We argue that the dynamical and computational hypotheses are compatible and in fact need each other: they are about different aspects of cognition. However, only computationalism is about the information-processing aspect. We then argue that any form of information processing relying on matching and comparing, as cognition does, must use discrete representations and computations defined over them.

In this paper we elaborate a conception of entailment based on what we call the Ackermann principle, which explicates valid entailment through a logical connection between sentences depending on their informational content. We reconstruct Dunn’s informational semantics for entailment on the basis of Restall’s approach, with assertion and denial as two independent speech acts, by introducing the notion of a ‘position description’. We show how the machinery of position descriptions can effectively be used to define the positive (...) and the negative information carried by sentences of a given language and to present a formalized version of the Ackermann principle as an inclusion relationship between the informational contents of the conclusions and the premises of a valid entailment. Being so interpreted, the entailment relation exhibits certain properties, including the property of transitivity. Whereas properties such as Anderson and Belnap’s variable sharing property or Parry’s proscriptive principle are normally presented as imposing a relevance requirement on valid entailment, the suggested formalization of the Ackermann principle supports all of Gentzen’s structural rules, including weakening, a rule that is normally given up in sequent-style proof systems for relevance logics. In this way we propose an Ackermann-inspired explication of the nature of entailment as a relation between the informational contents of sentences. (shrink)

It seems intuitively obvious that metameric matching of color samples entails a loss of information, for spectrophotometrically diverse materials appear the same. This intuition implicitly relies on a conception of the function of color vision and on a related conception of how color samples should be individuated. It assumes that the function of color vision is to distinguish among spectral energy distributions, and that color samples should be individuated by their physical properties. I challenge these assumptions by articulating a (...) different conception of the function of color vision, according to which color vision serves to partition object surfaces into discrimination classes. (shrink)

I argue that informational models of consciousness, including those proposed by the Integrated Information Theory, don’t presuppose or entail any particular view about the physical or metaphysical nature of consciousness. Such models only tell us how certain properties of consciousness can be mathematically described, thus providing a quantitative characterization of the phenomenon of consciousness that may contribute to the development of new methods of assessment and guide the explanatory project by supplying additional constraints on theoretical proposals. While informational models (...) are in principle compatible with multiple physical interpretations, a preliminary argument in favour of the continuity between informational approaches and the mechanistic project in neuroscience can be made based on historical precedents. (shrink)

We show that actuality entailments arise with goal-oriented modality only and endorse Belnap’s view of that goal-oriented modals use historical accessibility with a fixed past and an open future. This modal-theoretic assumption allows us to spell out the precise modal-temporal configuration in which the actuality entailment arises and our predictions are borne out by the data, cross-linguistically. We also show that, when any assumption about the identity of worlds at branching point is leveled - which appears to be the (...) case with generic deontic and opportunity modals, the actuality entailments disappear. We also predict that the entailment disappears with prospectivity. Finally, we argue that modal sentences giving rise to actuality entailments are informative, insofar as the contribution of the modality survives as a presupposition that the modal base is non-homogeneous. (shrink)

A barrier to entailment exists if you can't get conclusions of a certain kind from premises of another. One of the most famous barriers in philosophy is Hume's Law, which says that you can't get normative conclusions from descriptive premises, or in slogan form: you can't get an ought from an is. This barrier is highly controversial, and many famous counterexamples were proposed in the last century. But there are other barriers which function almost as philosophical platitudes: no Universal (...) conclusions from Particular premises, no Future conclusions from premises about the Past, and no claims that attribute Necessity from premises that merely tell us how things happen to be in the Actual world. Barriers to Entailment proposes a unified logical account of five barriers that have played important roles in philosophy, in the process showing how to diagnose proposed counterexamples and arguing that the case for Hume's Law is as strong as that for the platitudinous barriers. -/- The first two parts of the book employ techniques from formal logic, but present them in an accessible way, suitable for any reader with some background in first-order model theory (of the kind that might be taught in a first class in logic). Gillian Russell introduces tense, modal, indexical, and deontic formal logics, but always avoids unneeded complexity. Each barrier is connected to broader philosophical topics: universality, time, necessity, context-sensitivity, and normativity. Russell brings out under-recognised connections between the domains and lays the groundwork for further work at the intersections. -/- The last part of the book transposes the formal work to informal barrier theses in the philosophy of language, in the process doing new work on the concept of logical consequence, and providing new responses to proposed informal counterexamples to Hume's Law which employ hard-to-formalise tools from natural language, such as speech acts and thick normative expressions. (shrink)

The paragraph starting with “By accepting condition only,...” should be read as follows.

