The paper concerns the metaphysical possibility of life after death. It argues that the existence of a psychological duplicate is insufficient for resurrection, even if psychological continuity suffices for personal identity. That is because our persistence requires immanent causation. There are at most three ways of having life after death: if we are immaterial souls; if we are snatched bodily from our deathbeds; or if there is immanent causation ‘at a distance’ as Zimmerman proposes--but this requires (...) an ontology of temporal parts. (shrink)

I address an apparent conflict between Spinoza’s concepts of immanent causation and acting/doing [agere]. Spinoza apparently holds that an immanent cause undergoes [patitur] whatever it does. Yet according to his stated definition of acting and undergoing in the Ethics, this is impossible; to act is to be an adequate cause, while to undergo is to be merely a partial cause. Spinoza also seems committed to God’s being the adequate cause of all things, and, in a well-known passage, (...) appears to deny categorically that God is capable of undergoing. How then can God also be the immanent cause of all things, as Spinoza claims? On the basis of a close reading of the passage in question, I argue that Spinoza actually distinguishes between two senses of undergoing. An immanent cause undergoes not by being a partial cause but rather by being the metaphysical subject of its effect. While this sense of undergoing has its roots in scholasticism, Spinoza’s willingness to attribute such a capacity to undergo to God is idiosyncratic and reveals important ways in which his understanding of essence, perfection, and causation differs from the scholastic model. (shrink)

I explicate the crucial role played by efficient cause in Robert Rosen’s characterization of life, by elaborating on the topic of Aristotelian causality, and exploring the many alternate descriptions of causal and inferential entailments. In particular, I discuss the concepts of functional entailment and immanent causation, and examine how they fit into Robert Rosen’s relational-biology universe of living, anticipatory, and complex systems.

Against Danto's recent argument that the causation internal to basic actions is not a special, immanent causation, it is objected that (i) he introduces a notion of truncated action that involves a fallacious use of the Equals-subtracted-from-equals axiom, (ii) his version of the Identity Thesis turns upon a misleading notion of co-referentiality, and (iii) he falls into what, by his own theory of meaning, amounts to a category mistake concerning intentions as causes within actions. Hence Danto's arguments (...) do not warrant his materialist claim that causation is a univocal concept. (shrink)

I defend an expanded reading of immanent causation that includes both inherence and causal efficacy; I argue that the latter is required if God is to remain the immanent cause of finite modes.

Cet article explore la conception spinozienne du rapport entre substance et mode en analysant les notions de cause de soi, de cause immanente et de puissance. Nous soutenons que la théorie spinozienne de la causalité constitue une tentative pour développer une ontologie relationnelle de la puissance dans laquelle toute dénomination intrinsèque est fondée sur une dénomination extrinsèque. Par opposition à une interprétation courante selon laquelle la substance de Spinoza est une sorte de grande monade dans laquelle toutes choses inhèrent comme (...) les prédicats inhèrent à un sujet logique, nous maintenons que l’ontologie de l’immanence opère une extériorisation radicale de l’être : pour un mode fini, « exister » est s’extérioriser en tant que cause, c’est-à-dire agir. La substance, en revanche, n’est rien que la causalité en tant que telle, ou une forme absolue de l’extériorité. Par conséquent, quand Spinoza maintient que toutes choses sont « en Dieu » , la préposition in ne signifie pas s’intérioriser « dans un sujet » , mais plutôt s’extérioriser « dans l’action » .In this paper, I explore Spinoza’s conception of the relation between substance and mode through an analysis of the notions of self-causation, immanent causation and power. I argue that Spinoza’s theory of causality constitutes an attempt to develop a relational ontology of power where all intrinsic denominations are grounded in extrinsic ones. In opposition to a current reading according to which Spinoza’s substance is similar to a huge monad in which things inhere in the same way as predicates inhere in a logical subject, I argue that the ontology of immanence implies a radical exteriorization of being : for a finite mode, « to be » is to exteriorize itself as a cause, i.e. to act. As for substance, it is nothing but causality or action as such, an absolute form of exteriority. Hence, when Spinoza maintains that all things are « in God » , the preposition does not signify the interiorization « in a subject » , but rather an exteriorization « in action ». (shrink)

The alleged but unclear distinction between so-called “immanent” and so-called “transeunt” causation is structurally similar to an Aristotelian distinction between two kinds of potentiality (dunamis). It is argued that Aristotle’s distinction is in turn grounded in one between a metaphysically basic notion, rooted in his property theory, and a metaphysically posterior notion proper to the understanding of change in the science of nature. By examining Aristotle’s distinction, we can give a satisfying account of immanent and transeunt (...) class='Hi'>causation more generally. Furthermore, once we clarify the distinction in this way, some contemporary appeals to immanent causation turn out to be misguided, while others look promising. (shrink)

The article explains the nature of the immanent cause in Spinoza. It shows that immanent causation is a distinct genus of efficient causation, i.e., an efficient cause whose effect inheres in the cause.

