Even though International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is, strictly speaking, a branch of international law serving as the body of laws governing the conduct of armed conflicts, it functions also, and perhaps to a greater extent, as a moral system (either followed or rejected) for the armies involved in armed conflicts. As utilitarians already noticed, the development of legal systems was powerfully influenced by moral opinion, and conversely, moral standards had been profoundly influenced by law, so that the content of (...) many legal rules mirrored moral rules or principles. Law, like morality, is interested in creating a good society: enabling people to live together in a community and inculcating a sense of social responsibility. However, despite these similarities between the systems, law and morality differ in some of their objectives and in the methods they use for achieving their goals and sustaining human behavior. The application of this conclusion to IHL and the analysis of both its historical nascence in the nineteenth century and the philosophical concepts informing it suggests that IHL serves more the purposes of a moral system than those of a legal system. This claim is strengthened by the analysis of two examples of legal rules of IHL: the proportionality principle in causing collateral damage and the instruction that preventive (or targeted) killings should be used as a last resort. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper explores how specific Mahāyāna ethics, namely the interpretation of the Lotus Sūtra by Zhiyi (536–597), Nichiren (1222–1282) and Sōka Gakkai (1930–), can relate to core principles of international humanitarian law (IHL). In particular, it also assesses and discusses how Sōka Gakkai’s three key doctrines (the dignity of life, the variability of life and the interconnectedness of life) are congruent with some IHL principles. The paper then analyses how Buddhist organisations today can be advocates of IHL and (...) specifically looks at how Sōka Gakkai agrees with – and commits to – IHL in terms of the humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to EU military operations outside of the European Union (EU). It describes where the Union has performed best: promoting the development, acceptance, and respect of IHL by others. EU restrictive measures may be taken in its commercial policy, its foreign and security policy, and its development cooperation policy. A field in which the European Union may have a direct impact on violations of IHL is the export of arms. EU (...) member states continue to be involved in armed conflicts, but EU law did not govern their involvement. Therefore, the relationship between IHL and EU law is fortunately not (yet) an issue of daily concern for practitioners and EU institutions. In the instances in which the European Union has been a military actor abroad, IHL arguably did not apply because the Union had not become a party to an armed conflict. (shrink)

The enduring progression of artificial intelligence and cybernetics offers an ever-closer possibility of rational and sentient robots. The ethics and morals deriving from this technological prospect have been considered in the philosophy of artificial intelligence, the design of automatons with roboethics and the contemplation of machine ethics through the concept of artificial moral agents. Across these categories, the robotics laws first proposed by Isaac Asimov in the twentieth century remain well-recognised and esteemed due to their specification of preventing human harm, (...) stipulating obedience to humans and incorporating robotic self-protection. However the overwhelming predominance in the study of this field has focussed on human–robot interactions without fully considering the ethical inevitability of future artificial intelligences communicating together and has not addressed the moral nature of robot–robot interactions. A new robotic law is proposed and termed AIonAI or artificial intelligence-on-artificial intelligence. This law tackles the overlooked area where future artificial intelligences will likely interact amongst themselves, potentially leading to exploitation. As such, they would benefit from adopting a universal law of rights to recognise inherent dignity and the inalienable rights of artificial intelligences. Such a consideration can help prevent exploitation and abuse of rational and sentient beings, but would also importantly reflect on our moral code of ethics and the humanity of our civilisation. (shrink)

The role of physicians in armed conflict -- International humanitarian law -- International criminal law -- Customary status of international humanitarian law -- The relevant human rights norms applicable to the work of physicians in armed conflict -- The interpretation of the reference to medical ethics and generally accepted medical standards pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties -- Medical ethics in international law -- A pluralistic approach to medical ethics -- The documents by the (...) World Medical Association (WMA) -- Conclusion, recommendations and outlook. (shrink)

This article uses an economic narrative to examine the theoretical adequacy of applying humanitarian law to the regulation of the war on international terror. I will argue that problems inherent in collective action hinder the ability of this law to generate an optimal level of global security, and that the absence of the element of reciprocity lowers states’ compliance with it. The paper discusses factors such as audience costs, negative externalities of public conscience, NGOs’ activities, and the promotion of (...) the humanitarian approach toward humanitarian law in international bodies and courts as helping to mitigate these phenomena. A controversy between states concerning the application of humanitarian law to the war on international terror, however, might prevent these factors from offsetting the decline in the status of humanitarian law. Humanitarian law is therefore at risk of lapsing into irrelevance in this war. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce a computational control framework that can keep AI-driven military autonomous devices operating within the boundaries set by applicable rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) related to targeting. We discuss the necessary legal tests and variables, and introduce the structure of a hypothetical IHL-compliant targeting system.

