Results for 'I. Testimony-Based Belief'

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  1.  34
    Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity.I. Testimony-Based Belief - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 25.
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  2. Epistemic Extendedness, Testimony, and the Epistemology of Instrument-Based Belief.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):181 - 197.
    In Relying on others [Goldberg, S. 2010a. Relying on others: An essay in epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press], I argued that, from the perspective of an interest in epistemic assessment, the testimonial belief-forming process should be regarded as interpersonally extended. At the same time, I explicitly rejected the extendedness model for beliefs formed through reliance on a mere mechanism, such as a clock. In this paper, I try to bolster my defense of this asymmetric treatment. I argue that a (...)
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  3.  93
    I Can Trust You Now … but Not Later: An Explanation of Testimonial Knowledge in Children.Joshue Orozco - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):195-214.
    Children learn and come to know things about the world at a very young age through the testimony of their caregivers. The challenge comes in explaining how children acquire such knowledge. Since children indiscriminately receive testimony, their testimony-based beliefs seem unreliable, and, consequently, should fail to qualify as knowledge. In this paper I discuss some attempted explanations by Sandy Goldberg and John Greco and argue that they fail. I go on to suggest that what generates the (...)
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  4. Coverage-Reliability, Epistemic Dependence, and the Problem of Rumor-Based Belief.Axel Gelfert - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):763-786.
    Rumors, for better or worse, are an important element of public discourse. The present paper focuses on rumors as an epistemic phenomenon rather than as a social or political problem. In particular, it investigates the relation between the mode of transmission and the reliability, if any, of rumors as a source of knowledge. It does so by comparing rumor with two forms of epistemic dependence that have recently received attention in the philosophical literature: our dependence on the testimony of (...)
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  5. Testimony, Testimonial Belief, and Safety.Charlie Pelling - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):205-217.
    Can one gain testimonial knowledge from unsafe testimony? It might seem not, on the grounds that if a piece of testimony is unsafe, then any belief based on it in such a way as to make the belief genuinely testimonial is bound itself to be unsafe: the lack of safety must transmit from the testimony to the testimonial belief. If in addition we accept that knowledge requires safety, the result seems to be that (...)
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  6. Etiology, Understanding, and Testimonial Belief.Andrew Peet - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1547-1567.
    The etiology of a perceptual belief can seemingly affect its epistemic status. There are cases in which perceptual beliefs seem to be unjustified because the perceptual experiences on which they are based are caused, in part, by wishful thinking, or irrational prior beliefs. It has been argued that this is problematic for many internalist views in the epistemology of perception, especially those which postulate immediate perceptual justification. Such views are unable to account for the impact of an experience’s (...)
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  7. The Epistemology of Testimony.Duncan Pritchard - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):326–348.
    Let us focus on what I take it is the paradigm case of testimony—the intentional transfer of a belief from one agent to another, whether in the usual way via a verbal assertion made by the one agent to the other, or by some other means, such as through a note.1 So, for example, John says to Mary that the house is on fire (or, if you like, ‘texts’ her this message on her phone), and Mary, upon hearing (...)
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  8. Testimonial Knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - unknown
    Testimony is responsible, either directly or indirectly, for much of what we know, not only about the world around us but also about who we are. Despite its relative historical neglect, recent work in epistemology has seen a growing recognition of the importance and scope of testimonial knowledge. Most of this work has focused on two central questions, which will be the main topics of this article. First, is testimonial knowledge necessarily acquired through transmission from speaker to hearer, or (...)
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  9. Testimonial Insult: A Moral Reason for Belief?Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Logos and Episteme (1):27-48.
    When you don’t believe a speaker’s testimony for reasons that call into question the speaker’s credibility, it seems that this is an insult against the speaker. There also appears to be moral reasons that count in favour of refraining from insulting someone. When taken together, these two plausible claims entail that we have a moral reason to refrain from insulting speakers with our lack of belief, and hence, sometimes, a moral reason to believe the testimony of speakers. (...)
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  10. Moral Testimony and its Authority.Philip Nickel - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266.
    A person sometimes forms moral beliefs by relying on another person''s moral testimony. In this paper I advance a cognitivist normative account of this phenomenon. I argue that for a person''s actions to be morally good, they must be based on a recognition of the moral reasons bearing on action. Morality requires people to act from an understanding of moral claims, and consequently to have an understanding of moral claims relevant to action. A person sometimes fails to meet (...)
