Informedconsent is a central topic in contemporary biomedical ethics. Yet attempts to set defensible and feasible standards for consenting have led to persistent difficulties. In Rethinking InformedConsent in Bioethics Neil Manson and Onora O'Neill set debates about informedconsent in medicine and research in a fresh light. They show why informedconsent cannot be fully specific or fully explicit, and why more specific consent is not always ethically better. They (...) argue that consent needs distinctive communicative transactions, by which other obligations, prohibitions, and rights can be waived or set aside in controlled and specific ways. Their book offers a coherent, wide-ranging and practical account of the role of consent in biomedicine which will be valuable to readers working in a range of areas in bioethics, medicine and law. (shrink)
Unlike its friendly cousin the placebo effect, the nocebo effect (the effect of expecting a negative outcome) has been almost ignored. Epistemic and ethical confusions related to its existence have gone all but unnoticed. Contrary to what is often asserted, adverse events following from taking placebo interventions are not necessarily nocebo effects; they could have arisen due to natural history. Meanwhile, ethical informedconsent (in clinical trials and clinical practice) has centred almost exclusively on the need to inform (...) patients about intervention risks with patients to preserve their autonomy. Researchers have failed to consider the harm caused by the way in which the information is conveyed. In this paper, I argue that the magnitude of nocebo effects must be measured using control groups consisting of untreated patients. And, because the nocebo effect can produce harm, the principle of non-maleficence must be taken into account alongside autonomy when obtaining (ethical) informedconsent and communicating intervention risks with patients. (shrink)
Trials with highly unfavourable risk–benefit ratios for participants, like HIV cure trials, raise questions about the quality of the consent of research participants. Why, it may be asked, would a person with HIV who is doing well on antiretroviral therapy be willing to jeopardise his health by enrolling in such a trial? We distinguish three concerns: first, how information is communicated to potential participants; second, participants’ motivations for enrolling in potentially high risk research with no prospect of direct benefit; (...) and third, participants’ understanding of the details of the trials in which they enrol. We argue that the communication concern is relevant to the validity of informedconsent and the quality of decision making, that the motivation concern does not identify a genuine problem with either the validity of consent or the quality of decision making and that the understanding concern may not be relevant to the validity of consent but is relevant to the quality of decision making. In doing so, we derive guidance points for researchers recruiting and enrolling participants into their HIV cure trials, as well as the research ethics committees reviewing proposed studies. (shrink)
Implantable brain–computer interface technology is an expanding area of engineering research now moving into clinical application. Ensuring meaningful informedconsent in implantable BCI research is an ethical imperative. The emerging and rapidly evolving nature of implantable BCI research makes identification of risks, a critical component of informedconsent, a challenge. In this paper, 6 core risk domains relevant to implantable BCI research are identified—short and long term safety, cognitive and communicative impairment, inappropriate expectations, involuntariness, affective impairment, (...) and privacy and security. Work in deep brain stimulation provides a useful starting point for understanding this core set of risks in implantable BCI. Three further risk domains—risks pertaining to identity, agency, and stigma—are identified. These risks are not typically part of formalized consent processes. It is important as informedconsent practices are further developed for implantable BCI research that attention be paid not just to disclosing core research risks but exploring the meaning of BCI research with potential participants. (shrink)
The practice of obtaining informedconsent has its history in, and gains its meaning from, medicine and biomedical research. Discussions of disclosure and justified nondisclosure have played a significant role throughout the history of medical ethics, but the term “informedconsent” emerged only in the 1950s. Serious discussion of the meaning and ethics of informedconsent began in medicine, research, law, and philosophy only around 1972.
