Results for 'Inferentialism'

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  1. Brandom's Inferentialist Theory and the Meaning Entitlement Connection.Alessia Marabini - 2015 - Al Mukhatabat 16.
    According to Brandom’s conceptual role semantics, to grasp a concept involves a commitment to drawing certain inferences. This is a consequence of the inferentialist thesis that the meaning of a term is given by its justification through assertibility conditions. Inferential commitments come out from a material notion of inference which underwrites human rational discourse and activity. In this paper I discuss a problem of Brandom’s semantics allegedly exposed in an argument by Paul Boghossian against Dummett’s and Brandom’s substantive conception of (...)
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  2.  49
    In Defense of Mathematical Inferentialism.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Analysis and Metaphysics 16:70-83.
    I defend a new position in philosophy of mathematics that I call mathematical inferentialism. It holds that a mathematical sentence can perform the function of facilitating deductive inferences from some concrete sentences to other concrete sentences, that a mathematical sentence is true if and only if all of its concrete consequences are true, that the abstract world does not exist, and that we acquire mathematical knowledge by confirming concrete sentences. Mathematical inferentialism has several advantages over mathematical realism and (...)
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  3. Against an Inferentialist Dogma.Thomas Raleigh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1397-1421.
    I consider the ‘inferentialist’ thesis that whenever a mental state rationally justifies a belief it is in virtue of inferential relations holding between the contents of the two states. I suggest that no good argument has yet been given for the thesis. I focus in particular on Williamson (2000) and Ginsborg (2011) and show that neither provides us with a reason to deny the plausible idea that experience can provide non-inferential justification for belief. I finish by pointing out some theoretical (...)
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  4. Grasp of Concepts: Common Sense and Expertise in an Inferentialist Framework.Pietro Salis - 2015 - In M. Bianca P. Piccari (ed.), Epistemology of Ordinary Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 289-297.
    The paper suggests a distinction between two dimensions of grasp of concepts within an inferentialist approach to conceptual content: a common sense "minimum" version, where a simple speaker needs just a few inferences to grasp a concept C, and an expert version, where the specialist is able to master a wide range of inferential transitions involving C. This paper tries to defend this distinction and to explore some of its basic implications.
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  5.  66
    A Nonmonotonic Sequent Calculus for Inferentialist Expressivists.Ulf Hlobil - 2016 - In Pavel Arazim & Michal Dančák (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2015. College Publications. pp. 87-105.
    I am presenting a sequent calculus that extends a nonmonotonic consequence relation over an atomic language to a logically complex language. The system is in line with two guiding philosophical ideas: (i) logical inferentialism and (ii) logical expressivism. The extension defined by the sequent rules is conservative. The conditional tracks the consequence relation and negation tracks incoherence. Besides the ordinary propositional connectives, the sequent calculus introduces a new kind of modal operator that marks implications that hold monotonically. Transitivity fails, (...)
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  6. Inferentialism and the Categoricity Problem: Reply to Raatikainen.Julien Murzi & Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):480-488.
    It is sometimes held that rules of inference determine the meaning of the logical constants: the meaning of, say, conjunction is fully determined by either its introduction or its elimination rules, or both; similarly for the other connectives. In a recent paper, Panu Raatikainen (2008) argues that this view - call it logical inferentialism - is undermined by some "very little known" considerations by Carnap (1943) to the effect that "in a definite sense, it is not true that the (...)
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  7.  19
    Inferentialism.Florian Steinberger & Julien Murzi - 2017 - In Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Language. Wiley Blackwell. pp. 197-224.
    This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) (...)
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  8. Inferentialism and the Normativity of Meaning.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (1):75-97.
    There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative in any nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the anti-normativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism (...)
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  9. Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind.Jon Cogburn & Jason Megill - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439.
    We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument.
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  10. Semantic Inferentialism as (a Form of) Active Externalism.J. Adam Carter, James Henry Collin & S. Orestis Palermos - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
    Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers (1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With reference (...)