Responding to Henry Oldenburg’s request to clarify his views about the relation between God and Nature (Ep. 71), Spinoza writes: “I favor an opinion concerning God and Nature far different from the one Modern Christians usually defend. For I maintain that God is, as they say, the immanent, but not the transitive, cause of all things” (Ep. 73 (IV/307)). In the Ethics, Spinoza does not define the notion of causa immanens, but we can easily retrieve the precise meaning of (...) the term by scrutinizing E1p18d in which Spinoza proves that “God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things [Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens; non vero transiens].” The proof relies on two claims Spinoza established earlier in the Ethics: that all things are “in” God (E1p15), and that God is the “efficient cause” of all things (E1p16c1). Thus, an immanent cause is an efficient cause whose effect is in the cause, while a causa transiens is an efficient cause whose effect is not in the cause. (In the secondary literature, the relation of being-in is commonly referred to as ‘inherence’; notably, Spinoza himself uses the terminology of ‘inherence’ only once (Ep. 12 (IV/61)).). (shrink)

This article aims to study the intersection between critical realism and complexity theories through the existing literature on complex systems via an engagement with Luhmann’s autopoiesis. With reference to the philosophies of substance and persistence, I build on previous critical realist scholarship and provide an explanation for what the literature has only noted as the limitations and potentials of autopoiesis for complex systems thinking and its compatibility with Critical Realism. By highlighting how Luhmann’s autopoiesis is not a trans-immanent/ perdurantist-exdurantist (...) system, I show first how a trans immanent system through the method of calibration entails a complex causation involving objects in the environment of systems and not just within their boundaries. Second, I explain how a trans-immanent system fits with CR via the Morphogenetic Régulation framework by exploring the theme of crisis in terms of the movement from inadequate to adequate understanding of objects. (shrink)

In this paper I consider whether a powers ontology facilitates a reduction of causal relations to intrinsic powers of the causal relata. I first argue that there is a tension in the view that powerful causation is an internal relation in this sense. Powers are ontologically dependent on other powers for their individuation, but in that case—given an Aristotelian conception of properties as immanent universals—powers will not be intrinsic on several extant analyses of ‘intrinsic’, since to possess a (...) given power P requires the existence of other concrete particulars as bearers of the powers that individuate P. I suggest several ways for Aristotelians to resolve this tension, but all tenable options involve individuative type-level causal relations between powers. While these individuative relations between powers are internal in the sense that the powers are essentially related, this is a different sense of ‘ internal ’ to the one that entails reducibility. The proposed reduction of token-causal relations to powers succeeds only at the cost of irreducible type-level causal relations between the powers themselves. (shrink)

