Mathematics from the electromagnetic field quantization procedure and the soliton models of photons are used to construct a new 3D model of photons. Besides the interaction potential between the charged particle and the photons, which contains the annihilation and creation operators of photons, the new function for a description of free propagating photons is derived. This function presents the vector potential of the field, the function is a product of the harmonic oscillator eigenfunction with the well-defined coordinate of the oscillator (...) and the Gaussian function of the polar radius in the transverse direction. In the article, the difference between the quantum mechanics of particles and photons is discussed. (shrink)

Keith Augustine’s critical evaluation of the essay contest sponsored by the Bigelow Institute of Consciousness Studies (BICS) is an interesting but problematic review. It mixes reasonable and detailed criticisms of the contest and many of the winning essays with a disappointing reliance on some of the most trite and superficial criticisms of parapsychological research. Ironically, Augustine criticizes the winning essays for using straw-man arguments and cherry-picked evidence even though many of his own arguments commit these same errors.

Where does consciousness come from? For most scientists and laypeople, it is axiomatic that something in the substance of the brain - neurons, synapses and grey matter in just the right combination - create perception, self-awareness, and intentionality. Yet despite decades of neurological research, that ""something"" - the mechanism by which this process is said to occur - has remained frustratingly elusive. This is no accident, as the authors of this book argue, given that the evidence increasingly points to a (...) startling fact: consciousness may not, in fact, reside in the brain at all. In this wide-ranging and deeply scientific book, Imants Baruss and Julia Mossbridge utilise findings from special relativity and quantum mechanics, modern and ancient philosophers, and paranormal psychology to build a rigorous, detailed investigation into the origins and nature of human consciousness. Along the way, they examine the scientific literature on concepts including mediumship, out-of-body and near-death experiences, telekinesis, ""apparent"" versus ""deep time,"" and mind-to-mind communication, and introduce eye-opening ideas about our shared reality. The result is a revelatory tour of the ""post-materialist"" world, and a roadmap for consciousness research in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

There is considerable confusion surrounding the notion of consciousness. This confusion can be partially resolved by clarifying the referents of the word 'consciousness'. Doing so, however, reveals a more insidious problem, namely, the role played by personal beliefs in understanding consciousness. In particular, as revealed by a comprehensive survey, such beliefs range along a material- transcendent dimension, with the choice of notions of consciousness corresponding to materialist, conservatively transcendent, or extraordinarily transcendent positions. Further empirical research has revealed that those with (...) more transcendent beliefs tend to have a more rational and curious approach to the world than those with more materialist beliefs. And, indeed, transcendent beliefs are also associated with greater intelligence. Although the possibility of a developmental sequence from materialist to transcendent beliefs is suggested, given the nature of fundamental beliefs, it does not appear that reconciliation between them is possible. Thus, although the confusion surrounding the study of consciousness can be clarified, the situation giving rise to the confusion cannot be eliminated. (shrink)

The first of its kind, this project is a collection of critical and interpretive essays on George Santayana’s seminal work in American philosophy, Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923), 100 years after its first edition. The reader will be guided through the intricacies of Scepticism and Animal Faith by expert scholars. This book is a companion to Scepticism and Animal Faith for both first-time readers and readers intimately familiar with this work.

This book presents an analytic investigation into the nature of cognitive reality. The author explores various manifestations of consciousness with rational and empirical rigor; he begins with more ordinary states such as thinking, sleeping, and dreaming and then continues on with more extraordinary states such as hypnosis, trance, psychedelic experiences, transcendence, and experiences associated with death. This comprehensive overview of altered states examines consciousness from the physiological, cognitive, and experiential points of view. Readers will gain from this text an enriched (...) understanding of consciousness, reality, and the scientific endeavor. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2004 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Collects and clarifies the variety of notions of consciousness in an effort to establish a basis for an interdisciplinary study of consciousness.