We investigate an approach for drawing logical inference from inconsistent premisses. The main idea in this approach is that the inconsistencies in the premisses should be interpreted as uncertainty of the information. We propose a mechanism, based on Kinght’s [14] study of inconsistency, for revising an inconsistent set of premisses to a minimally uncertain, probabilistically consistent one. We will then generalise the probabilistic entailment relation introduced in [15] for propositional languages to the first order case to draw logical (...) inference from a probabilistic set of premisses. We will show how this combination can allow us to limit the effect of uncertainty introduced by inconsistent premisses to only the reasoning on the part of the premise set that is relevant to the inconsistency. (shrink)

This book celebrates and expands on J. Michael Dunn’s work on informational interpretations of logic. Dunn, in his Ph.D. thesis, introduced a semantics for first-degree entailments utilizing the idea that a sentence can provide positive or negative information about a topic, possibly supplying both or neither. He later published a related interpretation of the logic R-mingle, which turned out to be one of the first relational semantics for a relevance logic. An incompatibility relation between information states lends itself (...) to a definition of negation and it has figured into Dunn's comprehensive investigations into representations of various negations. The informational view of semantics is also a prominent theme in Dunn’s research on other logics, such as quantum logic and linear logic, and led to the encompassing theory of generalized Galois logics. Dunn’s latest work addresses informational interpretations of the ternary accessibility relation and the very nature of information. The book opens with Dunn’s autobiography, followed by a list of his publications. It then presents a series of papers written by respected logicians working on different aspects of information-based logics. The topics covered include the logic R-mingle, which was introduced by Dunn, and its applications in mathematical reasoning as well as its importance in obtaining results for other relevance logics. There are also interpretations of the accessibility relation in the semantics of relevance and other non-classical logics using different notions of information. It also presents a collection of papers that develop semantics for various logics, including certain modal and many-valued logics. The publication of this book is well timed, since we are living in an "information age.” Providing new technical findings, intellectual history and careful expositions of intriguing ideas, it appeals to a wide audience of scholars and researchers. (shrink)

Textual entailment is a relationship that obtains between fragments of text when one fragment in some sense implies the other fragment. The automation of textual entailment recognition supports a wide variety of text-based tasks, including information retrieval, information extraction, question answering, text summarization, and machine translation. Much ingenuity has been devoted to developing algorithms for identifying textual entailments, but relatively little to saying what textual entailment actually is. This article is a review of the logical (...) and philosophical issues involved in providing an adequate definition of textual entailment. We show that many natural definitions of textual entailment are refuted by counterexamples, including the most widely cited definition of Dagan et al. We then articulate and defend the following revised definition: T textually entails H = df typically, a human reading T would be justified in inferring the proposition expressed by H from the proposition expressed by T. We also show that textual entailment is context-sensitive, nontransitive, and nonmonotonic. (shrink)

According to Fred Dretske's externalist theory of knowledge a subject knows that p if and only if she believes that p and this belief is caused or causally sustained by the information that p. Another famous feature of Dretske's epistemology is his denial that knowledge is closed under known entailment. I argue that, given Dretske's construal of information, he is in fact committed to the view that both information and knowledge are closed under known entailment. (...) Hence, if it is true that, as Dretske also believes, accepting closure leads to skepticism, he must either embrace skepticism or abandon his information theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Christoph Jäger (2004) argues that Dretske's information theory of knowledge raises a serious problem for his denial of closure of knowledge under known entailment: Information is closed under known entailment (even under entailment simpliciter); given that Dretske explains the concept of knowledge in terms of "information", it is hard to stick with his denial of closure for knowledge. Thus, one of the two basic claims of Dretske would have to go. Since giving up the (...) denial of closure would commit Dretske to skepticism, it would most probably be better to rather give up the information-theoretic account of knowledge. But that means that one of the best externalist views of knowledge has to be given up. I argue here that Jäger is mistaken and that there is no problem for Dretske. There is a rather easy way out of Jäger’s problem. (shrink)

Luciano Floridi (2003) offers a theory of information as a “strongly semantic” notion, according to which information encapsulates truth, thereby making truth a necessary condition for a sentence to qualify as “information”. While Floridi provides an impressive development of this position, the aspects of his approach of greatest philosophical significance are its foundations rather than its formalization. He rejects the conception of information as meaningful data, which entails at least three theses – that information can (...) be false; that tautologies are information; and, that “It is true that...” is non-redundant – appear to be defensible. This inquiry offers various logical, epistemic, and ordinary-language grounds to demonstrate that an account of his kind is too narrow to be true and that its adoption would hopelessly obscure crucial differences between information, misinformation, and disinformation. (shrink)

