I argue that findings in support of Adams and Kveraga’s functional forecast model of emotion expression processing help settle the debate between rich and sparse views of the content of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue that these results in social vision suggest that the distinctive phenomenal character of experiences involving high-level properties such as emotions and social traits is best explained by their being visually experienced as opposed to being brought about by perceptual judgments.

This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the prima facie state–content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of “state–content error error,” i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that (...) characterize the type of content certain representations have are indeed independent of their structural properties. I also consider another objection to the general strategy, namely that it falls short of showing that the nonconceptual content of perceptual experiences thus established is the kind of content that figures in true explanations of intentional behavior. I concede this point in respect of Fodor's version of the strategy, while denying that it has any bearing on Heck's approach. The success of this objection in Heck's case ultimately depends, I argue, upon an unjustified commitment to a certain empirically suspect model of perception. (shrink)

In this paper I display a general metaphysical assumption that characterizes basic naturalistic views and that is inherited, in a residual form, by their leading teleological rivals. The assumption is that intentional states require identifiable inner vehicles and that to explain intentional properties we must develop accounts that bind specific contents to specific vehicles. I show that this assumption is deeply rooted in representationalist and reductionist theories of content and I argue that it is deeply inappropriate. I sketch the main (...) features of plausible alternatives: such alternatives are either anti-representationalist (Dynamical Systems' models) or anti-reductionist (institution-based approaches), and are not committed to any such metaphysical premise. (shrink)

Assuming along with Heidegger that philosophy is ontology of its object and phenomenology by its method, the intention is to present some guidelines for the hermeneutics of mystical poetry; specifically for the Cántico Espiritual. For this purpose, a description is essential to poetry, intended to clarify why this is so pure spoken, followed by the characterization of mystical poetry. Later I show that the ineffability of mystical poetry is a feature that belongs because this is original word that establishes a (...) way of being in the world, whose meaning is the union between man and God. Finally, in response to warnings that St. John of the Cross makes in the prologue and the annotation on the interpretation of mystical texts, I think about the conversion temple as emotional disposition installed in which he begins the search for the Beloved. (shrink)

According to so-called “thin” views about the content of experience, we can only visually experience low-level features such as colour, shape, texture or motion. According to so-called “rich” views, we can also visually experience some high-level properties, such as being a pine tree or being threatening. One of the standard objections against rich views is that high-level properties can only be represented at the level of judgment. In this paper, I first challenge this objection by relying on some recent studies (...) in social vision. Secondly, I tackle a different but related issue, namely, the idea that, if the content of experience is rich, then perception is cognitively penetrable. Against this thesis, I argue that the very same criteria that help us vindicate the truly sensory nature of our rich experiences speak against their being cognitively penetrable. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional—as opposed to associationist. The proposal under criticism moves from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations to the view that the structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for such biased behaviour is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I (...) contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational structure of implicit attitudes. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by the structural social injustice that implicit attitudes reflect, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue in favour of an associationist view. (shrink)

It has recently been pointed out that perceptual nonconceptualism admits of two different and logically independent interpretations. On the first (content) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the kind of content perceptual experiences have. On the second (state) view, perceptual nonconceptualism is a thesis about the relation that holds between a subject undergoing a perceptual experience and its content. For the state nonconceptualist, it thus seems consistent to hold that both perceptual experiences and beliefs share the same (conceptual) content, (...) but that for a subject to undergo a perceptual experience, the subject need not possess the concepts involved in a correct characterization of such content. I argue that the consistency of this position requires a non-Fregean notion of content that fails to capture the way the subject grasps the world as being. Hence state nonconceptualism leaves perceptual content attribution unsupported. Yet, on a characterization of content along the relevant (neo-Fregean) lines, this position would become incoherent, as it would entail that a subject could exercise cognitive abilities she doesn’t possess. I conclude that, given the notion of content demanded by the debate, the state view does entail the content view after all. (shrink)

Is action-guiding vision cognitively penetrable? More specifically, is the visual processing that guides our goal-directed actions sensitive to semantic information from cognitive states? This paper critically examines a recent family of arguments whose aim is to challenge a widespread and influential view in philosophy and cognitive science: the view that action-guiding vision is cognitively impenetrable. I argue, in response, that while there may very well be top–down causal influences on action-guiding vision, they should not be taken to be an instance (...) of cognitive penetration. Assuming otherwise is to assign a computational role to the influencing states that they cannot perform. Although questions about cognitive penetrability are ultimately empirical, the issues addressed in this paper are largely philosophical. The discussion here highlights an important set of considerations that help better understand the relations between cognition, vision, and action. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that while we may typically lack conscious access to the source of implicit attitudes and their impact on our beliefs and behaviour, we do have access to their content. In this paper, I discuss the notion of accessibility required for this argument (...) to work vis-à-vis these empirical results and offer two ways in which the accessibilist could meet the challenge posed by implicit biases. Ultimately both strategies fail, but the way in which they do, I conclude, reveals something general and important about our epistemic obligations and about the intuitions that inform the role of implicit biases in accessibilist justification. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional—as opposed to associationist. The proposal under criticism moves from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations to the view that the structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for such biased behaviour is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I (...) contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational structure of implicit attitudes. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by the structural social injustice that implicit attitudes reflect, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue in favour of an associationist view.En este artículo cuestiono la tesis de que la estructura representacional de las actitudes implícitas responsables del comportamiento implícitamente sesgado es proposicional—en lugar de asociacionista. De acuerdo con la propuesta criticada, si la conducta implícita sesgada puede ocasionalmente ser modulada por consideraciones lógicas y evidenciales, entonces la estructura de las actitudes implícitas responsables de esa conducta es proposicional. Cuestiono, en particular, la verdad de este condicional. Sostengo que la sensibilidad de las actitudes implícitas a consideraciones lógicas y evidenciales resulta ser un criterio inadecuado para establecer su verdadera estructura representacional. Consideraciones de otro tipo, que enfatizan los desafíos planteados por la injusticia social estructural que las actitudes implícitas reflejan, ofrecen, concluyo, un mejor apoyo para decidir esta cuestión a favor de una visión asociacionista. (shrink)