The use of private military force by states has been a long-standing phenomena in the history of warfare. Armies of mercenaries, privateering and recruitment of foreign nationals into armed forces have been common during the Middle Ages and later on. However, with the invention of effective firearms and artillery, standing regular armies, conscription and other developments that resulted in the essential rise of costs of war, the role of private military entrepreneurs diminished. By the end of XIXth century the state (...) became almost the only subject that was able to wage a full-scale war. Nevertheless, already in the middle of the XXth century mercenarism has been reborn in Africa’s colonial and post-colonial wars. The end of the XXth century and the beginning of the XXI century witnesses an enormous rise of private security and military companies (PSMC) that are hired to perform different functions related to use of force not only by states, but also by other clients such as international organisations, transnational corporations, etc. A PSMC may be defined as a profit-seeking private enterprise, which is established according to the national law of the state and which is providing, on the basis of a contract, services directly or indirectly connected with the use of military force or its institutions whether in time of armed conflict or peace, notwithstanding how such company describes itself. International humanitarian law has no specific regulation of PSMC. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to state that the activity of PSMC is not regulated, because international humanitarian law in any case, in one or another way, is applicable to the personnel of PSMC if it is engaged in armed conflict of either international or non-international character. (shrink)

Cyber warfare is becoming a new reality with new battles fought everyday on virtual battlefields. For a century and a half, International Humanitarian Law has been a sentry for victims of wars guaranteeing their legal protection from the calamities of war, trying hard to respond to Clausewitz’s “chameleon of war”. Cyber conflict marks new chameleon’s colour together with the unmanned aerial vehicles, autonomic battle systems and other technologies deployed on battlefields. However, it would be greatly erroneous to claim that (...) the International Humanitarian Law may not apply to the new phenomena just because it is caused by the advanced technology. Even if the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are already sixty years old, the International Humanitarian Law in itself has at minimum customary response mechanism, granting, in a spirit of Marten’s clause, protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience (Protocol I). Notwithstanding, some more complicated fundamental issues also have to be addressed: how the use of cybernetic weapons and means may affect the classic notion of armed conflict? How it can be interpreted in the light of new technologies, i.e. can we still rely on a classic understanding of weapon’s kinetic effect as the main element, or shall we embrace effectsbased “Schmitt’s criteria”. If it so happens, will it make an act without apparent damage to a person/property equal to military hostilities, required by the armed conflict notion and justify the real-life response to it. The effective or overall control tests were used for the attribution of non-state actor’s activity to the state party of an armed conflict but these tests might not meet its purpose in the virtual battlefield of loose networks and open-source communities. If the concept of armed conflict is treated more flexibly, other changes (including issues of attribution) may follow, as well. Perhaps this is the way how the combatant institute will evolve. With classic combatant’s criteria impossible to apply on virtual battlefields, one of the options would be to elaborate concepts of “constant combat function” and “direct participation in hostilities” more precisely, as well as to reconsider state’s affiliation requirements. (shrink)

