Results for 'Induction'

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  1. Inductive Risk and Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
    Although epistemic values have become widely accepted as part of scientific reasoning, non-epistemic values have been largely relegated to the "external" parts of science (the selection of hypotheses, restrictions on methodologies, and the use of scientific technologies). I argue that because of inductive risk, or the risk of error, non-epistemic values are required in science wherever non-epistemic consequences of error should be considered. I use examples from dioxin studies to illustrate how non-epistemic consequences of error can and should be considered (...)
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    Pessimistic Inductions: Four Varieties.K. Brad Wray - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):61-73.
    The pessimistic induction plays an important role in the contemporary realism/anti-realism debate in philosophy of science. But there is some disagreement about the structure and aim of the argument. And a number of scholars have noted that there is more than one type of PI in the philosophical literature. I review four different versions of the PI. I aim to show that PIs have been appealed to by philosophers of science for a variety of reasons. Even some realists have (...)
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  3. Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-Picking.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.
    In this article, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by P. Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-called Old Induction, like Vickers's, and New Induction, like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias—specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes that Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between (...)
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  4. Mark Siderits Deductive, Inductive, Both or Neither?Inductive Deductive - 2003 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 31:303-321.
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  5. Inductive Risk and the Contexts of Communication.Stephen John - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):79-96.
    In recent years, the argument from inductive risk against value free science has enjoyed a revival. This paper investigates and clarifies this argument through means of a case-study: neonicitinoid research. Sect. 1 argues that the argument from inductive risk is best conceptualised as a claim about scientists’ communicative obligations. Sect. 2 then shows why this argument is inapplicable to “public communication”. Sect. 3 outlines non-epistemic reasons why non-epistemic values should not play a role in public communicative contexts. Sect. 4 analyses (...)
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    Exploring Inductive Risk: Case Studies of Values in Science.Kevin C. Elliott & Ted Richards (eds.) - 2017 - Oup Usa.
    This book brings together eleven case studies of inductive risk-the chance that scientific inference is incorrect-that range over a wide variety of scientific contexts and fields. The chapters are designed to illustrate the pervasiveness of inductive risk, assist scientists and policymakers in responding to it, and productively move theoretical discussions of the topic forward.
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  7. Inductive Knowledge.Andrew Bacon - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):354-388.
    This paper formulates some paradoxes of inductive knowledge. Two responses in particular are explored: According to the first sort of theory, one is able to know in advance that certain observations will not be made unless a law exists. According to the other, this sort of knowledge is not available until after the observations have been made. Certain natural assumptions, such as the idea that the observations are just as informative as each other, the idea that they are independent, and (...)
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  8.  24
    Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - International Phenomenological Society.
    An account of inductive inference is presented which addresses both its epistemological and metaphysical dimensions. It is argued that inductive knowledge is possible by virtue of the fit between our innate psychological capacities and the causal structure of the world.
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  9. Historical Inductions, Old and New.Juha Saatsi - 2015 - Synthese:1-15.
    I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.
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    Historical Inductions, Old and New.Juha Saatsi - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):3979-3993.
    I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.
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  11. Immodest Inductive Methods.David Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.
    Inductive methods can be used to estimate the accuracies of inductive methods. Call a method immodest if it estimates that it is at least as accurate as any of its rivals. It would be unreasonable to adopt any but an immodest method. Under certain assumptions, exactly one of Carnap's lambda-methods is immodest. This may seem to solve the problem of choosing among the lambda-methods; but sometimes the immodest lambda-method is λ =0, which it would not be reasonable to adopt. We (...)
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  12.  19
    Elementary Induction on Abstract Structures.Yiannis Nicholas Moschovakis - 1974 - Amsterdam, Netherlands: Dover Publications.
    Hailed by the Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society as "easy to use and a pleasure to read," this research monograph is recommended for students and professionals interested in model theory and definability theory. The sole prerequisite is a familiarity with the basics of logic, model theory, and set theory. 1974 edition.
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  13. Induction and Inference to the Best Explanation.Ruth Weintraub - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):203-216.
    In this paper I adduce a new argument in support of the claim that IBE is an autonomous form of inference, based on a familiar, yet surprisingly, under-discussed, problem for Hume’s theory of induction. I then use some insights thereby gleaned to argue for the claim that induction is really IBE, and draw some normative conclusions.
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  14. Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought.P. B. Medawar - 2008 - Routledge.
    Originally published in 1969. This book explains what is wrong with the traditional methodology of "inductive" reasoning and shows that the alternative scheme of reasoning associated with Whewell, Pierce and Popper can give the scientist a useful insight into the way he thinks.
     
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  15.  44
    Practical Induction.Elijah Millgram - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
    Itself a pleasure to read, this book is full of inventive arguments and conveys Millgram's bold thesis with elegance and force.