In this paper I argue on two fronts. First, I press for the view that judging is a type of mental action, as opposed to those who think that judging is involuntary and hence not an action. Second, I argue that judging is specifically a type of non-voluntary mental action. My account of the non-voluntary nature of the mental act of judging differs, however, from standard non-voluntarist views, according to which ‘non-voluntary’ just means regulated by epistemic reasons. In addition, judging (...) is non-voluntary, I contend, because it is partially constituted by the exercise of a non-reason-governed skill. This skill, which I call ‘critical pop-out’, consists of an unreflective, often unconscious, ability to detect the kind of situations in which the reflective abilities that also partially constitute our acts of judging should be deployed. We are responsible for our judgments, I conclude, because in identifying such reflection-inviting situations, we reveal the kind of epistemic agents we are. (shrink)

I raise some doubts about the plausibility of Stanley and Williamson's view that all knowledge-how is just a species of propositional knowledge. By tackling the question of what is involved in entertaining a proposition, I try to show that Stanley and Williamson's position leads to an uncomfortable dilemma. Depending on how we understand the notion of contemplating a proposition, either intuitively central cases of knowing-how cannot be thus classified or we lose our grip on the very idea of propositional knowledge, (...) which then fails to demarcate any clear class of cases. I conclude with a brief discussion of the nature and role of knowledge-how, and its relation to the important, but less explored, notion of expertise. (shrink)

In this paper I approach the debate over non-human animals’ concepts from a metaphilosophical perspective. I compare exemplars of a full-fledged and an austere view of concepts and concept possession. A deflationist response to these views main- tains that the austere and the full-fledged theorist each makes claims that are true when they, respectively, assert and deny ‘nonhuman animals have concepts’. I will argue that the deflationist response is misplaced, using an analogy with the debate over the putative non-conceptual content (...) of perceptual experience. The argument turns on the type of intentional explanation that the austere view on concept posses- sion can support. For the deflationist response to be sustainable, adherents of the aus- tere view would need to have substantially weaker commitments to the explanatory power of their account of concepts and concept possession than, in fact, they do. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Paul Coates defends a sophisticated dispositional account which allegedly resolves the sceptical paradox developed by Kripke in his monograph on Wittgenstein's treatment of following a rule (Kripke, 1982). Coates' account appeals to a notion of 'homeostasis', unpacked as a subject's second-order disposition to maintain a consistent pattern of extended first-order dispositions regarding her linguistic behavior. This kind of account, Coates contends, provides a naturalistic model for the normativity of intentional properties and thus resolves Kripke's sceptical paradox. (...) In this paper I argue that Coates' second-order dispositional account cannot solve the sceptic's problems regarding meaning and normativity. My main contention is that in order for second-order dispositions to be able to effectively regulate the coordinated responses constitutive of first-order dispositions, those first order dispositions must be independently identifiable. Yet that's precisely what Kripke's sceptical argument calls into question. I shall also argue, in a more positive fashion, that Coates' own appeal to practical breakdowns may suggest a different —and more effective— response to the sceptic's concern. (shrink)