International human rights law and international humanitarian law (IHL) contain few obligations for rebel groups, yet those groups are nonetheless under pressure to comply with their foundational international norms. This case study of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) analyzes the evolution of its discourse and behavior related to human rights and IHL. It then compares changes in the group’s discourse to evidence of changes in behavior. The study finds that the KLA does significantly change its language, gradually incorporating such (...) language over time, but it also demonstrates that this change is not accompanied by improvements in human rights and IHL adherence in its behavior. The study considers whether greater adoption of these norms is better explained by a constructivist or a rationalist approach and, in particular, looks at the role of legitimacy. In addition, it offers insight into how groups may respond to future pressure to follow these norms. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article examines Buddhist teachings relevant to the regulation of war and compares them with international humanitarian law (IHL) and the just war tradition by which it has been informed. It argues that Buddhist ethics broadly align with IHL rules to minimise harm inflicted during war, and that Buddhism’s psychological resources can help support IHL to improve compliance with common humanitarian norms. Indeed, Buddhist mindfulness techniques can support even non-Buddhist combatants by enhancing their psychological resilience and capacity (...) to fight with skill and restraint. While IHL is a legal regime that legitimises violence under certain conditions, and lays down clear universally ratified rules, Buddhism is primarily an ethical and psychological system that addresses the motivations and inner roots of behaviour and can be understood and interpreted in different ways. In this respect, Buddhism overlaps with the field of military ethics, and can contribute much to enhance military training. However, while the centrality of non-harming (ahiṃsā) to Buddhism dictates that extraordinary efforts should be made to prevent war or otherwise minimise the harm inflicted – thereby checking interpretations of IHL that are overly permissive – Buddhism’s consequent reluctance to legitimise and thereby institutionalise war, and the ambiguity of its teachings in this regard, have generally precluded it from developing clear just war guidelines for belligerents to follow, and Buddhist resources to improve the conduct of hostilities have remained largely untapped. Mainstream traditions of Buddhist ethics must also be distinguished from more esoteric and localised beliefs and practices, and from the lived Buddhisms with which most lay Buddhists are more familiar, which do not necessarily embody the same degree of restraint. Belligerents might therefore have different conceptions or expectations of Buddhism depending on their culture and particular circumstances, or be unclear about what it says on the conduct of war. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The core teaching of Buddhism revolves around understanding and alleviating suffering. Since the purpose of international humanitarian law (IHL) is to minimise suffering during armed conflict, by protecting the innocent and restricting the means and methods of warfare, Buddhists should support IHL. In this paper, I try not to utilise the Buddha’s well-known teachings such as karma, impermanence, non-self, emptiness, compassion and so on, to explain why Buddhists should support IHL. Instead, I present how and why Buddhism underlines (...) the importance of secular ethics, indicating that humanity comes first for Buddhism, which would be the main reason for Buddhists to support IHL. Buddhist monks such as Yinshun and the 14th Dalai Lama view common humanity, conventional morality and inner values as the grounds for Buddhism. An enhancement of humanity and the promotion of morality are also part of the way of Buddhist practice. Viewed from a humanistic perspective, Buddhism may endorse all laws, rules, and regulations that are in the best interest of the public and align with values such as peace, freedom, equality, justice, benevolence, and more, regardless of whether they are applied internationally or domestically. Buddhism upholds IHL for similar reasons. (shrink)

Proportionality, as a concept, does not contain any inherent standards, but rather refers to a proper balance between all relevant factors. It is nevertheless necessary to make analytical distinctions that help identify the premises of its application within different contexts. This is particularly true for an area like international humanitarian law in which a proper focusing of the principle of proportionality is crucial. This article suggests that the distinction between a “thin” and a “thick” approach is a helpful analytical (...) tool depending on the number and the character of factors to be taken into account in the application of the principle of proportionality. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel on the permissibility of “targeted killings” is used to exemplify the drawbacks and advantages of both approaches. (shrink)

On 10 December 2003, a German civil court sitting in Bonn denied the victims of a NATO air raid the right to sue Germany and claim compensation for alleged violations of international humanitarian...

On 10 December 2003, a German civil court sitting in Bonn denied the victims of a NATO air raid the right to sue Germany and claim compensation for alleged violations of international humanitarian...

This work offers an analysis of all the legal and moral issues surrounding humanitarian intervention: the deaths of innocent persons and the Doctrine of Double Effect Governmental legitimacy - The Doctrine of Effective Political Control; UN Charter and evaluation of the Nicaragua ruling; The Morality of not intervening; US-led invasion of Iraq; Humanitarian intervention authorised by the UN Security Council - Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia among others highlight NATO's intervention in Kosovo; The Nicaragua Decision; and The (...) precedents of Panama, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The book's features include: a new framework based on the doctrine of double effect; basic principles of international ethics; outline of the moral argument for humanitarian intervention; explores the morality and legality of military action to end tyranny or anarchy; arguments in a much more detailed and complete fashion than in previous editions; in-depth examination of philosophy of international law; the relationship between custom and moral theory; new discussion of the question of right authority; and a full analysis of recent interventions in Kosovo and Iraq. book addresses a broad interdisciplinary audience of international lawyers, philosophers, and political scientists. In this new edition, the author responds to critics while updating the discussion in the light of the momentous events that took place at the beginning of the new millennium. (shrink)