In discussing the famous case of Otto, a patient with Alzheimer’s disease who carries around a notebook to keep important information, Clark and Chalmers argue that some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook. In other words, some of Otto’s beliefs are extended into the environment. Their main argument is a functionalist one. Some of Otto’s beliefs are physically realized in the notebook because, first, some of the beliefs of Inga, a healthy person who remembers important (...) class='Hi'>information in her head, are physically realized in her internal memory storage, and, second, there is no relevant functional difference between the role of the notebook for Otto and the role of the internal memory storage for Inga. The paper presents a new objection to this argument. I call it “the systems reply” to the functionalist argument since it is structurally analogous to the “the systems reply” to Searle’s Chinese room argument. According to the systems reply to the functionalist argument, what actually follows from their argument is not that beliefs of Otto are physically realized in the notebook but rather that the beliefs of the hybrid system consisting of Otto and his notebook are physically realized in the notebook. This paper also discusses Sprevak’s claim that the functionalist argument entails radical versions of extended mental states and shows that his argument is also vulnerable to the systems reply. (shrink)

Recently, natural language pragmatics started to make use of decision-, game-, and information theoretical tools to determine the usefulness of questions and assertions in a quantitative way. In the first part of this paper several of these notions are related with each other. It is shown that under particular natural assumptions the utility of questions and answers reduces to their informativity, and that the ordering relation induced by utility sometimes even reduces to the logical relation of entailment. The (...) second part of the paper shows how different proposals (using either protocols or likelihood functions) to measure the relevance/utility of non-partitional questions come down to the same thing. (shrink)

Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph Jäger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a (...) way that makes an information-based account of knowledge an effective tool in answering the skeptic. (shrink)

The entailment connective is introduced by Priest (2006b). It aims to capture, in a dialetheically acceptable way, the informal notion of logical consequence. This connective does not “fall foul” of Curry’s Paradox by invalidating an inference rule called “Absorption” (or “Contraction”) and the classical logical theorem called “Assertion”. In this paper we show that the semantics of entailment, given by Priest in terms of possible worlds, is inadequate. In particular, we will argue that Priest’s counterexamples to Absorption and (...) Assertion use in the metalanguage a dialetheically unacceptable principle. Furthermore, we show that the rejection of Assertion undermines Priest’s claim that the entailment connective expresses the notion of logical consequence. (shrink)

The development and use of large and dynamic health data repositories designed to support research pose challenges to traditional informed consent models. We used semi-structured interviewing to elicit diverse research stakeholders' views of a model of consent appropriate to participation in initiatives that entail collection, long-term storage, and undetermined future research use of multiple types of health data. We demonstrate that, when considering health data repositories, research stakeholders replace a concept of consent as informed with one in which consent is (...) engaged. In engaged consent, a participant's ongoing relationship with a repository serves as a substitute or adjunct to information exchange at enrollment. We detail research stakeholders' views of the risks of engaged consent and suggest questions for further study about engagement and consent procedures in initiatives that aim to store data for future unspecified research purposes. (shrink)

Frank Cabrera argues that informational explanatory virtues—specifically, mechanism, precision, and explanatory scope—cannot be confirmational virtues, since hypotheses that possess them must have a lower probability than less virtuous, entailed hypotheses. We argue against Cabrera’s characterization of confirmational virtue and for an alternative on which the informational virtues clearly are confirmational virtues. Our illustration of their confirmational virtuousness appeals to aspects of causal inference, suggesting that causal inference has a role for the explanatory virtues. We briefly explore this possibility, delineating a (...) path from Mill’s method of agreement to Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). (shrink)

Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolph Carnap’s classical theory of semantic information entails the counterintuitive feature that inconsistent statements convey maximal information. Theories preserving Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s modal intuitions while imposing a veridicality requirement on which statements convey information—such as the theories of Fred Dretske or Luciano Floridi—avoid this commitment, as inconsistent statements are deemed not information-conveying by fiat. This paper produces a pair of paradoxical statements that such “veridical-modal” theories must evaluate as both conveying and not conveying (...) information, although Bar-Hillel and Carnap’s theory accommodates these statements without inconsistency. Moreover, the paradoxes are independently interesting as the mode in which they self-refer bears on their evaluation. (shrink)

The idea is that, in a wide range of contexts, utterances of the sentences in (a) in each case will communicate the assumption in (b) in each case (or something closely akin to it, there being a certain amount of contextually governed variation in the speaker's propositional attitude and so the scope of the negation). These scalar inferences are taken to be one kind of (generalized) conversational implicature. As is the case with pragmatic inference quite generally, these inferences are defeasible (...) (cancellable), which distinguishes them from entailments, and they are nondetachable, which distinguishes them from conventional implicatures. The core idea is that the choice of a weaker element from a scale of elements ordered in terms of semantic strength (that is, numbers of entailments) tends to implicate that, as far as the speaker knows, none of the stronger elements in the scale holds in this instance. The pattern is quite clear in (1) and (2), where the weak/strong alternatives are some/all and five/six respectively. In the case of (3), the stronger expression must be intelligent and good-hearted which entails intelligent; what Y's utterance implicates is that Mary does not have the two properties: intelligence and good-heartedness, so that, given the proposition expressed (Mary is intelligent) it follows, deductively, that she is not good-hearted, in Y's opinion. The example in (4) involves a scale inversion due to the negation, so that the weak/strong alternatives are not necessarily/not possibly; the negation which the scalar inference generates creates a double negation, which is eliminated giving possibly. (shrink)

