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Howard Simmons [5]Howard J. Simmons [3]Howard L. Simmons [2]
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Howard Simmons
McMaster University
  1. Why You Should One-Box in Newcomb's Problem.Howard J. Simmons - manuscript
    I consider a familiar argument for two-boxing in Newcomb's Problem and find it defective because it involves a type of divergence from standard Baysian reasoning, which, though sometimes justified, conflicts with the stipulations of the Newcomb scenario. In an appendix, I also find fault with a different argument for two-boxing that has been presented by Graham Priest.
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  2. Sher on Blame.Howard Simmons - manuscript
    My subject is the theory of blame recently propounded by George Sher in his book, In Praise of Blame. I argue that although Sher has succeeded in capturing a number of genuine features of the concept of blame, there is an important element that he has omitted, which is the fact that necessarily, when A blames B for something and expresses this to B, A will realise that B is likely to find this unpleasant. The inclusion of the latter element (...)
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  3. Zombies Defeated: A Projectivist Account of Third-Person Consciousness Ascriptions.Howard J. Simmons - manuscript
    I defend an argument from Lauren Ashwell and Eric Marcus to the effect that the zombie idea is meaningless. I consider whether this idea could be saved from the force of the argument by adopting a projectivist account of third-person consciousness ascriptions. I decide that it cannot, but endorse that account anyway.
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  4.  40
    Circumstances and the Truth of Words: A Reply to Travis.Howard Simmons - 1997 - Mind 106 (421):117-118.
    I answer an argument from Charles Travis to the conclusion that minimalism about truth cannot cope with the context sensitivity of words. To do this, I construct a thought experiment involving a community whose language does not manifest context sensitivity, but whose statements do seem to be subject to truth in a minimalist sense.
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  5.  75
    Nathan on Evidential Insatiability.Howard Simmons - 1988 - Analysis 48 (1):57 - 59.
    This is a response to a paper by N.M.L. Nathan in which he argues that the attempt to provide a global justification of our entire set of beliefs necessarily leads to an infinite regress, in contrast with cases of local uncertainty, which he thinks can be resolved without regress. I argue that if he is right about the local uncertainty case, then he should not fear a regress in the global case, as the two situations are more similar than he (...)
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  6.  12
    The Progress of Affirmative Action: Accreditation and Diversity.Joseph B. Murphy, Sarah R. Blanshei, James F. Guyot, Howard L. Simmons, Joel Segall, Robert H. Chambers, Baruch College & Jim Sleeper - 1992 - Minerva 30 (4):531-552.
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  7.  13
    The Progress of Affirmative Action: Accreditation and Diversity. [REVIEW]Howard Simmons, Lamar Alexander & Scott Jaschik - 1992 - Minerva 30 (4):552-569.
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  8.  10
    Failures to Obtain Mediated Generalization Effects in Eyelid Conditioning.G. Robert Grice, Howard J. Simmons & John J. Hunter - 1963 - Journal of Experimental Psychology 65 (5):485.
  9.  10
    The Progress of Affirmative Action: Accreditation and Diversity. [REVIEW]Joseph B. Murphy, Sarah R. Blanshei, James F. Guyot, Howard L. Simmons, Joel Segall, I. I. I. Chambers, Baruch College & Jim Sleeper - 1992 - Minerva 30 (4):531-552.
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  10. Moral Desert: A Critique.Howard Simmons - 2010 - University Press of America.
    This book argues that moral desert should be excluded as a consideration in normative and applied ethics, as it is likely that no-one ever morally deserves anything for their actions and, if they do, it is in most cases impossible to know what. I also explain how moral deliberation in relation to punishment, distributive justice and personal morality can proceed without appeals to moral desert.
     
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