- Derek A. McDougall (1972). Religious Belief and Philosophical Analysis. Mind 81 (324):519-532.
- Hindu Nationalism Postmodernism (2005). Inthis Chapter I First Examine How Hindu Nationalists Construct the Myth of ''the Vedas as Books of Science.''I Claim That the Relativist Rhetoric of Postmodern Intellectuals has Given Philosophical Respectability to the Eclectic Patchwork of Science and Hindu Metaphysics That Goes Under the Name of ''Vedic Science.''I Argue That the Mixing Up of the Mythos of the Vedas with the Logos of Science Must Be of Great Concern Not Just to the Scientific Community, but Also to Religious People, for It is a Distortion of Both Science and Spirituality. [REVIEW] In Noretta Koertge (ed.), Scientific Values and Civic Virtues. Oup Usa.
- Hindu Nationalism Postmodernism (2005). In This Chapter I First Examine How Hindu Nationalists Construct the Myth of ''the Vedas as Books of Science.''I Claim That the Relativist Rhetoric of Postmodern Intellectuals has Given Philosophical Respectability to the Eclectic Patchwork of Science and Hindu Metaphysics That Goes Under the Name of ''Vedic Science.''I Argue That the Mixing Up of the Mythos of the Vedas with the Logos of Science Must Be of Great Concern Not Just to the Scientiﬁc Community, but Also to Religious People, for It is a Distortion of Both Science and Spirituality. [REVIEW] In Noretta Koertge (ed.), Scientific Values and Civic Virtues. Oup Usa.
- Jon Williamson (2007). Inductive Influence: Objective Bayesianism has Been Criticised for Not Allowing Learning From Experience: It is Claimed That an Agent Must Give Degree of Belief Formula to the Next Raven Being Black, However Many Other Black Ravens Have Been Observed. I Argue That This Objection Can Be Overcome by Appealing to Objective Bayesian Nets, a Formalism for Representing Objective Bayesian Degrees of Belief. Under This Account, Previous Observations Exert an Inductive Influence on the Next Observation. I Show How This Approach Can Be Used to Capture the Johnson–Carnap Continuum of Inductive Methods, as Well as the Nix–Paris Continuum, and Show How Inductive Influence Can Be Measured. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):689-708.
- Herbert Schnädelbach (2007). Was ist Philosophie?: This question cannot be answered in a simple form, because philosophy is a historical phenomenon that has experienced many changes. Hence the contribution begins by sketching what was called «Philosophy» in the past in order to, against the background of this history of the concept, sketch what happens in philosophy today. The thesis is that philosophy essentially concerns attempts at conceptual orientation in the domain of our fundamentals of thought, recognition and action. In philosophical discourse explicative, normative and descriptive aspects can be distinguished. Seen on the whole, philosophy is a conversation and that explains what may seem strange about it, namely its close connection to the history of philosophy, the high measure of forgetting and remembering, and the remarkable consistency of a few core themes over the centuries. Studia Philosophica 66:11-28.
- Åsa Wikforss (2009). Are There Understanding-Assent Links?: It is Commonly Held That There Are Internal Links Between Understanding and Assent Such That Being Semantically Competent with an Expression Requires Accepting Certain Sentences as True. The Paper Discusses a Recent Challenge to This Conception of Semantic Competence, Posed by Timothy Williamson . According to Williamson There Are No Understanding-Assent Links of the Suggested Sort, No Internal Connection Between Semantic Competence and Belief. I Suggest That Williamson is Quite Right to Question the Claim That Being Semantically Competent with an Expression E Requires Accepting a Certain Sentence S as True. However, Williamson Does Not Merely Wish to Reject This Version of the Understanding-Assent View, but the Very Idea That the Connection with Belief Provides Constitutive Constraints on Linguistic Understanding and Concept Possession. This Further Move, I Argue, is Very Problematic. Giving a Plausible Account of Semantic Competence Requires Acc. The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
- Jes Harfeld (2011). Philosophical Ethology: On the Extents of What It Is to Be a Pig. Society and Animals 19 (1):83-101.
- Basil Mitchell (1984). How is the Concept of Sin Related to the Concept of Moral Wrongdoing? Religious Studies 20 (2):165.