This paper has a two-fold goal. First, I defend the view that the prejudicial behaviour that results from implicit biases is best understood as a type of habitual action—as a harmful, yet deeply entrenched, passively acquired, socially relevant type of habit. Second, I explore how characterizing such implicitly biased behaviour as a habit aids our understanding of the responsibility we bear for it. As habits are ultimately susceptible of being controlled, agents ought to be held responsible for their implicit biased (...) actions. Yet, the blaming response should target agents only insofar as they have failed (while being able) to develop a particular kind of ability: the ability to spot the kind of situations that require the exercise of the relevant intellectual, moral, social, and prudential obligations. Being thus responsible, however, is consistent with the agent’s not being blameworthy. For the automaticity of the blamed agent’s implicitly biased behaviour makes it unintentional relative to intellectual, moral, social, and prudential values that she already cares about. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to defend the thesis that the content of know-how states is an accuracy assessable type of nonconceptual content. My argument proceeds in two stages. I argue, first, that the intellectualist distinction between types of ways of grasping the same kind of content is uninformative unless it is tied in with a distinction between kinds of contents. Second, I consider and reject the objection that, if the content of know-how states is non-conceptual, it will (...) be mysterious why attributions of knowing how create opaque contexts. I show that the objection conflates two distinct issues: the nature of the content of know-how states and the semantic evaluability of know-how ascriptions. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p87 In the last decades there was a structural turn in the classic debate between scientific realists and antirealists with empiricist orientation. Two main arguments support the realist conception: the ‘No Miracle Argument’ and the thesis of continuity. The thesis of continuity states that some parts of a theory are retained when a scientific change takes place. In a current famous article, J. Worrall (1989) defends the continuity argument by stating that what is preserved in the succession of two empirically (...) successful theories are the relations among the postulated entities and not the nature of the relata (structural or syntactical realism). Based on this perspective, van Fraassen introduces his position named Empiricist Structuralism , which claims that only the structures of phenomena are retained. This conception tries to explain the success of science and at the same time defend the continuity of structures. I will demonstrate in this paper that the accomplishment of the two mentioned requirements imply a capitulation in favor of realistic intuitions. (shrink)

In the last decades there was a structural turn in the classic debate between scientific realists and antirealists with empiricist orientation. Two main arguments support the realist conception: the ‘No Miracle Argument’ and the thesis of continuity. The thesis of continuity states that some parts of a theory are retained when a scientific change takes place. In a current famous article, J. Worrall defends the continuity argument by stating that what is preserved in the succession of two empirically successful theories (...) are the relations among the postulated entities and not the nature of the relata. Based on this perspective, van Fraassen introduces his position named Empiricist Structuralism, which claims that only the structures of phenomena are retained. This conception tries to explain the success of science and at the same time defend the continuity of structures. I will demonstrate in this paper that the accomplishment of the two mentioned requirements imply a capitulation in favor of realistic intuitions. (shrink)

RESUMEN:La originalidad que define la lectura deleuzeana de las artes es su crítica implícita a toda antropología o psicología del artista y del espectador, y a todo abordaje de la obra dependiente de la tradición hermenéutica, de las teorías del lenguaje y de la semiología estructuralista. El problema de la animalidad y de la vida en general en relación con el arte parece responder, de un modo inédito, al desdibujamiento de las esferas que la estética clásica distinguía como categorías escindidas (...) para el análisis de la obra de arte; el autor, la obra, el espectador. En este artículo proponemos un recorrido por algunos aspectos de las teorías de la individuación y lo viviente en Simondon, Bergson y von Uexküll para comprender su uso y función en la estética deleuzena. PALABRAS CLAVE:DELEUZE, ESTÉTICA, SIMONDON, BERGSON, VON UEXKÜLLABSTRACT:The originality of Deleuze aesthetics is its implicit refuse of any anthropology o psychology of the artist or the spectator, and also a refusal of hermeneutics, language theories and structuralist semiology towards an analysis of the work of art. The problem of animality and life in general in relation to art seems to respond, in an unprecedented way, to the fading of those which classical aesthetics regarded as split topics for the analysis of the work of art, i.e., author, work of art, spectator. This paper points out some relevant aspects of individuation and life theories in Simondon, Bergson and von Uexküll, so as to understand their use and function in Deleuze aesthetics. KEY WORDS:DELEUZE, AESTHETICS, SIMONDON, BERGSON, VON UEXKÜLL. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to show that Pettit and Smith’s (1996) argument concerning the nature of free belief is importantly incomplete. I accept Pettit and Smith’s emphasis upon normative constraints governing responsible believing and desiring, and their claim that the responsibly believing agent needs to possess an ability to believe (or desire) otherwise when believing (desiring) wrongly. But I argue that their characterization of these constraints does not do justice to one crucial factor, namely, the presence of (...) an unreflective, sub-personally constituted, ability to spot the kind of situations in which the reflective critical abilities constitutive of responsible believing (and desiring) should be deployed. (shrink)

Dual factor theories of meaning are fatally flawed in at least two ways. First. their very duality constitutes a problem: the two dimensions of meaning (reference and conceptual role) cannot be treated as totally orthogonal without compromising the intuition that much of our linguistic and non linguistic behavior is based on the cognizer’s interaction with the world. Second, Conceptual Role Semantics is not adequate for explaining a crucial feature of linguistic representation, viz., the special kind of compositionality known as concatenative (...) compositionality. Dual factor theories, I conclude, cannot constitute an acceptable philosophical model of content. (shrink)

