnam's "ideal" warranted assertibility), but rather as 'correct assertibility'. I argue that virtues of this package deal over each of the two broad positions (...)
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  48.  22
    Introspection About Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut From Infallibility to Impotence.Terry Horgan - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  49. Mary Mary, Quite Contrary.George Graham & Terence E. Horgan - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.
  50. Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum.Terence E. Horgan - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (June):453-69.
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