Raymond Aron is widely regarded as the most important figure in the history of twentieth-century French liberalism. Yet his status within the history of liberal thought has been more often proclaimed than explained. Though he is frequently lauded as the inheritor of France's liberal tradition, Aron's formative influences were mostly non-French and often radically anti-liberal thinkers. This book explains how, why, and with what consequences he belatedly defined and aligned himself with a French liberal tradition. It also situates Aron within (...) the larger histories of Cold War liberalism and decolonization, re-evaluating his contribution to debates over totalitarianism, the end of ideology, and the Algerian War. By exposing the enduring importance of Aron's student political engagements for the development of his thought, Iain Stewart challenges the prevailing view of Aron's early intellectual trajectory as a journey from naïve socialist idealism to mature liberal realism, offering a new critical perspective on one of the twentieth century's most influential intellectuals. (shrink)

Taking as its starting point recent claims that Jean-Paul Sartre's Critique de la Raison Dialectique was written as an attempt to overcome the historical relativism of Raymond Aron's Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire , the present article traces this covert dialogue back to a fundamental disagreement between the two men over the interpretation of Wilhelm Dilthey's anti-positivist theory of Verstehen or 'understanding'. In so doing it counters a longstanding tendency to emphasise the convergence of Aron and Sartre's philosophical interests (...) prior to the break in their friendship occasioned by the onset of the Cold War, suggesting that the causes of their later, radical political divergence were pregnant within this earlier philosophical divergence. (shrink)

Summary This article approaches post-war debates about the relationship between normative political theory and empirical political science from a French perspective. It does so by examining Raymond Aron's commentaries on a series of articles commissioned by him for a special issue of the Revue française de science politique on this theme as well as through an analysis of his wartime dialogue with the neo-Thomist philosopher, Jacques Maritain. Following a consideration of Aron's critique of contemporary approaches to this issue in France, (...) we discuss his own distinctive attempt to draw normative theory and empirical science into the same orbit by tracing the interaction of these two elements in his work from the late 1930s to the mid-1960s. (shrink)

We introduce a new logical operator CSTC and show that incorporating this operator into first-order logic enables as to capture the complexity class PSPACE. We also show that by varying how the operator is applied we can capture the complexity classes P, NP, the classes of the Polynomial Hierarchy PH, and PSPACE. As such, the operator CSTC can be regarded as a general purpose operator. We also give applications of these characterizations by showing that P and NP coincide with those (...) problems accepted by two new classes of program schemes , by producing some new complete problems for various complexity classes where the reductions are from first principles and do not use known complete problems , and by giving a simple proof that first-order logic incorporated with the least fixed point operator captures P. (shrink)

Jörgen Jörgensen (1938) asks why there should not be a valid deduction even though the premises are imperatives (“Jörgensen’s Dilemma”). Robert Walter (1996; 9 Ratio Juris 168), following Hans Kelsen, thinks that there can be a valid deduction if the premises, although in prescriptive (including imperative) language, are actually descriptions of prescriptions. It is suggested that Walter then has his own dilemma: the more possible it is, for such descriptions to be valid, the less likely it is, that the prescriptions (...) described are illogical; Walter’s Dilemma is a species of Jörgensen’s. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, presented as a form of legal positivism, is interpreted as establishing metaphysical bases of legal science, on analogy with Kant’s “metaphysical bases of natural science (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft)”. It is asked, in the light of the Pure Theory’s acknowledged difficulties, how far it succeeds in escaping from the exegetical tradition in Western legal theory.

We investigate why similar extensions of first-order logic using operators corresponding to NP-complete decision problems apparently differ in expressibility: the logics capture either NP or LNP. It had been conjectured that the complexity class captured is NP if and only if the operator is monotone. We show that this conjecture is false. However, we provide evidence supporting a revised conjecture involving finite variations of monotone problems.

We investigate the definability in monadic ∑11 and monadic Π11 of the problems REGk, of whether there is a regular subgraph of degree k in some given graph, and XREGk, of whether, for a given rooted graph, there is a regular subgraph of degree k in which the root has degree k, and their restrictions to graphs in which every vertex has degree at most k, namely REGkk and XREGkk, respectively, for k ≥ 2 . Our motivation partly stems from (...) the fact that REGkk and XREGkk are logspace equivalent to CONN and REACH, respectively, for k ≥ 3, where CONN is the problem of whether a given graph is connected and REACH is the problem of whether a given graph has a path joining two given vertices. We use monadic first - order reductions, monadic ∑11 games and a recent technique due to Fagin, Stockmeyer and Vardi to almost completely classify whether these problems are definable in monadic ∑11 and monadic Π11, and we compare the definability of these problems. (shrink)