In this paper, we propose a conceptual framework for constructing a diffusion index of changes in overall perceptions with respect to corruption. The corruption diffusion index we construct lies between 0 (the greatest overall deterioration in corruption perceptions) and 100 (the greatest overall improvement in corruption perceptions) with 50 (no change in corruption perceptions) as the critical reference. The proposed methodology is applied to the 2010/2011 global corruption barometer survey data. Possible refinements of the proposed methodology to capture the potentially (...) multi-dimensional nature of corruption and the practical challenges associated with the empirical implementation are discussed. (shrink)

I explain what haecceities are and the role they play in our thought and talk about specific individual things, whether those things are concrete or abstract. Everything that can be referred to by using a singular term has a haecceity. I distinguish between singular terms and general terms, on the one hand, and subject terms and predicate terms, on the other. I distinguish three types of sentence: singular predications; general predications; and singular quantifications. I show how singular predications can be (...) eliminated without loss of content, provided we have singular quantifications as well as general predications. This should not be confused with Quine’s “elimination of singular terms.” I say a few words about propositions. (shrink)

This paper will be concerned with the conjunctive interpretation of a family of disjunctive constructions. The relevant conjunctive interpretation, sometimes referred to as a “free choice effect,” (FC) is attested when a disjunctive sentence is embedded under an existential modal operator. I will provide evidence that the relevant generalization extends (with some caveats) to all constructions in which a disjunctive sentence appears under the scope of an existential quantifier, as well as to seemingly unrelated constructions in which conjunction appears under (...) the scope of negation and a universal quantifier. (shrink)

In this article, I first show the role played by passivity and laziness in Hegel’s philosophy of right. This allows us to better understand Jean-Luc Nancy’s first philosophy which is concerned with the singular plural being, and which was first elaborated in relation with Hegel’s conception of passivity. Finally, since laziness and activity are always intrinsically linked, I end this article with a criticism of what Nancy proposes as an action by analyzing one of his most recent works entitled Que (...) faire? (shrink)

In this paper I propose a method to solve controversies in scenarios of legal pluralism. Shortly, in scenarios of legal pluralism some of the controversies involve members of culturally differentiated groups who justify their allegations with arguments that only make sense in the culture to which they belong. If the adjudicator does not share the same cultural worldview as the parts under litigation, how can he/she come to make a decision determining the parties’ rights and obligations? My answer for this (...) question includes (1) an account of knowledge to culturally differentiated groups, and (2) a method for the evaluation of the culturally-dependent arguments. (shrink)

Judith Butler’s 2021 essay “Bodies That Still Matter” offers a compressed rehearsal of themes and moves that are developed in more detail in their 2020 book, The Force of Nonviolence: An Ethico-Political Bind. In both projects, Butler spotlights the term feminicidio as an instructive indicator of brutality and violence against feminized individuals, including trans women. Feminicidio exemplifies the violence of “unequal grievability” that Butler’s recent work seeks to overcome; therefore, in particular relation to their recent work on nonviolence, Butler insists (...) that the horror of feminicidio should be closely linked to analysis that mobilizes against the full social force of the crimes. Following the work of Montserrat Sagot, Butler calls for analysis that links the brutality of the killings with a structure of social domination and terror. Additionally, Butler introduces questions for further exploration about representation, social organization, and the relation of sexual terror to domination, extermination, or a general theory of sexuality and violence. In this article, I make a start on the set of questions that come along with the term feminicidio in the work of some of its key theorists such as Diana Russell, Marcela Lagarde, Monserrat Sagot, and Alicia Schmidt Camacho. Here, in support of Butler’s claim that feminicidio should be analyzed in ways that mobilize comprehensive resistance, this article (1) defends Lagarde’s definition of feminicidio as an institutionalized crime, especially against Russell’s objection; (2) develops Sagot’s analysis of femicide in relation to Achille Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics, (3) considers Schmidt Camacho’s critique of the term in the context of maquiladora labor in Mexico, and (4) excavates the salience of Foucault’s concept of biopower as an important model for Butler’s analysis. Finally, this article (5) argues that Butler’s work challenges nonviolence researchers to expand their interest and understanding of grieving as a form of resistance. (shrink)

Neil Levy defends no-platforming people who espouse dangerous or unacceptable views. I reject his notion of higher-order evidence as authoritarian and dogmatic. I argue that no-platforming frustrates the growth of knowledge.

In this nationwide study of American and Canadian journalists, I found that their moral and ethical values are solidly connected to the Judeo-Christian tradition, even among those who do not claim to be religiously oriented. This study shows that religious values are imbedded deeply, if not always consciously, in the moral and ethical values of journalists and that journalists of varying religious orientations tend to endorse a core group of moral and ethical principles at the heart of the religious heritage (...) of the United States and Canada. However, journalists have expanded their definition of what religion coverage means in an increasingly diverse and secular society, and few want to connect their professional values only with Christian teaching. (shrink)

I point out some logical errors and infelicities in Hájek’s discussion of philosophical heuristics.

According to the epistemic account of request normativity, a request gives us reasons by revealing normatively relevant information. The information is normative, not the request itself. I raise a new objection to the epistemic account based on situations where we might try to avoid someone requesting something of us. The best explanation of these situations seems to be that we do not want to acquire a new reason to do something. For example, if you know I am going to ask (...) you to read a draft of my paper, you might avoid running into me so as to avoid acquiring a reason to read a draft of my paper. I then argue that the epistemic account can successfully reply to this objection and that in fact the epistemic account does a better job of accounting for cases like this than competing views of the normativity of requests. (shrink)

The article inquires about the role of language in Cristina Peri Rossi’s Panic Signs [Indicios pánicos]. The hypothesis of the work is that language, as a mimetic instrument of representation and creation, established itself as a way to upgrade the relations of power during the Uruguayan pre-dictatorship. Being a qualitative research based on a hermeneutical approach, the article has the following aims: i) reconstruct the background to the dictatorship leaded by Juan Maria Bordaberry, ii) frame the work within the tradition (...) of dictator novel following Lukács’ socio-critical approach and Pierre Bourdieu’s field theory, iii) explain how language works as an instrument of representation and power, iv) analyze Peri Rossi’s work in the light of the aforementioned framework. It concludes, first, that the work responds to a mimetic language of representation, which involves taking a stance that is based on the notions of hegemony or counter-hegemony; and, second, that provided the scarce studies concerning the circumstantial situations of the work, the article might be regarded as a significant contribution to literary criticism. (shrink)

Le rôle des mathématiques dans la formation des officiers de l’armée néerlandaise, a profondément changé pendant le premier xixe siècle avec la fondation de l’Académie militaire en 1828. Les mathématiques étaient au centre de la formation. L’Académie était un des lieux les plus importants de diffusion des connaissances mathématiques aux Pays-Bas pendant la première moitié du xixe siècle, mais elle a perdu ce rôle pendant les années 1860-1870. Dans cet article, je me propose d’examiner à la fois les programmes de (...) l’Académie et le rôle central des enseignants de mathématiques de l’Académie dans la Société Mathématique néerlandaise et dans l’Académie royale des Sciences. Par ailleurs, l’évolution des mathématiques, visible dans ces deux institutions dans les années 1850, n’a pas entraîné une adaptation des programmes au sein de l’Académie. Ainsi, à partir de 1870, l’Académie a presque complètement disparu de la vie mathématique des Pays-Bas. The role of mathematics in the education of Dutch army officers changed dramatically in the early 19th century. This shift became visible with the founding of the Dutch Royal Military Academy in 1828, which shows the role of mathematics in military education shifting toward a purely pedagogical function. This change in approach, which primarily occurred in 1860’s, affected the standing and perception of an academy once highly respected in the field of mathematics. In the present work, I examine both the curricula at the Academy and the crucial role of the Academy’s mathematics instructors in the Dutch Mathematical Society and the Royal Academy of Sciences. Importantly, these two institutions managed to successfully adapt to the changing character of mathematical sciences that occurred around 185 Mathematicians at the Royal Military Academy, however, appeared to cling to an outdated view of mathematics. Failing to update their approach ultimately caused the Academy to lose its once prominent place in the Dutch mathematical community. (shrink)

Drawing on attribution theory and expectancy violation theory, this study investigates the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on stock market reactions in the context of intentional crises, during which stakeholders are likely to attribute crisis responsibility to the focal firm. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2012 to 2022, we find that in the context of an intentional crisis, the stock market reacts more negatively to firms with higher prior CSR performance. Two contingency factors (i.e., media attention (...) and state ownership) strengthen this negative relationship. This study contributes to the CSR literature by broadening knowledge of the insurance-like effects of CSR and by identifying a “boomerang effect” of CSR in the context of intentional crises. (shrink)

Karl Popper champions an open society in which all institutions, principles and values are open to criticism. Anthony O’Hear contends that Popper’s vision is utopian because an open society can survive only if some non-liberal values are assumed, including the prohibition of criticism of fundamental liberal principles and values. I correct O’Hear’s interpretation of Popper and I rebut most of his criticisms, arguing that an open society is stronger if it permits criticism of all views. However, I accept and strengthen (...) O’Hear’s rejection of Popper’s assimilation of an open society to a scientific community. I also suggest that the survival of open societies may require limits on immigration from societies permeated by Islamic fundamentalism or similar ideologies. (shrink)

In ‘The Open Society and its Enemies,’ Karl Popper contrasts closed and open societies. He evaluates irrationalism and the different kinds of rationalism and he argues that critical rationalism is superior. Living in an open society bestows great benefits but involves a strain that may in some people engender a longing to return to a closed society of tribal submission and an attraction for irrationalism. Attempts to recreate a closed society lead to totalitarianism. In the light of Popper’s arguments I (...) criticise contemporary identity politics and I show that identity politics is irrationalist and tends to totalitarianism. (shrink)

I explain how Karl Popper resolved the problem of induction but not the pragmatic problem of induction. I show that Popper’s solution to the pragmatic problem of induction is inconsistent with his solution to the problem of induction. I explain how Popper’s falsificationist epistemology can solve the pragmatic problem of induction in the same negative way that it solves the problem of induction.

Edmund Gettier’s three-page article is generally regarded as a classic of epistemology. I argue that Gettier cases depend upon three false assumptions and are irrelevant to the theory of knowledge. I suggest that we follow Karl Popper in abandoning subject-centred epistemologies in favour of theories of objective knowledge.

David Miller claims that every valid deductive argument begs the question. Other philosophers and logicians have made similar claims. I show that the claim is false. Its appeal depends on the existence of logical terminology, particularly concerning what a proposition 'contains' or its 'logical content,' that is best understood as metaphoric and that, given its aptness to mislead, would be better eschewed. I show how the terminology appears to derive from early modern theories of the nature of mind, ideas and (...) reasoning that have since been rejected. (shrink)

Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept of purpose is not theoretical. He argues that the concept is known directly to be instantiated, through self-awareness; and that to maintain that the concept is theoretical involves an infinite regress. I show that Schueler’s argument fails because all our concepts are theoretical in the sense that we may be mistaken in applying them to our experience. As a consequence, it is conceivable that (...) direct introspection of an event as a purposive action may be mistaken. I indicate ways in which the eliminativist may be able to explain why our perception and introspection is afflicted with systematic error. (shrink)

In ‘Aeon’ magazine (2 August 2017), Professor Paul Russell claims that tolerance demands that criticism of ideologies be permitted; but it also demands that criticism of natural identities be suppressed. He says that the Left’s failure to distinguish ideological from non-ideological identities has led identity politics into intolerance. I argue that Russell’s position is self-contradictory, implying that his (ideological) liberal identity both should and should not be open to criticism. Tolerance must be extended to criticism of non-ideological identities. Laws against (...) ‘hate speech’ are incompatible with tolerance. (shrink)

Cranston argued that scarcity makes universal welfare rights impossible. After showing that this argument cannot be avoided by denying scarcity, I consider four challenges to the argument which accept the possibility of conflicts between the duties implied by rights. The first denies the agglomeration principle; the second embraces conflicts of duties; the third affirms the violability of all rights-based duties; and the fourth denies that duties to compensate are overriding. I argue that all four challenges to the scarcity argument are (...) unsuccessful. I then discuss Eddy’s recent challenge, which makes welfare rights context dependent, but I argue that this also fails because it makes rights unknowable. I conclude that the scarcity argument, restated in the light of the discussion, shows that universal welfare rights, as ordinarily understood, are impossible and I explain the philosophical and practical significance of this conclusion. (shrink)