Humanitarian maps assembled using digital technology are indicative of transformations underway in how the world is made knowable, sensible, and actionable, including for international legal purposes. These transformations are exemplified by the Missing Maps Project (MMP), an initiative of the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team, a U.S.-registered non-profit, and three other non-governmental organisations operating internationally: American Red Cross; British Red Cross; and Médecins Sans Frontières. Projects such as the MMP make it harder for international lawyers to lay claim to, and (...) seek to imaginatively reorient, shared repositories of common sense. Meanwhile, international legal scholars continue to propagate ideas that the world may be reimagined with their help, largely without regard to such transformations. In lieu of imagination’s standard evocation to the end of enhancing critical agency in international legal writing, this article contends that the idiosyncratic notion of imagination advanced in the writings of Walter Benjamin may be better attuned to ongoing shifts in sense-making apparent in international humanitarian mapping. Walter Benjamin’s atypical rendering of imagination as a ‘purely receptive, uncreative’ force in a field of technological reproduction offers international legal scholars another way of thinking about agency and prospects for re-forming their field in the face of its burgeoning digitalisation. (shrink)

This paper examines what prevents us from legally enforcing the moral imperative of protecting human rights during military operations carried out for distinctly humanitarian purposes. The answer, I argue, lies not in familiar objections to bringing the law into greater congruence with morality, but in international law's indeterminacy regarding the use of force. Preserving stability within the nascent international legal system comes at the cost of a law that eschews the protection of individual rights even in cases in which (...) the protection of human rights is what justifies military action. The tension between state sovereignty and the protection of human rights thus not only generates well-known controversies about the lawfulness of military intervention. It also prevents us from devising laws to protect human rights during wars whose very purpose it is to stop human rights violations. Protecting human rights during humanitarian interventions may thus remain an undertaking as quixotic as it is morally urgent. (shrink)

International law has one principal mechanism for settling the legality of humanitarian interventions, the United Nations Security Council's power to authorise coercion. However, this is hardly satisfactory in practice and has failed to provide a more secure juridical basis for determining significant conflicts among states over when humanitarian force is justified. This article argues that, in spite of Immanuel Kant's limited analysis of intervention, and his silence on humanitarian intervention, his political theory provides the elements of a (...) compelling analysis on this topic. Five components of Kant's roadmap towards perpetual peace and an eventual world republic give conditional support for humanitarian intervention even in imperfect juridical conditions. This support is conditional on the achievement of juridical progress within and among states and has implications for the development of cosmopolitan citizenship. From Kant we learn that, ultimately, humanitarian intervention should become a matter of coercive law enforcement rather than an ethical question of ‘saving strangers’. (shrink)

This essay analyzes the doctrine of “humanitarian intervention” in the frame of international law in the second half of nineteenth century and identifies the ground of legitimation of this intervention in the violation of presumed universal laws of humanity. The analysis emphasizes the transformation of the paradigm of “humanitarian intervention” into the current doctrine of the “responsibility to protect,” which under the rubric of “responsibility” legitimizes limitations on a state's sovereignty in cases where the state fails to guarantee (...) the protection of its own population. This reconstruction of the genealogy of “humanitarian intervention” illustrates the continual exceptions to the principle of nonintervention, which means that the Westphalian principle of sovereignty has always been violated. Both doctrines—humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect—can be considered “hegemonic techniques” that use so-called universal concepts in order to legitimize unilateral power interests. (shrink)

The use of private security companies by national governments is met with widespread skepticism. Less understood is the role these companies can play in international humanitarian interventions in the service of international organizations. I argue here that despite valid concerns about the use of such private entities, we should nonetheless see them as legitimate participants in efforts to secure human rights protection around the globe. In order to assess their legitimacy, we need to ensure, among other things, that they (...) can adhere to ethical standards when serving in humanitarian missions, that they can be held accountable when they fail to uphold the standard of justice enshrined in international law, and that their for-profit status does not have implications detrimental to humanitarian concerns. (shrink)

