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  1.  50
    Inverted Earth Revisited.Huiming Ren - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):1093-1107.
    By considering another version of the Inverted Earth thought experiment in which the protagonist is informed that she is implanted with inverting lenses behind her eyes, I argue that the thought experiment doesn’t successfully pose a challenge to representationalism because after many years, the protagonist’s visual experience of the sky of Inverted Earth would simply represent it as blue.
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  2. The Distinction Between Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How.Huiming Ren - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):857-875.
    I first argue why Stanley and Williamson fail to eliminate the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. Then I argue that knowledge-how consists in a special kind of ways of thinking of ways of engaging in actions. So the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how is twofold: the objects of knowledge-that and knowledge-how are different; the ways in which we entertain the object of knowledge are also distinct when we have knowledge-that and knowledge-how. At the end, I consider two recent intellectualist efforts (...)
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  3.  66
    The Knowledge Intuition and the Ability Hypothesis.Huiming Ren - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (2):313-326.
    ABSTRACT: I argue that the Ability Hypothesis cannot really accommodate the knowledge intuition that drives the knowledge argument and therefore fails to defend physicalism. When the thought experiment is run with, instead of Mary, an advanced robot Rosemary, for whom there presumably is no distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that, proponents of the Ability Hypothesis would have to give a far-fetched and counterintuitive explanation of why Rosemary wouldn’t learn anything new upon release. View HTML Send article to KindleTo send this article (...)
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  4.  5
    Reference-Securing Belief and Content Externalism.Huiming Ren - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-13.
    I argue that our physical and social environments play a role in determining the content of most of our thoughts only indirectly—by playing a role in causing, and therefore, determining the content of, our reference-securing beliefs concerning general terms, beliefs that, when true, dictate what a general term will pick out. I also show that the problem of empty natural kind terms can be solved.
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  5.  98
    On 'Defending The Phenomenal Concept Strategy'.Huiming Ren - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):347-351.
    I argue that Diaz-Leon fails to defend the phenomenal concept strategy against Stoljar's criticism because she fails to give us any general reasons for thinking that conditionals that involve psychologically distinct concepts could be a priori.
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  6.  74
    Entitlement to Self‐Knowledge and Brute Error.Huiming Ren - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):543 – 562.
    I discuss Burge's argument that our entitlement to self-knowledge consists in the constitutive relation between the second-order review of thoughts and the thoughts reviewed, and defend it against Peacocke's criticism. I then argue that though our entitlement to self-knowledge is neutral to different environments, as Burge claims, the consideration of Burge's own notion of brute error shows that Burge's effort to reconcile externalism and self-knowledge is not successful.
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  7.  41
    Is the Splash Red?Huiming Ren - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):801-807.
    Ball (2009) claims that without phenomenal concepts, the knowledge argument fails. In this article, I argue that Ball doesn’t succeed in proving his claim. The reason is that the Marianna case is not a case where the acquisition of the concept required for entertaining a phenomenal belief content Q alone is sufficient for Marianna, given enough physical information about her environment, to infer Q.
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