Judith Jarvis Thomson and others contend that rights are pro-tanto rather than absolute, that is, that rights may permissibly be infringed in some circumstances. Alan Gewirth maintains that there are some rights that are absolute because infringing them would amount to unspeakable evil. However, there seem to be possible circumstances in which it would be permissible to infringe even those rights. Specificationists, such as Gerald Gaus, Russ Shafer-Landau, Hillel Steiner and Kit Wellman, argue that all rights are absolute because they (...) have implicit exceptions, the exceptions being either right-voiding or right-compatible. Specificationists have charged pro-tantoism with preventing rights from being action-guiding, and pro-tantoists have levelled the same charge against specificationism. I show that both charges are mistaken. Pro-tantoists claim that specificationists cannot account for the moral remainder that we recognise in some circumstances and which can be explained by reference to a permissible right-infringement. Specificationists retort that the moral remainder can be explained by invoking compensation-rights. I show that the pro-tantoist claim is true and that the specificationist retort is false on two counts: explanation in terms of compensation-rights is not applicable to all cases; and it fails to account for the moral dynamic in the cases to which it is applicable. The contention that rights are pro-tanto does not conflict with the substance of the contention that rights are trumps, despite claims of specificationists to the contrary. (shrink)

This article explores three distinct approaches to politics identified by Deleuze and Guattari. I argue that they consistently privilege a 'problematic' approach entailing individuals and associations establishing norms on the basis of the potential they possess within a concrete situation, and that this implies resistance to both the 'theorematic' politics they associate with statist philosophy and struggles aiming to alter the 'axiomatic' determination induced by global forces of capital. While this resistance necessarily proceeds in relation to established notions of identity (...) and value, it must also do more than aim for the establishment of particular institutional 'constants,' including particular democratic procedures and human rights. (shrink)

Social science employs teleological explanations which depend upon the rationality principle, according to which people exhibit instrumental rationality. Popper points out that people also exhibit critical rationality, the tendency to stand back from, and to question or criticise, their views. I explain how our critical rationality impugns the explanatory value of the rationality principle and thereby threatens the very possibility of social science. I discuss the relationship between instrumental and critical rationality and show how we can reconcile our critical rationality (...) with the possibility of social science if we invoke Popper’s conception of limited rationality and his indeterminism. (shrink)