Classroom teaching has two aims: learning philosophy, that is, the great philosophers, and doing philosophy. This article provides an overview of thirty exercises that can be used for doing philosophy, grouped into three approaches. The first approach, doing philosophy as connective truth finding or communicative action, is related to such philosophers as Dewey and Arendt, and is illustrated by the Socratic method. The second, doing philosophy as test-based truth finding, is related to such philosophers as Popper, and is illustrated by (...) Community of Philosophical Inquiry. The third, doing philosophy as juridical debate, judging truth-value and making judgment, is related to such philosophers as Foucault, and is illustrated by philosophical debate. The analysis shows that although the classical methods applied by the great philosophers appear to be missing from classroom exercises, they do, in fact, remain at the heart of the matter. (shrink)

Analysis of the social-cognitive substrate of scientific activity reveals that much of science functions in an inauthentic mode whereby a materialist world view constrains the authentic practice of science. But materialism cannot explain matter, as evidenced by empirical data concerning the nature of physical manifestation. Nor, then, should materialism be the basis for our interpretation of consciousness. It is time to move beyond scientific materialism and develop transcendent theories of consciousness. Such theories should minimally meet the following criteria: they should (...) be based on all of the usual empirical data concerning consciousness, including altered states of consciousness; they should take into account data about anomalous phenomena and transcendent states of consciousness; they should address the issue of existential meaning and provide soteriological guidance; and they should be consistent with the most accurate theories of physical manifestation, such as relativistic quantum field theories. Speculating within a quantum-theoretic context, consciousness could be inserted as a primitive element into reality by providing a role for intention in the selection process of observables, the collapse of the state vector, or the ordering of quantum fluctuations. But consciousness could be more fundamental, in the sense of a deep consciousness coinciding with a pre-physical substrate, from which intention shapes both mental experience and physical manifestation. If any significance can be attached to the mathematical formalism of relativistic quantum field theories, perhaps creation and annihilation operators, which determine the fluctuations of a quantum field, can metaphorically be regarded as the avenue through which intention acts. Morphic fields within the pre-physical substrate could hold in place patterns that shape the reality that we experience. Among such morphic fields could be ones that correspond to the world view of scientism. By becoming authentic, one could break from such constraints and consider alternative possibilities that can include various forms of radical transformation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to look at some of the apparent characteristics of consciousness in theories in which consciousness is said to play a role in the collapse of the state vector. In particular, these reflections are based primarily on the work of three theorists: Amit Goswami, Henry Stapp, and Evan Harris Walker. Upon looking at such theories, three characteristics of consciousness become apparent. The first is a volitional aspect of the mind that needs to be distinguished from (...) awareness or observation. The second is the stratification of consciousness such that the experiential stream that goes on privately for a given person can be distinguished from a universal deep consciousness, akin to David Bohm’s implicate order, that might underlie ordinary consciousness. Having done so, a question arises regarding the manner in which deliberately intentional acts that occur within one’s experiential stream can apparently have their intended effects. An indirect mechanism consistent with the M5 model of Robert Jahn and Brenda Dunne is proposed. Third, in transferring the notion of the collapse of the state vector from the context of observation in experimental physics to manifestation of everyday life, the temporal discontinuity of collapses implies that the experiential stream of ordinary waking consciousness is also discontinuous. Furthermore, in some collapse-type quantum mind theories, the subject–object distinction is thought to emerge with the collapse, so that the physical universe itself, including its spatial features, could be arising from a pre-physical substrate at the rate of once per Planck time. This idea can be modelled using Jack Ng’s notion of a spacetime lattice with Planck time timelike separations and Planck length spacelike separations. Furthermore, such modelling can be partially cast in category-theoretic form by adapting a previous application of Grothendieck topoi to Edmund Husserl’s conceptualization of conscious mental acts. Thus, a volitional aspect of mind, the stratification of consciousness, and discontinuity of the ordinary waking state are some of the characteristics of consciousness implicit in some collapse-type quantum mind theories. (shrink)

George Santayana (1863–1952) believed that a philosophy of orthodox common sense exists beneath all major systems of philosophy and religion. This philosophy is a form of naturalism. It begins with the assumption that we are animals generated by and sustained for a time within a vast impersonal physical cosmos that is the sole source of power. Although rational argumentation cannot justify this assumption, our actions repeatedly confirm it, and we could not live without it. Another central feature of Santayana’s philosophy (...) of naturalism is that we are conscious as well as active animals. The inner light of awareness, or what he calls “spirit,” arises by the activities of the physical body but is itself powerless. Our experience of the world is rendered in the morally charged signs of human cognition, and these may be aesthetically appreciated for their own sake in imagination, granting us the possibility of contemplative respite from the exigencies of life. Santayana’s philosophy is atheistic and holds out no religious hope of redemption. Still, it is celebratory of the life of consciousness and offers a path toward naturalistic spirituality. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the application of constructions from category theory to Smith and McIntyre's interpretation of Husserl's intentionality. 1 Not only did Hussefl's own ideas change in the course of his lifetime 2 but there are a number of interpretations of Husserl's work 3 so that the line of philosophical investigation that Husserl strongly influenced is still in the process of development. In this vein, Smith and McIntyre have recognized the potential for a possible worlds interpretation of intentionality (...) in Hussefl's writing 4 which has led them to extend their interpretation to give a many worlds account of intentionality. 5 Thus, while Smith and McIntyre have refuted interpretations of Husserl's noema in terms of ideal objects, they have been willing to explicate the noerna using possible objects. (shrink)

The overarching issue with this case study is poor regulation and quality control over direct-to-consumer genetic testing, delivered in the absence of any medical oversight.