Resumen El artículo muestra los rasgos esenciales, el principio y el sentido último de la conversión cristiana, a través del análisis del Libro de la vida y de Las Moradas del castillo interior, de Santa Teresa de Jesús. El método filosófico utilizado para la interpretación de los testimonios místicos ya indicados es un desarrollo original, cuyo origen se remonta a la fenomenología hermenéutica de Heidegger, cuyos principios he expuesto en el primer capítulo de mi libro ¿A dónde te escondiste, Amado, (...) ¿y me dejaste con gemido? Una fenomenología hermenéutica del Cántico Espiritual B, de San Juan de la Cruz. La importancia de estas páginas radica en que, para comprender el proceso místico cristiano, testimoniado por Santa Teresa de Jesús, el primer paso consiste en describir la experiencia con la cual comienza.The article shows the essential features, the beginning and the ultimate meaning of Christian conversion, through the analysis of Libro de la vida and Las moradas del castillo interior, by Santa Teresa de Jesús. The philosophical method used for the interpretation of the mystical testimonies already indicated is an original development, whose origin dates back to Heidegger's hermeneuticalphenomenology, the principies of which I have set out in the first chapter of my book ¿A dónde te escondiste, Amado, ¿y me dejaste con gemido? Una fenomenología hermenéutica del Cántico Espiritual B, de San Juan de la Cruz. The importance of these pages is that, to understand the christian mysticalprocess, witnessed by Saint Teresa of Jesus, the first step consists in describing the experience with which it begins. (shrink)

It is sometimes said that humans are unlike other animals in at least one crucial respect. We do not simply form beliefs, desires and other mental states, but are capable of caring about our mental states in a distinctive way. We can care about the justification of our beliefs, and about the desirability of our desires. This kind of observation is usually made in discussions of free will and moral responsibility. But it has profound consequences, or so I shall argue, (...) for our conception of the very nature of beliefs and other mental states. Suitably developed, it allows us to draw a line between two distinct ways in which a creature may possess a belief, represent a scene, and fall into error. The first way (which I shall call the 'mindless' way) involves little more than an encoding of information in some way designed to guide appropriate response. This is the common heritage of humans, and many other animals. The second way (which I shall call the 'mindful' way) requires that the creature be capable in addition of a special kind of second-order reflection, and (importantly) be expert at detecting the kinds of situation in which such reflection is called for. The differences between these two ways of 'believing that P' are sufficiently deep and significant to warrant (or so I claim) our treating them as two distinct classes of mental states. For it is only courtesy of the second layer of complexity, I shall argue, that it becomes proper to hold someone accountable for their beliefs or other mental states, and it is this fact of (something like) accountability that in turn raises the most significant challenge for philosophical attempts to give naturalized accounts of meaning, belief, and mentality. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to develop a notion of responsibility (semantic responsibility) that is to the notion of belief what epistemic responsibility is to the notion of justification. 'Being semantically responsible' is shown to involve the fulfilment of cognitive duties which allow the agent to engage in the kind of reason-laden discourses which render her beliefs appropriately sensitive to correction. The concept of semantic responsibility suggests that the notion of belief found in contemporary philosophical debates about content implicitly encompasses (...) radically different classes of beliefs. In what follows I make those different types explicit, and sketch some implications for naturalisation projects in semantics and for accounts of the (putative) non-conceptual content of perceptual experiences. (shrink)

Let’s consider the following paradox (Fodor [1989], Jackson and Petit [1988] [1992], Drestke [1988], Block [1991], Lepore and Loewer [1987], Lewis [1986], Segal and Sober [1991]): i) The intentional content of a thought (or any other intentional state) is causally relevant to its behavioural (and other) effects. ii) Intentional content is nothing but the meaning of internal representations. But, iii) Internal processors are only sensitive to the syntactic structures of internal representations, not their meanings. Therefore it seems that if we (...) want to defend the idea -absolutely plausible from an intuitive point of view- that mental / intentional states are causally responsible for behavioural outputs and we want to do it on the physicalist basis of any scientific methodology, we will have to give up the conviction that such intentional states qua intentional, i. e. as having a particular meaning, are the ones causally responsible for our behaviour. The path that takes us to mental epiphenomenalism is clear: 1) the causal powers of any event are completely determined by its physical properties; 2) although intentional properties supervene on physical properties, they can’t be identified with them; 3) intentional properties, as intentional, are not causally responsible for behaviour, because they don’t take part in the causal powers of the states to which they belong, i. e., intentional properties are epiphenomenal. Let’s consider now a different yet parallel position to the one just described. There is an important debate in cognitive science about whether the class of mechanisms to which we belong and which the computational modelling project of cognitive processes refers to is best represented by classical or connectionist approaches (McClelland, Rumelhart et. al [1986], Smolensky [1987] [1988], Fodor and Pylyshyn [1988], Pinker and Prince [1988], Clark [1989], Ramsey, Stich and Rumelhart [1991], Clark and Karmiloff-Smith [forthcoming]).In classical, serial processing models, information is encoded in terms of rules that have a linguistic character. In connectionist or parallel distributed processing (PDP) models, the causal relationships among the units that constitute the system determine how the information is processes by the network, although these units don’t have a direct semantic interpretation. But, for both, classical and connectionist models, all the computations can be explained without any reference to the content of the processed information, i.e., in both cases the properties that seem to be responsible for the system’s behaviour are ultimately physical properties nor intentional ones. This situation mirrors thus, within cognitive science, the philosophical discussion concerning the causal efficacy of semantic properties. Now, if in this debate we opt for the classical paradigm, there is a way of finding a solution to the computational version of the epiphenomenalism paradox. This solution is based mainly on the notion of supervenience or, more precisely, on the notion of mereological supervenience (Kim [1984] [1988])1 . The idea of intentional properties supervening on physical properties makes sense within the classical context because there exists an easily isolable supervenience base comprising the syntactic items in the socalled language of thought. But, what happens if we opt for the connectionist paradigm?. The situation here doesn’t seem to favour the use of the same supervenience strategy. For it has been argued (Ramsey, Stich and Garon [1991]) that beliefs, desires, and other mental states are nor, in the connectionist paradigm, individuable as weight or activation states of the system. This is because information is encoded by the network in distributed and superpositional representations, i.e., there are no straightforwardly isolable vehicles at the physical level that can be identified as the articulated supervenience base on which the semantic properties supervene2 . If this is true, then the connectionist not only loses the battle against epiphenomenalism but more drastically, seems to offer a standing invitation to eliminativism, since talk of beliefs and desires, etc. now seems to be floating free of any acceptable scientific underpinning, i.e., she has lost the necessary theoretical apparatus for supporting the intuitive idea that propositional attitudes -beliefs, desires and any mental states with semantic content- are physically realized. This second line of argumentation doesn’t take us to a paradox but to a dilemma: either we accept eliminativism, if connectionist hypothesis are correct or we defend the causal efficacy of mental states with semantic content by showing that, after all, connectionist networks are not plausible cognitive models (Davies [1991]). From my point of view, however, both lines of argumentation need to be revised. The aim of this paper is to find an account of the causal efficacy of content that avoids the aforementioned epiphenomenalist objections and that doesn’t require the discovery of inner symbols in the computational modelling of such contentful mental states. In short, the aim is to find a meeting point where a philosophical story about content and cause and the connectionist computational model can be brought together (Cfr. Clark [1989]). (shrink)