Leibniz argued that in natural world, only intra-substantial or immanent causation is possible— the causation that takes place within an individual, when an individual brings about a change in itself. In this dissertation, I address issues arising from Leibniz’s arguments against the rival view that posits a world of causally interacting substances and issues pertaining to Leibniz’s own positive metaphysics of immanent causation and change. -/- Chapter 1 is devoted to stage setting for the remainder (...) of the dissertation. I first offer a historically informed overview of efficient causation and change before introducing Leibniz’s novel views, including his criticisms of competing accounts and his own positive account. After presenting a detailed roadmap of my project, I articulate the idealistic interpretation of Leibniz assumed in this dissertation, where the only genuine substances are simple monads. Finally, I articulate the methodological approaches I employ. -/- In Chapters 2 and 3, I reconstruct and assess Leibniz’s most frequent argument against transeunt causation (the causation that occurs when a substance produces a property in a numerically distinct substance), what I call the “Transference Argument.” Leibniz argued that a created substance’s causing an accident in a numerically distinct substance is possible only if the agent transfers the accident from itself to the patient, where upon transference the agent no longer possesses the accident it transferred. Call the transeunt causal requirement that the agent transfer the accident produced from itself to the patient the “Transference Condition.” -/- Chapter 2 is devoted to two problems with Leibniz’s transference condition. First, Leibniz stated the transference condition throughout his career, but offered little argument for it. Second, God is a transeunt cause in Leibniz’s metaphysics yet God’s causation does not consist in transference. Thus, Leibniz needs a principled way to require transference for creaturely causation while denying that divine transeunt causation consists in transference. Finally, I close off chapter 2 by drawing attention to an important weakness with the transference condition that has not yet been recognized by Leibniz scholars. -/- In Chapter 3, I argue that there is nothing in Leibniz’s ontology that could be transferred from the cause to the recipient of the effect. I first argue that Leibniz’s ontology consists of simple non-corporeal substances and their modifications. Second, I present and articulate a number of important theses Leibniz affirmed about substances and their modifications, which entail that neither could be transferred. I also show that most of these theses were not unique to Leibniz, but were in fact widely endorsed by his predecessors who defended the possibility of creaturely transeunt causation. -/- In chapter 4, I continue the study of the nature of Leibnizian accidents, shifting the focus from their role in Leibniz’s critique of creaturely transeunt causation to their positive role in change and as causal relata, where such accidents are the effects of immanent causation. I shall argue that Leibniz’s thesis that accidents are modifications or limitations allowed him to posit mereologically simple substance that have a multitude of accidents at a time and change accidents over time. -/- In Chapter 5, I address an issue that has divided Leibniz scholars concerning the precise relata in Leibnizian immanent efficient causation. In many passages, Leibniz writes as if it is the substance or individual itself that efficiently causes its later properties or accidents. Call this the “Efficacious-substance” account. The efficacious-substance account is difficult to reconcile with Leibniz’s requirements that change be intelligible and deterministic. In plenty of other passages, he writes as if it is the substances earlier properties or accidents that cause its later accidents. Call this the “Efficacious-accident” account. The efficacious-accident account explains how change is intelligible and deterministic but it faces a “plurality of agents” objection. If a substance’s accidents are the efficient causes of later accidents, then prima facie there is a plurality of efficient causal agents in a substance. This view is incompatible with Leibniz’s requirement that substances be simple, unified entities. -/- Drawing upon a Scholastic distinction made between two kinds of efficient causes— principle quod efficient causes and principle quo efficient causes, I shall argue that for Leibniz, substances are principle quod efficient causes and their appetitions are principle quo efficient causes. This interpretation combines the strengths of the Efficacious-substance and Efficacious-accident accounts while overcoming their weaknesses. There is just one causal agent, the substance, but change is both intelligible and deterministic because as what an agent produces is explained by its appetitions. (shrink)

Early modern philosophers rejected various important aspects of Aristotelianism. Current scholarship debates the question to what extent the early moderns rejected final causation. Leibniz explicitly endorsed it. I argue that his notion of final causation should be understood in connection with his resurrection of substantial forms and his seeing such forms on the model of the soul. I relate Leibniz’ conception of final causation to the Aristotelian background as well as Descartes’s treatment of teleology. I argue that (...) he agreed with a view found in Aristotelianism that genuine efficiently causal powers require immanent teleology and with Descartes that immanent teleology presupposes cognition in the agent. (shrink)

Some recent scholars have argued that Spinoza's conception of causation should be understood in terms of the Aristotelian notion of a formal cause. I argue that while they are right to identify causation in Spinoza as a relation of entailment from an essence, they are mistaken about its philosophical pedigree. I examine three suggested lines of influence: (a) the late scholastic conception of emanation; (b) early modern philosophy of mathematics; and (c) Descartes's notion of the causa sui. In (...) each case, the evidence indicates that causation in Spinoza should be categorized in Aristotelian terms as efficient and not formal. (shrink)

Questions about the metaphysics of causation may be usefully divided as follows. First, there are questions about the nature of the causal relata, including (1.1) whether they are in spacetime immanence), (1.2) how fine grained they are individuation), and (1.3) how many there are adicity). Second, there are questions about the metaphysics of the causal relation, including (2.1) what is the difference between causally related and causally unrelated sequences connection), (2.2) what is the difference between sequences related as cause (...) to effect, and those related as effect to cause or as joint effects of a common cause direction), and (2.3) what is the difference between sequences involving the cause, and those involving mere conditions selection). (shrink)

This paper will be a limited attempt to make sense of divine causation in Leibniz. I will not be able to discuss whether divine causation is immanent causation, nor explore the metaphysics of creation, emanation, and miracles in detail. Rather, I will focus on adjudicating the degree to which Leibniz’s famous denial of the interaction of substances bears on his views of divine causation. (edited).

This paper investigates the degree to which information theory, and the derived uses that make it work as a metaphor of our age, can be helpful in thinking about God’s immanence and transcendance. We ask when it is possible to say that a consciousness has to be behind the information we encounter. If God is to be thought about as a communicator of information, we need to ask whether a communication system has to pre-exist to the divine and impose itself (...) to God. If we want God to be Creator, and not someone who would work like a human being, ‘creating’ will mean sustaining in being as much the channel, the material system, as the message. Is information control? It seems that God’s actions are not going to be informational control of everything. To clarify the issue, we attempt to distinguish two kinds of ‘genialities’ in nature, as a way to evaluate the likelihood of God from nature. We investigate concepts and images of God, in terms of the history of ideas but also in terms of philosophical theology, metaphysics, and religious ontology. (shrink)

Often a division of concepts can help us better understand unknown or seldom charted philosophical terrain: historically, the distinctions and differences between idealism and materialism have proven helpful, but with Quentin Meillassoux‟s concept of correlationism, the divisions between realism and anti realismwhich once seemed clean-cut are now harder to understand. Graham Harman has gone a step further than Meillassoux‟s initial definition of correlationism, by which “we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between (...) thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other,”2claiming in lectures that those who have pledged fidelity to the realism banner after Meillassoux aren‟t realist enough.Instead, says Harman, we should demand that any philosophy which claims to be realist must grant that no entity is more real than any other, whether they be atoms, quarks, institutions, regimes, human beings, bonobos, dreams or distant galaxies. A robust realism must maintain therefore that the universe is composed of objects of all shapes, sizes and types. It is here that I wish to stage something of an intervention; it seems to me that we could rather create a new division to help us understand the contemporary situation facing philosophy based on how various philosophies view objects. I propose that we contrast those philosophies which see objects only working through exterior means with those which grant some level of autonomy to objects; in other words, we should compare those philosophies which grant only an outer life to objects withthose which also grant them an inner life. A robust realism must not only count objects as means of our causal ends , or billiard balls in an extended chain of causation . Rather, a full-blown realism must look to the inner lives of objectsto understand the cosmos and not simply satisfy itself with studying their effects.By making this distinction, we can see more clearly the relevance of a number offigures who have yet to be regarded with any seriousness by the emerging speculative realism movement, creating another metaphysical option besidesweak and strong correlationism, eliminative materialism or idealism, speculative materialism and object-oriented philosophy, as well as better understand thefuture of speculative metaphysics. (shrink)

This chapter examines five emulation methods, drawing a distinction between structure replication and reconstruction (SR) methods, and reverse brain engineering (RBE) methods. It argues that we need reasons to claim a particular procedure does or does not maintain identity, independently of whether the procedure is destructive or nondestructive. The chapter proposes that whole brain emulation (WBE) research be aimed primarily at cybernetics and possibility of replacing a biological brain in steps that involve very small parts with no psychologically relevant structure. (...) It also argues that methods reliant on structure replication and reconstruction will not preserve personal identity, based on a neo‐Lockean definition of personal identity according to which the self is a relatively autonomous self‐perpetuating substance whose psychological continuity through time is ensured primarily by immanent causation. All SR methods involve too much transeunt causation. (shrink)

While the general topic of agency has been collaboratively explored in philosophy and psychology, mental action seems to resist such an interdisciplinary research agenda. Since it is difficult to empirically access mental agency beyond externally measurable behavior, the topic is mainly treated philosophically. However, this has not prevented philosophers from substantiating their arguments with psychological findings, but predominantly with those which allegedly limit the scope and conscious controllability of mental action in favor of automated subpersonal processes. By contrast, the call (...) for a methodological extension through introspective access is particularly noticeable among proponents of a wider significance of mental action. Taking this up, it is shown how an empirical-introspective methodology can obtain a differentiated structure of mental activities occurring in directed thought. The empirical results gained under replicable conditions with 32 participants lead to insights about mental activity regarding (1) immanent causation, (2) content-free intention, (3) active receptivity and (4) its selective openness to mental content, and (5) different levels of observational awareness. These arguments speak for assigning an agentive status to the activities studied and hence for a more significant role of mental action in cognitive processes. (shrink)

Background and assumptions. Persistence and philosophy of time ; Atomism and composition ; Scope ; Some matters of methodology -- Persistence, location, and multilocation in spacetime. Endurance, perdurance, exdurance : some pictures ; More pictures ; Temporal modification and the "problem of temporary intrinsics" ; Persistence, location and multilocation in generic spacetime ; An alternative classification -- Classical and relativistic spacetime. Newtonian spacetime ; Neo-Newtonian (Galilean) spacetime ; Reference frames and coordinate systems ; Galilean transformations in spacetime ; Special relativistic (...) spacetime ; Length contraction and time dilation ; Invariant properties of special relativistic spacetime -- Persisting objects in classical spacetime. Enduring, perduring, and exduring objects in Galilean spacetime ; The argument from vagueness ; From minimal D-fusions to temporal parts ; Motivating a sharp cutoff ; Some objections and replies ; Implications -- Persisting objects in Minkowski spacetime. Enduring, perduring, and exduring objects in Minkowski spacetime ; Flat and curved achronal regions in Minkowski spacetime ; Early reflections on persisting objects in Minkowski spacetime : Quine and Smart ; "Profligate ontology"? ; Is achronal universalism tenable in Minkowski spacetime? ; "Crisscrossing" and immanent causation -- Coexistence in spacetime. The notion of coexistence ; Desiderata ; Coexistence in Galilean spacetime ; Coexistence in Minkowski spacetime : CASH ; Alexandrov-Stein present and Alexandrov-Stein coexistence ; AS-Coexistence v. CASH : symmetry, multigrade, and objectivity ; As-coexistence v. CASH : relevance ; The mixed past of coexistence ; No need in the extended now -- Strange coexistence? Coexistence and existence@ ; The asymmetry thesis ; The absurdity thesis ; Collective CASH value of coexistence ; Collective existence@ and coexistence in classical spacetime ; Collective existence@ and coexistence in Minkowski spacetime ; Contextuality ; Chronological incoherence ; Some objections -- Shapes and other arrangements in Minkowski spacetime. How rigid is a granite block? ; Perspectives in space ; Perspectives in spacetime ; Are shapes intrinsic to objects? ; The causal objection ; The micro-reductive objection ; Pegs, boards, and shapes ; Perduring objects exist. (shrink)

This paper investigates the use of theories of mechanics to provide answers to questions in the metaphysics of spatial location and persistence. Investigating spatial location, I find that in classical physics bodies pertend the region of space at which they are exactly located, while a quantum system spans a region at which it is exactly located. Following this analysis, I present a ‘no-go’ result which shows that quantum mechanics restricts the available options for locational persistence theories in an interesting way: (...) it demonstrates that the spatiotemporal path of a persisting thing is discrete in time. This leads to unpalatable consequences for both perdurantists and endurantists. In particular, I argue that Butterfield's ‘anti-pointilliste’ perdurantism is ruled out, and show that endurantists relying on immanent causation run into trouble. I conclude by suggesting the revival of Whitehead's alternative mode of persistence called ‘reiteration.’. (shrink)

This paper argues that God's immanent causation and Spinoza's account of activity as adequate causation (of finite modes) do not always go together in Spinoza's thought. We show that there is good reason to doubt that this is the case in Spinoza's early Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well‐being. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza defends an account of God's immanent causation without fully endorsing the account of activity as adequate causation that he (...) will later introduce in the Ethics (E3def2). We turn to an examination of how God's immanent causation relates to the activity of finite things in the Ethics. We consider two ways to think about the link between God, seen as immanent cause, and the activity of finite things: namely, in terms of entailment and in terms of production. We argue that the productive model is most promising for understanding the way in which the activity of finite things and God's immanent causality are connected in Spinoza's (mature) philosophy. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen's brand of materialism leads him to speculate that God actually removes the deceased at the moment of death and replaces the corpse with a simulacrum that decays or is cremated. Dean Zimmerman offers an account of resurrection that is loyal to Peter van Inwagen's commitment to a materialist metaphysics, with its stress on the earlier life processes of an organism immanently causing its later ones, while maintaining that resurrection is possible without involving God in any ‘body snatching’. (...) My contention is that Zimmerman's account is metaphysically impossible. His alleged ‘solution’ is at odds with the principles governing the ways in which an organism can assimilate new parts. Instead of providing a scenario where we can be resurrected, Zimmerman has merely sketched a scenario where we are duplicated. An alternative materialist account of resurrection is offered, one in which immanent causation is not necessary. (shrink)

Proclus was one of the major Greek philosophers of late Antiquity. In his metaphysics he developed and systematized problems of Plato's thought, such as participation; transcendence - immanence; causation - participation - return; henads and monads; first and second causality. Before and after his works had been translated into Latin, Proclus influenced the Christian West through the _Liber the causis_, a Latin translation of an anonymous Arab version of Proclus' _Elementatio theologica_.