According to Fred Dretske’s semantic information theory, the process of becoming informed consists of two parts: the transfer of information via a channel, and the subsequent formation of a semantic structure, called ‘digitalisation’. Leaving out any one of the two parts renders the concept of becoming informed incomplete. Similarly, Peter Menzies and Huw Price’s agency-account of causation has a bipartite structure. The account posits that an event A is a cause of a distinct event B in cases where (...) bringing about the occurrence of A would be an effective means by which a free agent could bring about the occurrence of B. A major problem for this approach seems to be that the analysis contains two occurrences of ‘bringing about’, which might be taken for causal notions that would render the formula circular. However, applying two different interpretations to each of the occurrences yields a non-circular analysis of causation. These interpretations entail a conceptual structure of causation that is analogous to Dretske’s analysis of becoming informed. Building on this conceptual foundation, it can be shown that informational and causal views on events can be integrated into a combined account, according to which information channels and causal mechanisms are identical. Digitalisation and direct action are parts of causation by information, a concept that further binds becoming informed and causation to each other. Causation by information is relevant because it helps us make sense of the seeming contradiction of construing some events as actions, while at the same time allowing them to be effects of causes. (shrink)

The present paper studies formal properties of so-called modal information logics (MILs)—modal logics first proposed in (van Benthem 1996 ) as a way of using possible-worlds semantics to model a theory of information. They do so by extending the language of propositional logic with a binary modality defined in terms of being the supremum of two states. First proposed in 1996, MILs have been around for some time, yet not much is known: (van Benthem 2017, 2019 ) pose (...) two central open problems, namely (1) axiomatizing the two basic MILs of suprema on preorders and posets, respectively, and (2) proving (un)decidability. The main results of the first part of this paper are solving these two problems: (1) by providing an axiomatization [with a completeness proof entailing the two logics to be the same], and (2) by proving decidability. In the proof of the latter, an emphasis is put on the method applied as a heuristic for proving decidability ‘via completeness’ for semantically introduced logics; the logics lack the FMP w.r.t. their classes of definition, but not w.r.t. a generalized class. These results are build upon to axiomatize and prove decidable the MILs attained by endowing the language with an ‘informational implication’—in doing so a link is also made to the work of (Buszkowski 2021 ) on the Lambek Calculus. (shrink)

We find symmetry attractive. It interests us. Symmetry is often an indicator of the deep structure of things, whether they be natural phenomena, or the creations of artists. For example, the most fundamental conservation laws of physics are all based in symmetry. Similarly, the symmetries found in religious art throughout the world are intended to draw attention to deep spiritual truths. Not only do we find symmetry pleasing, but its discovery is often also surprising and illuminating as well. For these (...) reasons, we are inclined to think that symmetries are informative, and that symmetries contain information. On the other hand, symmetries represent a kind of invariance under transformation. Such invariance implies that symmetrical things contain redundancies. Redundancy, in turn, implies that the information content of a symmetrical structure or configuration is less than that of a similar nonsymmetrical structure. Symmetry, then, entails a reduction in information content. These considerations present us with somewhat of a paradox: On the one hand, many symmetries that we find in the world are surprising, and surprise indicates informativeness. On the other hand, the surprise value of information arises because it presents us with the unexpected or improbable, but symmetries, far from creating the unexpected, ensure that the known can be extended through invariant transformations. How can this paradox be resolved? (shrink)

One of the open problems in the philosophy of information is whether there is an information logic (IL), different from epistemic (EL) and doxastic logic (DL), which formalises the relation “a is informed that p” (Iap) satisfactorily. In this paper, the problem is solved by arguing that the axiom schemata of the normal modal logic (NML) KTB (also known as B or Br or Brouwer’s system) are well suited to formalise the relation of “being informed”. After having shown (...) that IL can be constructed as an informational reading of KTB, four consequences of a KTB-based IL are explored: information overload; the veridicality thesis (Iap → p); the relation between IL and EL; and the Kp → Bp principle or entailment property, according to which knowledge implies belief. Although these issues are discussed later in the article, they are the motivations behind the development of IL. (shrink)

Informal logic offers a radical new perspective on the evaluation of arguments. But little work has been done on how deep concepts in the logical foundations of argument need to be modified in light of such efforts. This paper offers an indication of what might be done by sketching a new approach to the theory of entailment, truth and relevance.

