Results for 'Incompatibilism'

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  1.  3
    And the so-Far Consequence Argument Stephen Hetherington University of New South Wales.Sofar Incompatibilism - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73:163-178.
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  2. Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
    The debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists depends in large part on what ordinary people mean by ‘free will’, a matter on which previous experimental philosophy studies have yielded conflicting results. In Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (2005, 2006), most participants judged that agents in deterministic scenarios could have free will and be morally responsible. Nichols and Knobe (2007), though, suggest that these apparent compatibilist responses are performance errors produced by using concrete scenarios, and that their abstract scenarios reveal the folk (...)
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  3.  3
    Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2008 - In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.
    This paper concerns the role of the transcendental distinction between agents qua phenomena and qua noumena in Kant's theory of free will. It argues (1) that Kant's incompatibilism can be accommodated if one accepts the "ontological" interpretation of this distinction (i.e. the view that agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena), and (2) that Kant's incompatibilism cannot be accommodated by the "two-aspect" interpretation, whose defining feature is the rejection of the ontological priority of agents qua (...)
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  4. Defending Hard Incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):228-247.
    In _Living Without Free Will_, I develop and argue for a view according to which our being morally responsible would be ruled out if determinism were true, and also if indeterminism were true and the causes of our actions were exclusively events.1 Absent agent causation, indeterministic causal histories are as threatening to moral responsibility as deterministic histories are, and a generalization argument from manipulation cases shows that deterministic histories indeed undermine moral responsibility. Agent causation has not been ruled out as (...)
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  5.  94
    What Must a Proof of Incompatibilism Prove?Seth Shabo - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):361-371.
    Peter van Inwagen has developed two highly influential strategies for establishing incompatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility. These have come to be known as ‘the Direct Argument’ and ‘the Indirect Argument,’ respectively. In recent years, the two arguments have attracted closely related criticisms. In each case, it is claimed, the argument does not provide a fully general defense of the incompatibilist’s conclusion. While the critics are right to notice these arguments’ limitations, they have not made it clear what (...)
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  6.  91
    The Fate of the Direct Argument and the Case for Incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):405-424.
    In this paper, I distinguish causal from logical versions of the direct argument for incompatibilism. I argue that, contrary to appearances, causal versions are better equipped to withstand an important recent challenge to the direct-argument strategy. The challenge involves arguing that support for the argument’s pivotal inference principle falls short just when it is needed most, namely when a deterministic series runs through an agent’s unimpaired deliberations. I then argue that, while there are limits to what causal versions can (...)
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  7. A Master Argument for Incompatibilism?Tomis Kapitan - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 127--157.
    The past 25 years have witnessed a vigorous discussion of an argument directed against the compatibilist approach to free will and responsibility. This reasoning, variously called the “consequence argument,” the “incompatibility argument,” and the “unavoidability argument,” may be expressed informally as follows: If determinism is true then whatever happens is a consequence of past events and laws over which we have no control and which we are unable to prevent. But whatever is a consequence of what’s beyond our control is (...)
     
