Ein textnaher, fortlaufender Kommentar zu Kants Lehre von organisierten Wesen in der „Kritik der Urteilskraft“ ist ein Desiderat sowohl der Kantforschung als auch der Philosophie und Geschichte der Lebenswissenschaften. Auch gibt es bisher nur wenige Lesarten, die Kants Philosophie der Biologie im Ganzen erschließen und versuchen, sie in die vielschichtigen historischen Kontexte der frühneuzeitlichen Naturforschung einzuordnen. Das vorliegende Buch schließt diese Lücken. Es verteidigt die Thesen, dass Kant organisierte Wesen durch drei Arten von Kräften und Gesetzen charakterisiert – durch mechanische, (...) physisch teleologische und moralteleologische Krätfe und Gesetze – deren Vereinbarkeit im Bewusstsein des Menschen, und in der Erfahrungswelt, so, wie sie dem Menschen erscheint, auf der regulativen Idee ihrer Einheit im schöpferischen, theoretisch praktischen Bewusstsein Gottes beruht. Kants Lehre von organisierten Wesen kann als Verbindung einer gemäßigten, weder animalkulistisch noch ovistisch vereinseitigten, Präformationslehre mit einer vitalistischen Spielart der Epigenesislehre verstanden werden. – Weiterführende und provokative Einsichten für eine der bewegtesten Debatten der gegenwärtigen Kantforschung. (shrink)
During the last twenty years, Kant's theory of biology has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars and developed into a field which is growing rapidly in importance within Kant studies. The volume presents fifteen interpretative essays written by experts working in the field, covering topics from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century biological theories, the development of the philosophy of biology in Kant's writings, the theory of organisms in Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment, and current perspectives on the teleology of nature.
The antinomy of teleological judgment is one of the most controversial passages of Kant’s "Critique of the Power of Judgment". Having developed the idea of an explanation of organized beings by mechanical and teleological natural laws in §§ 61-68, in §§ 69-78 Kant raises the question of whether higher order mechanical and teleological natural laws, which unify the particular empirical laws of organized beings, might pose an antinomy of conflicting principles within the power of judgment. I will argue against alternative (...) views that this antinomy is neither a conflict between objective constitutive principles of the determining power of judgment nor a conflict between an objective constitutive principle of the determining power of judgment and a subjective regulative maxim of the reflecting power of judgment nor does it consist in a confusion of a pair of subjective regulative maxims of the reflecting power of judgment with a pair of objective constitutive principles of the determining power of judgment, but does consist in an apparent conflict between mechanical and teleological natural laws as subjective regulative maxims of the reflecting power of judgment. I will further argue that Kant’s resolution of the antinomy consists in the regulative idea of a supersensible that represents the unity of both kinds of natural laws and justifies the unification of both kinds of natural laws in the human power of judgment. Kant uses three notions when he talks about the supersensible – the regulative idea of a divine artisan, the regulative idea of a divine intuitive understanding, and the regulative idea of an underdetermined, supernatural ground of nature. I will show how each of these notions accounts for the unity of both kinds of natural laws and will discuss possible correlations between them. I will then explain how the unity of both kinds of natural laws in the regulative idea of a supersensible accounts for the unification of both kinds of natural laws in the human power of judgment. While the divine intuitive understanding is perfect and uncreated and, thus, capable of a representation of the unity of both kinds of natural laws, the human discursive understanding is imperfect and created; it is capable only of the representation of the unification of both kinds of natural laws in form of a hierarchy of laws. (shrink)
Was Aristotle the ‘father’ and founder of the epigenesis doctrine? Historically, I will argue, this question must be answered with ‘no’. Aristotle did not initiate and had no access to a debate that described itself in terms of ‘epigenesis’ and ‘preformation’, and thus cannot be considered the ‘father’ or founder of the epigenesis-preformation controversy in a literal sense. But many ancient accounts of reproduction and embryological development contain analogies to what early modern scientist called ‘epigenesis’ and ‘preformation’, and, in this (...) analogous sense, Aristotle can be considered a precursor of the epigenesis-preformation controversy. But is Aristotle’s position actually epigenetic, as most of the traditional interpreters hold, or preformationist, as some of the recent scholars believe? I will argue against the one-sidedness of both readings that Aristotle’s account of reproduction and heredity contains mainly epigenetic, but also a few preformationist characteristics. Whereas, for instance, Aristotle’s idea of a successive development of the embryo’s parts is doubtlessly epigenetic, Aristotle’s idea that the development of the embryo is an actualization and enlargement of potential parts, which are simultaneously present in the semen, can be considered a preformationist feature. (shrink)