We continuously form perceptual beliefs about the world based on how things appear to us in our perceptual experiences. I see that the ripe tomato in front of me is red and I form the belief that this tomato is red based on my seeing it, i.e. based on my veridical perceptual experience of this red tomato. Perceptual experiences and beliefs are representational mental states. Both are defined not by what they are, i.e. their physical properties, but by what they (...) are about, what they represent, by their content. The content of both perceptual experiences and beliefs is specified by how the world must be for them to represent things correctly; it is specified by stating the conditions under which they would be true. (shrink)

On the Origin of Objects is, at heart, an extended search for a non-circular and nonreductive characterization of two key notions: intentionality and computation. Only a non-circular and non-reductive account of these key notions can, Smith believes, provide a secure platform for a proper understanding of the mind. The project has both a negative and a positive aspect. Negatively, Smith rejects views that attempt to identify the key notions with lower-level physical properties, arguing instead for a more abstract and systemic (...) understanding. This negative effort occupies Part I of the book. In Part II, we encounter the positive side of Smith's proposal: an attempt to develop a non-reductive analysis of computation and meaning able to meet the requirements laid out in Part I. One purpose of this critical review is to lay out this project in fairly simple terms. This is necessary since Smith's own treatment and prose sometimes obscures the flow of the argument. I suggest that, properly understood, Smith's proposal bears a clear affinity to ideas emerging from the dynamical systems movement within Cognitive Science, and that this tie-in can help put flesh on several of the more metaphorical characterizations in the book. My main criticism is that the book ultimately fails to provide an account able to meet Smith's own requirements for a truly non-reductive account of intentionality. This is especially the case regarding Smith's commitment to licensing a partition of the world based on no a priori assumptions whatsoever. The exercise is a valuable one, however, since it forces us to look harder at some foundational assumptions and at least hints at a new and refreshing perspective: one in which the key explanatory relations are grounded in facts about human practice and pragmatically established social norms. (shrink)

Fodor claims that the modularity of mind helps undermine relativism in various forms. I shall show first, that the modular vision of mind provides insufficient support for the rejection of relativism, and second, that an alternative model may, in fact, provide a better empirical response to the relativist challenge.

Semantic properties are not commonly held to be part of the basic ontological furniture of the world. Consequently, we confront a problem: how to 'naturalize' semantics so as to reveal these properties in their true ontological colors? Dominant naturalistic theories address semantic properties as properties of some other kind. The reductionistic flavor is unmistakable. The following quote from Fodor's Psychosemantics is probably the contemporary locus classicus of this trend. Fodor is commendably unapologetic: "I suppose that sooner or later the physicists (...) will complete the catalogue they've been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear upon their list. But aboutness surely won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep. It's hard to see, in the face of this consideration, how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really something else." Notice the shape of this explanatory project. Intentional properties will count as real in virtue of their identity with, or supervenience on, some set of lower-level physical properties. Fodor thus assumes, in effect, that the program of naturalization demands a higher-to-lower, top-to-bottom, kind of explanatory strategy. This paper addresses precisely that assumption, namely, that the non-semantic properties on which semantic properties depend, belong to what are intuitively lower levels of description than the intentional level itself. It also questions the higher-to-lower explanatory scheme associated with that assumption. My discussion of this topic draws on Robert Brandom's recent work and can be considered an analysis of Brandom's stance and its implications. The discussion should help to explain the general lack of progress in the project of naturalizing content. It should also help show why attempts to eliminate the normative vocabulary employed in specifying the practices that guide the use of a language are unlikely to succeed. I shall start by displaying the general order of explanation that characterizes typical naturalization projects, showing that even when a full reduction to physics is avoided, some important assumptions inherited from the explanatory model of physics remain. These include the demand for an array of causal explanations couched in terms of ultimate properties of the world, and the idea that such non-semantic properties should be constitutive of whatever semantic properties are in question. Extending Brandom's idea that the normativity of content is not reducible to physics, I shall argue that even such residual demands are inappropriate. More positively, I suggest that, despite the deep irreducibility of the normative dimension of content, we need not consider that dimension either primitive or inexplicable. Instead, such normative aspects can be unpacked by invoking a different, lower-to-higher, explanatory scheme in which the explanans includes higher level features such as skilled know-how and social frames of action. (shrink)