As part of a roundtable on “Balancing Legal Norms, Moral Values, and National Interests,” this essay describes the humanitarian diplomacy of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) by comparing it conceptually with other forms of advocacy and illustrating it with the ICRC's recent experience in the Yemen crisis. Humanitarian diplomacy is examined as one particular way of balancing legal norms, moral values, and national interests in the pursuit of greater respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) (...) and principled humanitarian action in armed conflicts. The essay looks back to ancient history for archetypal forms of humanitarian advocacy in various cultural traditions. It then describes humanitarian diplomacy's practice of discreet diplomacy and confidential dialogue with all parties to a conflict, and compares its relatively “quiet” approach with the “loud” approach of outrage activism focused on “naming and shaming,” which tends to be the norm today. The essay argues that there is an important and complementary place for the ICRC's style of humanitarian diplomacy alongside other forms of advocacy even in the face of criticism that the ICRC is sometimes publicly silent about what it knows of atrocities and avoids naming and shaming. (shrink)

'The genocide in Rwanda showed us how terrible the consequences of inaction can be in the face of mass murder. But the conflict in Kosovo raised equally important questions about the consequences of action without international consensus and clear legal authority. On the one hand, is it legitimate for a regional organization to use force without a UN mandate? On the other, is it permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with grave humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked?'. (...) This book is a comprehensive, integrated discussion of 'the dilemma' of humanitarian intervention. Written by leading analysts of international politics, ethics, and law, it seeks, among other things, to identify strategies that may, if not resolve, at least reduce the current tension between human rights and state sovereignty. This volume is an invaluable contribution to the debate on all aspects of this vital global issue. (shrink)

In international law, ‘humanitarian intervention’ refers to the use of military force by one nation or group of nations to stop genocide or other gross human rights violations in another sovereign nation. If humanitarian intervention is conceived as military in nature, it makes sense that only the most horrible, massive, and violent violations of human rights can justify intervention. Yet, that leaves many serious evils beyond the scope of legal intervention. In particular, violations of women's rights and freedoms (...) often go unchecked. To address this problem, I begin from two basic questions: When are violations of human rights sufficiently serious to require an international response of some sort? What should that response be? By re-orienting the aim and justification of international law to focus on individual autonomy rather than on peace between nations, I argue that women's rights violations other than genocide and mass rape can warrant intervention. Military intervention is often counter-productive to the aim of achieving autonomy, however. I suggest a range of responses to human rights violations that includes military intervention as one end of the spectrum, and combine this with a greater understanding of the scope of human rights violations that require international response. (shrink)

This essay argues that the ethics of humanitarian intervention cannot be readily subsumed by the ethics of just war without due attention to matters of political and moral motivation. In the modern era, a just war draws directly from self-benefitting motives in wars of self-defense, or indirectly in wars that enforce international law or promote the global common good. Humanitarian interventions, in contrast, are intuitively admirable insofar as they are other-regarding. That difference poses a challenge to the casuistry (...) of humanitarian intervention because it makes it difficult to reason by analogy from the case of war to the case of humanitarian intervention. The author develops this point in dialogue with Michael Walzer, the U.S. Catholic bishops, and President Clinton. He concludes by showing how a casuistry of intervention is possible, developing a motivational rationale that draws on the Golden Rule. (shrink)

Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. All are examples where humanitarian intervention has been called into action. This timely and important new volume explores the legal and moral issues which emerge when a state uses military force in order to protect innocent people from violence perpetrated or permitted by the government of that state. Humanitarian intervention can be seen as a moral duty to protect but it is also subject to misuse as a front for imperialism without regard to (...) international law. In Humanitarian Intervention, the contributors explore the many questions surrounding the issue. Is humanitarian intervention permitted by international law? If not, is it nevertheless morally permissible or morally required? Realistically, might not the main consequence of the humanitarian intervention principle be that powerful states will coerce weak ones for purposes of their own? The current debate is updated by two innovations in particular, the first being the shift of emphasis from the permissibility of intervening to the responsibility to intervene, and the second an emerging conviction that the response to humanitarian crises needs to be collective, coordinated, and preemptive. The authors shed light on the timely debate of when and how to intervene and when, if ever, not to. Contributors: Carla Bagnoli, Joseph Boyle, Anthony Coates, Thomas Franck, Brian D. Lepard, Catherine Lu, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Terry Nardin, Thomas Pogge, Melissa S. Williams, and Kok-Chor Tan. (shrink)

Medical professionals providing humanitarian aid in times of crisis face complicated ethical and clinical challenges. Today, humanitarian aid is given in accordance with existing guidelines developed by international humanitarian organizations and defined by international law. This paper considers the ethical aspects and frameworks of an atypical humanitarian project, namely one that provides medical support through an Israeli civilian hospital to Syrian Civil War casualties. We explore new ethical questions in this unique situation that pose a serious (...) challenge for the medical community and conventional ethical norms, a challenge Israeli medical staff meet on a daily basis. Before discussing the ethical challenges, we give a description of the project and its unique status. (shrink)