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  11. Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-Inferential?Peter J. Graham - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):84–95.
    Anti-reductionists hold that beliefs based upon comprehension (of both force and content) of tellings are non-inferentially justified. For reductionists, on the other hand, comprehension as such is not in itself a warrant for belief: beliefs based on it are justified only if inferentially supported by other beliefs. I discuss Elizabeth Fricker's argument that even if anti-reductionism is right in principle, its significance is undercut by the presence of background inferential support: for mature knowledgeable adults, justification from comprehension (...)
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  12.  94
    The Epistemic Parity of Testimony, Memory, and Perception.Christopher R. Green - manuscript
    Extensive literatures exist on the epistemology of testimony, memory, and perception, but for the most part these literatures do not systematically consider the extent of the analogies between the three epistemic sources. A number of the same problems reappear in all three literatures, however. Dealing simultaneously with all three sources and making a careful accounting of the analogies and disanalogies between them should therefore avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. Other than limits on the scope of which memorially- and testimonially- (...) beliefs should be included in the Parity Thesis, I argue that most of the disanalogies that different philosophers have proffered between the sources do not mark distinctions among the universes of possible testimonially-, memorially-, and perceptually-based beliefs regarding the explanation of those beliefs' epistemic status. I first criticize the suggestion that perception is a generative epistemic source, while testimony and memory are not; I propose and defend counterexamples in which testimony and memory produce new beliefs. Next, I criticize a variety of distinctions that have been drawn between testimony and perception, taken chiefly from the reductionist-antireductionist literature on testimony. I criticize the suggestion that the conceptualization of content and the transparency of experience affect the epistemologies of testimony and perception in different ways. Regarding memory and testimony, I advocate modeling testimony on the legal relationship of a principal and an agent, arguing that law's apparatus used to analyze such situations suggests that using others' epistemic services in testimony will supply the same epistemic benefits and burdens as if we had performed those epistemic tasks personally and then relied only on memory. I apply this analysis to the transmission of defeaters in testimony. I argue that memory does feature the epistemic equivalent of a perceptual image and that both perceptually- and memorially-based beliefs can concern either the past or the present. Finally, I construct a set of six transformations that turn individual possible instances of perceptually-, memorially-, or testimonially-based beliefs into individual possible instances of the other two types of beliefs without changing the structure of those beliefs' epistemologies. (shrink)
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  13.  39
    The Puzzle of Philosophical Testimony.Christopher Ranalli - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit (...)
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  14. Group Testimony.Deborah Tollefsen - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
    The fact that much of our knowledge is gained through the testimony of others challenges a certain form of epistemic individualism. We are clearly not autonomous knowers. But the discussion surrounding testimony has maintained a commitment to what I have elsewhere called epistemic agent individualism. Both the reductionist and the anti-reductionist have focused their attention on the testimony of individuals. But groups, too, are sources of testimony - or so I shall argue. If groups can be (...)
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  15.  53
    Testimony and Epistemic Risk: The Dependence Account.Karyn L. Freedman - 2015 - Social Epistemology 29 (3):251-269.
    In this paper, I give an answer to the central epistemic question regarding the normative requirements for beliefs based on testimony. My suggestion here is that our best strategy for coming up with the conditions for justification is to look at cases where the adoption of the belief matters to the person considering it. This leads me to develop, in Part One of the paper, an interest-relative theory of justification, according to which our justification for a proposition (...)
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  16.  52
    Circular Testimony.Stephen Wright - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2029-2048.
    According to internalist theories of testimony, beliefs based on what others say are justified by the reasons a listener uses in forming her belief. I identify a distinctive type of testimonial situation, which I call circular testimony and argue that a certain type of circular testimony establishes the incompleteness of internalist theories of testimony.
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  17. The Uses of Aesthetic Testimony.C. Thi Nguyen - 2017 - British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (1):19-36.
    The current debate over aesthetic testimony typically focuses on cases of doxastic repetition — where, when an agent, on receiving aesthetic testimony that p, acquires the belief that p without qualification. I suggest that we broaden the set of cases under consideration. I consider a number of cases of action from testimony, including reconsidering a disliked album based on testimony, and choosing an artistic educational institution from testimony. But this cannot simply be explained (...)