Informal logic offers a radical new perspective on the evaluation of arguments. But little work has been done on how deep concepts in the logical foundations of argument need to be modified in light of such efforts. This paper offers an indication of what might be done by sketching a new approach to the theory of entailment, truth and relevance.

Luciano Floridi (2003) offers a theory of information as a strongly semantic notion, according to which information encapsulates truth, thereby making truth a necessary condition for a sentence to qualify as information. While Floridi provides an impressive development of this position, the aspects of his approach of greatest philosophical significance are its foundations rather than its formalization. He rejects the conception of information as meaningful data, which entails at least three theses – that information can (...) be false; that tautologies are information; and, that It is true that ... is non-redundant – appear to be defensible. This inquiry offers various logical, epistemic, and ordinary-language grounds to demonstrate that an account of his kind is too narrow to be true and that its adoption would hopelessly obscure crucial differences between information, misinformation, and disinformation. (shrink)

In this article, I cast doubt on an apparent truism, namely, that if evidence is available for gathering and use at a negligible cost, then it’s always instrumentally rational for us to gather that evidence and use it for making decisions. Call this ‘value of information’ (VOI). I show that VOI conflicts with two other plausible theses. The first is the view that an agent’s evidence can entail non-trivial propositions about the external world. The second is the view that (...) epistemic rationality requires us to update our credences by conditionalization. These two theses, given some plausible assumptions, make room for rationally biased inquiries where VOI fails. I go on to argue that this is bad news for defenders of VOI. (shrink)

The concept of positional information is applied to a large amount of data obtained previously in experiments on developing and regenerating amphibian limbs. Only the proximo-distal axis of the limb is considered. It is shown that the concept provides a simple, unitary hypothesis which satisfactorily accounts for the experimental data, and may moreover suggest meaningful new approaches. It is suggested that the boundaries of the bipolar limb system lie in the girdle skeleton and at the distal end of the (...) limb, respectively, and that it is the apical epidermis of the growing or regenerating limb which defines the distal boundary conditions. A relatively stable gradient of positional information is assumed to be set up in the mesoderm . It is further shown that the differentiated limb retains its positional information and upon amputation imparts it to the base of the blastema. To explain an apparent discrepancy between the developing and the regenerating limb, it is proposed that dedifferentiation of mesodermal limb tissues upon amputation entails a change of positional value in the mesenchyme. Consequently, the amputation level does not once and for all specify the positional value at the proximal end of a mass of blastemal mesenchyme, particularly when the mesenchyme is transplanted in such a way that its linear size decreases or increases. (shrink)

This paper presents a way in which formal logic can be understood and reformulated in terms of argumentation that can help us unify formal and informal reasoning. Classical deductive reasoning will be expressed entirely in terms of notions and concepts from argumentation so that formal logical entailment is equivalently captured via the arguments that win between those supporting concluding formulae and arguments supporting contradictory formulae. This allows us to go beyond Classical Logic and smoothly connect it with human reasoning, (...) thus providing a uniform argumentation-based view of both informal and formal logic. (shrink)

The integrated information theory is a promising theory of consciousness. However, there are several problems with IIT's axioms and postulates. Moreover, IIT entails that some twodimensional grids of identical logic gates have more consciousness than humans. Many have found this prediction to be implausible, and as will be argued here, this prediction also exacerbates the so-called 'hard problem of consciousness'. Recently, it has been argued that if we treat the phenomenological aspects of consciousness as an illusion, we can avoid (...) the hard problem altogether by replacing it with the more tractable illusion problem: the problem of explaining how introspection systematically misrepresents experiences as having phenomenology. IIT is intended to be a theory of the phenomenological aspects of consciousness. However, it is possible to reformulate the axioms and postulates of IIT consistently with illusionism. Here it is argued that the resulting theory -- illusionist integrated information theory -- removes several problems for IIT including the hard problem and the logic gate problem, and also enables meaningful progress for illusionists on solving the illusion problem. (shrink)

BackgroundHealth data holds great potential for improved treatments. Big data research and machine learning models have been shown to hold great promise for improved diagnostics and treatment planning. The potential is tied, however, to the availability of personal health data. In recent years, it has been argued that data from health records should be available for health research, and that individuals have a duty to make the data available for such research. A central point of debate is whether such secondary (...) use of health data requires informed consent.Main bodyIn response to recent writings this paper argues that a requirement of informed consent for health record research must be upheld. It does so by exploring different contrasting notions of the duty of easy rescue and arguing that none of them entail aperfectduty to participate in health record research. In part because the costs of participation cannot be limited to 1) the threat of privacy breaches, but includes 2) the risk of reduced trust and 3) suboptimal treatment, 4) stigmatization and 5) medicalisation, 6) further stratification of solidarity and 7) increased inequality in access to treatment and medicine. And finally, it defends the requirement of informed consent by arguing that the mere possibility of consent bias provides a rather weak reason for making research participation mandatory, and that there are strong, independent reasons for making.ConclusionArguments from the duty of easy rescue in combination with claims about little risk of harm and potential consent bias fail to establish not only aperfectduty to participate in health record research, but also that participation in such research should be mandatory. On the contrary, an analysis of these arguments indicates that the duty to participate in research is most adequately construed as animperfectduty, and reveals a number of strong reasons for insisting that participation in health records research is based on informed consent. (shrink)