In this paper, I investigate the relation of Kant's theory of biology to epigenetic accounts of organic generation and development. In the literature, a dispute about similarities between Blumenbach's epigenetic account and Kant dominated the debate for many years (see Lenoir 1980, 1981, and 1982, 17–34, Richards 2000; 2002, 207–37; Look 2006, and van den Berg 2009). Some more recent interpreters claim that Wolff's, more than Blumenbach's account plays the pivotal role in the development of a vitalistic conception of epigenesis (...) in Kant (see Dupont 2007 and Huneman 2007). Although I myself hold the view that Kant's position contains preformistic and epigenetic characteristics, in the current paper I focus solely on an investigation of epigenetic elements in Kant's account and compare them to the corresponding epigenetic elements in Wolff's theory. Section I of the paper is devoted to an analysis of Wolff's most important epigenetic theorems: the notion of the essential power (vis essentialis) and the conception of the part-whole composition of organized matter. Although Wolff describes the essential power vitalisticly, as a principle of life, he understands it as the cause of mechanical motions explaining the generation, nourishment, and the growth of an organism. Wolff's model of the part-whole composition of organic matter is subtle, but committed to fundamental mechanistic assumptions, such as that the organism as a whole is composed of inorganic parts. In section II, I analyze the corresponding elements in Kant's theory: the notion of the formative power and the conception of the whole-part composition of organized materials. Kant describes the formative power as a principle that causes the purposive form of an organized being such that matter and mechanism are the means to the purpose of the being as their end. The purpose of the whole is a functional unit which is in principle superior to the form and matter of the subordinate parts. The parts are combined into such a whole in being mutually cause and effect of each other and in being related to the superior whole. In section III, I respond to the debate in the literature. Against Dupont (2007) and Huneman (2007) I argue that, according to Wolff, the vis essentialis accounts for mechanic effects in matter, whereas, according to Kant, the formative power explains the intentional order (form, end, purpose) of an individual organized being, its parts, and its species. Since this view is closer to Blumenbach than to Wolff, the ongoing comparison between Kant and Blumenbach in the literature is justified. However, the emphasis on the specific part-whole composition that Kant considers to be the determining feature of an organized being can be found only in Wolff and not in Blumenbach—though Wolff and Kant describe it in opposing ways. This increases the systematic importance of Wolff for Kant. Thus, a fresh look on the historical debate is required. (shrink)
This chapter examines Kant's account of the nature of nonhuman and human animals in the "Critique of the Power of Judgement". It discusses how Kant thought that a complete account of the forms of explanation commit one to belief in God. It concludes, firstly, that Kant's account implies an unhealthy anthropocentrism and an Enlightenment prejudice in the form of the overestimation of reason, and secondly, that the Kantian model of God lacks one of the main characteristics of the Christian conception (...) of God: the universal divine love, a power that unifies and embraces all beings, including nonhuman and human animals and their orders. (shrink)
Die Abhandlung „Immanuel Kant über das moralische Gefühl der Achtung“ legt nach einer Einführung in den historischen und werkgeschichtlichen Hintergrund wesentliche systematische Züge des moralischen Gefühls der Achtung dar. Es wird gezeigt, dass das apriorische Gefühl der Achtung einerseits von allen anderen empirischen Gefühlen unterschieden, dennoch aber ein Gefühl ist und in seiner spezifischen Sonderstellung drei bedeutende moralphilosophische Funktionen übernehmen kann: eine evaluative, eine kausale und eine bildende Funktion. Kants These, dass es im strengen Sinn nur ein rein moralisches Gefühl (...) gibt, wird gegen ein graduierendes Modell der moralischen Relevanz von Gefühlen diskutiert und gegen alternative klassische Deutungen des moralischen Gefühls wie die Liebe, die Sympathie und das Mitleid abgewogen. (shrink)
The notion of a formative power is one of the most obscure in Kant’s theory of biology. In section I of the paper, I will provide a list of all passages in which Kant uses the term, claiming that the older meaning of ‘formative power’ in Kant’s writings is an epistemological one, whereas the biological meaning of the term appears not before the mid-1780s. I will present and discuss some of these passages in closer detail, and will give a precise (...) interpretation of the most central passage in §65 of Kant's CPJ (5:374.21–6). I will defend the view that, for Kant, the formative power is an immaterial and intrinsic natural power of the organism that belongs to an account of final causation. As a cause, it does not generate the form and the matter, or the matter of organisms, but only the end-directed, purposive form of the matter of an organism. Reading the formative power as form-giving allows for a more careful analysis of Kant’s famous tree example in §64, which I will investigate in section II. The self-generation of a tree with regards to its species, as an individual and with regards to its parts, does not imply the generation of the form and the matter of a tree, or the generation of its matter, but only the causation of the purposive form of the matter of a tree. In section III, I will briefly outline consequences of my interpretation for a placement of Kant’s position among constitutive and regulative theological, and philosophical accounts of organic generation. The fact that the formative power as a form-giving capacity in the organism is a natural epigenetic power does not rule out a supernatural preformistic interpretation of the creation of the matter, and also not a supernatural creation of the formative power. Nature's formative power can be read as a secondary cause that supports God’s creation as a primary cause, and Kant’s position can be understood as mediating between philosophy and a constitutive theology in the pre-critical, and philosophy and a regulative theology in the critical period. (shrink)