I present a diversity of theories of freedom which I compare and contrast. I begin with a brief summary of my own recently published theory, which I show to be superior to the other theories considered. I find that there are various weaknesses or errors in the other theories and that my own theory is the only one that gives an adequate explanation of why freedom, or a free society, is desirable.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Religion and Ecology ed. by John HartDannis M. MattesonThe Wiley Blackwell Companion to Religion and Ecology Edited by John Hart OXFORD: JOHN WILEY & SONS LTD, 2017. 560 pp. $195.00If ecology is the study of "relationships in a place," as John Hart reminds readers in the preface of the Wiley Blackwell Companion to Religion and Ecology, it is fitting that this volume centers (...) its thrust relationally (xxiv). Throughout its pages, a diverse community of authors explores the relationships among religious and spiritual traditions, human life, and care for the Earth. Defining religion as a language with which to grapple with meanings assigned to cultural values (xxi), this volume turns to the meanings that humans have historically placed on their relationship to the Earth within spiritual and religious frameworks. It further ponders how our religions and spiritual traditions reflect a relationship to the Earth that is conscious of the status of our planet's health today. Offering insights from Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, Eastern and Western Christianity, and indigenous perspectives, the authors reflect on new and old insights from within their tradition that speak to specific ecological issues. The volume is split into four parts, flowing thematically from conceptual and descriptive, to concrete visions for practical steps toward healing the Earth. [End Page 199]Part 1 describes the various ways religious and spiritual traditions enhance ecological consciousness. Seyyed Hossein Nasr shows how the Qur'an depicts the created order as a reflection of God's face, suggesting that we are literally defacing the face of God in our industrial recklessness. David Mevorach Seidenberg presents a Jewish eco-theology, which decenters the human as the pinnacle of creation. In part 2, the authors further draw out the socioecological implications of religious teachings. Melanie Harris argues that religious communities must open their eyes to the link between structural violence against black women to structural violence against the Earth. She maintains that this analysis is key to finding solutions for ecological reparations. When Harris argues that social justice is Earth justice, she is claiming that the dismantling of both white supremacy and colonial ecology go hand in hand.Part 3, titled "Ecological Commitment," highlights the specific contexts in which the relationship between religion and ecology are embedded. Myrna Perez Sheldon and Naomi Oreskes trace the entanglement of evangelical identity with the politics of scientific doubt. In response, they suggest a new framework for evangelical participation in environmental restoration that moves beyond a political identity that is chained to right-wing doubt about climate change. In asking how "Korean Christianity can become more Nature-conscious, Nature-related, and Nature-integrated," Yong Bum Park points to Chondogyo, a Korean indigenous religion (333). This tradition is shown to take seriously the ecological crisis as a "crisis of consciousness and conduct," encouraging religious people to foster a socioecological vision of restoration (333).Part 4, which provides examples of concrete visions and projects on the ground, ends with John Hart's reimagining of the Earth as a "common commons." The notion that the Earth is a sacred "common commons" of "interdependent, integral, evolving relational community" requires conversion in light of how religious people relate to the Earth today (437). According to this commons ethic, land should be "commonized and communalized" rather than rendered private property (476).I highly recommend this volume for teaching undergraduate and graduate courses that are exploring the intersection of religion and ecology, especially courses focusing on religious ethics. Though the breadth of this work might strike the reader as boundless, herein lies its strength, especially for teachers of Christian ethics. This resource broadens the conversation recently highlighted by Pope Francis in Laudato Si' beyond the Christian perspective on ecology. The Companion models interreligious dialogue, opening to the diverse ways many different religious and spiritual traditions demand action for environmental restoration. [End Page 200]Dannis M. MattesonLoyola University ChicagoCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance. I argue that collective acceptance can create new status functions with deontic powers only if other status functions with deontic powers already exist, so that collective acceptance can create new institutions only if other institutions are presupposed. So, the claim that institutions depend upon collective acceptance involves a vicious infinite regress. I provide an example to show how an (...) institution of slavery could be created by individual acceptances plus mutual belief about those acceptances. I consider whether an institution could be created by individual acceptances without mutual belief about those acceptances; but my conclusion is largely negative. I contend that the emergence of a new institution presupposes an existing institutional context and I explain how infinite regress can be avoided. (shrink)

This paper identifies and analyses a novel species of hermeneutical epistemic injustice (HI). Fricker’s traditional account analyses HI in terms of a collective conceptual gap. (Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). Building on this, Simion’s analysis (in: Bondy P, Carter JA (eds) Well-founded belief: new essays on the epistemic basing relation. Routledge, New York, 2019) suggests the phenomenon is broader, and thus more ubiquitous: specifically, that agents who have been hermeneutically marginalised can be (...) susceptible to HI through failing to ground their social experience in conceptual resources that are already available. This paper advances the literature further and presents a novel strand of the phenomena, where agents both have, and base, their experience on available concepts but are still subject to HI. I argue that this is an important species of HI that should be investigated and accounted for, and I suggest that in virtue of being hermeneutically marginalised, often agents only have available to them defective or oppressive concepts. I further provide a case study of what this can look like online and new concerns social media presents for this kind of HI. CW: Mentions of transphobia, racism, sexism, rape. (shrink)

A Logical Form (LF) is a syntactic structure that is interpreted by the semantic component. For a particular structure to be a possible LF it has to be possible for syntax to generate it and for semantics to interpret it. The study of LF must therefore take into account both assumptions about syntax and about semantics, and since there is much disagreement in both areas, disagreements on LF have been plentiful. This makes the task of writing a survey article in (...) the field fairly difficult, a difficulty that is amplified by the amount of material that needs to be covered if the result is going to be in any way representative. My response to this difficulty is to limit my objectives. As a start, I will confine myself to issues relating to the syntactic positions of Quantificational Noun Phrases (QNPs) at LF and to various interpretive consequences. But even within these relatively narrow confines, I will not attempt anything close to a comprehensive survey. Instead my goal will be restricted to the presentation of one leading idea and to the discussion of some evidence that might bear on it.1 Much research on the nature of LF has consisted in attempts to account for the meaning of sentences containing QNPs. (shrink)