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  11.  35
    Inferentialist Metaethics, Bifurcations and Ontological Commitment.Christine Tiefensee - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2437-2459.
    According to recent suggestions within the global pragmatism discussion, metaethical debate must be fundamentally re-framed. Instead of carving out metaethical differences in representational terms, it has been argued that metaethics should be given an inferentialist footing. In this paper, I put inferentialist metaethics to the test by subjecting it to the following two criteria for success: Inferentialist metaethicists must be able to save the metaethical differences between moral realism and expressivism, and do so in a way that employs understandings of (...)
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  12. Making It Explicit and Clear: From "Strong" to "Hyper-" Inferentialism in Brandom and Peirce.Catherine Legg - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (1):105–123.
    This article explores how Robert Brandom's original "inferentialist" philosophical framework should be positioned with respect to the classical pragmatist tradition. It is argued that Charles Peirce's original attack on the use of "intuition" in nineteenth-century philosophy of mind is in fact a form of inferentialism, and thus an antecedent relatively unexplored by Brandom in his otherwise comprehensive and illuminating "tales of the mighty dead." However, whereas Brandom stops short at a merely "strong" inferentialism, which admits some non-inferential mental (...)
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  13. What Asymmetry? Knowledge of Self, Knowledge of Others, and the Inferentialist Challenge.Quassim Cassam - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).
    There is widely assumed to be a fundamental epistemological asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. They are said to be ’categorically different in kind and manner’ , and the existence of such an asymmetry is taken to be a primitive datum in accounts of the two kinds of knowledge. I argue that standard accounts of the differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of others exaggerate and misstate the asymmetry. The inferentialist challenge to the asymmetry focuses on the extent to which (...)
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  14. Non‐Inferentialism About Justification – The Case of Aesthetic Judgements.Fabian Dorsch - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):660-682.
    In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non‐inferentially. The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements by reference to lower‐level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that non‐inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic interest in artworks and other objects is limited (...)
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  15.  60
    Compositionality and Modest Inferentialism.James Trafford - 2014 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (1):39-56.
    This paper provides both a solution and a problem for the account of compositionality in Christopher Peacocke’s modest inferentialism. The immediate issue facing Peacocke’s account is that it looks as if compositionality can only be understood at the level of semantics, which is difficult to reconcile with inferentialism. Here, following up a brief suggestion by Peacocke, I provide a formal framework wherein compositionality occurs the level of the determining relation between inference and semantics. This, in turn provides a (...)
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  16. Motivating Inferentialism: Comments on Making It Explicit (Ch. 2).John McDowell - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):121-140.
    Brandom¿s attempt to motivate inferentialism is found wanting on a number of grounds, including a skepticism about how much recommendation for inferentialism can be derived from the evident unsatisfactoriness of the representationalism Brandom contrasts it with, which seems to be a straw man. Brandom¿s appeal to authorities (Sellars, Frege, Dummett) falls flat; in particular, his reading of Frege¿s early work as inferentialist in Brandom¿s sense is a misinterpretation. Given the programmatic character of Brandom¿s recommendation for inferentialism, the (...)
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  17.  19
    Kant’s Inferentialism: The Case Against Hume.David Landy - 2015 - Routledge.
    Kant’s Inferentialism draws on a wide range of sources to present a reading of Kant’s theory of mental representation as a direct response to the challenges issued by Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature. Kant rejects the conclusions that Hume draws on the grounds that these are predicated on Hume’s theory of mental representation, which Kant refutes by presenting objections to Hume’s treatment of representations of complex states of affairs and the nature of judgment. In its place, Kant (...)
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  18. Inferentialist Philosophy of Language and the Historiography of Philosophy.Kevin J. Harrelson - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (3):582-603.