In this issue of Journal of Medical Ethics, Pugh1 offers a pluralist justice-based argument in support of the spirit, if not the precise letter, of the UK approach to the use of genetic test results to underwrite life insurance. We agree with Dr Pugh’s general contention that there is ethical and philosophical support for curtailment of insurers’ access to, and use of, applicants’ GTR in underwriting. However, we disagree with the contention that broad revisionary implications of certain theories of justice (...) render them unpersuasive. In fact, despite the competing theories, the United Nations Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights has already made a clear statement on this issue. Article 6 of the Declaration,2 unanimously adopted in 1997 by 77 countries, along with a resolution for its implementation,3 states, ‘No one shall be subjected to discrimination based on genetic characteristics that is intended to infringe or has the effect of infringing human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity.’ Further, Article 25 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in the provision of life insurance. These statements are not contingent on the acceptability of the degree of revisionary implications. They are clear, unambiguous statements about the obligations of signatory countries. Despite this, few countries have taken steps commensurate with this expectation, possibly due to the scale of changes required for proper ratification. However, genetic discrimination is recognised as one …. (shrink)

In previous studies we had found correlations between the material-transcendent dimension underlying the Western intellectual tradition and the diversity of ideas concerning consciousness. In the course of our work we developed the Beliefs About Consciousness and Reality Questionnaire that could be used for measuring fundamental beliefs about consciousness and reality. A survey of participants at the scientific meeting Toward a Science of Consciousness 1996 ‘Tucson II’ was conducted using this questionnaire. Results from 212 respondents indicated scores substantially in the transcendent (...) direction, both for scales underlying the questionnaire as well as for some of its individual items, relative to a 1986 standardization sample. Having religious beliefs , interest in phenomenology and culture, lack of interest in neural correlates and age were also all correlated with scale scores in the transcendent direction. Given the diversity of fundamental beliefs about consciousness and reality of listeners at a meeting such as Tucson II, speakers need to find ways to communicate across the spectrum of the material-transcendent dimension. (shrink)

Confusion concerning the scientific study of consciousness is metanalysed by considering definitions of consciousness and the diversity of beliefs about consciousness and reality particularly as they are affected by information from anomalous experiences. This archival and theoretical examination reveals that the purported subjective nature of consciousness continues to create problems for its scientific study resulting in diversity in the academic community concerning the nature of consciousness. After a brief discussion in the first section of the confusion found in the literature (...) concerning consciousness, some of the referents of the term consciousness are defined in the second section. The third section consists of a summary of die results of a study by Baruss and Moore in which the disparity of versions of consciousness is related to differences in personal beliefs and purported experiences. In particular, purported anomalous experiences such as mystical experiences or out‐of‐body experiences are correlated with rejection of a physicalist interpretation of reality and a scientific mode of inquiry. Such experiences are discussed in the fourth section. It is indicated in the fifth section that the requirement for mterchangeability of observers in science has not been respected in some previous discussions of consciousness and that continued introspection of subjective experience and personal self‐exploration may be informative for a given investigator if not for everyone in the scientific community. (shrink)

This study follows upon Steven Brown's 2006 article in The Journal of Consciousness Studies about the ‘perpetual music track', a form of constant musical imagery. With Brown's assistance, a Musical Imagery Questionnaire was developed. The questionnaire was then administered to 67 participants with the intention of establishing relevant scales for quantifying the presence and extent of spontaneous musical imagery in individuals. In addition to the Musical Imagery Questionnaire, the Six Factor Personality Questionnaire, as well as the Transliminality Scale, which is (...) a measure of openness to psychological material, was used in order to explore the correlations of spontaneous musical imagery to personality constructs. Factor analysis of the responses to the Musical Imagery Questionnaire revealed six meaningful dimensions of spontaneous musical imagery that were labeled as Unconscious, Persistent, Entertainment, Completeness, Musicianship, and Distraction. Participants who scored high on Transliminality also tended to have more persistent, distracting, and unconscious musical imagery. There were also some smaller correlations with other personality variables. (shrink)

Science as a Spiritual Practice is in three parts. In the first part the author argues that there are problems with materialism and that self-transformation could lead individual scientists to more comprehensive ways of understanding reality. In the second part he takes on the contentious notion of inner knowledge and shows how access to inner knowledge could be possible in some altered states of consciousness. The third part is an analysis of the philosophy of Franklin Wolff, who claimed that the (...) transcendent states of consciousness which occurred for him resulted from his mathematical approach to spirituality. (shrink)

Tiller enquires into Santayana’s notion of a realm of truth. He considers how the realm of truth is situated in Santayana’s ontology. He notes some of the defining features of the realm of truth and differentiates it from Santayana’s account of true judgment.