The received view in medical contexts is that informedconsent is both necessary and sufficient for patient autonomy. This paper argues that informedconsent is not sufficient for patient autonomy, at least when autonomy is understood as a "relational" concept. Relational conceptions of autonomy, which have become prominent in the contemporary literature, draw on themes in the thought of Charles Taylor. I first identify four themes in Taylor's work that together constitute a picture of human agency (...) corresponding to the notion of agency implicit in relational accounts of autonomy. Drawing on these themes, I sketch two arguments against the position that informedconsent secures autonomy. The first is that informedconsent is an "opportunity" concept whereas autonomy is an "exercise" concept; the second is that informedconsent requires merely weak evaluation and not strong evaluation. On Taylor's analysis of agency, strong evaluation is required for agency and for autonomy. (shrink)
Substantial efforts have recently been made to reform the physician-patient relationship, particularly toward replacing the `silent world of doctor and patient' with informed patient participation in medical decision-making. This 'new ethos of patient autonomy' has especially insisted on the routine provision of informedconsent for all medical interventions. Stronly supported by most bioethicists and the law, as well as more popular writings and expectations, it still seems clear that informedconsent has, at best, been received (...) in a lukewarm fashion by most clinicians, many simply rejecting what they commonly refer to as the `myth of informedconsent'. The purpose of this book is to defuse this seemingly intractable controversy by offering an efficient and effective operational model of informedconsent. This goal is pursued first by reviewing and evaluating, in detail, the agendas, arguments, and supporting materials of its proponents and detractors. A comprehensive review of empirical studies of informedconsent is provided, as well as a detailed reflection on the common clinician experience with attempts at informedconsent and the exercise of autonomy by patients. In the end, informedconsent is recast as a management tool for pursuing clinically and ethically important goods and values that any clinician should see as meriting pursuit. Concurrently, the model incorporates a flexible, anticipatory approach that recognizes that no static, generic ritual can legitimately pursue the quite variable goods and values that may be at stake with different patients in different situations. Finally, efficiency of provision is addressed by not pursuing the unattainable and ancillary. Throughout, the traditional principle of beneficence is appealed to toward articulating an operational model of informedconsent as an intervention that is likely to change outcomes at the bedside for the better. (shrink)
Informedconsent in medical practice is essential and a global standard that should be sought at all the times doctors interact with patients. Its intensity would vary depending on the invasiveness and risks associated with the anticipated treatment. To our knowledge there has not been any systematic review of consent practices to document best practices and identify areas that need improvement in our setting. The objective of the study was to evaluate the informedconsent practices (...) of surgeons at University teaching Hospitals in a low resource setting. (shrink)
BackgroundFor many decades, the debate on children’s competence to give informedconsent in medical settings concentrated on ethical and legal aspects, with little empirical underpinnings. Recently, data from empirical research became available to advance the discussion. It was shown that children’s competence to consent to clinical research could be accurately assessed by the modified MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Clinical Research. Age limits for children to be deemed competent to decide on research participation have been studied: generally (...) children of 11.2 years and above were decision-making competent, while children of 9.6 years and younger were not. Age was pointed out to be the key determining factor in children’s competence. In this article we reflect on policy implications of these findings, considering legal, ethical, developmental and clinical perspectives.DiscussionAlthough assessment of children’s competence has a normative character, ethics, law and clinical practice can benefit from research data. The findings may help to do justice to the capacities children possess and challenges they may face when deciding about treatment and research options. We discuss advantages and drawbacks of standardized competence assessment in children on a case-by-case basis compared to application of a fixed age limit, and conclude that a selective implementation of case-by-case competence assessment in specific populations is preferable. We recommend the implementation of age limits based on empirical evidence. Furthermore, we elaborate on a suitable model for informedconsent involving children and parents that would do justice to developmental aspects of children and the specific characteristics of the parent-child dyad.SummaryPrevious research outcomes showed that children’s medical decision-making capacities could be operationalized into a standardized assessment instrument. Recommendations for policies include a dual consent procedure, including both child as well as parents, for children from the age of 12 until they reach majority. For children between 10 and 12 years of age, and in case of children older than 12 years in special research populations of mentally compromised patients, we suggest a case-by-case assessment of children’s competence to consent. Since such a dual consent procedure is fundamentally different from a procedure of parental permission and child assent, and would imply a considerable shift regarding some current legislations, practical implications are elaborated. (shrink)
Some philosophers have argued that during the process of obtaining informedconsent, physicians should try to nudge their patients towards consenting to the option the physician believes best, where a nudge is any influence that is expected to predictably alter a person’s behaviour without restricting her options. Some proponents of nudging even argue that it is a necessary and unavoidable part of securing informedconsent. Here I argue that nudging is incompatible with obtaining informed (...) class='Hi'>consent. I assume informedconsent requires that a physician tells her patient the truth about her options and argue that nudging is incompatible with truth-telling. Instead, nudging satisfies Harry Frankfurt’s account of bullshit. (shrink)
Unrealistic therapeutic beliefs are very common—the majority of patient-subjects enrol in phase 1 trials seeking and expecting significant medical benefit, even though the likelihood of such benefit has historically proven very low. The high prevalence of therapeutic misestimation and unrealistic optimism in particular has stimulated debate about whether unrealistic therapeutic beliefs in early-phase clinical trials preclude adequate informedconsent. We seek here to help resolve this controversy by showing that a crucial determination of when such therapeutic beliefs are (...) ethically problematic turns on whether they are causally linked and instrumental to the motivation to participate in the trial. Thus, in practice, it is ethically incumbent on researchers to determine which understanding and beliefs lead to the participant’s primary motivation for enrolling, not to simply assess understanding, beliefs and motivations independently. We further contend that assessing patient-subjects’ appreciation as a component of informedconsent—it is already an established component of decision-making capacity assessments—can help elucidate the link between understanding-beliefs and motivation; appreciation refers to an individual’s understanding of the personal significance of both the medical facts and the experience of trial participation. Therefore, we recommend that: in addition to the usual question, ‘Why do you want to participate in this trial?’, all potential participants should be asked the question: ‘What are you giving up by participating in this trial?’ and researchers should consider the settings in which it may be possible and practical to obtain ‘two-point consent’. (shrink)
(2013). InformedConsent, Big Data, and the Oxymoron of Research That Is Not Research. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 40-42. doi: 10.1080/15265161.2013.768864.
The therapeutic misconception has been seen as presenting an ethical problem because failure to distinguish the aims of research participation from those receiving ordinary treatment may seriously undermine the informedconsent of research subjects. Hence, most theoretical and empirical work on the problems of the therapeutic misconception has been directed to evaluate whether, and to what degree, this confusion invalidates the consent of subjects. We argue here that this focus on the understanding component of informed (...) class='Hi'>consent, while important, might be too narrow to capture the ethical complexity of the therapeutic misconception. We show that concerns about misplaced trust and exploitation of such trust are also relevant, and ought to be taken into account, when considering why the therapeutic misconception matters ethically. (shrink)
Increasingly, bioethicists defend informedconsent as a safeguard for trust in caretakers and medical institutions. This paper discusses an ‘ideal type’ of that move. What I call the trust-promotion argument for informedconsent states:1. Social trust, especially trust in caretakers and medical institutions, is necessary so that, for example, people seek medical advice, comply with it, and participate in medical research.2. Therefore, it is usually wrong to jeopardise that trust.3. Coercion, deception, manipulation and other violations of (...) standard informedconsent requirements seriously jeopardise that trust.4. Thus, standard informedconsent requirements are justified.This article describes the initial promise of this argument, then identifies challenges to it. As I show, the value of trust fails to account for some commonsense intuitions about informedconsent. We should revise the argument, commonsense morality, or both. (shrink)
Most writing on informedconsent in Africa highlights different cultural and social attributes that influence informedconsent practices, especially in research settings. This review presents a composite picture of informedconsent in Nigeria using empirical studies and legal and regulatory prescriptions, as well as clinical experience. It shows that Nigeria, like most other nations in Africa, is a mixture of sociocultural entities, and, notwithstanding the multitude of factors affecting it, informedconsent is (...) evolving along a purely Western model. Empirical studies show that 70–95% of Nigerian patients report giving consent for their surgical treatments. Regulatory prescriptions and adjudicated cases in Nigeria follow the Western model of informedconsent. However, adversarial legal proceedings, for a multiplicity of reasons, do not play significant roles in enforcing good medical practice in Nigeria. Gender prejudices are evident, but not a norm. Individual autonomy is recognized even when decisions are made within the family. Consent practices are influenced by the level of education, extended family system, urbanization, religious practices, and health care financing options available. All limitations notwithstanding, consent discussions improved with increasing level of education of the patients, suggesting that improved physician's knowledge and increasing awareness and education of patients can override other influences. Nigerian medical schools should restructure their teaching of medical ethics to improve the knowledge and practices of physicians. More research is needed on the preferences of the Nigerian people regarding informedconsent so as to adequately train physicians and positively influence physicians' behaviors. (shrink)