I criticize Brian Earp's ‘Some Writing Tips for Philosophy’. Earp's article is useful for someone who wishes to do well in analytic philosophy as currently practised but it also casts doubt on why such analytic philosophy would be of interest to someone who wants to learn something new. In addition to its good tips, Earp's article contains two bad tips which, if followed, will tend to produce a paper that says next to nothing. I list the two faulty tips, show (...) how the practices of great philosophers and scientists contradict them, then set out some contrary good tips for philosophers who aim to write a paper that makes a contribution to our knowledge. (shrink)

It is well known that in certain environments the scope of a moved quantifier phrase can be determined at either its pre-movement position (“scope reconstruction”) or its postmovement position (“surface scope”). Thus the familiar ambiguity of (1) results from two choices for the scope of the moved QP. Under scope reconstruction, the scope of the moved existential QP is the sister of the pre-movement position (i.e. the sister of t, [to win the lottery]), while under surface scope it is the (...) sister of the post-movement position (i.e. [is likely t to win the lottery]). The two scope possibilities yield different semantic interpretations, corresponding to the paraphrases in (2). (1) Someone from New York is likely t to win the lottery (2) a. It is likely that there will be someone from New York who wins the lottery.. (shrink)

Summary This paper reconceptualizes Thomas Clifford Allbutt's contributions to the making of scientific medicine in late nineteenth-century England. Existing literature on Allbutt usually describes his achievements, such as his design of the pocket thermometer and his advocacy of the use of the ophthalmoscope in general medicine, as independent events; and his work on the development of comparative pathology is largely overlooked. In this paper I focus on this latter aspect. I examine Allbutt's books and addresses and claim that Allbutt argued (...) for the centrality of comparative pathology in the advancement of medical knowledge. He held that diseases should be studied as biological phenomena and that medicine should be made a biological science. He also argued that comparative pathology should be based upon the idea of evolution, and its study should embrace other nineteenth-century sciences including neurology, embryology and bacteriology. Allbutt's writings reveal that his endorsement of comparative pathology, his promotion of the use of the ophthalmoscope and the thermometer in clinical medicine, and his support of the hospital unit system were part of a single programme. All were grounded in his scientific vision of medicine which emphasized a research culture, a stringent nosological attitude and an integration of laboratory sciences and clinical medicine. (shrink)

The rhetorical view suggests that the goal of factual ar- gumentation in legal proceedings is to persuade the fact-finder about the facts under litigation. However, R does not capture our social expecta- tions: we want fact-finders to know the facts justifying their decisions, and persuasion does not necessarily lead to knowledge. I want to present an epistemic theory of argumenta- tion honoring our expectations. Un- der my account, factual argumenta- tion aims to transmit knowledge to the fact-finder.

This book tells part of the story of my life in a succession of anecdotes, or ‘Danecdotes,’ as a friend called them. It generally focuses on the unusual and thereby offers material for reflection. I often include some more or less philosophical reflections within the anecdotes; and such reflections often raise further questions too. The book may be considered as a contribution to ‘the philosophy of everyday life.’ The anecdotes are autobiographical and are presented in approximately chronological order. However, the (...) book is not an autobiography. Large segments of my life have been excluded, particularly those concerning my sex life and intimate relationships. So, although the book is highly personal, it is not so personal as to be uncomfortable, either for me, or for my sexual partners, or for my intimate friends, or for my family, or for the educated reader. The topics covered include growing up in the old Notting Hill slums (long since demolished), attendance (and non-attendance) at a comprehensive school in Shepherd's Bush, cohabitation, working in a rough pub in Notting Hill, my life as an aggressive drunk, beer festivals, my on-off academic career, work as a management consultant, workplace bullying, my career as a management accountant, excelling under pressure, fall into depression, anxiety and bruxism, attempts to regain sanity, and philosophical reflections on life, work, management, morals, politics, metaphysics, God, and how to discover oneself. The pdf is available for free download from my Acaademia page. The paperback is available from Amazon at cost-price. (shrink)