1. I know that Sydney Shoemaker thinks that persons and their identities are real things. The word ‘construct’ enters my critique only in my IV, in the wake of my questions—cognate with the ‘fair question’ Shoemaker mentions in his last paragraph—about the weirdly impersonal characterization of mental states into which Shoemaker is forced by his desire to see personal identity as a matter of synchronic and diachronic unity relations holding between mental states. I see the impersonality of these characterizations as (...) the price Shoemaker pays for his refusal to acknowledge that the relation of persons to states is conceptually prior to the unity relation between states. The causality that Shoemaker sees as involved in the ‘immanent causation’ by which substances persist is recognized much better in the same what? approach of S & SR, the what importing reference to a thing-kind with some specific way of behaving. (shrink)

1. I know that Sydney Shoemaker thinks that persons and their identities are real things. The word ‘construct’ enters my critique only in my IV, in the wake of my questions—cognate with the ‘fair question’ Shoemaker mentions in his last paragraph—about the weirdly impersonal characterization of mental states into which Shoemaker is forced by his desire to see personal identity as a matter of synchronic and diachronic unity relations holding between mental states. I see the impersonality of these characterizations as (...) the price Shoemaker pays for his refusal to acknowledge that the relation of persons to states is conceptually prior to the unity relation between states. The causality that Shoemaker sees as involved in the ‘immanent causation’ by which substances persist is recognized much better in the same what? approach of S & SR, the what importing reference to a thing-kind with some specific way of behaving. (shrink)

The Effectiveness of Causes presents a strong view of causation seen as an operation between participants in events, and not as a relation holding between events themselves. In it, Emmet proposes that other philosophical views of cause and effect provide only a world of events, each of which is presented as an unchanging unit. Such a world, she contends, is a “Zeno universe,” since transitions and movement are lost. Emmet offers a more complex interpretation of the various forms of (...) causal dependence. She sees “immanent” causation in the mere persistence of things, where effects are not temporarily separable from causes, and she considers the operation of “efficacious grace.” This is a new approach to the traditional problem and provides stimulating implications for the other metaphysical questions and for the philosophy of science. (shrink)

This paper—written for nonspecialist readers—asks whether life after death is in any sense possible given the apparent fact that after we die our remains decay to the point where only randomly scattered atoms remain. The paper argues that this is possible only if our remains are not in fact dispersed in this way, and discusses how that might be the case. -/- 1. Life After Death -- 2. Total Destruction -- 3. The Soul -- 4. Body-Snatching -- 5. Radical Resurrection (...) -- 6. Irreversibility -- 7. Atomic Reassembly -- 8. The Transporter -- 9. Replicas and Originals -- 10. Survival and Causal Connections. (shrink)

Abstract.Differences in methods of knowing correlate with differences in concepts about what is known. This is an underlying issue in science and religion. It is seen, first, in Arthur Peacocke's reasoning about God as transcendent and personal, is based on an assumption of correlative thinking that like causes like. This contrasts with a notion of causation in empirical science, which explains the emergence of new phenomena as originating from temporally prior phenomena quite unlike that which emerges. The scientific understanding (...) of causation is compatible with a naturalistic theism that holds a nonpersonal model of God as the creative process. However, focusing on the immanence of God, there is a second correlation between methods of knowing and concepts of God. Classical empiricism, used by science, correlates with God understood nonpersonally as the creative process. Radical empiricism, in which feelings and not only sense perceptions have cognitive import, opens up the possibility that one can experience Peacocke's personal, panentheistic God as pattern‐forming influence. I illustrate this second method‐concept correlation with a personal experience. (shrink)

Plausibly, if an object persists through time, then its later existence must be caused by its earlier existence. Many theists endorse a theory of continuous creation, according to which God is the sole cause of a creature's existence at a given time. The conjunction of these two theses rather unfortunately implies that no object distinct from God persists at all. What strategies for resolving this difficulty are available? (Published Online April 7 2006).

