We report core stratigraphy and chronology that explains the diachronic history of the surface in a prehispanic wetland agricultural complex of planting platforms and canals at Mandinga, central Veracruz, Mexico. Using recognizable stratigraphic horizons, elevations of prehistoric surfaces were measured for the wetland prior to the construction of platforms and canals, immediately following construction, at the time of abandonment, and of the present-day surface. Significant topographic and hydrological changes are evident. We discuss our results in the light of prehispanic water (...) management and cultivation and postulate water storage within the wetland, a patchy management of water and cultivation, and variable productivity. The paper ends with a discussion of the lessons that can be learned when contemplating contemporary cultivation of wetlands. In addition to the environmental concerns, we emphasize the need to consider the physical, socio-economic, and political contexts in which contemporary wetland agriculture would have to operate. (shrink)
Heikki Ikäheimo and Arto Laitinen (eds), Recognition and Social Ontology Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 134-137 Authors Sybol Cook Anderson, St. Mary's College of Maryland, USA Journal Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy & Social Theory Online ISSN 1568-5160 Print ISSN 1440-9917 Journal Volume Volume 13 Journal Issue Volume 13, Number 1 / 2012.
Colin Turnbull's book The Mountain People has aroused much non-academic as well as much academic interest. The success of The Ik , Peter Brook's recent stage adaptation of the book, shows how widespread this interest is. The interest centres on Turnbull's anthropological descriptions of his life with the Ik people. The Ik society is one in which the weak, the old and the children are left to fend for themselves and die. Help proffered to the needy is frowned upon. Food (...) is snatched from the mouths of the old, medicine stolen from the sick, and children left to feed and house themselves at about the age of three. Sexual codes no longer exist, cruelty is thought amusing, and the weak and dying are exploited. Turnbull believes that he has discovered a people without morality; a society that previously possessed a moral code, but which lost it. (shrink)
Ethics of any kind basically assume that all human beings by nature aim at happiness. However, this general starting point has to be made concrete in order to be relevant for action, and hence suitable for moral appreciation. What does my happiness consist in? Contrary to what has often been taken for granted, the concrete aim is not instrumental or subsidiary to the overall aim of happiness. To me, my particular aim is rather identical with happiness. The choice I make (...) — if choice it is — indeed constitutes my happiness, i.e. the overall aim that directs my existential choices. This article is focused on the way Aristotelian ethics envisages the concreteness of this overall aim. This is not the concreteness of the means leading to the aim, which has often been discussed in Aristotelian scholarship, but happiness itself, taken as the specific but nevertheless universal aim that I seek to accomplish in my life. The main arguments are taken from Nicomachean Ethics VI and III. These texts, central to any discussion of Aristotle's views on the role of choice and deliberation in acquiring happiness, are re-interpreted, avoiding the deadlock of a debate between intellectualists and non-intellectualists. (shrink)
In this paper a distinction is made between two conceptions of the ego in freudian metapsychology. According to the first conception, a conception which Freud never gave up, the ego is conceived as a specific function on the surface of the living organism ; it is the result of a progressive differentiation of the Id ('Es') under the driving power of internal stimuli and external reality. Fitted with specific neutral, i.e. non-conflictual functions as perception, memory, control of the bodily motions (...) and consciousness, the ego has to defend the individual as a biological living organism against the threats from without and within. In this conception the ego is treated as an instance that doesn't take part in the different psychic conflicts. We analyse the philosophical presuppositions and show the metapsychological disadvantages of this hypothesis that has been worked out especially in the American ego-psychology. According to the second conception, that takes into account important clinical pheno mena as identification, idealisation, narcissism, ideal of the ego, the ego is conceived as a metaphorical effect of a specific psychic act. With Lacan, we try to analyse and to interpret this specific act as an act that causes an infinite splitting in the ego : the ego is constituted as a subject that from its origin is separated from itself. Instead of being a biological function that lives in the immediate metonymical prolongiation of the living organism, it rather has to defend a certain representation of himself. This point of view doesn't exclude a purely functional description of the ego ; but the different functions have now to be interpreted differently because the ego is the effect of conflicts in which it takes part (consciousness is interlaced with unconsciousness, perception with denying...). In the last part of our study we show how Freud makes the philosophically important distinction between the ego as an object of the Id and the ego as a subject that has to speak in the first person ('I'). We try to give a Lacanian interpretation of the subject as act on the basis of the well-known Freudian formula 'Wo Es war soll Ich werden'. (shrink)
In Het kapitaal beschreef Karl Marx in uiterst schrille kleuren de voorgeschiedenis van de kapitalistische productiewijze. Het was een langdurig proces dat zich over eeuwen uitstrekte en waarbij kleine boeren op gewelddadige wijze van hun primaire productiemiddel, de grond, werden gescheiden en aldus in 'vrije' loonarbeiders veranderd. De kern van dit proces was de privatisering van de meent of commons, de traditioneel voor gemeenschappelijk gebruik bestemde grond.