There is a compelling idea in the air. Both contemporary philosophers of mind and philosophers of language are engaged in developing theories of content that are naturalistic. The stand has been taken: semantic properties are not part of the primitive ontological furniture of the world. If we want to vindicate those properties as real, we will have to show that it is possible to unpack them into some other –primitive– set of properties. It is taken for granted that there is (...) no alternative way of avoiding circularity in explaining the semantic properties of mental or linguistic representations. The following quote from Fodor's Psychosemantics is probably the locus classicus for this trend: "I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue they've been compiling of the ultimate and irreducible properties of things. When they do, the likes of spin, charm, and charge will perhaps appear upon their list. But aboutness surely won't; intentionality simply doesn't go that deep. It's hard to see, in the face of this consideration, how one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some extent or other, a Reductionist. If the semantic and the intentional are real properties of things, it must be in virtue of their identity with properties that are themselves neither intentional nor semantic. If aboutness is real, it must be really something else." The naturalistic project seems thus to be deeply rooted in the search for a non-circular, explanatory account of intentional categories. Although, in principle, one should not take naturalism in regard to some realm as committing one to any sort of reductive explanation of that realm, in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, naturalism and reductionism como easily upon a meeting point. The reason is that explanatory, non-circular answers are taken to be reductionist. If this is correct, we would have to conclude that naturalism entails reductionism or, even more strongly, that naturalism is constitutively dependent upon the defense of a reductionist thesis. In this case, we would have to admit that there cannot be a non-reductionist naturalistic theory of content. The main aim of this paper is to cast some light on the issue of what naturalism means regarding a theory of content. It is a matter of a some urgency to find out exactly what it takes for a theory of content to be naturalistic. Until we do so, we cannot properly evaluate the existing theories. I will center my discussion of this topic on the question of whether naturalistic theories of content ought to be reductionist theories. The claim I want to defend is that, despite the current trend regarding the relations between naturalism and reductionism, the former is not constitutively dependent upon the latter. I will argue that, in fact, the strong requirements of a reductionist thesis are the very reason the project of naturalization seems to be doomed. However, I will try to show that once we have weakened those requirements, non-reductionist answers are certainly acceptable, in the sense of being informative, non-circular, and above all, explanatory. I propose a safe[r] characterization of naturalism that seems to better fit our theoretical views about content, and to turn the whole project into a more promising enterprise. (shrink)

Peacocke's characterization of what he calls implicit conceptions recognizes the significance of a subset of contentful states in making rational behavior intelligible. What Peacocke has to offer in this paper is an account of why we need implicit conceptions; how we can discover them; what they explain; what they are; and how they can help us to better understand some issues in the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. The rationalist tradition in which Peacocke's project ought to be (...) located is concerned with the nature of understanding. His notion of implicit conceptions is invoked to explain non-straightforwardly inferential but rational patterns of concept-involving behavior. We come to know about implicit conceptions because we treat the thinker's practices as having a certain representational content. They are implicit in what the thinker does. I intend to focus on the question of what implicit conceptions are. I will argue for the following position: that —even at the personal level— certain inferential principles underlie the process that leads to the thinker's reliably differential responses and that subsequently point us in the direction of a notion such as that of an implicit conception. More precisely, I will argue that practical inferential processes are involved in the understanding-based capacities that support our ascription of personal-level implicit conceptions to the thinker. If I am right, then Peacocke's implicit conceptions don't preclude acceptance of personal-level conceptual role theories because that practical inferential articulation, i.e. that conceptual role, is the implicit conception itself. (shrink)

Peacocke's characterization of what he calls implicit conceptions recognizes the significance of a subset of contentful states in making rational behavior intelligible. What Peacocke has to offer in this paper is an account of (i) why we need implicit conceptions; (ii) how we can discover them; (iii) what they explain; (iv) what they are; and (v) how they can help us to better understand some issues in the theory of meaning and the theory of knowledge. The rationalist tradition in which (...) Peacocke's project ought to be located is concerned with the nature of understanding. His notion of implicit conceptions is invoked to explain non-straightforwardly inferential but rational patterns of concept-involving behavior. We come to know about implicit conceptions because we treat the thinker's practices as having a certain representational content. They are implicit in what the thinker does. I intend to focus on the question of what implicit conceptions are (although in doing so some of the other aspects will also come to the fore). I will argue for the following position: that —even at the personal level— certain inferential principles underlie the process that leads to the thinker's reliably differential responses and that subsequently point us in the direction of a notion such as that of an implicit conception. More precisely, I will argue that practical inferential processes are involved in the understanding-based capacities that support our ascription of personal-level implicit conceptions to the thinker. If I am right, then Peacocke's implicit conceptions don't preclude acceptance of personal-level conceptual-role theories because that practical inferential articulation, i.e. that conceptual role, is the implicit conception itself. (shrink)

