The radical forms of naturalistic epistemology look more like revolutionary manifestos than a reasonable alternatives. A modest form of naturalism is worth promoting. This modest form can cooperate with hermeneutics to solve epistemic problems, and therefore wins the title of cooperative naturalism, and benefits from the hermeneutic account of experience. Cooperative naturalism somewhat bridges the gap between analytic and continental philosophy.
Tactile emotion recognition provides a lot of valuable information in human-computer interaction, and it has strong application prospects in many aspects such as smart home and medical treatment. So this situation raises a question: How to quickly and efficiently let the robot perform the correct emotion recognition? In this work, we develop a lifelong learning algorithm which is based on the efficient dictionary learning technology, to tackle the tactile emotion recognition across different tasks. To verify the efficiency of the proposed (...) method, we applied it to two data sets for experimentation: Corpus of Social Touch (CoST) and our dataset(We built it with a 12X12 array sensor). The results show that the proposed lifelong learning algorithm achieves satisfactory results. (shrink)
Disjunctivism is the view that perceptual experience is either constituted by fact in the world or mere appearance. This view is said to be able to guarantee our cognitive contact with the world, and thus remove a crucial “prop” upon which skepticism depends. This paper has two aims. First, it aims to show that disjunctivism is a solution to Cartesian skepticism. Cartesian skepticism is an epistemological thesis, not an ontological one. Therefore, if there is an external world, we may well (...) undergo a veridical experience, and thus we can take advantage of disjunctivism to adopt an anti-evidential-skepticism strategy to counter Cartesian skepticism. Second, this paper argues that disjunctivism fails to solve Pyrrhonian skepticism. To counter Pyrrhonian skepticism, one has to give reasons both for his belief and for his believing. But disjunctivism can only account the former, that is, the reason for the content of perceptual belief. Given that one’s experience in good case and bad case is subjectively indistinguishable, one cannot just use his experience to justify his believing. This shows that disjunctivism cannot meet the requirement to provide an adequate account for reflective knowledge. (shrink)
A fundamental way in which human thought has developed has been constantly to explain the earliest "classics" that are the source of that thought. All in all, the number of such classics is not very high, their explanations are past counting. Moreover, they are constantly increasing, giving rise to an explanatory chain deriving from the classics. In the development of Chinese philosophy, this aspect is particularly noticeable, so that one can describe Chinese philosophy as a continual explanation of the classics. (...) This holds for both Confucianism and Daoism. The main classics of Daoism are the Laozi and the Zhuangzi. These two works have been constantly reread and reinterpreted throughout history. From the late nineteenth century onward, Chinese philosophy came into closer contact with Western philosophy. Foreign concepts were brought in to provide philosophers with new "insight." Some thinkers applied this new insight or these foreign concepts to the Daoist classics. In this way, they brought a new explanation of the Daoist classics and enriched the ways of interpreting the texts.1 Paving the way in this direction were Yan Fu. Zhang Taiyan, Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei, and Hu Shi. (shrink)
A fundamental way in which human thought has developed has been constantly to explain the earliest "classics" that are the source of that thought. All in all, the number of such classics is not very high, their explanations are past counting. Moreover, they are constantly increasing, giving rise to an explanatory chain deriving from the classics. In the development of Chinese philosophy, this aspect is particularly noticeable, so that one can describe Chinese philosophy as a continual explanation of the classics. (...) This holds for both Confucianism and Daoism. The main classics of Daoism are the Laozi and the Zhuangzi. These two works have been constantly reread and reinterpreted throughout history. From the late nineteenth century onward, Chinese philosophy came into closer contact with Western philosophy. Foreign concepts were brought in to provide philosophers with new "insight." Some thinkers applied this new insight or these foreign concepts to the Daoist classics. In this way, they brought a new explanation of the Daoist classics and enriched the ways of interpreting the texts.1 Paving the way in this direction were Yan Fu . Zhang Taiyan , Liang Qichao , Wang Guowei , and Hu Shi. (shrink)
In (2011) McLeod suggested that the first century Chinese philosopher Wang Chong 王充 may have been a pluralist about truth. In this reply I contest McLeod's interpretation of Wang Chong, and suggest "quasi-pluralism" (albeit more as an alternative to pluralism than as an interpretation of Wang Chong), which combines primitivism about the concept of truth with pluralism about justification.
Within various contexts, such as politics and parenting, Confucianism has been criticized on the basis that it endorses ‘unquestioning obedience’ to authorities. In recent years, several philosophers have argued against this view by appealing to textual evidence from Classical Confucian philosophers. In this essay, I examine Wang Yangming’s views on this subject, arguing that Wang teaches that criticism of those who stand in a socially superior role relation is not only permitted, but encouraged. From this, I consider the (...) implications that Wang’s analysis has for contemporary discussions of disagreement between epistemic superiors and inferiors and epistemic peerhood. I will argue that Wang’s position is much closer to the total evidence view than the preemptive view. Relatedly, I will suggest that Wang provides a novel proposal about how to recognise or disregard epistemic ‘superiors’, especially in the context of moral knowledge. (shrink)
Throughout history, the thinking of Western Europe and America has often dominated scholarly conversation, even on objects of study outside of those cultures. Thus Western academic inquiry into Chinese philosophy, for example, from Confucius and Laozi to Mozi and Chen Liang, has rarely engaged with scholarly work from China itself. This has been the West&’s great loss. Penn State University Press is pleased to have entered into an agreement with Nanjing University Press to allow greater access to the critical work (...) of Chinese scholars concerning prominent Chinese thinkers. These volumes, all displaying the text in both Chinese and English, offer unique, fresh, and provocative assessments of these essential Chinese philosophical and intellectual figures. (shrink)