International law makes it explicit that states shall not intervene militarily or otherwise in the affairs of other states; it is a central principle of the charter of the United Nations. But international law also provides an exception; when a conflict within a state poses a threat to international peace, military intervention by the UN may be warranted. (Indeed, the UN Charter provides for an international police force, though nothing has ever come of this provision). The Charter and other UN (...) documents also assert that human rights are to be protected — but in the past the responsibility for the protection of human rights has for the most part been allowed to rest on the government of the state where the violation of rights occurs. Not surprisingly in this context, the question of what protection (if any) should be provided by the UN or otherwise to individuals when their human rights are violated by their governments or with the complicity of their governments remains a contentious issue. Should the principle of respect for state sovereignty trump the principle of respect for human rights? Historically it has been allowed to do so, but recently it has been more and more widely argued that when states fail to respect the human rights of their citizens (or of others who reside within their boundaries), they may be held accountable for their actions. Is military humanitarian intervention justifiable? And if so, under what circumstances? Those are the questions addressed in this collection of essays. The focus of the volume is on the abstract principles involved; though reference is sometimes made to specific cases, the essays here consist primarily of philosophical reflection on the abstract issues. (A companion volume on the specific issues surrounding a particular case, Lessons of Kosovo, is being published simultaneously.). (shrink)

International law makes it explicit that states shall not intervene militarily or otherwise in the affairs of other states; it is a central principle of the charter of the United Nations. But international law also provides an exception; when a conflict within a state poses a threat to international peace, military intervention by the UN may be warranted.. The Charter and other UN documents also assert that human rights are to be protected — but in the past the responsibility for (...) the protection of human rights has for the most part been allowed to rest on the government of the state where the violation of rights occurs. Not surprisingly in this context, the question of what protection should be provided by the UN or otherwise to individuals when their human rights are violated by their governments or with the complicity of their governments remains a contentious issue. Should the principle of respect for state sovereignty trump the principle of respect for human rights? Historically it has been allowed to do so, but recently it has been more and more widely argued that when states fail to respect the human rights of their citizens, they may be held accountable for their actions. Is military humanitarian intervention justifiable? And if so, under what circumstances? Those are the questions addressed in this collection of essays. The focus of the volume is on the abstract principles involved; though reference is sometimes made to specific cases, the essays here consist primarily of philosophical reflection on the abstract issues. (shrink)

My title is deliberately provocative. What could be less humanitarian than the Melian Dialogue? For most readers of Thucydides it is the paradigm of imperial brutality, ranking with the braggadocio of Sennacherib's Rabshakeh in its insistence upon the coercive force of temporal power. The Melians are assured that the rule of law is not applicable to them. As the weaker party they can only accept the demands of the stronger and be content that they are not more extreme. Appeals (...) to moral or religious norms are quite irrelevant, for in their position the Melians simply cannot afford them—as little as Mr. Doolittle could afford middle-class morality. The message is a hard one, and it has elicited outrage over the centuries from the majority of scholars who tend to prefer the καλὰ ὀνόματα of propaganda to the harsh underlying realities of imperial expansion. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, writing shortly after a war to protect western values had resulted in a new world order, finds it inconceivable that Athenian generals could discount divinely-inspired hope and insist on the imperative of force or that the Melians, that tiny state, would prefer the nobler to the safer course. In this he is echoed by George Grote, writing in the expansionist days of the early nineteenth century: ‘a civilized conqueror is bound by received international morality to furnish some justification—a good plea, if he can—a false plea or a sham plea if he has not better’. Instead, says Grote, the Athenian envoy ‘disdains the conventional arts of civilized diplomacy’; and the inevitable conclusion for him, as it had been for Dionysius, is that the Dialogue is fundamentally bogus, a composition of Thucydides ‘to bring out the sentiments of a disdainful and confident conqueror in dramatic antithesis’. (shrink)