    This article considers the implications of inferentialist philosophy of language for debates in the historiography of philosophy. My intention is to mediate and refine the polemics between contextualist historians and ‘analytic’ or presentist historians. I claim that much of Robert Brandom’s nuanced defence of presentism can be accepted and even adopted by contextualists, so that inferentialism turns out to provide an important justification for orthodox history of philosophy. In the concluding sections I argue that the application of Brandom’s theory (...)
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  19. Pragmatism and Inferentialism.John MacFarlane - 2010 - In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explici. Routledge. pp. 81--95.
    One of the central themes of Brandom’s work is that we should construct our sematic theories around material validity and incompatibility, rather than reference, truth, and satisfaction. This approach to semantics is motivated in part by Brandom’s pragmatism about the relation between semantics and the more general study of language use—what he calls “pragmatics”: Inferring is a kind of doing. . . . The status of inference as something that can be done accordingly holds out the promise of securing an (...)
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  20.  68
    Moral Inferentialism and the Frege-Geach Problem.Mark Douglas Warren - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2859-2885.
    Despite its many advantages as a metaethical theory, moral expressivism faces difficulties as a semantic theory of the meaning of moral claims, an issue underscored by the notorious Frege-Geach problem. I consider a distinct metaethical view, inferentialism, which like expressivism rejects a representational account of meaning, but unlike expressivism explains meaning in terms of inferential role instead of expressive function. Drawing on Michael Williams’ recent work on inferential theories of meaning, I argue that an appropriate understanding of the pragmatic (...)
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  21.  16
    Inferentialism and Quantification.Owen Griffiths - 2017 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 58 (1):107-113.
    Logical inferentialists contend that the meanings of the logical constants are given by their inference rules. Not just any rules are acceptable, however: inferentialists should demand that inference rules must reflect reasoning in natural language. By this standard, I argue, the inferentialist treatment of quantification fails. In particular, the inference rules for the universal quantifier contain free variables, which find no answer in natural language. I consider the most plausible natural language correlate to free variables—the use of variables in the (...)
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  22. Motivating Inferentialism.Mark McCullagh - 2005 - Southwest Philosophy Review 21 (1):77-84.
    Robert Brandom has supported his inferentialist conception of semantic content by appealing to the claim that it is a necessary condition on having a propositional attitude that one appreciate the inferential relations it stands in. When we see what considerations can be given in support of that claim, however, we see that it doesn’t even motivate an inferentialist semantics. The problem is that that claim about what it takes to have a propositional attitude does nothing to show that its inferential (...)
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  23.  14
    The Implications of Robert Brandom's Inferentialism for Intellectual History.David L. Marshall - 2013 - History and Theory 52 (1):1-31.
    Quentin Skinner’s appropriation of speech act theory for intellectual history has been extremely influential. Even as the model continues to be important for historians, however, philosophers now regard the original speech act theory paradigm as dated. Are there more recent initiatives that might reignite theoretical work in this area? This article argues that the inferentialism of Robert Brandom is one of the most interesting contemporary philosophical projects with historical implications. It shows how Brandom’s work emerged out of the broad (...)
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  24.  3
    Intellectual History, Inferentialism, and the Weimar Origins of Political Theory.David L. Marshall - 2017 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 11 (2):170-195.
    _ Source: _Page Count 26 The dilemma of presentism is sometimes represented as a choice between the increased relevance and utility of a historiographic practice that can articulate its relation to the present and the increased objectivity or openness to the otherness of the past of a historiographic practice that articulates the past “on its own terms.” The present article argues that, at least with reference to intellectual history, we should understand that ideas appear most fully when they are run (...)
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  25.  86
    Inferentialism and Singular Reference.Mark McCullagh - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):183-220.
    Basic to Robert Brandom’s project in Making It Explicit is the demarcation of singular terms according to the structure of their inferential roles---rather than, as is usual, according to the kinds of things they purport to denote. But the demarcational effort founders on the need to distinguish extensional and nonextensional occurrences of expressions in terms of inferential roles; the closest that an inferentialist can come to drawing that distinction is to discern degrees of extensionality, and that is not close enough. (...)
