Results for 'Inductive Scepticism'

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  1.  49
    Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise (...)
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  2. The Principle of Indifference and Inductive Scepticism.Robert Smithson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1):253-272.
    Many theorists have proposed that we can use the principle of indifference to defeat the inductive sceptic. But any such theorist must confront the objection that different ways of applying the principle of indifference lead to incompatible probability assignments. Huemer offers the explanatory priority proviso as a strategy for overcoming this objection. With this proposal, Huemer claims that we can defend induction in a way that is not question-begging against the sceptic. But in this article, I argue that the (...)
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  3.  8
    The Principle of Indifference and Inductive Scepticism.Robert Smithson - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv029.
    Many theorists have proposed that we can use the principle of indifference to defeat the inductive sceptic. But any such theorist must confront the objection that different ways of applying the principle of indifference lead to incompatible probability assignments. Huemer ([2009]) offers the explanatory priority proviso as a strategy for overcoming this objection. With this proposal, Huemer claims that we can defend induction in a way that is not question-begging against the sceptic. But in this article, I argue that (...)
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  4. Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. C. Stove - 1973 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
    This book aims to discuss probability and David Hume's inductive scepticism. For the sceptical view which he took of inductive inference, Hume only ever gave one argument. That argument is the sole subject-matter of this book. The book is divided into three parts. Part one presents some remarks on probability. Part two identifies Hume's argument for inductive scepticism. Finally, the third part evaluates Hume's argument for inductive scepticism.
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  5.  57
    Okasha on Inductive Scepticism.Marc Lange - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):226-232.
    In a recent paper replying to the inductive sceptic, Samir Okasha says that the Humean argument for inductive scepticism depends on mistakenly construing inductive reasoning as based on a principle of the uniformity of nature. I dispute Okasha's argument that we are entitled to the background beliefs on which (he says) inductive reasoning depends. Furthermore, I argue that the sorts of theoretically impoverished contexts to which a uniformity-of-nature principle has traditionally been restricted are exactly the (...)
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  6.  43
    Moral Scepticism and Inductive Scepticism.Robert Black - 1989 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90:65 - 82.
    Viewing moral scepticism as the rejection of objective desirabilities, inductive scepticism may be seen as the rejection of objective believabilities. Moral scepticism leads naturally to amoralism rather than subjectivism, and inductive scepticism undermines not our practices of induction but only a view about justification. The two scepticisms together amount to the adoption of a defensibly narrow, formal view of reason.
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  7. Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. C. Stove - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 35 (3):646-647.
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  8. Quasi-Inductive Scepticism.J. M. Hinton - 1951 - Mind 60 (240):542-547.
  9.  75
    Stove on Hume's Inductive Scepticism.Jonathan E. Adler - 1975 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):167 – 170.
  10.  51
    A Refutation of Popperian Inductive Scepticism.Ken Gemes - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):183-184.
  11.  19
    Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism[REVIEW]Michael Williams & D. C. Stove - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (3):453.
  12.  56
    A Restoration of Popperian Inductive Scepticism.David Miller - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):137-139.
  13.  18
    D. C. Stove, "Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism". [REVIEW]Donald W. Livingston - 1975 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (3):413.
  14. Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. G. Stove - 1979 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 169 (2):237-239.
  15.  4
    Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. C. Stove - 1974 - Philosophical Quarterly 24 (94):72-73.
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  16.  24
    Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.I. M. Fowlie - 1974 - Philosophical Books 15 (2):24-26.
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  17.  18
    STOVE, D. C.: "Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism". [REVIEW]Ian Hinckfuss - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52:269.
  18.  27
    Inductive Scepticism and Experimental Reasoning in Moral Subjects in Hume's Philosophy.Anne Jaap Jacobson - 1989 - Hume Studies 15 (2):325-338.
  19.  28
    Probability and Hume’s Inductive Scepticism[REVIEW]Maria Wolf - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 25:353-353.
  20.  24
    Stove and Inductive Scepticism.William K. Goosens - 1979 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):79-84.
  21.  20
    Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism[REVIEW]Clifford A. Hooker - 1975 - Hume Studies 1 (1):25-29.
  22.  19
    Mellor on Inductive Scepticism.Barry Gower - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (159):233-240.
  23.  25
    A Refutation of Inductive Scepticism.Ken Gemes - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):434 – 438.
  24.  24
    Modal Realism and Inductive Scepticism.Holly Thomas - 1993 - Noûs 27 (3):331-354.
  25.  13
    Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism. By D. C. Stove. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973. Pp. 132. £ 3.00. [REVIEW]James Noxon - 1973 - Dialogue 12 (4):735-741.
  26.  10
    Is Hume's Inductive Scepticism Based Upon Rationalistic Assumptions?Beverly K. Hinton - 2000 - Modern Schoolman 77 (4):309-332.
  27.  18
    Stove on Inductive Scepticism.Barry Gower - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):109 – 112.
  28.  4
    Probability and Hume’s Inductive Scepticism[REVIEW]Maria Wolf - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 25:353-353.
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  29.  1
    Regularity Theory and Inductive Scepticism: The Fight Against Armstrong.Benjamin Smart - 2009 - Lyceum 11 (1).
  30.  5
    Inductions About Attention and Consciousness: Comments on Carolyn Suchy-Dicey, ‘Inductive Scepticism and the Methodological Argument’.John Campbell - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):610-612.
  31. The Nature of Hume’s Inductive Scepticism: A Critical Notice.J. Cassidy - 1977 - Ratio 19 19 (1):47-54.
     
