This paper highlights the voices and experiences of individuals who objected to animal dissection in their high school science and biology classes. The data were collected via online surveys , and 8 of these participants took part in more in-depth telephone interviews. Participants were former students from Ontario, Canada, who discussed their experiences with animal dissection in general, and objection to dissection in particular, if applicable. The findings reveal that students who expressed objection to dissection experienced a range of teacher (...) responses, including pressure to participate, the request to join another group of students and watch, the choice to use a dissection alternative, warnings of compromised grades, and other responses. The study points to the importance of choice policies to ensure that dissection alternatives are available in classrooms. In this way, students can select among different options of how they would like to learn, and teachers can be prepared to accommodate those who choose not to dissect. (shrink)
This study investigated gender-related differences in ethical attitudes of 318 graduate and undergraduate business students. Significant differences were observed in male and female responses to questions concerning ethics in social and personal relationships. No differences were noted for survey items concerning rules-based obligations. Implications for future management are discussed.
In his justifiedly famous paper, “Elusive Knowledge” (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74:4, 1996), David Lewis presents a contextualist account of knowledge, which, like other contextualist accounts, depicts sceptical claims as involving application of a higher standard of knowledge than is applied in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. On Lewis’ account, the sceptic’s denials and the everyday ascriptions are made in different contexts, which allows them both to be true. His account gives detailed specification of how contexts are to be determined. My (...) paper points out that this view is unattractive to the sceptic, since it makes scepticism, even if true, completely disconnected from and irrelevant to the rest of our cognitive discourse. After arguing that the sceptic’s own ascriptions of knowledge (made outside the philosophy seminar room) can be explained in non-contextualist ways, I expound and criticise Lewis’ analysis of knowledge, taking up in particular a central component of his account, the “Rule of Attention”. In the central part of the paper I argue that the reasons given for the inclusion of the rule are all inadequate, and also that there are positive reasons for rejecting it. The final section of the paper argues that the excision of the Rule of Attention removed would leave Lewis’ account subject to serious counter- examples. (shrink)
In this paper, I respond to the paper “The Validation of Induction” by Robert Pargetter and John Bigelow (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75:1, 1997), in which the authors propound the thesis that the arguments commonly thought of as good inductive arguments “properly construed, are deductively valid”. I maintain that they have not established this claim, and neither have they established a number of associated but logically independent claims that they make about inductive arguments and inductive inferences.
I discuss and criticise Douglas Gasking’s paper, “The Analytic-Synthetic Controversy” (in the current issue of this journal). Gasking proposes an explanation of our classifying together as “analytic” statements like “Someone is a bachelor if and only if he is an unmarried man”. He proposes that the feature common to the statements that we so classify is that they provide the only “semantic anchor” for a word that does not have, in Quine’s terms, a socially constant stimulus meaning. I argue that, (...) even after modifications are introduced to allow the account to handle certain difficulties, the account falls to some fatal objections. (shrink)
Sceptics have been accused of achieving their sceptical conclusions by an arbitrary (though usually implicit) redefinition of terms like “justified”, so that, while it may be true that no belief is justified in the sceptic’s new sense of the word, all the beliefs we have taken as justified remain so in the ordinary, standard meaning of the term. This paper defends scepticism against this charge. It is pointed out that there are several sorts of case where someone’s belief may be (...) properly termed justified in one “sense”, or from one “point of view”, but from another, equally properly termed unjustified. It is argued that the point of view of the sceptic, or the sense in which he uses the term, is one of the perfectly standard ones, and not some arbitrarily introduced new sense. In addition, an explanation that is not damaging to scepticism is provided of a sceptic’s own continued ascriptions of justifiedness in everyday contexts. (shrink)
This paper argues for a completely universal scepticism, according to which no beliefs at all are justified to the least degree. The argument starts with a version of the Agrippan trilemma, according to which, if we accept that a belief is justified, we must choose between foundationalism, coherentism of a particular sort, and an infinite regress of justified beliefs. Each of these theories is given a careful specification in terms of the relationship of “justifiedness in p depending on justifiedness in (...) q”. It is then argued that no beliefs – not even beliefs about phenomenal experiences – are foundational in the required way. Both coherentism and infinitism are untenable, since, since they face various objections, most significantly the objection that acceptance of either would commit one to allowing that all beliefs were justified. Because the three possible accounts of justificational structure all fail radically, it is concluded that no beliefs are justified. (shrink)
Investigation of the origin and function of three magnets from I. I. Rabi's laboratory at Columbia University leads to a closer inquiry into the early history of molecular beam evaluations of the angular momenta and magnetic moments of atomic nuclei than has been undertaken heretofore. The resulting insights into the background and the course of Rabi's research programme would probably not have occurred without the orientation enforced by these artifacts.