Several attempts have been made to transfer the concept of informedconsent from medical and research ethics to dealing with affected groups in other areas such as engineering, land use planning, and business management. It is argued that these attempts are unsuccessful since the concept of informedconsent is inadequate for situations in which groups of affected persons are dealt with collectively (rather than individually, as in clinical medicine). There are several reasons for this. The affected (...) groups from which informedconsent is sought cannot be identified with sufficient precision. Informedconsent is associated with individual veto power, but it does not appear realistic to give veto power to all individuals who are affected for instance by an engineering project. Most importantly, the concept of informedconsent puts focus on the public’s acceptance of ready-made proposals rather than on its participation in the decision-making process as a whole, which includes the development of alternatives for the decision. Therefore, the concept of informedconsent is not applicable to a company’s relations with groups and collectives. It may, however, be applicable to a company’s relations with individual persons such as customers and employees. (shrink)
Informedconsent, decision-making styles and the role of patient-physician relationships are imperative aspects of clinical medicine worldwide. We present the case of a 74-year-old woman afflicted with advanced liver cancer whose attending physician, per request of the family, did not inform her of her true diagnosis. In our analysis, we explore the differences in informed-consent styles between patients who hold an "independent" and "interdependent" construal of the self and then highlight the possible implications maintained by this (...) position in the context of international clinical ethics. Finally, we discuss the need to reassess informed-consent styles suitable to the needs of each patient regardless of whether he or she resides in the United States or in Japan. (shrink)
The Office for Human Research Protections was correct in determining that the consent forms for the National Institutes of Health -sponsored SUPPORT study were seriously flawed. Several articles defended the consent forms and criticized the OHRP's actions. Disagreement focuses on three central issues: how risks and benefits should be described in informedconsent documents; the meaning and application of the concept of “standard of care” in the context of research; and the proper role of OHRP. Examination (...) of the consent forms reveals that they failed to disclose the reasonably foreseeable risks of the experimental interventions in the study, as well as the potential for differences in the degree of risk between these interventions. Although the concept of “standard of care” may be helpful in determining the ethical acceptability of other aspects of research, such as clinical equipoise, it is not helpful in discussing consent requirements. (shrink)
Our aim is to expand the regulative ideal governing consent. We argue that consent should not only be informed but also based on rational beliefs. We argue that holding true beliefs promotes autonomy. Information is important insofar as it helps a person to hold the relevant true beliefs. But in order to hold the relevant true beliefs, competent people must also think rationally. Insofar as information is important, rational deliberation is important. Just as physicians should aim to (...) provide relevant information regarding the medical procedures prior to patients consenting to have those procedures, they should also assist patients to think more rationally. We distinguish between rational choice/action and rational belief. While autonomous choice need not necessarily be rational, it should be based on rational belief. The implication for the doctrine of informedconsent and the practice of medicine is that, if physicians are to respect patient autonomy and help patients to choose and act more rationally, not only must they provide information, but they should care more about the theoretical rationality of their patients. They should not abandon their patients to irrationality. They should help their patients to deliberate more effectively and to care more about thinking rationally. We illustrate these arguments in the context of Jehovah's Witnesses refusing life-saving blood transfusions. Insofar as Jehovah's Witnesses should be informed of the consequences of their actions, they should also deliberate rationally about these consequences. (shrink)
Informedconsent is the single most important concept for understanding decision-making capacity. There is a steady pull in the clinical world to transform capacity into a technical concept that can be tested objectively, usually by calling for a psychiatric consult. This is a classic example of medicalization. In this article I argue that is a mistake, not just unnecessary but wrong, and explain how to normalize capacity assessment.Returning the locus of capacity assessment to the attending, the primary care (...) doctor, and even to ethics consultation in today's environment will require a substantial effort to undo a strong but illusory impression of capacity assessment. Hospital attorneys as well as clinical ethicists with a sophisticated understanding of health law can be in the vanguard of this reorientation. (shrink)
The legal basis of informedconsent in Texas may on first examination suggest an unqualified affirmation of persons as the source of authority over themselves. This view of individuals in the practice of informedconsent tends to present persons outside of any social context in general and outside of their families in particular. The actual functioning of law and medical practice in Texas, however, is far more complex. This study begins with a brief overview of the (...) roots of Texas law and public policy regarding informedconsent. This surface account is then contrasted with examples drawn from the actual functioning of Texas law: Texas legislation regarding out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders. As a default approach to medical decision-making when patients lose decisional capacity and have failed to appoint a formal proxy or establish their wishes, this law establishes a defeasible presumption in favor of what the law characterizes as “qualified relatives” who can function as decision-makers for those terminal family members who lose decisional capacity. The study shows how, in the face of a general affirmation of the autonomy of individuals as if they were morally and socially isolated agents, space is nevertheless made for families to choose on behalf of their own members. The result is a multi-tier public morality, one affirming individuals as morally authoritative and the other recognizing the decisional standing of families. (shrink)