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  18.  80
    Testimonial Knowledge From Lies.Kevin McCain - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):459-468.
    Recently, Dan O’Brien has argued that there are situations in which a hearer can gain testimonial knowledge from a speaker who is lying. In order to make his case, O’Brien presents two examples where a speaker lies to a hearer, but supposedly the hearer comes to have testimonial knowledge on the basis of the lying speaker’s testimony. O’Brien claims that his examples demonstrate that lies can be used to pass on knowledge in a non-inferential fashion. I argue that O’Brien (...)
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  19.  42
    Testimonial Justification: The Parity Argument.Frederick F. Schmitt - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 33 (2):385-406.
    On an individualist view of testimonial justification, a subject’s belief based on testimony is justified ultimately on the basis of nontestimonial beliefs alone. The prevailing version of individualism has been inductive individualism, according to which the nontestimonial basis for a testimonial belief is an inductively based belief in the reliability of the testifier. Here I consider an alternative to inductive individualism, which I call the parity account. This is the view, endorsed in various forms (...)
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  20. Testimony: Evidence and Responsibility.Matthew Carl Weiner - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Testimony is an indispensable way of gaining knowledge and also a voluntary act for which the teller can be held responsible. This dissertation analyzes these two aspects of testimony, the epistemological and the normative. Indeed, it argues that these two aspects cannot be separated: A satisfactory account of testimony's epistemology must allow for testimony's normative status, while an account of testimony's normative status can be derived from testimony's epistemology. ;Epistemologically, the general reliability of (...) should be treated differently from the reliability of particular pieces of testimony. We are justified in believing that testimony is generally reliable, without needing evidence to that effect. This avoids the problems that would arise from attempting to gather evidence for testimony's general reliability. Particular pieces of testimony, however, can only provide a justification for belief by providing evidence for what is told. This view about particular pieces of testimony faces the problem of how the teller can present her testimony as evidence while accepting responsibility for it, and how the hearer can take testimony as evidence while holding the hearer responsible for it. ;To solve this problem, I give an account, based on inference to the best explanation, of the specific way testimony provides evidence for what is told. To see testimony as evidence for what is told, we must explain it in terms of the reasons people have for choosing to say one thing rather than another. On this account, the evidence that testimony provides depends on the teller's choice to assume responsibility for her testimony, rather than precluding that assumption of responsibility. ;On the other hand, the epistemology of testimony imposes certain norms on the act of telling someone something. The teller is responsible for the truth of her testimony, in that she stakes her future credibility on its truth. Loss of credibility would count as a sanction for violating the responsibility to tell the truth, because a teller ordinarily intends her testimony to be believed. This responsibility to tell the truth is derived from the epistemology of testimony. (shrink)
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  21. Testimony and Grammatical Evidentials.Peter Van Elswyk - 2020 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 135-144.
    Unlike other sources of evidence like perception and memory, testimony is intimately related to natural language. That intimacy cannot be overlooked. In this chapter, I show how cross-linguistic considerations are relevant to the epistemology of testimony. I make my case with declaratives containing grammaticalized evidentials. My discussion has a negative and a positive part. For the negative part, it is argued that some definitions of testimony are mistaken because they do not apply to testimony offered by (...)
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  22.  84
    Basing Beliefs on Reasons.Joseph Tolliver - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 15 (1):149-161.
    I propose to analyze the concept of basing beliefs on reasons. The concept is an important one in understanamg the so-called "inferential" or "indirect" knowledge. After briefly stating the causal analyses of this concept given by D.M. Armstrong and Marshall Swain I will present two cases which show these analyses to be too strong and too weak. Finally, I will propose an analysis which avoids these twin difficulties.
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  23.  11
    Basing Beliefs on Reasons.Joseph Tolliver - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 15 (1):149-161.
    I propose to analyze the concept of basing beliefs on reasons. The concept is an important one in understanamg the so-called "inferential" or "indirect" knowledge. After briefly stating the causal analyses of this concept given by D.M. Armstrong and Marshall Swain I will present two cases which show these analyses to be too strong and too weak. Finally, I will propose an analysis which avoids these twin difficulties.