An old question in Spinoza scholarship is how finite, non-eternal things transitively caused by other finite, non-eternal things (i. e., the entities described in propositions like E1p28) are caused by the infinite, eternal substance, given that what follows either directly or indirectly from the divine nature is infinite and eternal (E1p21–23). In “Spinoza’s Monism I,” “Spinoza’s Monism I,” in the previous issue of this journal. I pointed out that most commentators answer this question by invoking entities that are indefinite and (...) sempiternal, but argued that perhaps we should not be so quick to assume that in Spinoza’s system, an infinite and eternal substance could cause such indefinite, sempiternal entities. But if such eternal-durational causation is denied, then it seems harder to see how Spinoza’s system could be coherent: if Spinoza holds that the infinite, eternal substance cannot cause anything that is not infinite and not eternal, then how can he also hold that all things are modes immanently caused by substance (E1p15, E1p18, E1p25)? In this essay, I explain how Spinoza’s system could be understood in light of a denial of eternal-durational causation. On the interpretation I offer, God is the cause of all things and all things are modes because the essences of all things follow from the divine nature and all essences enjoy infinite, eternal reality as modes immanently caused by the infinite, eternal substance. The same non-substantial essences can also be conceived as enjoying non-infinite, non-eternal reality, but so conceived, they are enduring, finite (or sempiternal, indefinite) entities that cannot be conceived as modes caused by and inhering in the one infinite, eternal substance. I conclude by pointing out that if we take this interpretive route, we do have to understand Spinoza as committed to acosmism, or a denial of the reality of the world – at least the world of enduring, finite things. (shrink)

In his groundbreaking work of 1969, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation, Edwin Curley attacked the traditional understanding of the substance-mode relation in Spinoza, which makes modes inhere in the substance. Curley argued that such an interpretation generates insurmountable problems, as had been already claimed by Pierre Bayle in his famous entry on Spinoza. Instead of having the modes inhere in the substance Curley suggested that the modes’ dependence upon the substance should be interpreted in terms of (efficient) causation, (...) i.e., as committing Spinoza to nothing over and above the claim that the substance is the (efficient) cause of the modes. These bold and fascinating claims generated one of the most important scholarly controversies in Spinoza scholarship of the past thirty-five years. In this chapter I argue against Curley’s interpretation and attempt to reestablish the traditional understanding of Spinozistic modes as inhering in God and as predicated of God. I also criticize Curley’s philosophical motivation for suggesting this interpretation. I do believe, however, that Curley is right about the existence of an intimate connection between the substance-mode relation and causation in Spinoza. In the next chapter I will study the notion of ‘immanent cause’, which merges efficient causality and inherence. I will clarify the relation between immanent, efficient and material causation, and show where precisely Spinoza diverged from the traditional Aristotelian taxonomy of causes. In the second chapter I also discuss the German Idealists’ view of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’. Under this interpretation Spinoza was a modern reviver of Eleatic monism, who allegedly asserts the mere existence of God, and denies the reality of the world of particular things. Spinozistic modes - according to this reading - are nothing but passing and unreal phenomena. Though this view of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’ can be supported by some lines in Spinoza’s thought, I believe it should be rejected since it is not consistent with some of the most central doctrines of the Ethics. In the final part of the second chapter I discuss the relation between modes and the attributes under which they fall, and suggest a terminological distinction between a ‘mode of God’ (i.e., a mode under all attributes) and a ‘mode of an attribute’ (i.e., a mode under a specific attribute), a distinction which can help us avoid some common confusions in the treatment of the issue. (shrink)

According to Leininger, presentists and growing blockers cannot explain why past and present regularities persist in the future. In order to do so, they would have to appeal to enforcers, such as causation, laws or dispositions. But in a world with no future, these enforcers are powerless and cannot guarantee future regularity. I disagree and argue that Leininger’s coordination problem can be met by distinguishing type- from token-level necessitation. Whereas token-level necessitation is cross-temporal and subject to Leininger’s coordination problem, (...) type-level necessitation is atemporal and immune to the coordination problem. For this solution to work, though, type-level necessitation must be ontologically prior to token-level necessitation. This forces us to adopt a Platonist position according to which universals are transcendent, and not immanent. (shrink)

Many enthusiasts of theistic evolution willingly accept Aquinas’s distinction between primary and secondary causes, to describe theologically “the mechanics” of evolutionary transformism. However, their description of the character of secondary causes in relation to God’s creative action oftentimes lacks precision. To some extent, the situation within the Thomistic camp is similar when it comes to specifying the exact nature of secondary and instrumental causes at work in evolution. Is it right to ascribe all causation in evolution to creatures—acting as (...) secondary and instrumental causes? Is there any space for a more direct divine action in evolutionary transitions? This article offers a new model of explaining the complexity of the causal nexus in the origin of new biological species, including the human species, analyzed in reference to both the immanent and transcendent orders of causation. (shrink)

