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Profile: Imogen Dickie (University of Toronto)
  1. Fixing Reference.Imogen Dickie - 2015 - Oxford University Press.
    Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles, the first of which connects aboutness and truth, and the second of which connects truth and justification. These principles (...)
     
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  2. We Are Acquainted with Ordinary Things.Imogen Dickie - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford University Press. pp. 213-245.
     
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  3. Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement.Imogen Dickie & Gurpreet Rattan - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):131-151.
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  4. How Proper Names Refer.Imogen Dickie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):43-78.
    This paper develops a new account of reference-fixing for proper names. The account is built around an intuitive claim about reference fixing: the claim that I am a participant in a practice of using α to refer to o only if my uses of α are constrained by the representationally relevant ways it is possible for o to behave. §I raises examples that suggest that a right account of how proper names refer should incorporate this claim. §II provides such an (...)
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    Visual Attention Fixes Demonstrative Reference By Eliminating Referential Luck.Imogen Dickie - 2011 - In Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies & Wayne Wu (eds.), Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Oxford University Press.
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    Skill Before Knowledge. [REVIEW]Imogen Dickie - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):737-745.
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  7. The Sortal Dependence of Demonstrative Reference.Imogen Dickie - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):34-60.
    : ‘Sortalism about demonstrative reference’ is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. Section 1 distinguishes two sortalist views. Section 2 argues that one of them is false. Section 3 argues that the other is true. Section 4 uses the argument from Section 3 to develop a new response to the objection to sortalism from examples where we seem (...)
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  8. Informative Identities in the Begriffsschrift and 'on Sense and Reference'.Imogen Dickie - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):pp. 269-288.
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  9. Negation, Anti-Realism, and the Denial Defence.Imogen Dickie - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):161 - 185.
    Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new response to (...)
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  10. The Generality of Particular Thought.Imogen Dickie - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):508-531.
    This paper is about the claim that, necessarily, a subject who can think that a is F must also have the capacities to think that a is G, a is H, a is I, and so on (for some reasonable range of G, H, I), and that b is F, c is F, d is F, and so on (for some reasonable range of b, c, d). I set out, and raise objections to, two arguments for a strong version of (...)
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    The Essential Connection Between Epistemology and the Theory of Reference.Imogen Dickie - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):99-129.
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    Everybody Needs to Know?Imogen Dickie - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (10):2571-2583.
    I propose an amendment to Sosa’s virtue reliabilism. Sosa’s framework assigns a central role to sophisticated, conceptual, motivational states: ‘intentions to affirm aptly’. I argue that the suggestion that ordinary knowers in fact are motivated by such intentions in everyday belief-forming situations is at best problematic, and explore the possibility of an alternative virtue reliabilist framework. In this alternative framework, the role Sosa assigns to ‘intentions to affirm aptly’ is played instead by non-conceptual motivational states, which I call ‘needs’. The (...)
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  13. Informative Identities in the Begriffsschrift and ‘On Sense and Reference’.Imogen Dickie - 2008 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2):269-287.
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  14. III-How Proper Names Refer.Imogen Dickie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):43-78.
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  15. Referring to Real Particulars.Imogen Dickie - 2003
     
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