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  24. #BelieveWomen and the Ethics of Belief.Renee Bolinger - forthcoming - In NOMOS LXIV: Truth and Evidence. New York:
    ​I evaluate a suggestion, floated by Kimberly Ferzan (this volume), that the twitter hashtag campaign #BelieveWomen is best accommodated by non-reductionist views of testimonial justification. I argue that the issue is ultimately one about the ethical obligation to trust women, rather than a question of what grounds testimonial justification. I also suggest that the hashtag campaign does not simply assert that ‘we should trust women’, but also militates against a pernicious striking-property generic (roughly: ‘women make false sexual assault accusations’), that (...)
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  25. Can We Trust Our Memories? C. I. Lewis's Coherence Argument.T. Shogenji & E. Olsson - 2004 - Synthese 142 (1):21-41.
    In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis's view on the roleof coherence – what he calls ''congruence'' – in thejustification of beliefs based on memory ortestimony. Lewis has two main theses on the subject. His negativethesis states that coherence of independent items ofevidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusionunless each item has some credibility of its own. Thepositive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherenceof independently obtained items of evidence – such asconverging memories or testimonies – (...)
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  26.  49
    The Puzzle of Philosophical Testimony.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):142-163.
    An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit (...)
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  27. Testimony, Recovery and Plausible Deniability: A Response to Peet.Alex Davies - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):18-38.
    According to telling based views of testimony (TBVs), B has reason to believe that p when A tells B that p because A thereby takes public responsibility for B's subsequent belief that p. Andrew Peet presents a new argument against TBVs. He argues that insofar as A uses context-sensitive expressions to express p, A doesn't take public responsibility for B's belief that p. Since context-sensitivity is widespread, the kind of reason TBVs say we have to believe (...)
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  28.  72
    Belief and Self‐Consciousness.David Hunter - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (5):673 – 693.
    This paper is about what is distinctive about first-person beliefs. I discuss several sets of puzzling cases of first-person belief. The first focus on the relation between belief and action, while the second focus on the relation of belief to subjectivity. I argue that in the absence of an explanation of the dispositional difference, individuating such beliefs more finely than truth conditions merely marks the difference. I argue that the puzzles reveal a difference in the ways that (...)
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  29. Retraction and Testimonial Justification: A New Problem for the Assurance View.Matthew Vermaire - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3959-3972.
    The Assurance View, as advanced by Angus Ross and Richard Moran, makes the epistemology of testimony a matter of interpersonal commitments and entitlements. More specifically, I argue, their position is best understood as claiming that for someone’s belief to be testimonially justified is for some speaker to bear illocutionary responsibility for its truth. With this understanding in hand, I present a problem for the view that has so far escaped attention, a problem deriving from the wide freedom we (...)
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  30.  31
    Testimonial Reasons.David Matheson - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):757-774.
    In this paper I consider whether the reasons on which our testimonial beliefs are directly based—“testimonial reasons”—are basic reasons for belief. After laying out a Dretske-inspired psychologistic conception of reasons for belief in general and a corresponding conception of basic reasons for belief, I present a prima facie case against the basicality of testimonial reasons. I then respond to a challenge from Audi to this case. To the extent that my response is successful, the viability of (...)
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  31. Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification.Jonathan Egeland - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):458-474.
    ABSTRACTAccording to epistemic internalists, facts about justification supervene upon one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. Epistemic externalists, on the other hand, deny this. More specifically, externalists think that the supervenience base of justification isn't exhausted by one's internal reasons for believing certain propositions. In the last decade, the internalism–externalism debate has made its mark on the epistemology of testimony. The proponent of internalism about the epistemology of testimony claims that a hearer's testimonial justification for believing that p (...)
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  32.  40
    A Credibility-Backed Norm for Testimony.Matt Weiner - forthcoming - Episteme:1-13.
    I propose that testimony is subject to a norm that is backed by a credibility sanction: whenever the norm is violated, it is appropriate for the testifier to lose some credibility for their future testimony. This is one of a family of sanction-based norms, where violation of the norm makes it appropriate to lose some power; in this case, the power to induce belief through testimony. The applicability of the credibility norm to testimony follows (...)
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  33.  11
    Humeanism and the epistemology of testimony.Dan O’Brien - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    A contemporary debate concerning the epistemology of testimony is portrayed by its protagonists as having its origins in the eighteenth century and the respective views of David Hume and Thomas Reid. Hume is characterized as a reductionist and Reid as an anti-reductionist. This terminology has been widely adopted and the reductive approach has become synonymous with Hume. In Sect. 1 I spell out the reductionist interpretation of Hume in which the justification possessed by testimonially-acquired beliefs is reducible to the (...)