In this paper, I treat the question of whether and in what regard Kant's theory of biology contains a version of the argument from design, which is the question of whether Kant considers the purposive order of organized nature as a physicotheological proof for the existence of God, and in turn, the existence of God as the supersensible ground for the teleological order of organized nature. As an introduction to the topic, I name traditional examples of the argument from design (...) (section 1). I then outline Kant's changing attitude towards the argument in his Theory of Heavens, his Argument essay and the three Critiques, highlighting Kant's return to the argument from design in the CPJ after examining and rejecting it in his earlier writings. I elaborate in detail Kant's different uses of the argument in the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment" (section 2). In section 3, I develop a consistent reading of Kant's references to the physicotheological proof in the "Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment": in the "Analytic" he develops a teleological account of nature that makes no use of the argument from design but is consistent with it. In the "Dialectic" and the "Methodology", however, Kant discusses more ambitious systematic questions: the unity of the theoretical laws of nature and the unity of the natural and the supernatural moral laws. These are questions that require an explicit reference to the argument from design (section 3). (shrink)
In "The Metamorphosis of Plants" (1790) and the related didactic poem (1798) Goethe describes the generation and development of plants as six metamorphoses of the primal plant and its organ, the leaf. In a first step, I will try to analyze the nature of the primal plant and its organ, the leaf. Is the primal plant and its organ, the leaf, an idea or does it consist in matter? If it is an idea, is it the idea of all plants (...) (the plant), the idea of a particular species of plants, or the idea of the individual plant? If it is matter – which kind of matter? In a second step, I will analyze the generic nature of the primal plant and its organ, the leaf. How does the metamorphosis of plants proceed? Suppose the leaf is A and the parts of the plants are B, C and D. Does A transform into B, C, D by a process from A to B to A, from A to C to A, and from A to D to A; or does A transform into B, proceed from B as B to C, and proceed from C as C to D; or does A transform into B, while remaining at the same time A, and proceed from B as A to C, while remaining at the same time A, and proceed from C as A to D, while remaining at the same time A? Which of these models explains our experience of plant generation and growth and allows a meaningful interpretation of Goethe's mysterious claim that 'All is leaf'? (shrink)
A commentary on §§ 64-68 of Kant's "Critique of the Power of Judgment". Nach einer allgemeinen Definition von zweckmäßigen Gegenständen und deren Binnendifferenzierung in künstliche und natürliche Zwecke, setzt Kant in § 64 mit einer vorläufigen Definition des eigentlichen Untersuchungsgegenstandes ein. Dinge sind genau dann Naturzwecke, wenn sie von sich selbst Ursache und Wirkung sind. Kant veranschaulicht diese Definition am Beispiel eines organischen Gegenstandes: an einem Baum. In § 65 soll die vorläufige Definition von Naturzwecken präzisiert und von einem bestimmten (...) Begriff abgeleitet werden. Kant führt die Selbstverursachung von Organismen zunächst auf eine Bildungskraft im Inneren der Dinge zurück. Da diese Kraft aber nicht erfahrbar ist, und da sich der Mensch natürliche Organismen dennoch nur durch die Wirksamkeit einer solchen Kraft erklären kann, wird sie als ein a priori regulatives Prinzip der menschlichen Urteilskraft gedeutet, das keinen gegenstandskonstitutiven, sondern einen bloß forschungsheuristisch–regulativen Charakter hat. In den §§ 66 und 67 versucht Kant zu zeigen, daß der Mensch die Idee der Teleologie der Natur als apriorisch–regulatives Prinzip bei der Beurteilung einzelner natürlicher Organismen (§ 66) und der Natur als System der Zwecke im ganzen verwendet (§ 67). In § 68 wertet Kant die Ergebnisse der "Analytik“ wissenschaftstheoretisch aus. Da die Teleologie der Natur auf einem unabhängigen, immanenten Prinzip beruht, ist sie eine eigenständige systematische Wissenschaft, die vor allem von der Theologie, aber auch von der mathematischen Naturwissenschaft verschieden ist. (shrink)
Among the most important controversies about the form and content of the table of the categories of freedom are the questions, first, what the table of the categories of freedom is about; second, if the categories of freedom have moral content or if they can be morally indifferent; and third, if the categories of freedom are a priori unconditioned or a posteriori conditioned concepts. I will argue, first, that the categories of freedom thematize particular aspects of determining grounds of human (...) actions and man's voluntary treatment of these determining grounds. Second, they are determining grounds of human actions "with respect to the concepts of the good and evil" (CprR 5:66.17-18), that is, they do have good or evil moral content and cannot be morally indifferent. And third, all categories of freedom thematize aspects of determining grounds of human actions under empirical conditions in their relation to the unconditioned: the practical law (which is itself not part of the table of the categories of freedom) and the generation of moral contents (the concepts of good and evil which are derived from the practical law). (shrink)