Contemporary persons are daily confronted with enormous quantities of information, some of which reveal causal connections between their actions and harm that is visited upon distant others. Given their limited cognitive and information processing capacities, persons cannot reasonably be expected to respond to every cry for help or call to action, but neither can they defensibly refuse to hear and reflect upon any of them. Persons have a limited obligation to know, I argue, which requires that they inform (...) themselves and others about their role in harmful social practices, with a view toward challenging the norms that sustain such practices. In this paper, I explore this obligation to know, and the related idea of excusable ignorance, offering accounts of the epistemic burden that it entails for persons in their capacities as citizens and in the context of global climate change and of reproach as a potentially effective tool for rectifying rather than excusing ignorance. (shrink)

Context: Doctors have been known to treat or give consultation to patients informally, with none of the usual record keeping or follow up. They may wish to know whether this practice is ethical.Objective: To determine whether this practice meets criteria of medical ethics.Design: Informal medicine is analysed according to standard ethical principles: autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence, distributive and procedural justice, and caring.Setting: Hospital, medical school, and other settings where patients may turn to physicians for informal help.Conclusion: No generalisation can be (...) made to the effect that informal medicine is or is not ethical. Each request for informal consultation must be considered on its own merits.Guidelines: Informal medicine may be ethical if no payment is involved, and when the patient is fully aware of the benefits and risks of a lack of record keeping. When an informal consultation does not entail any danger to the patient or others, the physician may agree to the request. If, however, any danger to the patient or others is foreseen, then the physician must insist on professional autonomy, and consider refusing the request and persuading the patient to accept formal consultation. If a reportable infectious disease, or other serious danger to the community, is involved, the physician should refuse informal consultation or treatment, or at least make a proper report even if the consultation was informal. If agreeing to the request will result in an unfair drain on the physician’s time or energy, he or she should refuse politely. (shrink)

Both I and Belnap, motivated the "Belnap-Dunn 4-valued Logic" by talk of the reasoner being simply "told true" (T) and simply "told false" (F), which leaves the options of being neither "told true" nor "told false" (N), and being both "told true" and "told false" (B). Belnap motivated these notions by consideration of unstructured databases that allow for negative information as well as positive information (even when they conflict). We now experience this on a daily basis with the (...) Web. But the 4-valued logic is deductive in nature, and its matrix is discrete: there are just four values. In this paper I investigate embedding the 4-valued logic into a context of probability. Jøsang's Subjective Logic introduced uncertainty to allow for degrees of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty. We extend this so as to allow for two kinds of uncertainty— that in which the reasoner has too little information (ignorance) and that in which the reasoner has too much information (conflicted). Jøsang's "Opinion Triangle" becomes an "Opinion Tetrahedron" and the 4-values can be seen as its vertices. I make/prove various observations concerning the relation of non-classical "probability" to non-classical logic. (shrink)

Pretheoretically, ‘all believers are immortal’ is about all believers, but B is not about any unbeliever. Similarly, ‘all mortals are unbelievers’ is not about any immortal, but M is about all mortals. But B and M are logically equivalent universal generalizations, so arguably they are about exactly the same objects; by, they are about those mortals who are unbelievers, contradicting. If one responds by giving up, is there still a sense in which B treats unbelievers differently from believers? I argue (...) that there is. B is uninformative about unbelievers but informative about believers, in the following sense: for any object o, the information that B provides only about o—namely, ‘o is a believer only if o is immortal’—is entailed by ‘o is an unbeliever’ but not by ‘o is a believer’. (shrink)

What is a computer? What distinguishes computers from other artificial or natural systems with alleged computational capacities? What does use of a physical system for computation entail, and what distinguishes such use from otherwise identical transformation of that same system when it is not so used? This paper addresses such questions through a theory of information processing artifacts, the class of technical artifacts with physical capacities that enable agents to use them as means to their computational ends. Function ascription, (...) use plan requirements, malfunction, and efficacy of IPAs are all addressed in this theory, with emphasis on artifacts that can be used—reliably or otherwise—for digital computation. By explicitly distinguishing physically grounded computational capacities from user-ascribed computational functions, and by recognizing the distinct roles of each for the implementation of computations in artifacts, this theory clearly distinguishes the use of physical systems for computation from the transformations of physical system states that enable such use. As such, it provides a rigorous basis for distinguishing “computers” from other artificial and natural systems—a distinction whose nature and legitimacy faces ever-evolving challenges from multiple disciplines. This theory, and the associated “instrumental” view of computation in artifacts, naturally accommodates the openminded but scrupulous consideration of radically unconventional physical systems as potential substrates for future computers. (shrink)