Abstract. The paper begins by challenging Hart's argument aimed to show that sanctions are not part of the concept of law. It shows that in the "minimal" legal system as understood by Hart, sanctions may be required for keeping the legal system efficacious. I then draw a methodological conclusion from this argument, which challenges the view of Hart (and his followers) that legal philosophy should aim at discovering some general, politically neutral, conceptual truths about law. Instead, the aim should be (...) to discover the values because of which certain things in the world are classified as law and others as non-law. Focusing on those would give us a more insight to the roles law plays in society, as well as more illuminating answers to traditional jurisprudential questions like the status of law in evil regimes. (shrink)

David Miller argues that there are no good reasons, either sufficient or insufficient. I show that most of his arguments are invalid or unsound. Several of his arguments depend upon the false claim that every deductively valid argument is circular. I accept one of Miller's arguments for the conclusion that there are no good reasons which are less-than-sufficient. I accept one of his arguments to the conclusion that there are no probative sufficient reasons. But I explain how there are epistemic (...) sufficient reasons which are relative to the game of science and how their existence is consistent with Miller's main contentions while avoiding Miller's apparently anarchic account of our knowledge. (shrink)

This paper argues that “covert” operations like Quantifier Raising (QR) can precede “overt” operations. Specifically we argue that there are overt operations that must take the output of QR as their input. If this argument is successful there are two interesting consequences for the theory of grammar. First, there cannot be a “covert” (i.e. post-spellout) component of the grammar. That is, what distinguishes operations that affect phonology from those that do not cannot be an arbitrary point in the derivation (“spellout”) (...) before which the former apply and after which the latter do; all syntactic operations apply in the same component (henceforth ‘single component grammar’). Second, there must be some alternative means for distinguishing “overt” from “covert” operations. One such alternative, which we can call the ‘phonological theory of QR’, was suggested by Bobaljik (1995), Pesetsky (1998), Groat and O’Neil (1994). These authors proposed that the distinguishing property has to do with principles of the syntax-phonology interface. Assume that movement is a copying operation with phonology targeting one copy in a chain for pronunciation. The distinction between “overt” and “covert” movement, these authors suggest, is this: “overt” movements are the result of phonology targeting the head of a chain for.. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Martin Hackl and I identified a variety of circumstances where scalar implicatures, questions, definite descriptions, and sentences with the focus particle only are absent or unacceptable (Fox and Hackl 2006, henceforth F&H). We argued that the relevant effect is one of maximization failure (MF): an application of a maximization operator to a set that cannot have the required maximal member. We derived MF from our hypothesis that the set of degrees relevant for the semantics of degree (...) constructions is always dense (the Universal Density of Measurement, UDM). The goal of this paper is to present an apparent shortcoming of F&H and to argue that it is overcome once certain consequences of the proposal are shown to follow from more general properties of MF. Specifically, the apparent problem comes from evidence that the core generalizations argued for in F&H extend to areas for which an account in terms of density is unavailable. Nevertheless, I will argue that the account could still be right. Certain dense sets contain "too many alternatives" for there to be a maximal member, thus leading to MF. But, there are other sets that lead to the same predicament. My goal will be to characterize a general signature of MF in the hope that it could be used to determine the identity of alternatives in areas where their identity is not clear on independent grounds. (shrink)

In contrast to eminent historical philosophers, almost all contemporary philosophers maintain that slavery is impermissible. In the enthusiasm of the Enlightenment, a number of arguments gained currency which were intended to show that contractual slavery is not merely impermissible but impossible. Those arguments are influential today in moral, legal and political philosophy, even in discussions that go beyond the issue of contractual slavery. I explain what slavery is, giving historical and other illustrations. I examine the arguments for the impossibility of (...) contractual slavery propounded in the Enlightenment and their offspring expounded in recent writings, including those by Barnett, Cassirer, Ellerman, Rawls, Roberts-Thomson, Satz and Steiner. I show that they involve confusions between abilities and rights, free will and freedom, directing and doing, what may be true sequentially and what may be true simultaneously, default rights and universal rights, impermissibility and impossibility, and metaphorical and literal uses of language. (shrink)

John Searle, in several articles and books, has contended that institutions incorporating status functions with deontic powers are created by collective acceptance that is not analysable into individual acceptance. I point out three self-contradictions in Searle’s exposition.