The trend toward the “humanization” of international law reflects a greater emphasis on individuals rather than simply states as objects of concern. The advance of human rights law (HRL) has been an important impetus for this trend. Some observers suggest that humanization can be furthered even more by applying HRL rather than international humanitarian law (IHL) to hostilities between states and nonstate armed groups, unless a state explicitly declares that it is engaged in an armed conflict. This essay argues, (...) however, that a court should not defer to a state's characterization of hostilities, but should base its analysis on whether hostilities meet the criteria for an armed conflict. Applying HRL to hostilities that effectively are an armed conflict but not acknowledged as such risks diluting the legitimacy and normative force of HRL. On the one hand, if a court applies conventional stringent HRL standards, this body of law may be seen as unrealistic and is likely to be ignored. On the other hand, a court that adapts HRL standards to armed conflict may need to take a consequentialist approach at odds with HRL's deontological foundations. Clearly differentiating between HRL and IHL may thus best promote the humanization of warfare. (shrink)

abstract Apparently, there are some important tensions that must be confronted in grappling with the issue of the permissibility of humanitarian intervention. Notably, there is the tension between respecting sovereignty and responding to the plight of the needy, that is, there is tension between respecting governments’ authority and desire for non‐interference, and respecting the individuals who suffer under their leadership. I argue that these and other tensions should be resolved in favour of protecting the individuals who suffer in (...) class='Hi'>humanitarian crises, though the way to do this defensibly requires that we put in place many safeguards against abuse. My main theoretical argument emerges from a model of global justice that I develop. I then examine recent reports on intervention and state sovereignty compiled by an inter‐national commission in order to show that consensus is building about the permissibility of military intervention to protect fundamental human rights for vulnerable populations in certain cases. Some important public policy proposals are evolving in the direction of protecting individuals over states, but there are still some important gaps that remain between what is theoretically desirable and proposals about international law. I show where some of those gaps are and how we can close them. (shrink)

The question of military intervention for humanitarian purposes is a major focus for international law, the United Nations, regional organizations such as NATO, and the foreign policies of nations. Against this background, the 2011 bombing in Libya by Western nations has occasioned renewed interest and concern about armed humanitarian intervention and the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. This volume brings together new essays by leading international, philosophical, and political thinkers on the moral and legal issues involved in AHI, (...) and contains both critical and positive views of AHI. Topics include the problem of abuse and needed limitations, the future viability of RtoP and some of its problematic implications, the possibility of AHI providing space for peaceful political protest, and how AHI might be integrated with post-war justice. It is an important collection for those studying political philosophy, international relations, and humanitarian law. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) offers numerous opportunities to improve military Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance operations. And, modern militaries recognize the strategic value of reducing civilian harm. Grounded in these two assertions we focus on the transformative potential that AI ISR systems have for improving the respect for and protection of humanitarian relief operations. Specifically, we propose that establishing an interface for humanitarian organizations to military AI ISR systems can improve the current state of ad-hoc humanitarian notification systems, which (...) are notoriously unreliable and ineffective for both parties to conflict and humanitarian organizations. We argue that such an interface can improve military awareness and understanding while also ensuring that states better satisfy their international humanitarian law obligations to respect and protect humanitarian relief personnel. (shrink)

The primary purpose of government is to secure public goods that cannot be achieved by free markets. The Coordination Principle tells us to consolidate sovereign power in a single institution to overcome collective action problems that otherwise prevent secure provision of the relevant public goods. There are several public goods that require such coordination at the global level, chief among them being basic human rights. The claim that human rights require global coordination is supported in three main steps. First, I (...) consider Pogge's and Habermas's analyses as alternatives to Hobbesian conceptions of justice. Second, I consider the core conventions of international law, which are in tension with the primacy of state sovereignty in the UN system. Third, I argue that the just war tradition does not limit just causes for war to self-defense; it supports saving innocent third parties from crimes against humanity as a just reason for war. While classical authors focused less on this issue, the point is especially clear in twentieth-century just war theories, such as those offered by the American Catholic bishops, Jean Elshtain, Brian Orend, and Michael Walzer. Against Walzer, I argue that we add intractable military tyranny to the list of horrors meriting intervention if other ad bellum conditions are met. But these results require us to reexamine the "just authority" of first resort to govern such interventions. The Coordination Principle implies that we should create a transnational federation with consolidated powers in place of a treaty organization requiring near-unanimity. But to be legitimate, such a global institution must also be directly answerable to the citizens of its member states. While the UN Security Council is inadequate on both counts, a federation of democracies with a directly elected executive and legislature could meet both conditions. (shrink)