A growing number of authors defend putative examples of knowledge from falsehood (KFF), inferential knowledge based in a critical or essential way on false premises, and they argue that KFF has important implications for many areas of epistemology (whether evidence can be false, the Gettier debate, defeasibility theories of knowledge, etc.). I argue, however, that there is no KFF, because in any supposed example either the falsehood does not contribute to the knowledge or the subject lacks knowledge. In particular, I (...) show that if the subject actually has knowledge in putative KFF cases, then there is always a veridical evidential path meeting the basing conditions that accounts for her knowledge; if there is no such path, then the subject is in a type of Gettier case. All the recent arguments that rely on KFF are therefore based on a mistake. (shrink)

Many epistemologists have recently defended views on which all evidence is true or perceptual reasons are facts. On such views a common account of basic perceptual reasons is that the fact that one sees that p is one’s reason for believing that p. I argue that that account is wrong; rather, in the basic case the fact that p itself is one’s reason for believing that p. I show that my proposal is better motivated, solves a fundamental objection that the (...) received view faces, and illuminates the nature of reasons for belief. (shrink)

Vincent Vega from Pulp Fiction and the Nietzschian Superman!!!

Teaching through discussion is perhaps the most fundamental pedagogical technique of philosophy. When done well, discussion can promote long-term, durable learning. It supports an active-learning classroom, sparks higher-order cognition, and helps students construct their own understanding of the material. Yet it is often not done well: it is easily dominated by a few students; it can waste time on tangents and minutiae; it can fail to motivate students to prepare adequately; and it is not easily scalable. In this paper we (...) present a technique, the random discussion leader (RDL), which addresses all of these shortcomings of traditional discussion. Qualitative and quantitative evidence from our quasi-experimental study (n = 279) suggests that RDL leads to better preparation, better engagement with the material, more equitable participation, and higher quality discussions. Additionally, we provide a toolkit for instructors interested in trying RDL, showing how the technique can be adapted to various course settings and materials. (shrink)

In this paper I develop a version of Bloom’s taxonomy applicable to philosophy, and I use it to create a tool for categorizing the Bloom level of assessment items in formal logic classes. I then show how to use the tool to improve the alignment of teaching and assessment in one’s courses. Alignment means we are assessing students on what we are actually teaching them. One dimension of alignment is cognitive levels, such as lower-level factual knowledge or higher-level critical reasoning (...) skills. By using the tool to graph the Bloom level of one’s assessment items, one can better understand how well one’s assessment aligns with one’s teaching. Doing so allows instructors to make informed changes to both teaching and assessment, and, ultimately, to provide the right level of challenge to the majority of students. (shrink)

This is the first collection of essays exclusively devoted to knowledge from non-knowledge and related issues. It features original contributions from some of the most prominent and up-and-coming scholars working in contemporary epistemology. There is a nascent literature in epistemology about the possibility of inferential knowledge based on premises that are, for one reason or another, not known. The essays in this book explore if and how epistemology can accommodate cases where knowledge is generated from something other than knowledge. Can (...) reasoning from false beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from unjustified beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from gettiered beliefs generate knowledge? Can reasoning from propositions one does not even believe generate knowledge? The contributors to this book tackle these and other questions head-on. Together, they advance the debate about knowledge from non-knowledge in novel and interesting directions. Illuminating Errors will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in epistemology and philosophy of mind. (shrink)