Many contemporary legal positivists have argued that legal theory is evaluative because it requires the theorist to make judgments of importance. At the same time they argue that it is possible to know without resort to evaluative considerations. I distinguish between two senses of : in one sense it refers to legal validity, in another to the content of legal norms, and I argue that legal positivism is best understood (as indeed some legal positivists have explicitly said) as a claim (...) about legal content. Understood this way, however, it is open to the objection that knowing the content of legal norms requires evaluative considerations for reasons similar to those offered by positivists for thinking that legal theory is requires evaluative considerations. I then distinguish between evaluative considerations in general and moral considerations and argue that because of the subject-matter of legal norms, there are good reasons for thinking that it is moral considerations, and not just any other evaluative considerations, that are required for knowing the content of legal norms. (shrink)

This is a three-page refutation of the Rachels's denial of moral diversity. In sections 2.5 and 2.6 of ‘The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,’ James and Stuart Rachels argue that diversity amongst cultures with regard to moral rules is overstated because all cultures have some values in common. I show that their argument is invalid and otherwise unsound and that cultures differ substantially with regard to their moral rules.

This paper examines a single relevant source regarding Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and his attempt to explain how we perceive and experience the Other. In the fifth chapter of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl describes our encounters with others through a process of non-inferential analogy and details the ways we ‘appresent’ the Other. This unique and admittedly narrow approach to understanding intersubjectivity, I submit, offers significant insights regarding the nature of interactions between competing athletes and the meanings these experiences generate. The (...) descriptive-explanatory account of the ‘appresentation’ of the Other in sport presented here will not be exhaustive. But it will, I anticipate, be informative, supplement existing works in the phenomenology of sport, and appeal intuitively to some of our intersubjective experiences in competitive sport. (shrink)

I distinguish arguments and arguing and I explain some important logical features of arguments. I then explain how philosophers have been misled, apparently by Euclid, into giving seriously mistaken accounts of arguing. I give a few examples. I then offer a seven-step guide on how to argue. After that, I conclude.

Many of the current debates in jurisprudence focus on articulating the boundaries of law. In this essay I challenge this approach on two separate grounds. I first argue that if such debates are to be about law, their purported subject, they ought to pay closer attention to the practice. When such attention is taken it turns out that most of the debates on the boundaries of law are probably indeterminate. I show this in particular with regard to the debate between (...) inclusive and exclusive positivists: I present several ways of understanding what this debate is about and argue that none of them is defensible. My second argument focuses more on the purpose of jurisprudential inquiry. I argue there that even if some jurisprudential debates have determinate answers, it does not follow that they deserve our attention, because not all true facts are worth knowing. After discussing and rejecting the claim that jurisprudence could be justified as knowledge for its own sake, I propose one possible justification for engaging in legal philosophy and outline its implications for the kind of issues that should be pursued. (shrink)

Responds to Leiter's naturalist/realist approach to jurisprudence - particularly his claim that such an approach implies exclusive positivism. Considers analogy with naturalized epistemology. "With regard to the first step the realists were anti-foundationalists in the sense that they 'denied that legal reasons justify a unique decision: the legal reasons underdetermine the decision '. The second step, the replacement suggests that instead of a justificatory account of adjudication, i.e. some prescription as to how judges should decide cases, the reaslists provided an (...) empirical description o fhow judges actually decide cases." Notes that positivists are generally commited to a moderate foundationalism by their acceptance of a RoR. "[T]he analogy with the epistemological anti-foundationalist thesis would suggest that foundationalism in law is committed to the view that if X is a legal norm, it is a legal norm in virtue of inference from self-validating foundations. There is nothing in this view that commits the legal foundationalist to the view that legal norms necessarily cover the entire practical domain, and therefor provide a determinate answer to every practical question...Now, if the anti-foundationl step fails, then we need not, indeed must not, take the second step, because if we take it, we will lsoe something of great importance for our understanding of law. If legal norms qua reasons are part of what determines the outcome of cases, then in order to understand how legal decisions are reached, we cannot disregard them." If Leiter rejects this moderate foundationalism, then it is in tension with his other claim that the realists were positivists. Goes on to argue that nothing in the realist program contributes to the hard vs. soft positivism debate and, in fact, does nothing to substantiate positivism. Offers brief explication of "positivism of norms". (shrink)

It is often claimed that the Duhem problem shows that the notion of falsifiability is inapplicable to scientific theories. I explain why the claim is false.