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  16. Induction, Explanation, and Natural Necessity.John Foster - 1983 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 83:87-101.
    I want to examine a possible solution to the problem of induction-one which, as far as I know, has not been discussed elsewhere. The solution makes crucial use of the notion of objective natural necessity. For the purposes of this discussion, I shall assume that this notion is coherent. I am aware that this assumption is controversial, but I do not have space to examine the issue here.
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  17. Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):59-68.
    In this paper, I outline a reductio against Stanford’s “New Induction” on the History of Science, which is an inductive argument against scientific realism that is based on what Stanford (2006) calls “the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). From the supposition that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is cogent, and the parallel New Induction on the History of Philosophy (Mizrahi 2014), it follows that scientific antirealism is not worthy of belief. I also show that (...)
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  18.  89
    Probability, Induction and Statistics: The Art of Guessing.Bruno de Finetti - 1972 - New York: John Wiley.
  19. Induction, Conceptual Spaces and AI.Peter Gärdenfors - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (1):78 - 95.
    A computational theory of induction must be able to identify the projectible predicates, that is to distinguish between which predicates can be used in inductive inferences and which cannot. The problems of projectibility are introduced by reviewing some of the stumbling blocks for the theory of induction that was developed by the logical empiricists. My diagnosis of these problems is that the traditional theory of induction, which started from a given (observational) language in relation to which all (...)
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  20. Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief.Colin Howson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory suggests that Hume's argument is flawed. However, Colin Howson argues that there is no flaw and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion; he also offers a solution to one of the central (...)
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  21.  89
    Inductive Risk, Epistemic Risk, and Overdiagnosis of Disease.Justin B. Biddle - 2016 - Perspectives on Science 24 (2):192-205.
    Philosophers interested in the role of values in science have focused much attention on the argument from inductive risk. In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of authors argued that value judgments play an ineliminable role in the acceptance or rejection of hypotheses. No hypothesis is ever verified with certainty, and so a decision to accept or reject a hypothesis depends upon whether the evidence is sufficiently strong. But whether the evidence is sufficiently strong depends upon the consequences of making (...)
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  22. Inductive Inconsistencies.Carl Gustav Hempel - 1960 - Synthese 12 (4):439-69.
  23. Induction and Natural Kinds.Howard Sankey - 1997 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 1 (2):239-254.
    The paper sketches an ontological solution to an epistemological problem in the philosophy of science. Taking the work of Hilary Kornblith and Brian Ellis as a point of departure, it presents a realist solution to the Humean problem of induction, which is based on a scientific essentialist interpretation of the principle of the uniformity of nature. More specifically, it is argued that use of inductive inference in science is rationally justified because of the existence of real, natural kinds of (...)
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  24.  31
    Inductive Knowledge and Lotteries: Could One Explain Both ‘Safely’?Haicheng Zhao & Peter Baumann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):118-126.
    Safety accounts of knowledge claim, roughly, that knowledge that p requires that one's belief that p could not have easily been false. Such accounts have been very popular in recent epistemology. However, one serious problem safety accounts have to confront is to explain why certain lottery‐related beliefs are not knowledge, without excluding obvious instances of inductive knowledge. We argue that the significance of this objection has hitherto been underappreciated by proponents of safety. We discuss Duncan Pritchard's recent solution to the (...)
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  25. Inductions, Red Herrings, and the Best Explanation for the Mixed Record of Science.P. D. Magnus - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):803-819.
    Kyle Stanford has recently claimed to offer a new challenge to scientific realism. Taking his inspiration from the familiar Pessimistic Induction (PI), Stanford proposes a New Induction (NI). Contra Anjan Chakravartty’s suggestion that the NI is a ‘red herring’, I argue that it reveals something deep and important about science. The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives, which lies at the heart of the NI, yields a richer anti-realism than the PI. It explains why science falls short when it falls (...)
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  26. Inductive Inference and its Natural Ground.Hilary Kornblith - 1993 - MIT Press.
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    Inductive Judgments About Natural Categories.Lance J. Rips - 1975 - Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 14 (6):665-681.
    The present study examined the effects of semantic structure on simple inductive judgments about category members. For a particular category, subjects were told that one of the species had a given property and were asked to estimate the proportion of instances in the other species that possessed the property. The results indicated that category structure—in particular, the typicality of the species—influenced subjects' judgments. These results were interpreted by models based on the following assumption: When little is known about the underlying (...)
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  28. Backwards Induction in the Centipede Game.John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):237-242.
    The standard backward-induction reasoning in a game like the centipede assumes that the players maintain a common belief in rationality throughout the game. But that is a dubious assumption. Suppose the first player X didn't terminate the game in the first round; what would the second player Y think then? Since the backwards-induction argument says X should terminate the game, and it is supposed to be a sound argument, Y might be entitled to doubt X's rationality. Alternatively, Y (...)