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  32.  5
    Hume’s Inductive Scepticism.P. J. McGrath - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 24:64-81.
  33.  1
    Hume’s Inductive Scepticism.P. J. McGrath - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 24:64-81.
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  34. The Nature of Hume's Inductive Scepticism: A Critical Notice.John Cassidy - 1977 - Ratio (Misc.) 19 (1):47.
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  35. Stove on Hume's Inductive Scepticism.J. E. Adler - 1975 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53:167.
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  36. STOVE, D. C. "Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism". [REVIEW]John Fox - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26:85.
  37. STOVE, D. C. "Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism". [REVIEW]E. Millstone - 1976 - Mind 85:297.
  38. Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. C. Stove - 1976 - Mind 85 (338):297-298.
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  39. Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. C. Stove - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (1):85-87.
     
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  40. Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism.D. C. Stove - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):203-211.
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  41.  22
    Skepticism About Inductive Knowledge.Joe Morrison - 2011 - In Duncan Pritchard & Sven Bernecker (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge.
    A survey of arguments and positions concerning the possibility of inductive knowledge, this piece covers: Hume's problem of induction; the underdetermination of theories by evidence; the method of hypothesis; the relationship between underdetermination and evidential holism; attempts to specify how some statements can be said to be evidentially (or justificatorily) relevant to other claims.
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  42. Socratic Scepticism.Roger Wertheimer - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (4):344-62.
    The Socratic Paradox (that only Socrates is wise, and only because only he recognizes our lack of wisdom) is explained, elaborated and defended. His philosophical scepticism is distinguished from others (Pyrrhonian, Cartesian, Humean, Kripkean Wittgenstein, etc.): the doubt concerns our understanding of our beliefs, not our justification for them; the doubt is a posteriori and inductive, not a priori. Post-Socratic philosophy confirms this scepticism: contra-Descartes, our ideas are not transparent to us; contra-Verificationism, no criterion distinguishes sense from (...)
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  43.  33
    Hume's Scepticism and Realism - His Two Profound Arguments Against the Senses in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.Jani Hakkarainen - 2007 - Tampere, Finland: University of Tampere.
    The main problem of this study is David Hume’s (1711-76) view on Metaphysical Realism (there are mind-independent, external, and continuous entities). This specific problem is part of two more general questions in Hume scholarship: his attitude to scepticism and the relation between naturalism and skepticism in his thinking. A novel interpretation of these problems is defended in this work. The chief thesis is that Hume is both a sceptic and a Metaphysical Realist. His philosophical attitude is to suspend his (...)
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  44.  93
    Proving Induction.Alexander Paseau - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Logic 10:1-17.
    The hard problem of induction is to argue without begging the question that inductive inference, applied properly in the proper circumstances, is conducive to truth. A recent theorem seems to show that the hard problem has a deductive solution. The theorem, provable in zfc, states that a predictive function M exists with the following property: whatever world we live in, M correctly predicts the world’s present state given its previous states at all times apart from a well-ordered subset. On (...)
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  45. Scepticism, Rationalism and Externalism.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1:311-331.
    This paper is about three of the most prominent debates in modern epistemology. The conclusion is that three prima facie appealing positions in these debates cannot be held simultaneously. The first debate is scepticism vs anti-scepticism. My conclusions apply to most kinds of debates between sceptics and their opponents, but I will focus on the inductive sceptic, who claims we cannot come to know what will happen in the future by induction. This is a fairly weak kind (...)
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  46. From Bayesian Epistemology to Inductive Logic.Jon Williamson - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):468-486.
    Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al., 2011, Part 1). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010, Chapter 7). §1 introduces the semantics and then, in §2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008). §3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive (...)
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  47.  68
    One Form of Scepticism About Induction.Keith Campbell - 1963 - Analysis 23 (4):80 - 83.
    The argument of this article is that the use of general terms, And in particular the general term 'generalizations established inductively', Is possible only on the basis of at least weak inductive reasoning. In consequence, Total scepticism concerning induction, The proposition that "no inductive generalization, Of any kind, Is justifiable", Is one of those propositions which are incoherent because their assertion is possible only on the basis of their own falsehood.
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  48.  31
    Inference and Scepticism.Jose L. Zalabardo - 2014 - In Elia Zardini & Dylan Dodd (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press.
    I focus on a family of inferences that are intuitively incapable of producing knowledge of their conclusions, although they appear to satisfy sufficient conditions for inferential knowledge postulated by plausible epistemological theories. They include Moorean inferences and inductive-bootstrapping inferences. I provide an account of why these inferences are not capable of producing knowledge. I argue that the reason why these inferences fail to produce knowledge of their conclusions is that inferential knowledge requires that the subject is more likely to (...)
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  49. Conspiracies And Lyes: Scepticism And The Epistemology of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 1998 - Dissertation, University College London
    In Conspiracies and Lyes I aim to provide an epistemological account of testimony as one of our faculties of knowledge. I compare testimony to perception and memory. Its similarity to both these faculties is recognised. A fundamental difference is stressed: it can be rational to not accept testimony even if testimony is fulfilling its proper epistemic function because it can be rational for a speaker to not express a belief; or, as I say, it can be rational for a speaker (...)
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  50.  39
    Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):517-539.
    Much has been written about Kemp Smith's famous problem regarding the tension between Hume's naturalism and his scepticism. However, most commentators have focused their attention on the Treatise; those who address the Enquiry often take it to express essentially the same message as the Treatise. When Hume's scepticism in the Enquiry has been investigated in its own right, commentators have tended to focus on Hume's inductive scepticism in Sections 4 and 5. All in all, it seems (...)
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