In this essay, I would like to do three things. First, I would like to provide a broad and brief overview of the effects of absolute poverty in creating an information gap and a digital divide and the effects of these gaps in perpetuating absolute poverty. Second, I would like to show that ordinary case intuitions, normative ethical theories, and theological considerations converge in entailing a moral obligation to help those in poverty. Third, I would like to argue, all (...) too briefly, that although this surely involves making donations of both cash and food - free of the sorts of conditions that are frequently imposed by organizations like the IMF and World Bank - it also involves donations of a sort that are specifically targeted to close the information and digital divides. (shrink)

This paper argues that questions have an important role to to play in logic, both semantically and proof-theoretically. Semantically, we show that by generalizing the classical notion of entailment to questions, we can capture not only the standard relation of logical consequence, which holds between pieces of information, but also the relation of logical dependency, which holds between information types. Proof-theoretically, we show that questions may be used in inferences as placeholders for arbitrary information of a (...) given type; by manipulating such placeholders, we may construct formal proofs of dependencies. Finally, we show that such proofs have a specific kind of constructive content: they do not just witness the existence of a certain dependency, but actually encode a method for transforming information of the types described by the assumptions into information of the type described by the conclusion. (shrink)

I propose an account of indicative conditionals that combines features of minimal change semantics and information semantics. As in information semantics, conditionals are interpreted relative to an information state in accordance with the Ramsey test idea: “if p then q” is supported at a state s iff q is supported at the hypothetical state s[p] obtained by restricting s to the p-worlds. However, information states are not modeled as simple sets of worlds, but by means of (...) a Lewisian system of spheres. Worlds in the inner sphere are considered possible; worlds outside of it are ruled out, but to different degrees. In this way, even when a state supports “not p”, it is still possible to suppose p consistently. I argue that this account does better than its predecessors with respect to a set of desiderata concerning inferences with conditionals. In particular, it captures three important facts: that a conditional is logically independent from its antecedent; that a sequence of antecedents behaves like a single conjunctive antecedent ; and that conditionals restrict the quantification domain of epistemic modals. I also discuss two ways to construe the role of a premise, and propose a generalized notion of entailment that keeps the two apart. (shrink)

Ever since the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996, 1995) first entered the scene in the debate over consciousness many have taken it to show the limitations of a scientific or naturalist explanation of consciousness. The hard problem is the problem of explaining why there is any experience associated with certain physical processes, that is, why there is anything it is like associated with such physical processes? The character of one’s experience doesn’t seem to be entailed by physical processes and (...) so an explanation which can overcome such a worry must (1) explain how physical processes give rise to experience (explain the entailment), (2) give an explanation which doesn’t rely on such physical processes, or (3) show why the hard problem is misguided in some sense. Recently, a rather ambitious and novel theory of consciousness has entered the scene – Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness (Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi, 2008; Tononi et al., 2016) – and proposes that consciousness is the result of a specific type of information processing, what those developing the theory call integrated information. The central aim of this dissertation is to philosophically investigate IIT and see whether it has the ability to overcome the hard problem and related worries. I then aim to use this philosophical investigation to answer a set of related questions which guide this dissertation, which are the following: Is it possible to give an information-theoretic explanation of consciousness? What would the nature of such an explanation be and would it result in a novel metaphysics of consciousness? In this dissertation, I begin in chapter one by first setting up the hard problem and related arguments against the backdrop of IIT (Mindt, 2017). I show that given a certain understanding of structural and dynamical properties IIT fails to overcome the hard problem of consciousness. I go on in chapter two to argue that a deflationary account of causation is the best view for IIT to overcome the causal exclusion problem (Baxendale and Mindt, 2018). In chapter three, I explain IIT’s account of how the qualitative character of our experience arises (qualia) and what view of intentionality (the directedness of our mental states) IIT advocates. I then move on in chapter four to show why the hard problem mischaracterizes structural and dynamical properties and misses important nuances that may shed light on giving a naturalized explanation of consciousness. In the last and fifth chapter, I outline a sketch of a novel metaphysics of consciousness that takes the conjunction of Neutral Monism and Information-Theoretic Structural Realism to give what I call Information-Theoretic Neutral-Structuralism. (shrink)

