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Ian Mccready-Flora [4]Ian C. McCready-Flora [3]
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Ian McCready-Flora
University of Virginia
  1. Aristotle and the Normativity of Belief.Ian McCready-Flora - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 44:67-98.
  2. Protagoras and Plato in Aristotle: Rereading the Measure Doctrine.Ian C. McCready-Flora - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 49:71-127.
     
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  3.  4
    Aristotle and the Normativity of Belief.Ian C. McCready-Flora - 2013 - In Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume 44. Oxford University Press UK.
    Aristotle argues for and relies on the view that a constitutive norm prescribing true belief binds all rational subjects. This normativity is peculiar to belief, and derives but is distinct from the epistemic value of true belief, which is grounded in a teleological function that governs even non-rational cognition. Only rational creatures can have beliefs, and Aristotle uses the normative constraint on belief to distinguish it from imagining, its closest non-rational counterpart. This subjection to norms is therefore part of what (...)
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  4. Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief, Affect and Rationality.Ian Mccready-Flora - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):394-435.
    I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non-rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition (...)
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    Affect and Sensation: Plato’s Embodied Cognition.Ian McCready-Flora - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (2):117-147.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 2, pp 117 - 147 I argue that Plato, in the _Timaeus_, draws deep theoretical distinctions between sensation and affect, which comprises pleasure, pain, desire and emotion. Sensation is both ‘fine-grained’ and ‘immediate’. Emotions, by contrast, are mediated and coarse-grained. Pleasure and pain are coarse-grained but, in a range of important cases, immediate. The _Theaetetus_ assimilates affect to sensation in a way the _Timaeus_ does not. Smell frustrates Timaeus because it is coarse-grained, although unlike pleasure (...)
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    When Protagoras Made Aristotle His Fitch.Ian McCready-Flora - 2019 - Ancient Philosophy Today 1 (2):171-191.
    While defending the principle of non-contradiction in Metaphysics 4, Aristotle argues that the Measure Doctrine of Protagoras is equivalent to the claim that all contradictions are true; given all...
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    Protagoras and Plato in Aristotle: Rereading the Measure Doctrine.Ian C. McCready-Flora - 2015 - In Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume 49. Oxford University Press UK.
    We have far less evidence for Aristotle’s reception of Protagoras than we like to think, and the evidence we do have is somewhere we hardly ever look. With one exception, every reference Aristotle makes to the Measure Doctrine—Protagoras’ claim that humans are the ‘measure of all things —concerns the Doctrine as amplified in Plato’s Theaetetus, and the ‘Protagoras’ in question is Plato’s fictional character as fictional. Metaph. I 1, 1053a35–b3 provides the only exception, where Aristotle offers an anomalous reading of (...)
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