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  26.  3
    Intellectual History, Inferentialism, and the Weimar Origins of Political Theory.David L. Marshall - 2017 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 11 (2).
    _ Source: _Page Count 26 The dilemma of presentism is sometimes represented as a choice between the increased relevance and utility of a historiographic practice that can articulate its relation to the present and the increased objectivity or openness to the otherness of the past of a historiographic practice that articulates the past “on its own terms.” The present article argues that, at least with reference to intellectual history, we should understand that ideas appear most fully when they are run (...)
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  27.  7
    Semantic Inferentialism as Active Externalism.Adam Carter, James H. Collin & Orestis Palermos - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):387-402.
    Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers :7–19, 1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With (...)
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  28.  1
    Inferentialism and Singular Reference.Mark Mccullagh - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):183-220.
    Basic to Robert Brandom’s project in Making It Explicit is the demarcation of singular terms according to the structure of their inferential roles—rather than, as is usual, according to the kinds of things they purport to denote. But the demarcational effort founders on the need to distinguish extensional and nonextensional occurrences of expressions in terms of inferential roles; the closest that an inferentialist can come to drawing that distinction is to discern degrees of extensionality, and that is not close enough. (...)
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  29. Intellectual History, Inferentialism, and the Weimar Origins of Political Theory.David L. Marshall - forthcoming - New Content is Available for Journal of the Philosophy of History.
    _ Source: _Page Count 26 The dilemma of presentism is sometimes represented as a choice between the increased relevance and utility of a historiographic practice that can articulate its relation to the present and the increased objectivity or openness to the otherness of the past of a historiographic practice that articulates the past “on its own terms.” The present article argues that, at least with reference to intellectual history, we should understand that ideas appear most fully when they are run (...)
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  30. A Paradox of Inferentialism.Giacomo Turbanti - 2015 - AL-MUKHATABAT 16:163-195.
    John McDowell articulated a radical criticism of normative inferentialism against Robert Brandom’s expressivist account of conceptual contents. One of his main concerns consists in vindicating a notion of intentionality that could not be reduced to the deontic relations that are established by discursive practitioners. Noticeably, large part of this discussion is focused on empirical knowledge and observational judgments. McDowell argues that there is no role for inference in the application of observational concepts, except the paradoxical one of justifying the (...)
     
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  31. Expressivism, Inferentialism, and the Theory of Meaning.Matthew Chrisman - 2010 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    One’s account of the meaning of ethical sentences should fit – roughly, as part to whole – with one’s account of the meaning of sentences in general. When we ask, though, where one widely discussed account of the meaning of ethical sentences fits with more general accounts of meaning, the answer is frustratingly unclear. The account I have in mind is the sort of metaethical expressivism inspired by Ayer, Stevenson, and Hare, and defended and worked out in more detail recently (...)
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  32.  5
    Inferentialism and Knowledge. Brandom's Arguments Against Reliabilism.José L. Zalabardo - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    I take issue with Robert Brandom's claim that on an analysis of knowledge based on objective probabilities it is not possible to provide a stable answer to the question whether a belief has the status of knowledge. I argue that the version of the problem of generality developed by Brandom doesn't undermine a truth-tracking account of noninferential knowledge that construes truth-tacking in terms of conditional probabilities. I then consider Sherrilyn Roush's claim that an account of knowledge based on probabilistic tracking (...)
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  33.  76
    A Contentious Trinity: Levels of Entailment in Brandom's Pragmatist Inferentialism.Edgar Andrade-Lotero & Catarina Dutilh Novaes - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (1):41-53.