In Jorge Luis Borges’ short story, “Borges and I,” one character, referred to in the first person, complains about his strained and complex relation with another character, called “Borges.” But the characters are both presumably the author of the short story. I try to use ideas from the philosophy of language to explain how Borges uses language to express complex thoughts, and then discuss two interpretations of the story.
Some authors have claimed that ante rem structuralism has problems with structures that have indiscernible places. In response, I argue that there is no requirement that mathematical objects be individuated in a non-trivial way. Metaphysical principles and intuitions to the contrary do not stand up to ordinary mathematical practice, which presupposes an identity relation that, in a sense, cannot be defined. In complex analysis, the two square roots of –1 are indiscernible: anything true of one of them is true of (...) the other. I suggest that i functions like a parameter in natural deduction systems. I gave an early version of this paper at a workshop on structuralism in mathematics and science, held in the Autumn of 2006, at Bristol University. Thanks to the organizers, particularly Hannes Leitgeb, James Ladyman, and Øystein Linnebo, to my commentator Richard Pettigrew, and to the audience there. The paper also benefited considerably from a preliminary session at the Arché Research Centre at the University of St Andrews. I am indebted to my colleagues Craige Roberts, for help with the linguistics literature, and Ben Caplan and Gabriel Uzquiano, for help with the metaphysics. Thanks also to Hannes Leitgeb and Jeffrey Ketland for reading an earlier version of the manuscript and making helpful suggestions. I also benefited from conversations with Richard Heck, John Mayberry, Kevin Scharp, and Jason Stanley. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)
У статті зроблена спроба привернути увагу фахівців до такого напряму економіки й розваг, як гральний бізнес. Описано розвиток i стан цього бізнесу в США, Росiйськiй Федерацiї й Українi. Наголошено на перспективності розвитку грального бізнесу в Україні.
Spade 1988 sugges t s tha t t he r e are ac tua l l y two theo r i e s t o address t h i s ques t i o n t o , an ear l y one and a l a t e r one . 2 Most o f the presen t pape r i s a deve l o pmen t o f t h i s i dea . I sugges t (...) tha t ear l y work by Sherwood and o the r s was a s tudy o f quan t i f i e r s : the i r semant i c s and t he e f f e c t s o f con t e x t on i n f e r e n ce s t ha t can be made f r om quan t i f i e d te rms . La te r , i n the hands o f Bur l e y and o the r s , i t changed i n t o a s tudy o f someth i n g e l se , a s tudy o f what I ca l l g loba l quan t i f i c a t i o n a l e f f e c t . In sec t i o n 1 , I exp l a i n what these two op t i o n s are. (shrink)
I argue for the following claims:  all uses of I are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I.  no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless  I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though  I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, and although  (...) if I’m thinking about something specifically as myself, I can’t fail to be thinking of myself, and although  a genuine understanding use of I always involves the subject thinking of itself as itself, whatever else it does or doesn’t involve, and although  if I take myself to be thinking about myself, then I am thinking about myself. (shrink)
There are striking structural similarities between Freud's ego and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, which for Kant grounds our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’. There are also striking similarities between Freud's superego and Kant's account of the mental structure that grounds our use of ‘I’ in the moral ‘I ought to’. The paper explores these similarities on three main points: the conflict of motivations internal to the mind, the relation between discursive and pre-discursive representation of moral motivation, and the (...) unconscious character of moral motivation. The suggestion is that Freud offers resources for a naturalized account (an account in terms of the causal development of empirical human beings) of just those features of our moral motivation that, according to Kant, seem to make it least amenable to a naturalistic explanation. How much of a revision of Kant's analysis of moral justification is thereby entailed is beyond the purview of the paper. (shrink)
There are striking structural similarities between Freud's ego and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, which for Kant grounds our use of ‘I’ in ‘I think’. There are also striking similarities between Freud's superego and Kant's account of the mental structure that grounds our use of ‘I’ in the moral ‘I ought to’. The paper explores these similarities on three main points: the conflict of motivations internal to the mind, the relation between discursive and pre‐discursive representation of moral motivation, and the (...) unconscious character of moral motivation. The suggestion is that Freud offers resources for a naturalized account of just those features of our moral motivation that, according to Kant, seem to make it least amenable to a naturalistic explanation. How much of a revision of Kant's analysis of moral justification is thereby entailed is beyond the purview of the paper. (shrink)
First we prove that the set of countable linear orders of the form I + I form a complete analytic set. As a consequence of this we improve a result of Humke and Laczkovich, who showed in [HL] that the set of functions of the form f ⚬ f form a true analytic set in C[0, 1]. We show that these functions form a complete analytic set, solving a problem mentioned on p. 215 of [K1] and on p. 4 of (...) [B]. (shrink)