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  8.  48
    More Trouble for Direct Source Incompatibilism: Reply to Yang. [REVIEW]Charles Hermes & Joe Campbell - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (3):335-344.
    Direct source incompatibilism (DSI) is the conjunction of two claims: SI-F: there are genuine Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs); SI-D: there is a sound version of the direct argument (DA). Eric Yang ( 2012 ) responds to a recent criticism of DSI (Campbell 2006 ). We show that Yang misses the mark. One can accept Yang’s criticisms and get the same result: there is a deep tension between FSCs and DA, between SI-F and SI-D. Thus, DSI is untenable. In this essay, (...)
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  9. Two Kinds of Incompatibilism.Robert H. Kane - 1989 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (December):219-54.
    The present essay is about this problem of the intelligibility of incompatibilist freedom. I do not think Kant, Nagel and Strawson are right in thinking that incompatibilist theories cannot be made intelligible to theoretical reason, nor are those many others right who think that incompatibilist accounts of freedom must be essentially mysterious or terminally obscure. I doubt if I can say enough in one short paper to convince anyone of these claims who is not already persuaded. But I hope to (...)
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  10. A Regress Argument for Restrictive Incompatibilism.David Vander Laan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (2):201 - 215.
    Plausibly, no agent ever performs an action without some desire to perform that action. If so, a regress argument shows that, given incompatibilism, we are only rarely free. The argument sidesteps recent objections to this thesis.
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  11.  37
    Defending Direct Source Incompatibilism.Eric Yang - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (3):325-333.
    Joseph Keim Campbell has attempted to say “farewell” to a particular version of source incompatibilism, viz. direct source incompatibilism, arguing that direct source incompatibilism is committed to two theses that are in tension, thereby threatening the coherence of the position. He states that direct source incompatibilism is committed to the following claims: SI-F: there are genuine Frankfurt-style counterexamples. SI-D: there is a sound version of the Direct Argument. Campbell argues that both of these theses cannot be (...)
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  12.  67
    Farewell to Direct Source Incompatibilism.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):36 - 49.
    Traditional theorists about free will and moral responsibility endorse the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action that she performs only if she can do or could have done otherwise. According to source theorists, PAP is false and an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she is the source of that action. Source incompatibilists accept the source theory but also endorse INC: if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible (...)
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  13. Incompatibilism and "Bypassed" Agency.Gunnar Björnsson - 2014 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), Surrounding Free Will. Oxford University Press. pp. 95–112.
    Eddy Nahmias and Dylan Murray have recently argued that when people take agents to lack responsibility in deterministic scenarios, they do so because they take agents’ beliefs, desires and decisions to be bypassed, having no effect on their actions. This might seem like an improbable mistake, but the Bypass Hypothesis is bolstered by intriguing experimental data. Moreover, if the hypothesis is correct, it provides a straightforward error theory for incompatibilist intuitions. This chapter argues that the Bypass Hypothesis, although promising and (...)
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  14.  76
    Source Incompatibilism and its Alternatives.Kevin Timpe - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):143-155.
    In current debates about moral responsibility, it is common to differentiate two fundamentally different incompatibilist positions: Leeway Incompatibilism and Source Incompatibilism. The present paper argues that this is a bad dichotomy. Those forms of Leeway Incompatibilism that have no appeal to ‘origination’ or ‘ultimacy’ are problematic, which suggests that incompatibilists should prefer Source Incompatibilism. Two sub-classifications of Source Incompatibilism are then differentiated: Narrow Source Incompatibilism holds that alternative possibilities are outside the scope of what (...)
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  15.  46
    Flickers of Freedom and Frankfurt-Style Cases in the Light of the New Incompatibilism of the Stit Theory.Katarzyna Paprzycka - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:553-565.
    Frankfurt-style examples aim to undermine the principle that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise, which in turn requires the availability of alternate possibilities.1 They are thus considered a reason for refuting incompatibilism. One lesson drawn from Frankfurt-style examples is exemplified by the compatibilist account of Fischer and Ravizza.2 They accept the impact of Frankfurt-style cases and hold that the incompatibilist requirement of regulative control, which involves the agent’s ability to perform the action and her ability to perform (...)
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  16.  64
    Reflections on the Incompatibilist's Direct Argument.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2007 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):1 - 19.
    The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument (...)
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  17.  96
    After Compatibilism and Incompatibilism.Ted Honderich - manuscript
    A determinism of decisions and actions, despite our experience of deciding and acting and also an interpretation of Quantum Theory, is a reasonable assumption. The doctrines of Compatibilism and Incompatibilism are both false, and demonstrably so. Whole structures of culture and social life refute them, and establish the alternative of Attitudinism. The real problem of determinism has seemed to be that of accomodating ourselves to the frustration of certain attitudes, at bottom certain desires. This project of Affirmation can run (...)
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  18.  38
    Common Sense, Strict Incompatibilism, and Free Will.Boris Rähme - 2013 - Philosophical Inquiries 1 (1):107-124.
    Peter van Inwagen and Colin McGinn hold that there are strong arguments for strict incompatibilism, i.e. for the claim that the free will thesis (F) is inconsistent not just with determinism but with the negation of determinism as well. Interestingly, both authors deny that these arguments are apt to justify the claim that (F) is false. I argue that van Inwagen and McGinn are right in taking the fact that epistemic commitment to (F) is deeply rooted in common sense (...)
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  19.  30
    Source Incompatibilism and the Foreknowledge Dilemma.Tina Talsma - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):209-219.
    The problem that divine foreknowledge poses for free will is one that is notoriously difficult to solve. If God believes in advance how an agent will act, this fact about the past eradicates all alternatives for the actor, given the infallibility of God’s beliefs. And if we assume, with many theists, that free will requires alternatives possibilities, then it looks as if God’s omniscience is incompatible with our free will. One solution to this problem, introduced and defended by David Hunt, (...)
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  20.  1
    A Regress Argument for Restrictive Incompatibilism.D. Vander-Laan - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (2):201-215.
    Plausibly, no agent ever performs an action without some desire to perform that action. If so, a regress argument shows that, given incompatibilism, we are only rarely free. The argument sidesteps recent objections to this thesis.
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  21.  43
    Incompatibilism and the Logic of Transfer.Danilo šuster - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):45-54.
    Modal arguments for incompatibility of freedom and determinism are typically based on the “transfer principle” for inability to act otherwise (Beta). The principle of agglomerativity (closure under conjunction introduction) is derivable from Beta. The most convincing counterexample to Beta is based on the denial of Agglomeration. The defender of the modal argument has two ways to block counterexamples to Beta: (i) use a notion of inability to act otherwise which is immune to the counterexample to agglomerativity; (ii) replace Beta with (...)
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  22. Uncompromising Source Incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.
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  23. Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame.Michael Otsuka - 1998 - Ethics 108 (4):685-701.
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  24.  52
    Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility.Michael S. McKenna - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):37-51.
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  25. A Critique of Pereboom's 'Four-Case Argument' for Incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Analysis 65 (285):75-80.
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  26.  33
    Problems with Actual-Sequence Incompatibilism.John Martin Fischer - 2000 - Journal of Ethics 4 (4):323-328.
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  27.  82
    Reasons Reactivity and Incompatibilist Intuitions.Michael S. McKenna - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):131-143.
  28. The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism[REVIEW]Eleonore Stump - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.
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  29. Living Without Free Will: The Case for Hard Incompatibilism.Derk Pereboom - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), Journal of Ethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 477-488.
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  30. Incompatibilism and the Fixity of the Past.Neal A. Tognazzini & John Martin Fischer - forthcoming - In John Keller (ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from van Inwagen. Oxford University Press.
    A style of argument that calls into question our freedom (in the sense that involves freedom to do otherwise) has been around for millennia; it can be traced back to Origen. The argument-form makes use of the crucial idea that the past is over-and-done-with and thus fixed; we cannot now do anything about the distant past (or, for that matter, the recent past)—it is now too late. Peter van Inwagen has presented this argument (what he calls the Consequence Argument) in (...)
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  31. On an Argument for Incompatibilism.David Widerker - 1987 - Analysis 47 (January):37-41.
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  32. On a Proof of Incompatibilism.James W. Lamb - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (January):20-35.
  33. The Case for Incompatibilism[REVIEW]Gideon Rosen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (3):699-706.
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  34.  56
    Warfield's New Argument for Incompatibilism.D. K. Nelkin & S. C. Rickless - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):104-107.
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  35.  53
    Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Power Necessity.Erik Carlson - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):277-290.
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  36. Determinism as True, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism as False, and the Real Alternative.Ted Honderich - 2002 - In Robert H. Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
     