- Hans Muller & Bana Bashour (2011). Why Alief is Not a Legitimate Psychological Category. Journal of Philosophical Research 36:371-389.
- Timothy Chan (1981). Paul Tillich and the Question of God: A Philosophical Appraisal. Dissertation, University of Arkansas
- Tsuchiya Naotsugu (forthcoming). "What is It Like to Be a Bat?" - a Pathway to the Answer From the Integrated Information Theory. Philosophy Compass.
- Catalin Vasile Bobb (2011). From the Problem of “Evil” to Interpretation. "Hermeneutic Phenomenology" As a Method for Understanding the Religious Discourse. Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 10 (30):299-317.
- Pascal Engel, Belief As a Disposition to Act: Variations on a Pragmatist Theme.
- Michael L. Peterson (ed.) (2009). Reason & Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.
- Jung H. Lee (2007). What is It Like to Be a Butterfly? A Philosophical Interpretation of Zhuangzi's Butterfly Dream. Asian Philosophy 17 (2):185 – 202.
- Denys Turner (2002). How to Be an Atheist: Inaugural Lecture Delivered at the University of Cambridge, 12 October 2001. Cambridge University Press.
- Christopher L. Bodily (1994). "While Orthodox Sociology Tends to Be" Method-Oriented," a Construc-Tionist Perspective Openly Acknowledges That How Sociology is Done (Methods) is Not a Separate Question From Why It is Done in a Particular Way (Theory). Constructionist Efforts Are Compelled, Not by Rigid Methodological Strictures, but by the Assumption That as Active Social". In Theodore R. Sarbin & John I. Kitsuse (eds.), Constructing the Social. Sage Publications. pp. 12--174.
- Raimon Panikkar (2005). IAM Expected to Give a Philosophical Introduction. An Introduction It Will Be, Because It Will Not Enter Into the Profundities of These Three Words. It is Philosophical—in the Real Sense of the Word: Philosophy is as Much the Love Of. [REVIEW] In Bettina Baumer & John R. Dupuche (eds.), Void and Fullness in the Buddhist, Hindu, and Christian Traditions: Sunya-Purna-Pleroma. D.K. Printworld. pp. 11.
- Michael Ruse (2005). Mydictionary Offers Many Meanings for the Word ''Trust,''but the First and Presumably Primary Seems the Most Pertinent for a Discussion About the Na-Ture and Practice of Science and Scientists. Trust is ''Firm Belief or Confidence in the Honesty, Integrity, Reliability, Justice, Etc. Of Another Person or Thing; Faith; Reliance.''There Seems to Be a Two-Part Reason Why Trust, as Thus Defined, is an Absolutely Crucial Component to the Practice of Science. [REVIEW] In Noretta Koertge (ed.), Scientific Values and Civic Virtues. Oup Usa. pp. 99.
- John S. Wilkins (2003). How to Be a Chaste Species Pluralist-Realist: The Origins of Species Modes and the Synapomorphic Species Concept. [REVIEW] Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):621-638.
- I. What (2005). Have Described Here is Part of What May Be Called 'the Religious Problem of Evil', Which Also Admits of Non-Theistic Versions of the Problem of Evil Such as Those Arising in Some Eastern Religious Traditions. For a Critical Discussion of One Popular Solution (in Terms of the Doctrine of Karma) to the Non-Theistic Problem of Evil in Indian Religious Thought, See Whitley RP Kaufman,“Karma, Rebirth, and the Problem of Evil,”. Philosophy East and West 55:15-32.
- Kimberly Connor (2012). If It Weren't for Bad Luck, I Wouldn't Have No Luck at All : Blues and the Human Condition. Why Can't We Be Satisfied? : Blues is Knowin' How to Cope / Brian Domino ; Doubt and the Human Condition : Nobody Loves Me but My Momma- and She Might Be Jivin' Too / Jesse R. Steinberg ; Blues and Emotional Trauma : Blues as Musical Therapy / Robert D. Stolorow and Benjamin A. Stolorow ; Suffering, Spirituality, and Sensuality : Religion and the Blues / Joseph J. Lynch ; Worrying the Line : Blues as Story, Song, and Prayer. [REVIEW] In Jesse R. Steinberg & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Blues -- Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking Deep About Feeling Low. Wiley-Blackwell.