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  34.  39
    Reliabilism and the Testimony of Robots.Billy Wheeler - 2020 - Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 24 (3):332-356.
    We are becoming increasingly dependent on robots and other forms of artificial intelligence for our beliefs. But how should the knowledge gained from the “say-so” of a robot be classified? Should it be understood as testimonial knowledge, similar to knowledge gained in conversation with another person? Or should it be understood as a form of instrument-based knowledge, such as that gained from a calculator or a sundial? There is more at stake here than terminology, for how we treat objects (...)
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  35. Aesthetic Testimony and the Norms of Belief Formation.Jon Robson - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):750-763.
    Unusability pessimism has recently emerged as an appealing new option for pessimists about aesthetic testimony—those who deny the legitimacy of forming aesthetic beliefs on the basis of testimony. Unusability pessimists argue that we should reject the traditional pessimistic stance that knowledge of aesthetic matters is unavailable via testimony in favour of the view that while such knowledge is available to us, it is unusable. This unusability stems from the fact that accepting such testimony would violate an (...)
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  36. On the Possibility of Knowledge Through Unsafe Testimony.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (5):513-526.
    If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe. Otherwise, will not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that hearer will lack knowledge? Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Goldberg (2005; 2007) argues that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two cases. Lackey (2008) and Pelling (2013) criticize Goldberg’s examples. But Pelling goes on (...)
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  37.  4
    The Epistemology of Testimony-Based Knowledge and Justification.Robert Audi - 2018 - In Johannes Müller-Salo (ed.), Robert Audi: Critical Engagements. Springer Verlag. pp. 197-205.
    Testimony is a special challenge in epistemology. Human life as we know it would be impossible without it; we commonly accept it without question; and only the highly skeptical doubt that from it we gain much knowledge about matters on which we lack independent evidence. In my theory of testimony, it figures as an essential source of knowledge in our lives, but not as a basic source of it; and the way in which testimony yields justification for (...)
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  38.  1
    Epistemic Justification of Testimonial Beliefs and the Categories of Egophoricity and Evidentiality in Natural Languages: An Insoluble Paradox of Thomas Reid's Anti-Reductionism.Elżbieta Łukasiewicz - 2020 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 62 (1):137-168.
    The paper is concerned with the epistemological status of testimony and the question of what may confer justification on true testimonial beliefs and enable us to call such beliefs knowledge. In particular, it addresses certain anti-reductionist arguments in the epistemology of testimony and their incompatibility with the grammatical categories of egophoricity and evidentiality present in the architecture of natural languages. First, the tradition of epistemological individualism and its rationale are discussed, as well as certain attempts within this tradition (...)
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  39.  45
    Beliefs and Testimony as Social Evidence: Epistemic Egoism, Epistemic Universalism, and Common Consent Arguments.Joshua Rollins - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):78-90.
    Until recently, epistemology was largely caught in the grips of an epistemically unrealistic radical epistemological individualism on which the beliefs and testimony of others were of virtually no epistemic significance. Thankfully, epistemologists have bucked the individualist trend, acknowledging that one person's belief or testimony that P might offer another person prima facie epistemic reasons – or social evidence as I call it – to believe P. In this paper, I discuss the possibility and conditions under which beliefs (...)
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  40. Belief Merging and the Discursive Dilemma: An Argument-Based Account to Paradoxes of Judgment Aggregation.Gabriella Pigozzi - 2006 - Synthese 152 (2):285-298.
    The aggregation of individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions is called judgment aggregation. Literature in social choice and political theory has claimed that judgment aggregation raises serious concerns. For example, consider a set of premises and a conclusion where the latter is logically equivalent to the former. When majority voting is applied to some propositions it may give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions. This problem is (...)
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  41.  41
    The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2006 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (S1):118-138.
    Many people agree that a proper epistemological treatment of testimonial knowledge will regard testimonial warrant—the total truth-conducive support enjoyed by a belief grounded on a piece of testimony —as socially diffuse, in the sense that it is not something that supervenes on the proper functionality of the hearer’s cognitive resources together with the reasons she has for accepting the testimony. After arguing for such a view, I go on to identify a challenge many people think flows from (...)