"Consciousness", it is widely agreed, does not name any single cognitive phenomenon. But nor is the gathering of distinct phenomena under that single label an accident. What seems to unify the range of cognitive goods in this "variety store" is the central yet elusive notion of the availability of some content or feeling in subjective experience. The paper begins by building a rough taxonomy of the various ways different approaches have tried to give an account of this central target. Among (...) these approaches there are two to which special attention is paid. According to the first, our very cognitive constitution makes the issue of subjective experience scientifically intractable . According to the second , the philosophical worries about the subjectivity of experience are solved once consciousness is analyzed as the result of a long process of evolution that turns the flexible architecture of the brain into a virtual sequential machine. It is my contention that noconceptual argument of the first kind can establish the impossibility of one day achieving a scientific understanding of the property of being conscious. It is also my contention that a better understanding of the underlying neurophysiological and computational mechanisms is needed if Dennett′s theory is to resolve, rather than side-step, those problems related to the subjective phenomenology of consciousness. In short, I aim to show that there is no cause to regard a scientific theory of subjective experience to be in principle unobtainable. But that, contra Dennett, the form of such a scientific understanding is not yet clear. (shrink)

En este ensayo nos proponemos realizar un trabajo de traducción, como lo sugiere Boaventura de Sousa Santos, entre aspectos puntuales de la teoría estética de Augusto Boal y algunos de los estudios que sobre la colonialidad del ser han realizado autores como Walter Mignolo y Nelson Maldonado Torres, entre otros. Nuestros objetivos son, primero, subrayar los vínculos entre las dos teorías para revelar la viabilidad de la existencia de una colonialidad del crear; segundo, reflexionar la estética del oprimido como una (...) estética descolonizadora. (shrink)

Resumen En esta nota crítica presento un análisis de los materiales textuales que constituyen el capítulo 19 de la serie Early Greek Philosophy de A. Laks y G. Most dedicado a Parménides. Después de comparar cuantitativamente los textos de este capítulo con las ediciones de H. Diels y A.H. Coxon, así como de precisar cuáles son los textos "nuevos" que figuran en esta edición y las formas en que los editores decidieron presentarlos, ofrezco algunas consideraciones sobre el concepto mismo de (...) recepción y su operatividad en este capítulo, sobre la superación definitiva de la distinción entre testimonios y fragmentos y sobre las ventajas y desventajas que supone cortar los textos para la presentación esquemática y temática de los contenidos. Por último, examino el modo en que la doctrina de Parménides se presenta en este capítulo y muestro algunas de las decisiones que los autores tomaron sobre los innumerables problemas de transmisión textual del Poema.In this critical note, I will present an analysis of the textual materials that constitute the 19th chapter, dedicated to Parmenides, of the Early Greek Philosophy series by A. Laks and G. Most. After offering a quantitative comparison of the texts in this chapter and the editions of H. Diels and A.H. Coxon, and after specifying which "new" texts figure in this edition and how they are presented, I will provide considerations on the concept of reception and how it operates throughout this chapter, on the definite overcoming of the distinction between testimonia and fragmenta, and on the advantages and disadvantages of cutting out the texts for the schematic and thematic presentation of its contents. Finally, I examine how Parmenides' doctrine is presented and comment on some of the decisions that the authors made on a few of the innumerable problems related to the textual transmission of the Poem. (shrink)

What I find particularly valuable in the juxtaposition of these three essays on my book is the triangulation made possible by their different versions of much the same story. I present my view as a product of cognitive science, but all three express worries that it may involve some sort of ominous backsliding towards the evils of behaviorism. I agree with Baars and McGovern when they suggest that philosophy has had some baleful influences on psychology during this century. Logical positivism (...) at its best was full of subtle softenings, but behaviorist psychologists bought the tabloid version, and sold it to their students in large quantities. George Miller's account of those dreary days is not an exaggeration, and the effects still linger in some quarters. (Philosophers are often amused--but they should really be disconcerted--to note that the only living, preaching logical positivists today are to be found in psychology departments.). (shrink)

This is a review of Mind and Supermind. By KEITH FRANKISH. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp xiv + 255. Price £45.00 (US $75.00). ISBN 0521 812038 (hardback).