- Emad H. Atiq (2016). How to Be Impartial as a Subjectivist. Philosophical Studies 173 (3):757-779.
- Mark Nesti (2011). Phenomenology and Sports Psychology: Back To The Things Themselves! Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 5 (3):285 - 296.
- Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek & Petar Iliev (2011). Everything is Knowable – How to Get to Know Whether a Proposition is True. Theoria 78 (2):93-114.
- Roxana Baiasu (2014). How is Philosophy Supposed to Engage with Religion? Heidegger's Philosophical Atheism and Its Limits. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):113-136.
- Vincent Brümmer (1999). How Rational is Rational Theology? A Reply to Mikael Stenmark. Religious Studies 35 (1):89-97.
- Kate Nolfi (2015). How to Be a Normativist About the Nature of Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):181-204.
- Paul Ghils (2015). Editorial, Cosmopolis. Spirituality, Religion and Politics. Cosmopolis. A Journal of Cosmopolitics 7 (3-4).
- Vincent W. J. Van Gerven Oei (2012). Cumposition: Theses on Philosophy's Etymology. Continent 2 (1).
- Christopher Coope (1973). Wittgenstein's Theory of Knowledge. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 7:246-267.
- Susan Mendus (ed.) (2000). The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life. Duke University Press.
- Gregg Ten Elshof (2007). Religious Experience, Conceptual Contribution and the Problem of Diversity: How Not to Make the Problem Worse. Philosophical Explorations 32:235-250.
- Kyungsuk Choi (2008). “Bioethics” as a New Challenge to Philosophy. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 10:37-51.
- Stefano Gualeni (2014). Augmented Ontologies or How to Philosophize with a Digital Hammer. Philosophy and Technology 27 (2):177-199.
- Alberto G. Urquidez (forthcoming). Jorge L. A. Garcia and the Ordinary Use of 'Racist Belief'. Social Theory and Practice.
- Andreas Weiermann (1998). How is It That Infinitary Methods Can Be Applied to Finitary Mathematics? Gödel's T: A Case Study. Journal of Symbolic Logic 63 (4):1348-1370.
- Joel D. Velasco (2009). When Monophyly is Not Enough: Exclusivity as the Key to Defining a Phylogenetic Species Concept. Biology and Philosophy 24 (4):473-486.
- Michael H. G. Hoffmann (2004). How to Get It. Diagrammatic Reasoning as a Tool of Knowledge Development and its Pragmatic Dimension. Foundations of Science 9 (3):285-305.
- Jonathan Kvanvig (1986). How to Be a Reliabilist. American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):189 - 198.
- Ulf Zackariasson (2015). What Is It to Be Religiously Mistaken?: A Pragmatist Perspective. The Pluralist 10 (3):292-312.
- Ann Taves (2009). Religious Experience Reconsidered: A Building Block Approach to the Study of Religion and Other Special Things. Princeton University Press.
- Barış Şentuna & Dinçer Kanbur (2016). What Kind of an Activity is a Virtual Game? A Postmodern Approach in Relation to Concept of Phantasm by Deleuze and the Philosophy of Huizinga. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 10 (1):42-50.
- Victoria Harrison (2012). An Internalist Pluralist Solution to the Problem of Religious and Ethical Diversity. Sophia 51 (1):71-86.
- Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos (2006). Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.
- Simon A. Hailwood (2003). How to Be a Green Liberal: Nature, Value and Liberal Philosophy. Routledge.
- Edward Gilman Slingerland (1998). Effortless Action: Wu-Wei as a Spiritual Ideal in Early China. Dissertation, Stanford University
- John Gardner (2014). Law as a Leap of Faith: Essays on Law in General. Oxford University Press UK.
- B. J. C. Madison (2004). Plantinga on Warrant and Religious Belief. Dissertation, King's College London
- M. F. Peschl, G. Bottaro, M. Hartner-Tiefenthaler & K. Rötzer (2014). Learning How to Innovate as a Socio-Epistemological Process of Co-Creation: Towards a Constructivist Teaching Strategy for Innovation. Constructivist Foundations 9 (3):421-433.
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