To participate in health research, there is a need for well-administered informedconsent. Understanding of informedconsent, especially in international health research, is influenced by the participants' understanding of information and the meaning attached to the information communicated to them regarding the purpose and procedure of the research. Incorrect information and the power differential between researcher and participants may lead to participants becoming victims of harmful research procedures. Meningitis epidemics in Kano in early 1996 led to (...) a response from drug companies, especially Pfizer, as well as humanitarian workers from Médecins Sans Frontiers, which resulted in an unethical trial. Pfizer's drug trial during the epidemics has left a lasting controversy, which has yet to be resolved. This paper examines the key issues surrounding the controversy, discusses the context of informed decision-making, the ethical issues and implications of the incident, and concludes with some recommendations. Relevant texts, journals, Internet materials, newspaper articles and documentary materials on the conduct of the Pfizer's Trovan trial have been consulted. Four types of action (act intuitively, act rationally, act ignorantly, and act contextually – based on information provided) are identified as possible options for decision making. Participants most likely acted in ignorance due to poor understanding of the information contained in the verbal informedconsent administered, thereby raising ethical issues. It is concluded that health research ethics committees have an important role to play nationally and locally in overseeing research, and in avoiding future occurrences. (shrink)
It is generally held that doctors and researchers have an obligation to obtain informedconsent. Over time there has been a move in relation to this obligation from a requirement to disclose information to a requirement to ensure that that information is understood. Whilst this change has been resisted, in this article I argue that both sides on this matter are mistaken. When investigating what information is needed for consent to be informed we might be trying (...) to determine what information a person would need in order to consent at all, or we might be trying to determine what information a person needs in order to make an informed choice about whether or not to consent. I argue that the obligation to ensure understanding only applies to information generated by the first type of enquiry; but that much of the information generally thought necessary in order for consent to be informed is only required if our concern is with the second type of enquiry. For this reason it is neither the case that doctors and researchers should ensure all the information they provide is understood, nor is it the case that their only obligation is to disclose it. (shrink)
Broad genome-wide testing is increasingly finding its way to the public through the online direct-to-consumer marketing of so-called personal genome tests. Personal genome tests estimate genetic susceptibilities to multiple diseases and other phenotypic traits simultaneously. Providers commonly make use of Terms of Service agreements rather than informedconsent procedures. However, to protect consumers from the potential physical, psychological and social harms associated with personal genome testing and to promote autonomous decision-making with regard to the testing offer, we argue (...) that current practices of information provision are insufficient and that there is a place – and a need – for informedconsent in personal genome testing, also when it is offered commercially. The increasing quantity, complexity and diversity of most testing offers, however, pose challenges for information provision and informedconsent. Both specific and generic models for informedconsent fail to meet its moral aims when applied to personal genome testing. Consumers should be enabled to know the limitations, risks and implications of personal genome testing and should be given control over the genetic information they do or do not wish to obtain. We present the outline of a new model for informedconsent which can meet both the norm of providing sufficient information and the norm of providing understandable information. The model can be used for personal genome testing, but will also be applicable to other, future forms of broad genetic testing or screening in commercial and clinical settings. (shrink)
Several authors have recently argued that psychotherapy, as it is commonly practiced, is deceptive and undermines patients’ ability to give informedconsent to treatment. This ‘deception’ claim is based on the findings that some, and possibly most, of the ameliorative effects in psychotherapeutic interventions are mediated by therapeutic common factors shared by successful treatments, rather than because of theory-specific techniques. These findings have led to claims that psychotherapy is, at least partly, likely a placebo, and that practitioners of (...) psychotherapy have a duty to ‘go open’ to patients about the role of common factors in therapy ; to not ‘go open’ is supposed to unjustly restrict patients’ autonomy. This paper makes two related arguments against the ‘go open’ claim. While therapies ought to provide patients with sufficient information to make informed treatment decisions, informedconsent does not require that practitioners ‘go open’ about therapeutic common factors in psychotherapy, and clarity about the mechanisms of change in psychotherapy shows us that the common-factors findings are consistent with, rather than undermining of, the truth of many theory-specific forms of psychotherapy; psychotherapy, as it is commonly practiced, is not deceptive and is not a placebo. The call to ‘go open’ should be resisted and may have serious detrimental effects on patients via the dissemination of a false view about how therapy works. (shrink)