Resumen La argumentación es una forma de discurso en la que un hablante defiende una postura en una discusión. El presente trabajo se enfoca en la complejidad argumentativa y los recursos evaluativos y evidenciales que caracterizan las disputas de niños de diverso nivel socioeconómico. Se analizaron 94 disputas entre niños de 4 años y otros niños (5 a 10 años) en situaciones de juego espontáneo registradas en hogares de sectores socioeconómicos medio y bajo. El análisis identificó diferencias marginales en la (...) complejidad argumentativa entre los grupos. Por su parte se hallaron diferencias significativas en recursos de evaluativos de emocionalidad y en los evidenciales deónticos y exclamativos a favor de los sectores de nivel socioeconómico bajo. Los sectores medios registraron un mayor empleo de expresiones de causalidad y conectores. Los resultados se discuten a la luz de los hallazgos de investigaciones previas. Abstract Argumentation is a type of discourse in which a speaker defends a claim in a discussion. The present work focuses on the argumentative complexity and the evaluative and evidential resources that characterize the disputes of children of different socioeconomic levels. We analyzed 94 disputes between 4-year-old children and other children (5 to 10 years old) in situations of spontaneous play registered in homes of middle and low socioeconomic status (SES). The analysis identified marginal differences in argumentative complexity between the groups. On the other hand, significant differences were found in evaluative expressions of emotion and in deontic and exclamatory evidential markers, more frequently used by the low SES group. The mid SES group tends to use a higher number of expressions of causality and connectors. The results are discussed with reference to the findings of previous research. (shrink)

La realidad aumentada permite la interacción del usuario con el mundo físico. Esto da la posibilidad de sustituir fantomas por modelos digitales. Se pretende determinar la funcionalidad de implementar tecnología de Realidad aumentada como recurso pedagógico para la asignatura de Anatomía General. Se entregará a los estudiantes una aplicación para teléfono móvil y un cuadernillo con imágenes. Con dicho teléfono visualizarán imágenes que se transformarán en imágenes de realidad aumentada que el estudiante manipulará a través de su teléfono. Los resultados (...) esperados se enfocarán en fomentar la inclusión de modelos de M-LEARNING dentro de la carrera y la Universidad. (shrink)

El presente artículo es fruto de una interpretación filosófica de “El evangelio de los sufrimientos”, cuyo hilo conductor es la identificación de los rasgos esenciales del cristianismo. Las páginas que ahora se ofrecen a la consideración del lector constituyen un análisis fenomenológico-hermenéutico de la manera en que el cristiano se relaciona con las cosas, con la naturaleza, con el prójimo y consigo mismo, con base en la fe. La tesis que se busca demostrar es que el cristianismo es un modo (...) de existencia cuya realización plena es imposible porque nadie puede sufrir como lo hizo Cristo en la cruz. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to assess the relationships among ethical context, organizational commitment, and person-organization fit using a sample of 304 young working adults. Results indicated that corporate ethical values signifying different cultural aspects of an ethical context were positively related to both organizational commitment and person-organization fit. Organizational commitment was also positively related to person-organization fit. The findings suggest that the development and promotion of an ethical context might enhance employees' workplace experiences, and companies should consider adopting (...) ethical policies that support principled conduct, punish unethical actions, and increase individual perceptions of an ethical company environment. (shrink)

El artículo menciona el giro en favor de los enfoques participativos o comprometidos políticamente en el campo CTS, realizando una propuesta para su profundización desde una senda alineada con la teoría crítica de la tecnología. Inspirado en los aportes de Andrew Feenberg y Johan Söderberg, el artículo emprende esta tarea mediante la conjunción de conceptos de la perspectiva de la construcción social de la tecnología con aquellos de una tradición hegeliano-marxista interesada en visiones del sistema capitalista como una totalidad que (...) limita la contingencia en el desarrollo tecnológico. Así, propone el rescate de conceptos como clase, capitalismo y lógica del capital, para la comprensión del desarrollo tecnológico. En el curso de esta tarea, el relativismo constructivista es considerado un problema central para profundizar este giro y se lo reemplaza por una evaluación de los códigos técnicos y del contexto social más amplio que el capitalismo representa. En el trascurso del texto, se expone una reutilización de los conceptos constructivistas con arreglo a los intereses de una posición alineada con la teoría crítica de la tecnología. Así, el concepto "marco tecnológico" se asociará con el de "código técnico", de Feenberg, y con el rescate de la lógica mercantil pregonada por la teoría crítica y Söderberg. The paper mentions the turn in favor of participatory or politically engaged approaches in the STS field, and outlines a proposal for deepening this turn within a critical theory of technology route. Inspired in the contributions of Andrew Feenberg and Johan Söderberg, the paper undertakes this task through a combination of concepts from the perspective of social construction of technology with those of a Hegelian-Marxist tradition interested in visions of the capitalist system as a whole posing limits to contingency in technological development. Thus, it offers to rescue such concepts as class, capitalism, market relations and logic of the capital, to better understand technological development. During this task, constructivist relativism is considered a central problem to deepen this turn and thus replaced by an assessment of the technical codes and the wider social context represented by capitalism. In the following parts the paper presents a reuse of constructivist concepts according to the interests of a position aligned with critical theory of technology. Thus, the concept of "technological frame" will be associated with Feenberg's "technical code" and with the rescue of the market logic advocated by critical theory and Söderberg. (shrink)