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  42. Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension.Peter J. Graham - 2010 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 148--174.
    This paper argues for the general proper functionalist view that epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Such a process is reliable in normal conditions when functioning normally. This paper applies this view to so-called testimony-based beliefs. It argues that when a hearer forms a comprehension-based belief that P (a belief based on taking another to have asserted (...)
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  43.  42
    Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference.Marcelo Alejandro Falappa, Alejandro Javier García, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Guillermo Ricardo Simari - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):161-193.
    We propose a revision operator on a stratified belief base, i.e., a belief base that stores beliefs in different strata corresponding to the value an agent assigns to these beliefs. Furthermore, the operator will be defined as to perform the revision in such a way that information is never lost upon revision but stored in a stratum or layer containing information perceived as having a lower value. In this manner, if the revision of one layer leads to the (...)
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  44.  48
    From Knowledge-Based Programs to Graded Belief-Based Programs, Part I: On-Line Reasoning.Noël Laverny & Jérôme Lang - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):277-321.
    Knowledge-based programs (KBPs) are a powerful notion for expressing action policies in which branching conditions refer to implicit knowledge and call for a deliberation task at execution time. However, branching conditions in KBPs cannot refer to possibly erroneous beliefs or to graded belief, such as “if my belief that φ holds is high then do some action α else perform some sensing action β”.
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  45.  73
    I—The Humean Thesis on Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.
    This paper suggests a bridge principle for all-or-nothing belief and degrees of belief to the effect that belief corresponds to stably high degree of belief. Different ways of making this Humean thesis on belief precise are discussed, and one of them is shown to stand out by unifying the others. The resulting version of the thesis proves to be fruitful in entailing the logical closure of belief, the Lockean thesis on belief, and coherence (...)
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  46. Belief, Credence, and Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):153-168.
    In this article, I argue that faith’s going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith’s epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically rational.
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  47.  90
    BeliefBased Exemptions: Are Religious Beliefs Special?Gemma Cornelissen - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (1):85-109.
    Religious beliefs are often singled out for special treatment in secular liberal societies. Yet if a legal exemption is granted for a belief with a religious foundation, the question arises whether a similar, non‐religious moral belief must also be granted an exemption. I argue that common reasons for favoring religious over non‐religious beliefs fail to provide a convincing moral case for drawing a distinction of this nature. I focus on arguments concerning the role of religious beliefs in constituting (...)
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  48. Responsibility for Testimonial Belief.Benjamin McMyler - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.
    According to so-called “credit views of knowledge,” knowledge is an achievement of an epistemic agent, something for which an agent is creditable or responsible. One influential criticism of the credit view of knowledge holds that the credit view has difficulty making sense of knowledge acquired from testimony. As Jennifer Lackey has argued, in many ordinary cases of the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, if anyone deserves credit for the truth of the audience’s belief it is the testimonial speaker rather (...)
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  49. Belief and Aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
    Does belief have an aim? According to the claim of exclusivity, non-truth-directed considerations cannot motivate belief within doxastic deliberation. This claim has been used to argue that, far from aiming at truth, belief is not aim-directed at all, because the regulation of belief fails to exhibit a kind of interaction among aims that is characteristic of ordinary aim-directed behaviour. The most prominent reply to this objection has been offered by Steglich-Petersen (Philos Stud 145:395–405, 2009), who claims (...)
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  50.  38
    Group Belief: Lessons From Lies and Bullshit.I.—Jennifer Lackey - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):185-208.
    Groups and other sorts of collective entities are frequently said to believe things. Sarah Huckabee Sanders, for instance, was asked by reporters at White House press conferences whether the Trump administration ‘believes in climate change’ or ‘believes that slavery is wrong’. Similarly, it is said on the website of the Aclu of Illinois that the organization ‘firmly believes that rights should not be limited based on a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity’. A widespread philosophical view is that (...) on the part of a group’s members is neither necessary nor sufficient for group belief. In other words, groups are said to be able to believe that p even when not a single individual member of the group believes that p. In this paper, I challenge this view by focusing on two phenomena that have been entirely ignored in the literature: group lies and group bullshit. I show that when group belief is understood in terms of actions over which group members have voluntarily control, as is standardly thought, paradigmatic instances of a group lying or bullshitting end up counting as a group believing. Thus we need to look elsewhere for an adequate account of group belief. (shrink)
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