Interest in νομαστìκωμδєȋν began early. Even before the compilation of prosopo-graphical κωμδούμєνο in the second century B.C., Hellenistic study of Aristophanes had devoted attention to the interpretation of personal satire. The surviving scholia contain references to Alexandrian scholars such as Euphronius, Eratosthenes and Callistratus which show that in their commentaries and monographs these men had dealt with issues of νομαστì κωμδєȋν Much material from Hellenistic work on Old Comedy was transmitted by later scholars, particularly by Didymus and Symmachus in their (...) variorum editions, and was eventually embodied in the scholia, though of course in an abridged and sometimes distorted form. Many of our fragments of Old Comedy, preserved in the scholia or in medieval works of reference as parallels to passages in Aristophanes, are direct evidence of the long ancient tradition of interest in the genre's large element of personal satire. What we find in the scholia should not therefore be treated as representative only of the latest and most derivative stages of ancient scholarship. It is the purpose of this article to argue that the scholia on Aristophanes allow us to see that in matters of νομαστì κωμδєȋν certain assumptions about the nature of this type of comic material were persistently made by ancient scholars, and that certain interpretative habits were consequently developed from them. It is my further aim to suggest that this pattern of interpretation has been widely but unjustifiably perpetuated in later work on Aristophanes. (shrink)
Homeri Ilias. Scholarum in usum edidit Paulus Cauer. Pars I. Carm. I.—XII. Editio Maior. Vienna, Tempsky; Leipzig, Freytag. 3m. Ditto. Ditto. Editio Minor, 1m. 75. The First Three Books of Homer's Iliad, with Introduction, Commentary, and Vocabulary for the use of schools. By Thomas D. Seymour, Hillhouse Professor of Greek in Yale College. Boston, Ginn. Homer's Ilias in Verkürzter Ausgabe. Für den Schulgebrauch von A. Th. Christ. Mit 9 Abbildungen und 2 Karten. Vienna, Tempsky. 1 fl. 30kr.
As one of the most important episodes of change in the Ottoman Empire, the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876) was a phase when the state and its political and ideological formation witnessed structural transformation and reforms. During this period, privy councils were instituted at every level, as one of the basic changes in decision-making and the legislation process of the Ottoman State. Meclis-i Âlî-i Umûmî (the Supreme Council-General) is located at the top of the counsulting hierarchy of councils at the administrative piramid, (...) instituted in 1838. The Supreme Council-General also functioned as an equivalent to that of a “senate” of the modern parliament for the first time in this transition period. (shrink)
The text questions the idea of transgenderism, or more specifically, the positioning of the androgynous paradigm that is ecological , as a possible Utopian projection into the future; as a radical NO to the present that still has not, regardless of whether we like it or not, fulfilled the possibility of legal and political status for all forms of life.Naturally enough, apart from an interpretation of the androgyne as the archetype of the unity of oppossing energies , I also take (...) into account Kari Weil’s interpretation of the androgyne,according to whose unmasking the androgyne also figures as the misogynous ideal, a construct of the patriarchal ideosphere. Or, as Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar have proposed – the alternative term gynandrous , since the very structure of the lexeme androgyny reflects the power of the male symbolic vision over the female view of the Universe.Considering the circumstances in Croatia, transgenderism is perceived in the text as an ignored state of affairs, since intersexuals are not categorised in the »Statute on the Structure and Method of Work of the Expert Opinion Component in Implementing Rights from Social Welfare and Other Rights According to Specific Regulations«, which simply means that they have no specific rights under the present social welfare system.By way of the identity of the androgyne as a third gender, which unifies the categories of masculinity and femininity, or, more specifically, by the ecological androgynous paradigm, I consider the attempt to delete the dichotomy of neglected Nature versus culture, as explicated, for example,by the feminist biologist Lynda Birke, and the attempt to achieve a bioethical encounter between the human animal and the ‘nonhuman’ animal, which I define conditionally with the term transspeciesism, which covers the ethical negation of speciesism.Namely, within the framework of eco/feminist theory, the socio-cultural anthropologist Barbara Noske was one of the first to put forward the question of the human relation towards other animals, demanding the establishment of an anthropology of animals, since – even now – only an anthropology of humans exists in relation to animals. (shrink)