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  29. Induction and Supposition.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - The Reasoner 6:78-80.
    Applying good inductive rules inside the scope of suppositions leads to implausible results. I argue it is a mistake to think that inductive rules of inference behave anything like 'inference rules' in natural deduction systems. And this implies that it isn't always true that good arguments can be run 'off-line' to gain a priori knowledge of conditional conclusions.
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  30.  82
    Testimony, Induction and Folk Psychology.Jack Lyons - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (2):163 – 178.
    An influential argument for anti-reductionism about testimony, due to CAJ Coady, fails, because it assumes that an inductive global defense of testimony would proceed along effectively behaviorist lines. If we take seriously our wealth of non-testimonially justified folk psychological beliefs, the prospects for inductivism and reductionism look much better.
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  31. Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox.Patrick Maher - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (1):50-70.
    Hempel's paradox of the ravens arises from the inconsistency of three prima facie plausible principles of confirmation. This paper uses Carnapian inductive logic to (a) identify which of the principles is false, (b) give insight into why this principle is false, and (c) identify a true principle that is sufficiently similar to the false one that failure to distinguish the two might explain why the false principle is prima facie plausible. This solution to the paradox is compared with a variety (...)
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    Inductive Metaphysics: Editors' Introduction.Kristina Engelhard, Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla, Alexander Gebharter & Ansgar Seide - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):1-26.
    This introduction consists of two parts. In the first part, the special issue editors introduce inductive metaphysics from a historical as well as from a systematic point of view and discuss what distinguishes it from other modern approaches to metaphysics. In the second part, they give a brief summary of the individual articles in this special issue.
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  33. A Material Theory of Induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
    Contrary to formal theories of induction, I argue that there are no universal inductive inference schemas. The inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is local. Some are so localized as to defy familiar characterization. Since inductive inference schemas are underwritten by facts, we can assess and control the inductive risk taken in an induction by investigating the warrant for its underwriting facts. In learning (...)
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  34. The Inductive Argument From Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition.William P. Alston - 1991 - Philosophical Perspectives 5:29-67.
  35.  71
    The Risk of Using Inductive Risk to Challenge the Value-Free Ideal.Inmaculada de Melo-Martín & Kristen Intemann - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (4):500-520.
    The argument from inductive risk has been embraced by many as a successful account of the role of values in science that challenges the value-free ideal. We argue that it is not obvious that the argument from inductive risk actually undermines the value-free ideal. This is because the inductive risk argument endorses an assumption held by proponents of the value-free ideal: that contextual values never play an appropriate role in determining evidence. We show that challenging the value-free ideal ultimately requires (...)
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  36. Demonstrative Induction: Its Significant Role in the History of Physics.Jon Dorling - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (3):360-372.
    It is argued in this paper that the valid argument forms coming under the general heading of Demonstrative Induction have played a highly significant role in the history of theoretical physics. This situation was thoroughly appreciated by several earlier philosophers of science and deserves to be more widely known and understood.
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  37. Induction, Simplicity and Scientific Progress.Nicholas Maxwell - 1979 - Scientia 114 (14):629-653.
    In a recent work, Popper claims to have solved the problem of induction. In this paper I argue that Popper fails both to solve the problem, and to formulate the problem properly. I argue, however, that there are aspects of Popper's approach which, when strengthened and developed, do provide a solution to at least an important part of the problem of induction, along somewhat Popperian lines. This proposed solution requires, and leads to, a new theory of the role (...)
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  38. The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too Far.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3209-3226.
    In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist’s thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this interpretation of the pessimistic induction fails, too. If (...)
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  39.  18
    Inductively Generated Formal Topologies.Thierry Coquand, Giovanni Sambin, Jan Smith & Silvio Valentini - 2003 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 124 (1-3):71-106.
    Formal topology aims at developing general topology in intuitionistic and predicative mathematics. Many classical results of general topology have been already brought into the realm of constructive mathematics by using formal topology and also new light on basic topological notions was gained with this approach which allows distinction which are not expressible in classical topology. Here we give a systematic exposition of one of the main tools in formal topology: inductive generation. In fact, many formal topologies can be presented in (...)
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    Intuition, Induction, and the Middle Way.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1982 - The Monist 65 (3):287-301.
    The tapestry of Wilfrid Sellars’s writings is dauntingly rich in stimulus and suggestion. I shall take up here an intriguing strand of thought that was woven into one of his early papers ‘Language, Rules and Behavior’, and I shall discuss some of the issues to which it gives rise. Sellars was concerned in that paper with the procedures by which people evaluate actions as right or wrong, arguments as valid or invalid, and cognitive claims as well or ill grounded. He (...)
