Ian Evans [5]Ian M. Evans [1]
See also
Ian Evans
University of Arizona
Ian Evans
Massey University
Ian MacLean-Evans
York University
  1. The problem of the basing relation.Ian Evans - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2943-2957.
    In days past, epistemologists expended a good deal of effort trying to analyze the basing relation—the relation between a belief and its basis. No satisfying account was offered, and the project was largely abandoned. Younger epistemologists, however, have begun to yearn for an adequate theory of basing. I aim to deliver one. After establishing some data and arguing that traditional accounts of basing are unsatisfying, I introduce a novel theory of the basing relation: the dispositional theory. It begins with the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  2.  50
    Knowledge.Ian Evans & Nicholas D. Smith - 2012 - Malden, MA: Polity. Edited by Nicholas D. Smith.
    Introductions to the theory of knowledge are plentiful, but none introduce students to the most recent debates that exercise contemporary philosophers. Ian Evans and Nicholas D. Smith aim to change that. Their book guides the reader through the standard theories of knowledge while simultaneously using these as a springboard to introduce current debates. Each chapter concludes with a “Current Trends” section pointing the reader to the best literature dominating current philosophical discussion. These include: the puzzle of reasonable disagreement; the so-called (...)
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  3. Schaffer's Demon.Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):552-559.
    Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has summoned a new sort of demon – which he calls the debasing demon – that apparently threatens all of our purported knowledge. We show that any debasing skeptical argument must attack the justification condition and can do so only if a plausible thesis about justification is false.
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4. Sosa’s dream.Nathan Ballantyne & Ian Evans - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):249-252.
  5. An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism.Ian Evans, Don Fallis, Peter Gross, Terry Horgan, Jenann Ismael, John Pollock, Paul D. Thorn, Jacob N. Caton, Adam Arico, Daniel Sanderman, Orlin Vakerelov, Nathan Ballantyne, Matthew S. Bedke, Brian Fiala & Martin Fricke - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149-155.
    Bayesians take “definite” or “single-case” probabilities to be basic. Definite probabilities attach to closed formulas or propositions. We write them here using small caps: PROB(P) and PROB(P/Q). Most objective probability theories begin instead with “indefinite” or “general” probabilities (sometimes called “statistical probabilities”). Indefinite probabilities attach to open formulas or propositions. We write indefinite probabilities using lower case “prob” and free variables: prob(Bx/Ax). The indefinite probability of an A being a B is not about any particular A, but rather about the (...)
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  19
    Book Review Section 3. [REVIEW]Phil Francis Carspecken, Linda K. Johnsrud, Norman S. Kaufman, Robert Lowe, Harvey Kantor, Larry T. Mcgehee, Ian M. Evans & Michael Manley-Casimir - 1991 - Educational Studies 22 (1):110-142.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation