Dieser Band enthält die vier Arbeiten Freges: Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildeten Formelsprache, 1879; Anwendungen der Begriffsschrift, 1879; Über den Briefwechsel Leibnizens und Huggens mit Papin, 1881; Über den Zweck der Begriffsschrift, 1883; Über die wissenschaftliche Berechtigung einer Begriffsschrift, 1882. Frege's research work in the field of mathematical logic is of great importance for the present-day analytic philosophy. We actually owe to Frege a great amount of basical insight and exemplary research, which set up a new standard also in other (...) fields of knowledge. As the founder of mathematical logic he severely examindes the syllogisms on which arithmetic is built up. In doing so, Frege recognized that our colloquial language is inadequate to define logic structures. His notional language corresponded to the artaivicial logical language demandes by Leibniz. Frege's achievement in the field of logic were so important, that they radiated into the domain of philosophy and influenced the development of mathematical logic decisively. (shrink)

I wish to express, first of all, my profound gratitude to Professor J. M. Bochenski, without whose assistance the present work would have not been possible. To be concise, I would like to state that his contribution to this book may be viewed at three levels: (1) that of the general spirit, (2) that of the specific ideas, theses or approaches which are expressed in its pages, (3) that of this work qua doctoral dissertation. The general spirit which has guided (...) my research coincides with that underlying Professor :Oochenski's own works, in particular his Formale Logik (Munchen 1956). Moreover, the particular occasion which suggested my investigation was a statement included in that book according to which the literature in the field still lacked a detailed work on Frege (p. 317). I wish, likewise, to express my gratitude to other professors of the University of Fribourg for their generous help. I mention especially Professors P. Wyser, M. D. Philippe, N. Luyten, and V. Kuiper. I have also benefited from Professor E. Specker's lectures at the Eidge nossische Technische Hochschule (ZUrich) and from Professor Olof Gigon's lectures at the University of Bern. From an earlier period I wish to express my gratitude to the professors of the philosophy department of the Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires, especially the late Professor Francisco Romero. The Swiss National Library (Bern) has greatly facilitated access to bibliographical sources, and the library of the University of Munster (Westphalien) has kindly provided microfilms of Frege's Nachlap. (shrink)

After presenting the ordinary and the Fregean formulations of the ancestral, I raise the question of what is their relationship, the natural candidate being that the Fregean version is an analysans intended to improve upon, and replace, the common notion of ancestral (the analysandum). Next, two types of circles that arise in connection with the Fregean ancestral are presented, and it is claimed that one of the circles makes it impossible to maintain the just described (“replacement”) interpretation. A reference is (...) made to Kerry, who was the first to point out a circularity in Frege’s ancestral. Some of Frege’s remarks are examined in order to tentatively sketch, an answer to the issue of the relationship between ordinary and Fregean ancestral; the latter, if not as an analysans replacing the common notion, can still be seen as a profound enrichment of the former. (shrink)

For centuries abstraction was understood as an operation according to which, from a given phenomenon, something is kept, but something else is not paid attention to, is ”abstracted from”. This notion of abstraction not only has been rejected by the mainstream of analytic philosophy and logic as worthless psychologism but, moreover, largely replaced by a new conception of abstraction in which the allegedly ”psychological” feature of ”not paying attention to”, or ”abstracting from”, is no longer visible. Psychologism has been overcome, (...) of course, but at the expense of removing any genuine abstraction from the new notion. This is the ”trouble” in the history of abstraction. (shrink)

En 1967, Ignacio Angelelli publie un ouvrage pionnier : la bibliographie frégéenne est encore assez mince quand l’étudiant du Professeur Bocheñski soutient, à Fribourg en Suisse, sa dissertation doctorale. L’essentiel des ouvrages, articles et recensions du grand logicien est encore dispersé et non réédité.Mais le principal intérêt de l’ouvrage dont nous donnons ici une première traduction française ne tient pas seulement au fait qu’il marque une date importante dans le champ des études frégéennes et qu’il peut constituer à sa manière (...) un “classique”; son importance est directement liée à son objet et à sa méthode.L’objet est clairement assigné dès la première phrase de l’introduction. Si l’Idéographie est bien le document fondateur de la logique contemporaine, digne de prendre rang aux côtés des Analytiques d’Aristote, comment déterminer plus précisément la signification et la portée de cette rupture frégéenne par rapport à la tradition philosophique?Autrement dit, il ne s’agit pour l’auteur ni de présenter un exposé général de la pensée de Frege, ni de discuter de questions techniques que son œuvre aura laissé ouvertes dans une riche postérité , mais bien de situer cette “percée” en vue de mieux la comprendre, quitte à critiquer certains de ses aspects ou de ses attendus. (shrink)

The author distinguishes three views of negation: 1) term-negation ; 2) predicate-negation ; 3) sentence-negation. Strictly, however, he thinks there is no genuine sentential negation; sentential negation is reducible to the denial of a predicate. The author claims to have shown this in the present book. If sentential negation is regarded as "external" and predicate negation as "internal" to sentences, the reduction of sentential negation to predicate negation is an "internalization" of negation. The author envisages a more general reductionism for (...) logical symbols: "the internalization of negation seems to be the first and most important step [in Englebretsen's program of viewing all sentences as logically categorical]. The internalization of other operations, including modality, should follow". (shrink)

This volume contains a critical edition and English translation of the Latin text of the twenty-second treatise of part 1 of Paul of Venice's Logica Magna, De Scire et dubitare, "On Knowing and Being Uncertain." The issue of the treatise is "whether something known by someone is uncertain to him or not known to him". Paul of Venice presents about thirty arguments aimed at showing that indeed there are propositions that one both knows and is uncertain about. Let us take (...) a look at the first three arguments. (shrink)