Author: Boruszewski Jarosław Title: MACHINES AND SYMBOLS (I) – SEMANTIC ASPECTS OF CYBERNETICS AND AUTOMATION (Maszyny i symbole (I) – semantyczne aspekty cybernetyki i automatyzacji) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2011, vol:.12, number: 2011/1, pages: 397-425 Keywords: MACHINES, SYMBOLS, SEMANTIC, CYBERNETICS, AUTOMATION Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:This article is the first part of the cycle titled “Machines and symbols”. The main issue of this cycle may be formulated as a question: can (...) machines and technical devices operate with symbols? A very important problem raised in this essay is the difference between symbols and signals. The concept of signal is also broadly discussed in the paper, because there are many different definitions of this concept. The present text contains semantic and philosophical considerations concerning cybernetics, mathematical theory of communication, industrial semiotics and semio-technics. In these theories, terms “symbol” and “signal” are often used interchangeably which leads to misconceptions. One of the most frequent misconceptions is confusing discrete signals with symbols. The author focused on communication systems where machines are senders and humans are receivers, because descriptions of these systems tend towards anthropomorphization of a machine-sender. This tendency makes signals sent out by machines treated as symbols comprehensible by a human-receiver. Another interesting aspect of machine-human communication systems is the treatment of a human-receiver as some kind of machine. Such an idea is called “mechanomorphism”. (shrink)
This collection of essays provides the first systematic investigation of practical necessity and offers novel perspectives on this intriguing phenomenon. While debates on necessity often take place in the realm of metaphysics, there is a form of necessity that is pertinent to practical philosophy. “Here I stand. I can do no other,” a phrase habitually attributed to Luther, is often interpreted as revealing underlying normative reasons that exhibit a special kind of necessitating force, experienced as an inescapable constraint by the (...) agent. However, one of the features that make this phenomenon so fascinating is that this constraint is often deciphered as stemming from a form of necessitation that articulates the agent’s autonomy or practical identity. Luther’s saying serves as a leitmotif for an exploration of different claims and challenges related to practical necessity. (shrink)
Books VI-X of Livy's history of Rome describe the beginnings of Rome's conquest of Italy in the fourth century BC and contain some of Livy's finest writing. This is the first full-scale, scholarly commentary to be written on this part of the history in modern times. The first of three volumes, this book contains an extensive introduction and the commentary to Book VI. The introduction provides a full analysis of the Roman annalistic tradition, of Livy's style and narrative technique, and (...) of the manuscript tradition; the commentary devotes equal attention to historical, literary, linguistic, and textual matters. The remaining two volumes, which are forthcoming, will deal with Books VII-VIII and IX-X respectively. An indispensable work of reference for anyone interested in Latin literature and early Roman history, as well as for scholars of Livy himself, these three volumes represent a major new contribution to Latin scholarship. (shrink)
Ideal agents are role models whose perfection in some normative domain we try to approximate. But which form should this striving take? It is well known that following ideal rules of practical reasoning can have disastrous results for non-ideal agents. Yet, this issue has not been explored with respect to rules of theoretical reasoning. I show how we can extend Bayesian models of ideally rational agents in order to pose and answer the question of whether non-ideal agents should form new (...) degrees of belief in the same way as their ideal counterparts. I demonstrate that the epistemic and the practical case are parallel: following ideal rules does not always lead to optimal outcomes for non-ideal agents. (shrink)
I use some ideas of Keith DeRose's to develop an (invariantist!) account of why sceptical reasoning doesn't show that I don't know that I'm not a brain in a vat. I argue that knowledge is subject to the risk-of-error constraint: a true belief won’t have the status of knowledge if there is a substantial risk of the belief being in error that hasn’t been brought under control. When a substantial risk of error is present (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are (...) false in nearby worlds), satisfying the constraint requires bringing the risk under control. This is achieved either by sensitivity, i.e. you wouldn’t have the belief if it were false, or by identifying evidence for the proposition. However, when the risk of error is not substantial (i.e. beliefs in propositions that are not false in nearby worlds), the constraint is satisfied by default. My belief that I am not a brain in a vat is insensitive and I have no evidence for it, but since it is not false in nearby worlds, it satisfies the constraint by default. (shrink)
Can we ever truly answer the question, “Who am I?” Moderated by Alex Voorhoeve (London School of Economics), neuro-philosopher Elie During (University of Paris, Ouest Nanterre), cognitive scientist David Jopling (York University, Canada), social psychologist Timothy Wilson (University of Virginia),and ethicist Frances Kamm (Harvard University) examine the difficulty of achieving genuine self-knowledge and how the pursuit of self-knowledge plays a role in shaping the self.
In this paper I argue that a necessary condition of one’s perceiving God is that an experience of the right phenomenological sort be caused in one ‘directly enough’ by God and - bypassing the issue of what is necessary for an experience to be of the right phenomenological sort - discuss some difficulties in finding reasons for thinking that God has or has not ‘directly enough’ caused any such experience.
In a Normal Case, a subject has a justified true belief that P and also knows that P. In a Gettier Case, a subject has a justified true belief that P but does not know that P. The received view (endorsed by Lycan and others) is that if one is in a Normal Case then one cannot know that he is not in a Gettier case. I argue that the received view is mistaken and I discuss the implications this has (...) on some other epistemological issues. (shrink)