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  37.  42
    Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility.Justin A. Capes - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1477-1495.
    Arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility sometimes make use of various transfer of non-responsibility principles. These principles purport to specify conditions in which lack of moral responsibility is transmitted to the consequences of things for which people are not morally responsible. In this paper, after developing what I take to be the most serious objections to extant principles of this sort, I identify and defend a new transfer of non-responsibility principle that is immune to these and other (...)
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  38.  77
    In Defense of Incompatibilism.Carl Ginet - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (November):391-400.
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  39. Fatalism, Incompatibilism, and the Power to Do Otherwise.Penelope Mackie - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):672-689.
  40.  36
    How Not to Argue for Incompatibilism.Michael Kremer - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (1):1-26.
    Ted A. Warfield has recently employed modal logic to argue that compatibilism in the free-will/determinism debate entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. I show that Warfield's argument fails. A parallel argument leads to the false conclusion that the mere possibility of determinism, together with the necessary existence of any contingent propositions, entails the rejection of intuitively valid inferences. The error in both arguments involves a crucial equivocation, which can be revealed by replacing modal operators with explicit quantifiers over possible (...)
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  41.  54
    Incompatibilism Without the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.Robert Heinaman - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (September):266-76.
  42.  80
    The Logic of Theological Incompatibilism: A Reply to Westphal.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):46-48.
    In our paper, "Omniscience, Freedom, and Dependence" (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88: 346-367), we argued that recent attempts (by Merricks, McCall, and Westphal) to resolve the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge fail because they are question-begging. Westphal replied to our paper in an earlier issue of Analysis, and this article is our rejoinder to his reply.
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  43.  82
    The Modal Argument for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (March):227-44.
  44.  76
    On a New Argument for Incompatibilism.Erik Carlson - 2003 - Philosophia 31 (1-2):159-164.
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  45. Incompatibilism.J. M. Ficsher - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (January):127-37.
     
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  46. Ethical Consequences of Recent Work on Incompatibilism.Ralph D. Ellis - 1991 - Philosophical Inquiry 13 (3-4):22-42.
     
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  47. Assuming Determinism, Free Will Can Only Be an Illusion: An Argument for Incompatibilism.Ariel Yadin - 2004 - Iyyun 53 (July):275-286.
     
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  48. Do Judgments About Freedom and Responsibility Depend on Who You Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions About Compatibilism and Incompatibilism.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.
    Recently, there has been an increased interest in folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility from both philosophers and psychologists. We aim to extend our understanding of folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility using an individual differences approach. Building off previous research suggesting that there are systematic differences in folks’ philosophically relevant intuitions, we present new data indicating that the personality trait extraversion predicts, to a significant extent, those who have compatibilist versus incompatibilist intuitions. We argue that identifying groups (...)
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  49. Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.
    Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pre theoretical intuitions. we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is infact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our (...)
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  50. Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions.Eddy Nahmias & Dylan Murray - 2010 - In Jesus Aguilar, Andrei Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 189--215.
    We discuss recent work in experimental philosophy on free will and moral responsibility and then present a new study. Our results suggest an error theory for incompatibilist intuitions. Most laypersons who take determinism to preclude free will and moral responsibility apparently do so because they mistakenly interpret determinism to involve fatalism or “bypassing” of agents’ relevant mental states. People who do not misunderstand determinism in this way tend to see it as compatible with free will and responsibility. We discuss why (...)
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