    We investigate the relations among Brandom’s three dimensions of semantic inferential articulation, namely, incompatibility entailments, committive consequences, and permissive consequences. In his unpublished manuscript “Conceptual Content and Discursive Practice” Brandom argues that (1) incompatibility entailment implies committive consequence, and that (2) committive consequence in turn implies permissive consequence. We criticize this hierarchy both on internal and external grounds. Firstly, we prove that, using Brandom’s own definitions, the reverse of (1) also holds, and that the reverse of (2) may hold (but (...)
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  34.  38
    Inferentialism Without Verificationism: Reply to Prawitz.Julien Murzi - 2011 - In Emiliano Ippoliti & Carlo Cellucci (eds.), Logic and Knowledge. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 285-90.
    I discuss Prawitz’s claim that a non-reliabilist answer to the question “What is a proof?” compels us to reject the standard Bolzano-Tarski account of validity, andto account for the meaning of a sentence in broadly verificationist terms. I sketch what I take to be a possible way of resisting Prawitz’s claim---one that concedes the anti-reliabilist assumption from which Prawitz’s argument proceeds.
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  35. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2000 - Harvard University Press.
    This new work provides an approachable introduction to the complex system that Making It Explicit mapped out.
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  36.  20
    Is Inferentialism Circular?Jaroslav Peregrin - forthcoming - Analysis:anx130.
    Variations on the argument “Inferences are moves from meaningful statements to meaningful statements; hence the meanings cannot be inferential roles” are often used as knock-down argument against inferentialism. In this short paper I indicate that the argument is simply a non sequitur.
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  37. Inferentialism and Cognitive Penetration of Perception.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):1-28.
    Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see is influenced by such states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief that results from cognitive penetration may be less justified than a nonpenetrated one. Inferentialism is a kind of internalist view that tries to account for this by claiming that some experiences are epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has that experience, and the familiar canons of good inference provide the appropriate standards (...)
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  38.  62
    Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Steven Gross & Robert B. Brandom - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):284.
    This is a book review of: -/- Robert B. Brandom, Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pp. 230.
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  39.  97
    Inferentialism and Our Knowledge of Others’ Minds.William E. S. McNeill - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1435-1454.
    Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to (...)
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  40. From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism.Matthew Chrisman - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Recent philosophical debate about the meaning of knowledge claims has largely centered on the question of whether epistemic claims are plausibly thought to be context sensitive. The default assumption has been that sentences that attribute knowledge or justification have stable truth-conditions across different contexts of utterance, once any non-epistemic context sensitivity has been fixed. The contrary view is the contextualist view that such sentences do not have stable truth-conditions but can vary depending on the context of utterance. This debate manifestly (...)
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  41. Inferentialism and the Categoricity Problem: Reply to Raatikainen. North-Holland - unknown
    It is sometimes held that rules of inference determine the meaning of the logical constants: the meaning of, say, conjunction is fully determined by either its introduction or its elimination rules, or both; similarly for the other connectives. In a recent paper, Panu Raatikainen argues that this view—call it logical inferentialism—is undermined by some “very little known” considerations by Carnap (1943) to the effect that “in a definite sense, it is not true that the standard rules of inference” themselves (...)
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  42.  13
    What Asymmetry? Knowledge of Self, Knowledge of Others, and the Inferentialist Challenge.Quassim Cassam - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):723-741.
    There is widely assumed to be a fundamental epistemological asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of others. They are said to be ’categorically different in kind and manner’, and the existence of such an asymmetry is taken to be a primitive datum in accounts of the two kinds of knowledge. I argue that standard accounts of the differences between self-knowledge and knowledge of others exaggerate and misstate the asymmetry. The inferentialist challenge to the asymmetry focuses on the extent to which both (...)
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  43.  50
    Semantic Inferentialism and the Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.James Henry Collin - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (9):846-856.
    Alvin Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism makes the case that the conjunction of evolutionary theory and naturalism cannot be rationally believed, as, if both evolutionary theory and naturalism were true, it would be highly unlikely that our cognitive faculties are reliable. I present Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism and survey a theory of meaning espoused by Robert Brandom, known as semantic inferentialism. I argue that if one accepts semantic inferentialism, as it is developed by Brandom, then Plantinga's motivation (...)