We’ll sketch the debate on testimony in social epistemology by reference to the contemporary debate on reductionism/anti-reductionism, communitarian epistemology and inferentialism. Testimony is a fundamental source of knowledge we share and it is worthy to be considered in the ambit of a dialogical perspective, which requires a description of a formal structure which entails deontic statuses and deontic attitudes. In particular, we’ll argue for a social reformulation of the “space of reasons”, which establishes a fruitful relationship with the epistemological view (...) of Wilfrid Sellars. (shrink)

The standard approach for abstractive text summarization is to use an encoder-decoder architecture. The encoder is responsible for capturing the general meaning from the source text, and the decoder is in charge of generating the final text summary. While this approach can compose summaries that resemble human writing, some may contain unrelated or unfaithful information. This problem is called “hallucination” and it represents a serious issue in legal texts as legal practitioners rely on these summaries when looking for precedents, (...) used to support legal arguments. Another concern is that legal documents tend to be very long and may not be fed entirely to the encoder. We propose our method called LegalSumm for addressing these issues by creating different “views” over the source text, training summarization models to generate independent versions of summaries, and applying entailment module to judge how faithful these candidate summaries are with respect to the source text. We show that the proposed approach can select candidate summaries that improve ROUGE scores in all metrics evaluated. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to show a tension in the nozickian entitlement theory. The tension is between the enforcement of the rectification principle in ideal epistemic conditions and the first two clauses of the theory. In order to do that, I argue that the principle of rectification in the above conditions entails a weird theoretical result: it is better applied under relative ignorance than under ideal conditions, which suggests that Nozick’s theory is too rigid. The underlying point is (...) that Nozick neglects some important aspects concerning the effects of time in property claims. I finish the paper suggesting that we can face this problem in two ways and that both imply costs. The first one is to keep the theory as it was conceived, accepting the objection that it is, in a way, implausible. Or we can change the theory and weaken its purely historical character. And it is not clear how this can be done without raising difficulties. (shrink)

The discourse about traceability in food chains focused on traceability as means towards the end of managing health risks. This discourse witnessed a call to broaden traceability to accommodate consumer concerns about foods that are not related to health. This call envisions the development of ethical traceability. This paper presents a justification of ethical traceability. The argument is couched in liberal distinctions, since the call for ethical traceability is based on intuitions about consumer rights to informed choice. The paper suggests (...) that two versions of ethical traceability find justification. The first version of ethical traceability entails that governments ensure that all consumers are provided with foods that respect some threshold level of, e.g., animal welfare that is supported by an overlapping consensus. The second version of ethical traceability entails that food producers provide consumers with products, and sufficient information about these products, that are relevant for reasonable, non-superficial values that are not supported by an overlapping consensus. Governments should facilitate this in the sense that consumers are not provided with misinformation about characteristics of foods that are relevant for reasonable, non-superficial values that are not supported by an overlapping consensus. (shrink)

This article introduces the concept of spiritual intelligence in terms of a natural human ability to take a different perspective on reality rather than an extraordinary ability to engage with a different/supernatural reality. From a cognitive perspective, spiritual intelligence entails a re‐balancing of the two main modes of human cognition, with a prioritization of the holistic‐intuitive mind over the conceptual one. From the psychological and phenomenological perspectives, it involves a different kind of engagement with information: slower, more participatory, less (...) objectifying, and not focused entirely on problem solving. The article ends with a reflection on the theological implications of the proposed model and how such an account of spiritual intelligence as knowing differently might relate to theological anthropology and the theology of the spirit and the spiritual. (shrink)

Over the past 60 years there have been tremendous advances made in Argumentation Theory. One crucial advance has been the move from the investigation of static arguments to a concern with dialogic interactions in concrete contexts. This focus has entailed a slow shift toward involving both non-logical and non-discursive elements in the analysis of an argument. I argue that the traditional attitude Informal Logic has displayed toward emotion can be and ought be moderated. In particular, I examine the role of (...) emotion in everyday argumentation, and how Informal Logic can encompass it alongside the more traditional logical mode of communication. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to describe ways in which elementary students access information from various components of informational social studies texts in schools. Although the time devoted to elementary social studies has decreased considerably in recent years, a renewed focus on content-area literacy skills, driven by state standard initiatives, presents us with the opportunity to regain lost social studies instructional time by integrating social studies content during literacy instructional time. However, it is not entirely clear what this (...) instructional time should entail. This paper describes how third-, fourth-, and fifth-grade children navigate various aspects of the written and graphical elements of informational social studies reading materials. Results indicate that when students are unable to correctly answer questions about the content of the reading materials, they primarily attempt to do so in one of four ways: (1) responding without the use of a discernable strategy; (2) extracting random information from the passage; (3) relying on prior knowledge; or, (4) extracting information from the correct aspect of text that is not responsive to the question. Based on researcher-developed reading assessments as data sources, we explain the challenges children encounter and make recommendations for elementary social studies instruction. (shrink)