Schleiermacher’s approach to the doctrine of God has attracted interest in contemporary theological scholarship. The article tries to map the major features of his God-construal and a number of perspectives are highlighted. Attention is given to the general sentiments of his project, the history of interpretation, the question of a primary referent for ‘God’ and the centrality of causation, the role of structure in his Glaubenslehre and finally the attribute tradition and the doctrine of the Trinity. The second part (...) of the article engages Schleiermacher’s interpretation from the developments in especially the Trinitarian Renaissance since the last part of the 20th century. A number of critical divergences are identified, for example, the preference given to plurality, greater appreciation for the immanent Trinity, a Trinitarian approach to the attributes and an expansive notion of the ‘practical’ implications of the Trinity. Critical questions about ‘Schleiermacher’s God’ are raised in the conclusion. (shrink)

The main focus of this dissertation is the late medieval doctrine of Concurrentism. Concurrentists hold that God is immediately, causally involved in every event in nature, and yet so are creatures: For any natural effect to obtain, both God and creature must make a genuine causal contribution to the effect. Yet the presence of God's immanent activity in nature is claimed to not overdetermine or render otiose the real and necessary causal input of creatures. I develop and defend this (...) view as follows. First, I explain that---for the theist---any proper account of secondary causation can be given only against the backdrop of God's primary causation, which is best described as God's causal providence. Next, I offer a traditional interpretation of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, one that sharply distinguishes it in kind from ordinary, natural efficient causality or production. Given this interpretation, I argue that simply in virtue of being committed to creation ex nihilo, the theist is thereby committed to a theory of primary causation that I call The Strong View of Divine Providence . SP entails that God must not only sustain or conserve that which He creates, but also act directly in the operations of His creatures, and in the production of their effects. I then employ SP to evaluate the various theories of secondary causation available. Of the three possible contenders---Mere Conservationism, Occasionalism, and Concurrentism---I argue that only the latter two are compatible with SP. I then provide objections to occasionalism, showing how the doctrine either undermines its commitments to both divine providence and human freedom---so is philosophically and theologically unacceptable---or is better categorized as a version of one of the other two theories. Since mere conservationism is ruled out, simply given the conditions of SP, it follows that the most plausible view for the traditional theist to hold is some version of concurrentism. I then offer a positive analysis of concurrentism by explaining why God must concur with creatures, what God's concurrence amounts to, and then describe a simple model to explain how God concurs with creatures. (shrink)

Comment s'inscrit dans l'univers des causalités cette causalité singulière que signifiait jadis l'étrange expression " cause de soi "? (causa sui)? Le projet humain n'est autre que cette énigmatique causalité dont l'icône est, parmi nous, l'enfant nouveau-né. La tradition philosophique, plus soucieuse de la mort, a fait constamment abstraction de la naissance. Il convenait donc de partir de la naissance comme première étape d'une causalité de soi par soi. Sur cette paradoxale causalité se posent aujourd'hui les questions les plus décisives (...) : Quel est le monde de temporalité qui lui convient? Quel rapport entretient-elle avec le monde sous le double aspect d'immanence et de rupture? Comment s'insère-t-elle dans le politique en sa forme démocratique? Et tout d'abord quel jugement porter sur les événements majeurs de notre temps qui ont motivé la critique de cette démocratie? (shrink)

My two principal aims in this essay are interconnected. One aim is to provide a new interpretation of the ‘infinite modes’ in Spinoza’s Ethics. I argue that for Spinoza, God, conceived as the one infinite and eternal substance, is not to be understood as causing two kinds of modes, some infinite and eternal and the rest finite and non-eternal. That there cannot be such a bifurcation of divine effects is what I take the ‘infinite mode’ propositions, E1p21–23, to establish; E1p21–23 (...) show that each and every one of the immanent effects of an infinite and eternal God is an infinite and eternal mode. The other aim is to show that these propositions can be understood as part of an extended critical response to Descartes’s infamous doctrine that God creates eternal truths and true and immutable natures. If we have the correct (Spinozan) conceptions of what God is and how God works, we see that an eternal and infinite God can only be understood to cause ‘eternal truths,’ and that these eternal truths are infinite and eternal modes of God. (shrink)