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  44. Inferentialism and the Compositionality of Meaning.Jaroslav Peregrin - unknown
    Inferentialism, which I am going to present in detail in the following sections, is the view that meanings are, roughly, roles that are acquired by types of sounds and inscriptions in virtue of their being treated according to rules of our language games, roughly in the sense in which wooden pieces acquire certain roles by being treated according the rules of chess. The most important consequences are that (i) a meaning is not an object labeled (stood for, represented ...) (...)
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  45.  15
    Motivating Inferentialism: Comments onMaking It Explicit.John McDowell - 2005 - Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 13 (1):121-140.
    Brandom's attempt to motivate inferentialism is found wanting on a number of grounds, including a skepticism about how much recommendation for inferentialism can be derived from the evident unsatisfactoriness of the representationalism Brandom contrasts it with, which seems to be a straw man. Brandom's appeal to authorities falls flat; in particular, his reading of Frege's early work as inferentialist in Brandom's sense is a misinterpretation. Given the programmatic character of Brandom's recommendation for inferentialism, the quality of the (...)
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  46. Inferentialism, Representationalism and Derogatory Words.Daniel Whiting - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):191 – 205.
    In a recent paper, after outlining various distinguishing features of derogatory words, Jennifer Hornsby suggests that the phenomenon raises serious difficulties for inferentialism. Against Hornsby, I claim that derogatory words do not pose any insuperable problems for inferentialism, so long as it is supplemented with apparatus borrowed from Grice and Hare. Moreover, I argue, derogatory expressions pose difficulties for Hornsby's favoured alternative theory of meaning, representationalism, unless it too is conjoined with a similar Grice/Hare mechanism. So, the upshot (...)
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  47.  16
    Semantic Inferentialism as Active Externalism.Adam Carter, James H. Collin & Orestis Palermos - unknown
    Within contemporary philosophy of mind, it is taken for granted that externalist accounts of meaning and mental content are, in principle, orthogonal to the matter of whether cognition itself is bound within the biological brain or whether it can constitutively include parts of the world. Accordingly, Clark and Chalmers :7–19, 1998) distinguish these varieties of externalism as ‘passive’ and ‘active’ respectively. The aim here is to suggest that we should resist the received way of thinking about these dividing lines. With (...)
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  48.  64
    A Non-Inferentialist, Anti-Realistic Conception of Logical Truth and Falsity.Heinrich Wansing - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):93-100.
    Anti-realistic conceptions of truth and falsity are usually epistemic or inferentialist. Truth is regarded as knowability, or provability, or warranted assertability, and the falsity of a statement or formula is identified with the truth of its negation. In this paper, a non-inferentialist but nevertheless anti-realistic conception of logical truth and falsity is developed. According to this conception, a formula (or a declarative sentence) A is logically true if and only if no matter what is told about what is told about (...)
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  49.  13
    Collective Actors Without Collective Minds An Inferentialist Approach.Javier González de Prado Salas & Jesús Zamora-Bonilla - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (1):3-25.
    We present an inferentialist account of collective rationality and intentionality, according to which beliefs and other intentional states are understood in terms of the normative statuses attributed to, and undertaken by, the participants of a discursive practice—namely, their discursive or practical commitments and entitlements. Although these statuses are instituted by the performances and attitudes of the agents, they are not identified with any physical or psychological entity, process or relation. Therefore, we argue that inferentialism allows us to talk of (...)
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  50. What is Inferentialism?Jaroslav Peregrin - unknown
    Inferentialism is the conviction that to be meaningful in the distinctively human way, or to have a 'conceptual content', is to be governed by a certain kind of inferential rules. The term was coined by Robert Brandom as a label for his theory of language; however, it is also naturally applicable (and is growing increasingly common) within the philosophy of logic.
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