Critical attention directed to John Rawls ’s ideal theory has in particular leveled three charges against it: first, its infeasibility; second, its inadequacy for providing normative guidance on actual injustices; and third, its insensitivity to the justice concerns of marginalized groups. Recently, advocates for Rawls ’s ideal theory have replied that problems arising at the stage of ideal theory can be addressed at the later stage of his nonideal theory. This article disputes that claim by arguing that although Rawls ’s (...) nonideal theory provides a good answer to the infeasibility charge, it does not do so for the second and third charges. To argue for this thesis, I illustrate that nonideal theory in Rawls ’s Law of Peoples is unable to identify crucial injustices that emerge in the nonideal conditions of real world globalization. (shrink)

Within the social ontology of the nationalist model, the main agents of global justice claims are viewed as nation states or national collectivities. By contrast, within the cosmopolitan model, individuals, as citizens of the cosmopolitan world, are viewed as agents of global justice claims. I argue that neither of these models appropriately reflect the ontological conditions and circumstances of justice that have been produced by the current processes of globalization nor capture the justice claims of women who suffer as a (...) result of the global economy. As an alternative, I propose a transnational feminist model: processes of globalization have generated transnationalized socioeconomic units as ontological conditions of justice, and, in such conditions, transnational women’s collectivities are viewed as agents of global justice. -/- . (shrink)

Agent-centered morality has been a serious challenge to ethical theories based on agent-neutral morality in defining what is the moral point of view. In this paper, my concern is to examine whether arguments for agent-centered morality, in particular, arguments for agent-centered option, can be justified. -/- After critically examining three main arguments for agent-centered morality, I will contend that although there is a ring of truth in the demands of agent-centered morality, agent-centered morality is more problematic than agent-neutral morality. Nevertheless, (...) we need to take seriously the challenges to agent-neutral morality by finding a way to reflect the insight of agent-centered morality within the framework of agent-neutral morality without collapsing it into agent-centered morality. As a way of doing so, I suggest that we need to integrate the situated, rather than transcendental, nonideal, rather than idealized, and dialogical, rather than monological, perspectives developed in feminist ethics, into agent-neutral morality. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide a critique of Rawls’ non-ideal theory by arguing that in as much as background assumptions about what non-ideal conditions mean are derived from his idealized theory, not from existing actual conditions, his non-ideal theory is also idealized and flawed, similarly to his ideal theory. Thus, first, I argue that idealized assumptions which are used in the justification of justice principles are not neutral to members in non-ideal conditions; and second, such accounts systematically exclude some sort (...) of actual injustice claims, in particular, justice claims from neo-liberal globalization. (shrink)