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  41. Induction in the Socratic Tradition.John P. McCaskey - 2014 - In Louis F. Groarke & Paolo C. Biondi (eds.), Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Perspectives on Induction. De Gruyter. pp. 161-192.
    Aristotle said that induction (epagōgē) is a proceeding from particulars to a universal, and the definition has been conventional ever since. But there is an ambiguity here. Induction in the Scholastic and the (so-called) Humean tradition has presumed that Aristotle meant going from particular statements to universal statements. But the alternate view, namely that Aristotle meant going from particular things to universal ideas, prevailed all through antiquity and then again from the time of Francis Bacon until the mid-nineteenth (...)
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  42. Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen Part One: How to Solve the Problem of Induction.Nicholas Maxwell - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):61-79.
    In this three-part paper, my concern is to expound and defend a conception of science, close to Einstein's, which I call aim-oriented empiricism. I argue that aim-oriented empiricsim has the following virtues. (i) It solve the problem of induction; (ii) it provides decisive reasons for rejecting van Fraassen's brilliantly defended but intuitively implausible constructive empiricism; (iii) it solves the problem of verisimilitude, the problem of explicating what it can mean to speak of scientific progress given that science advances from (...)
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  43.  72
    Induction of Lucid Dreams: A Systematic Review of Evidence.Tadas Stumbrys, Daniel Erlacher, Melanie Schädlich & Michael Schredl - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (3):1456-1475.
    In lucid dreams the dreamer is aware of dreaming and often able to influence the ongoing dream content. Lucid dreaming is a learnable skill and a variety of techniques is suggested for lucid dreaming induction. This systematic review evaluated the evidence for the effectiveness of induction techniques. A comprehensive literature search was carried out in biomedical databases and specific resources. Thirty-five studies were included in the analysis , of which 26 employed cognitive techniques, 11 external stimulation and one (...)
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  44.  24
    What Inductive Explanations Could Not Be.John Dougherty - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5473-5483.
    Marc Lange argues that proofs by mathematical induction are generally not explanatory because inductive explanation is irreparably circular. He supports this circularity claim by presenting two putative inductive explanantia that are one another’s explananda. On pain of circularity, at most one of this pair may be a true explanation. But because there are no relevant differences between the two explanantia on offer, neither has the explanatory high ground. Thus, neither is an explanation. I argue that there is no important (...)
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    Inductive Logic.Vincenzo Crupi - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):641-650.
    The current state of inductive logic is puzzling. Survey presentations are recurrently offered and a very rich and extensive handbook was entirely dedicated to the topic just a few years ago [23]. Among the contributions to this very volume, however, one finds forceful arguments to the effect that inductive logic is not needed and that the belief in its existence is itself a misguided illusion , while other distinguished observers have eventually come to see at least the label as “slightly (...)
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  46. The Pessimistic Induction and the Exponential Growth of Science Reassessed.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4321-4330.
    My aim is to evaluate a new realist strategy for addressing the pessimistic induction, Ludwig Fahrbach’s (Synthese 180:139–155, 2011) appeal to the exponential growth of science. Fahrbach aims to show that, given the exponential growth of science, the history of science supports realism. I argue that Fahrbach is mistaken. I aim to show that earlier generations of scientists could construct a similar argument, but one that aims to show that the theories that they accepted are likely true. The problem (...)
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  47. Bayesian Induction Is Eliminative Induction.James Hawthorne - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):99-138.
    Eliminative induction is a method for finding the truth by using evidence to eliminate false competitors. It is often characterized as "induction by means of deduction"; the accumulating evidence eliminates false hypotheses by logically contradicting them, while the true hypothesis logically entails the evidence, or at least remains logically consistent with it. If enough evidence is available to eliminate all but the most implausible competitors of a hypothesis, then (and only then) will the hypothesis become highly confirmed. I (...)
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    Sensitivity, Induction, and Miracles.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):118-126.
    Sosa, Pritchard, and Vogel have all argued that there are cases in which one knows something inductively but does not believe it sensitively, and that sensitivity therefore cannot be necessary for knowledge. I defend sensitivity by showing that inductive knowledge is sensitive.
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  49. Enumerative Induction and Best Explanation.Robert H. Ennis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (18):523-529.
  50. Optimum Inductive Methods: A Study in Inductive Probability, Bayesian Statistics, and Verisimilitude.Roberto Festa - 1993 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht.
    According to the Bayesian view, scientific hypotheses must be appraised in terms of their posterior probabilities relative to the available experimental data. Such posterior probabilities are derived from the prior probabilities of the hypotheses by applying Bayes'theorem. One of the most important problems arising within the Bayesian approach to scientific methodology is the choice of prior probabilities. Here this problem is considered in detail w.r.t. two applications of the Bayesian approach: (1) the theory of inductive probabilities (TIP) developed by Rudolf (...)
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