This chapter discusses the limitations of approaches to modelling and handling evidential issues using hierarchical network representations. Such models of evidential inference rest on the compound proposition that real-world evidential inference usually or always consists of propositional ‘atoms’ that are linked together by nomological entities of some kind, entities that are often — but not always — called ‘generalisations’. These sorts of models or representations of evidential inference are referred to as ‘network-and-generalisation’ models of evidential inference. It is argued that (...) for certain important problems, especially where these concern meaning and human understanding, these need to be complemented by other methods. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Expressivism, Projectivism and SantayanaGlenn Tiller1. Santayana and Non-CognitivismThere is a general consensus that Santayana's metaethical analysis of moral judgments falls under the category of non-cognitivism. For instance, Timothy Sprigge writes that "Santayana's position shares some features with those attitudinist theories of ethics or values for which value judgments express attitudes rather than beliefs."1 In another example, John Lachs states that "Santayana agrees with the emotivists that moral terms have (...) no descriptive significance.2 And, in a similar vein, Thomas Munson writes that, for Santayana, "Ultimate Good is not an opinion hazarded."3 Each of these writers classifies Santayana as one who expounds the basic thesis of non-cognitivism that moral judgments are not descriptive, and hence neither true nor false.Certainly there is a wealth of textual evidence which suggests this interpretation. While it is true, as Sprigge comments, that Santayana offers only a collection of "scattered observations" on metaethical questions such as the nature of moral judgments, those observations amount to a clear affirmation of non-cognitivism.4 Below is a small but representative sample of Santayana's statements on this metaethical issue:Moral terms are caresses or insults and describe nothing.5In order to understand why Santayana thinks that moral terms "describe nothing" and that to "esteem a thing good" is never to assert a truth, we must turn to Santayana's account of valuation. Santayana's account of valuation turns on two principle ideas which lie at the heart of his moral theory. These two ideas can be set out as follows. First, there is the origin of morality, which takes us into Santayana's notion of the psyche. Second, there is the phenomenology of moral experience, which centers on Santayana's epiphenomenalist theory of consciousness. We turn first to Santayana's analysis of the origins of morality.2. The Psyche And The Origin Of MoralitySantayana vigorously rejects any Humean empiricist notion of the self as "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions."8 Santayana objects that this phenomenalistic conception of the self leaves "no room for anything latent," and "in a living being, especially in a nice Englishman, what is latent is the chief thing."9 In Santayana's opinion, the assumptions of materialism must underlie any understanding we have of human nature. Thus, for Santayana the psyche is not some evanescent phenomenal self or passing datum, but rather "that habit in matter which forms the human body and the human mind."10 It is the principle of the long-term development of the individual, for contained within our psyche:There is our whole past, as it were, knocking at the door; there are our silent hopes; there are our future discourses and decisions working away, like actors rehearsing their parts, at their several fantastic arguments. All this is the psyche's work.11In sum, we can say that the psyche accounts for everything that is latent in the self; it embodies the potentiality of a human life from its beginning to its final development.To say that the psyche embodies all that is potential within us and accounts for our material development is to view the psyche as the ultimate origin of animal interests. In other words, we can say that the psyche accounts for all the physical predispositions of an animal life. These predispositions, such as the [End Page 240] habit of the body to repair itself after being injured, may be considered "animal interests" insofar as they represent the (innate) physical course of development of some animal life. Of course, here we are taking the terms "animal interests" and "predispositions" in a purely materialistic way; we are noting, to repeat Santayana's phrase, the "habit of matter."Accepting that the psyche accounts for all predispositions in animal life and that it is the source of animal interests has important implications. According to Santayana, this fact alone accounts for the origin of morality:This predetermined, specific direction of animal life is the key to everything moral; without it no external circumstance could be favourable or unfavourable to us; and spirit within us would have no reason to welcome, to deplore, or... (shrink)