According to the standard view of informedconsent, a prospective subject's consent to participate in a research study is invalid if the individual fails to comprehend the information about the study standardly disclosed to him. I argue that this involves three mistakes. First, the standard view confuses an ethical aspiration with a minimum ethical standard. Second, it assigns the entire responsibility for producing comprehension in study participants to the investigators. Most importantly, the standard view requires the termination (...) of many otherwise perfectly ethical research studies. This last conclusion follows from appreciating a pervasive phenomenon that is known as the "therapeutic misconception." I argue that a prospective subject's consent to participate in research can be perfectly valid even if he or she does not comprehend the information that investigators are required to disclose. Furthermore, I explain that this alternative view does not in the least compromise the vital goal of ensuring the protection of subjects in research. (shrink)
This article introduces the notion of ‘routinisation’ into discussions of informedconsent. It is argued that the routinisation of informedconsent poses a threat to the protection of the personal autonomy of a patient through the negotiation of informedconsent. On the basis of a large survey, we provide evidence of the routinisation of informedconsent in various types of interaction on the internet; among these, the routinisation of consent to the (...) exchange of health related information. We also provide evidence that the extent of the routinisation of informedconsent is dependent on the character of the information exchanged, and we uncover a range of causes of routinisation. Finally, the article discusses possible ways of countering the problem of routinisation of informedconsent. (shrink)
The concepts of placebos and placebo effects refer to extremely diverse phenomena. I recommend dissolving the concepts of placebos and placebo effects into loosely related groups of specific mechanisms, including expectation-fulfillment, classical conditioning, and attentional-somatic feedback loops. If this approach is on the right track, it has three main implications for the ethics of informedconsent. First, because of the expectation-fulfillment mechanism, the process of informing cannot be considered independently from the potential effects of treatment. Obtaining informed (...)consent influences the effects of treatment. This provides support for the authorized concealment and authorized deception paradigms, and perhaps even for outright deceptive placebo use. Second, doctors may easily fail to consider the potential benefits of conditioning, leading them to misjudge the trade-off between beneficence and autonomy. Third, how attentional-somatic feedback loops play out depends not only on the content of the informing process but also on its framing. This suggests a role for libertarian paternalism in clinical practice. (shrink)
Research into personal health data holds great potential not only for improved treatment but also for economic growth. In these years many countries are developing policies aimed at facilitating such research often under the banner of ‘big data’. A central point of debate is whether the secondary use of health data requires informedconsent if the data is anonymised. In 2013 the Danish Minister of Health established a new register collecting data about all ritual male childhood circumcisions in (...) Denmark. The main purpose of the register was to enable future research into the consequences of ritual circumcision. This article is a study into the case of the Danish Circumcision Registry. We show that such a registry may lead to various forms of harm such as 1) overreaching social pressure, 2) stigmatization, 3) medicalization of a religious practice, 4) discrimination, and 5) polarised research, and that a person may therefore have a strong and legitimate interest in deciding whether or not such data should be collected and/or used in research. This casts doubt on the claim that the requirement of informedconsent could and should be waived for all types of secondary research into registries. We finally sketch a new model of informedconsent – Meta consent – aimed at striking a balance between the interests in promoting research and at the same time protecting the individual. Research participants may have a strong and legitimate interest in deciding whether or not their data should be collected and used for registry-based research whether or not their data is anonymised. (shrink)
This article develops a model of informedconsent for fresh oöcyte donation for stem cell research, during in vitro fertilisation (IVF), by building on the importance of patients’ embodied experience. Informedconsent typically focuses on the disclosure of material information. Yet this approach does not incorporate the embodied knowledge that patients acquire through lived experience. Drawing on interview data from 35 patients and health professionals in an IVF clinic in Australia, our study demonstrates the uncertainty of (...) IVF treatment, and the tendency for patients to overestimate their chances of success prior to the experience of treatment. Once in active treatment, however, patients identify their oöcytes as both precious and precarious. We argue that it is necessary to formally include embodied experience as a source of knowledge in informedconsent procedures, both for gratuitous donation and for egg-sharing regimes. We recommend that at least one full cycle of IVF be completed before approaching women to divert eggs away from their own fertility treatment. (shrink)
Neither the range of potential results from genomic research that might be returned to participants nor future uses of stored data and biospecimens can be fully predicted at the outset of a study. Informedconsent procedures require clear explanations about how and by whom decisions are made and what principles and criteria apply. To ensure trustworthy research governance, there is also a need for empirical studies incorporating public input to evaluate and strengthen these processes.
