Abstract This article aims to identify the perceptions of teachers about moral education in Trinidad and Tobago. Part I presents teachers? perceptions which emerged from responses to the following questions: 1. Who should be responsible for moral education? 2. How should moral education be done? 3. Does moral education involve reasoning and/or behaviour? 4. Should moral education be a separate course or part of existing courses? 5. What resources and services are needed in order to carry out moral education? Part (...) II presents a selection of responses in the form of quotations to Question 6: What one main, crucial question or comment is uppermost in your thinking about moral education? The responses have been analysed and critiqued. It is envisaged that research and development in moral education curricula will be informed by these perceptions, and that the introduction of effective programmes in moral education could influence the quality of life both in the school as a society and in the larger community outside. (shrink)
Stephen Tracy's neat demonstration that IG I3 35—authorizing the building of a temple and appointment of a priestess for Athena Nike—was cut by the man responsible for the Promachos accounts at first seemed decisive for the traditional c. 448 B.C. against my radical down-dating. Ira Mark then argued that this decree provided for the naiskos and altar of his Stage III in the 440s: the marble temple belonged to Stage IV over twenty years later. Despite these two powerful interventions the (...) matter is not closed. David Gill has, I fancy, convincingly refuted Mark on archaeological and architectural grounds. And there is still more to be said from the epigraphic angle. IG I 36, cut on the back of the stele, looks like a delayed rider to 35. But just how delayed was it? It arranged for the regular payment of the priestess's salary by the kolakretai in office in the month Thargelion. On the traditional view the gap would be close to a quarter of a century, since 36 is firmly dated 424/3 B.C. This is quite extraordinary, though reasons have been found for it. More serious perhaps is some neglected epigraphic evidence. We have eighteen other examples in fifth-century Attic epigraphy where decrees are followed on the same stone by other texts; but virtually all the gaps are short, never more than a few years. The relevant texts are IG I 4, 11/12, 41, 42/43, 52 A–B, 59, 61, 66, 68, 71, 72, 73, 89, 93, 101, 127/II1, 156, 1454. It is true that 42/43 are dated c. 445–442 and c. 435–427 B.C. in IG I, but this is quite arbitrary. (shrink)
Reseña de NIETZSCHE, Friedrich: Obras completas . Volumen I. Escritos de juventud . Edición a cargo de Diego Sánchez Meca. Traducciones de Joan B. Llinares Chover, Diego Sánchez Meca y Luis E. de Santiago Guervós. Madrid: Tecnos, 2011.
At the outset of the article I set forth a general characterization of Robert B. Brandom’s philosophy, as belonging to the post-empiricist tradition with inferential-ism as its main idea. In section 2 I discuss four dichotomies important to the method-ology which allows Brandom to construct his philosophical system. My point is to indicate the arbitrariness of the absolutist account of these dichotomies, which gives rise to misuse of relative categories. In effect, Brandom’s dichotomic way of theo-retical exposition does not respect (...) Davidson’s principle of relationism, which Bran-dom himself declares to accept. In the next section, I go on to consider two basic mo-tives for the resolute Brandomian attack on empiricism: strong inferentialist and an-tirepresentationalist theses. Pertaining to this view is also the claim of irreducible linguistic normativity. In section 4, these questions are treated in the context of the ap-parently novel theory of semantic pragmatism. Section 5 is crucial to my purposes. There I criticize the excessively narrow Brandomian conception of empiricism in the theory of meaning. I argue that Brandom’s attack on empiricism depends on a false analysis of the distinction between circumstances and consequences of application holding for sentences. In addition, the problem of conceptual content’s fine grainess is treated, as well as the Kantian dichotomy of reasons versus causes, interpreted by Brandom in terms of the social/natural distinction. Finally, section 6 deals with the relation holding between the concept of reason on the one hand, and the objectivism and representationalism theses, on the other. Despite appearances, in Brandom’s philosophical system there is no place for objective standards of procedural reason. (shrink)