17 found
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  1. Do Humans Have Two Systems to Track Beliefs and Belief-Like States?Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
    The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...)
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  2. How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind.Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.
    What could someone represent that would enable her to track, at least within limits, others' perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs including false beliefs? An obvious possibility is that she might represent these very attitudes as such. It is sometimes tacitly or explicitly assumed that this is the only possible answer. However, we argue that several recent discoveries in developmental, cognitive, and comparative psychology indicate the need for other, less obvious possibilities. Our aim is to meet this need by describing the (...)
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  3.  30
    Executive Function is Necessary for Perspective Selection, Not Level-1 Visual Perspective Calculation: Evidence From a Dual-Task Study of Adults.Adam W. Qureshi, Ian A. Apperly & Dana Samson - 2010 - Cognition 117 (2):230-236.
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  4.  22
    Two Sources of Evidence on the Non-Automaticity of True and False Belief Ascription.Elisa Back & Ian A. Apperly - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):54-70.
  5.  14
    The Cost of Thinking About False Beliefs: Evidence From Adults’ Performance on a Non-Inferential Theory of Mind Task.Ian A. Apperly, Elisa Back, Dana Samson & Lisa France - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1093-1108.
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  6.  31
    Beyond Simulation–Theory and Theory–Theory: Why Social Cognitive Neuroscience Should Use its Own Concepts to Study “Theory of Mind”.Ian A. Apperly - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):266-283.
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  7.  23
    Making Tools Isn’T Child’s Play.Sarah R. Beck, Ian A. Apperly, Jackie Chappell, Carlie Guthrie & Nicola Cutting - 2011 - Cognition 119 (2):301-306.
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  8. Is Goal Ascription Possible in Minimal Mindreading?Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2016 - Psychological Review 123 (2):228-233.
    In this response to the commentary by Michael and Christensen, we first explain how minimal mindreading is compatible with the development of increasingly sophisticated mindreading behaviours that involve both executive functions and general knowledge, and then sketch one approach to a minimal account of goal ascription.
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  9.  96
    Domain-Specificity and Theory of Mind: Evaluating Neuropsychological Evidence.Ian A. Apperly, Dana Samson & Glyn W. Humphreys - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (12):572-577.
  10. Distinguishing Intentions From Desires: Contributions of the Frontal and Parietal Lobes.Claudia Chiavarino, Ian A. Apperly & Glyn W. Humphreys - 2010 - Cognition 117 (2):203-216.
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  11.  27
    Testing the Domain-Specificity of a Theory of Mind Deficit in Brain-Injured Patients: Evidence for Consistent Performance on Non-Verbal, “Reality-Unknown” False Belief and False Photograph Tasks.Ian A. Apperly, Dana Samson, Claudia Chiavarino, Wai-Ling Bickerton & Glyn W. Humphreys - 2007 - Cognition 103 (2):300-321.
  12.  24
    Developmental Studies and the Domain-Specificity of Belief Reasoning.Ian A. Apperly, Dana Samson & Glyn W. Humphreys - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (12):572-577.
  13.  13
    Is Tool-Making Knowledge Robust Over Time and Across Problems?Sarah R. Beck, Nicola Cutting, Ian A. Apperly, Zoe Demery, Leila Iliffe, Sonia Rishi & Jackie Chappell - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  14.  7
    How is Mindreading Really Like Reading?Ian A. Apperly - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    I suggest an alternative basis for Heyes’ analogy between cultural learning of mindreading and text reading. Unlike text reading, mindreading does not entail decoding of observable stimuli. Like text reading, mindreading requires relevant inferences. Identification of relevant inferences is a deeply challenging problem, and the most important contribution of cultural learning to mindreading may be an apprenticeship in thinking like a mindreader.
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  15.  19
    Tool Innovation May Be a Critical Limiting Step for the Establishment of a Rich Tool-Using Culture: A Perspective From Child Development.Sarah R. Beck, Jackie Chappell, Ian A. Apperly & Nicola Cutting - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (4):220-221.
    Recent data show that human children (up to 8 years old) perform poorly when required to innovate tools. Our tool-rich culture may be more reliant on social learning and more limited by domain-general constraints such as ill-structured problem solving than otherwise thought.
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  16.  10
    The Benefit of Seeing in Company.Ian A. Apperly - 2019 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 23 (6):451-453.
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  17.  14
    The Development of Co-Representation Effects in a Joint Task: Do Children Represent a Co-Actor?Sophie J. Milward, Sotaro Kita & Ian A. Apperly - 2014 - Cognition 132 (3):269-279.
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