Obtaining ‘informedconsent’ from every individual participant involved in health research is a mandatory ethical practice. Informedconsent is a process whereby potential participants are genuinely informed about their role, risk and rights before they are enrolled in the study. Thus, ethics committees in most countries require ‘informedconsent form’ as part of an ethics application which is reviewed before granting research ethics approval. Despite a significant increase in health research activity in low-and (...) middle-income countries in recent years, only limited work has been done to address ethical concerns. Most ethics committees in LMICs lack the authority and/or the capacity to monitor research in the field. This is important since not all research, particularly in LMICs region, complies with ethical principles, sometimes this is inadvertently or due to a lack of awareness of their importance in assuring proper research governance. With several examples from Nepal, this paper reflects on the steps required to obtain informed consents and highlights some of the major challenges and barriers to seeking informedconsent from research participants. At the end of this paper, we also offer some recommendations around how can we can promote and implement optimal informedconsent taking process. We believe that paper is useful for researchers and members of ethical review boards in highlighting key issues around informedconsent. (shrink)
Research focused on the prodromal period prior to the onset of psychosis is essential for the further development of strategies for early detection, early intervention, and disease pre-emption. Such efforts necessarily require the enrollment of individuals who are at risk of psychosis but have not yet developed a psychotic illness into research and treatment protocols. This work is becoming increasingly internationalized, which warrants special consideration of cultural differences in conceptualization of mental illness and international differences in health care practices and (...) rights regarding research participation. The process of identifying and requesting informedconsent from individuals at elevated risk for psychosis requires thoughtful communication about illness risk and often involves the participation of family members. Empirical studies of risk reasoning and decisional capacity in young people and individuals with psychosis suggest that most individuals who are at-risk for psychosis can adequately provide informedconsent; however ongoing improvements to tools and procedures are important to ensure that this work proceeds with maximal consideration of relevant ethical issues. This review provides a discussion of these issues in the context of international research efforts. (shrink)
The current ethical and regulatory framework for research is often charged with burdening investigators and impeding socially valuable research. To address these concerns, a growing number of research ethicists argue that informedconsent should be adapted to the risks of research participation. This would require less rigorous consent standards in low-risk research than in high-risk research. However, the current discussion is restricted to cases of research in which the risks of research participation are outweighed by the potential (...) clinical benefits for the individual research participant. Furthermore, current proposals do not address the worry that risk-adapted informedconsent may result in enrolling participants into research without their autonomous authorization. In this paper, we show how the standard view of informedconsent – consent as autonomous authorization – can be adapted to risk even when the research does not have a favourable risk-benefit profile for the participant. Our argument has two important implications: first, it implies that current and proposed consent standards are not adequately calibrated to risk and, second, that consent standards also need to be adapted to factors other than risk. (shrink)
In recent years, informedconsent has been suggested as a way to deal with risks posed by engineered nanomaterials. We argue that while we can learn from experiences with informedconsent in treatment and research contexts, we should be aware that informedconsent traditionally pertains to certain features of the relationships between doctors and patients and researchers and research participants, rather than those between producers and consumers and employers and employees, which are more prominent (...) in the case of engineered nanomaterials. To better understand these differences, we identify three major relational factors that influence whether valid informedconsent is obtainable, namely dependency, personal proximity, and existence of shared interests. We show that each type of relationship offers different opportunities for reflection and therefore poses distinct challenges for obtaining valid informedconsent. Our analysis offers a systematic understanding of the possibilities for attaining informedconsent in the context of nanomaterial risks and makes clear that measures or regulations to improve the obtainment of informedconsent should be attuned to the specific interpersonal relations to which it is supposed to apply. (shrink)
Can heroin addicts give consent to research on trials in which heroin is prescribed to them? Analyses of addicts and informedconsent have been objects of debate in several articles. Informedconsent requires the agent not only to be competent but also to give consent voluntarily. This has been questioned because of alleged features of heroin addiction. Until recently the discussion has focused on heroin addicts' desires for heroin, whether these are irresistible and thus (...) pose a problem for giving consent. Still, in light of empirical evidence, there seems to be a consensus more or less that the problem is not whether the addicts can resist their desire for heroin. A recent article concentrates specifically on heroin addicts' false assumptions of options and voluntariness. We argue that the prevailing framing of the options in this discussion in terms of heroin and access to it is problematic. The way in which the options are typically laid out suggests an assumption that participation in the research is allegedly based on the addicts' views on using the drug. We argue that this way of presenting the options is, first, a mismatch to the studies carried out and, second, symptomatic of potential misconceptions about heroin addiction and addicts. Furthermore, we also suggest that the account of voluntariness needs to be realistic in order for subjects to be able to give consent voluntarily in actual situations, and for medical research to carry out studies on improving outcomes in addiction treatment in an ethical way. (shrink)
The article covers electronic informedconsent from different dimensions so that practitioners might understand the history, regulation, and current status of eIC. It covers the transition of informedconsent to electronic screens and the implications of that transition in terms of design, costs, and data analysis. The article explores the limits of regulation mandating eIC for mobile application research, and addresses some of the broader social context around eIC.
Neil Manson and Onora O’Neill have recently defended an original theory of informedconsent in their book Rethinking InformedConsent in Bioethics (2007). The development of their ‘waiver’ model is premised on the failings of the theory of informedconsent as disclosure, which is rejected on two counts: firstly, the disclosure model’s implicit reliance upon a ‘conduit-container’ model of communication means that the regulatory requirements of informedconsent can rarely be achieved; secondly, (...) the model’s purported ethical justification via a principle of respect for patient autonomy is presented as being vacuous. Despite having laudable motivations for rethinking informedconsent, I argue that their theory of informedconsent as waiver can be criticised on similar grounds. In order to support this thesis I object that Manson and O’Neill’s developed theory of agential communication is too intricate to easily meet the demands of informedconsent as waiver. Secondly, I show that the model appears to be implicitly reliant upon a principle of respect for patient autonomy. Hence, despite improving upon the doctrine of informedconsent, the waiver model needs further elucidation in order to avoid the problems mounted against the disclosure model. (shrink)
Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction: why focus on informedconsent?; 2. Deciding who decides: capacity and consent; 3. Putting the informed into 'informedconsent': information and decision-making; 4. Freedom of expression: the voluntary nature of consent; 5. A patient's prerogative? The continuing nature of consent; 6. Concluding words about consent; Index.
BackgroundThis essay provides an ethical and conceptual argument for the use of informedconsent prior to the diagnosis of brain death. It is meant to enable the family to make critical end-of-life decisions, particularly withdrawal of life support system and organ donation, before brain death is diagnosed, as opposed to the current practice of making such decisions after the diagnosis of death. The recent tragic case of a 13-year-old brain-dead patient in California who was maintained on a ventilator (...) for over 2 years illustrates how such a consent would have made a crucial difference.MethodsConceptual, philosophical, and ethical analysis.ResultsI first consider a conceptual justification for the use of consent for certain non-beneficial and unwanted medical diagnoses. I suggest that the diagnosis of brain death falls into this category for some patients. Because the diagnostic process of brain death lacks the transparency of traditional death determination, has a unique epistemic structure and a complex risk-benefit profile which differs markedly from case to case, and presents conflicts of interest for physicians and society, I argue that pre-diagnostic counseling and informedconsent should be part of the diagnostic process. This approach can be termed as “allow cardiac death”, whose parallel logic with “allow natural death” is discussed. I also discuss potential negative impacts on organ donation and health care cost from this proposal and offer possible mitigation. I show that the pre-diagnostic counseling can improve the possibility for well-thought-out decisions regarding organ donation and terminating life-support system in cases of hopeless prognosis. This approach differs conceptually from the pluralism of the definition of death, such as those in New Jersey and Japan, and it upholds the Uniform Determination of Death Act.ConclusionsMy intention is not to provide an instant panacea for the ongoing impasse of the brain death debate, but to point to a novel conceptual ground for a more pragmatic, and more patient- and family-centered approach. By enabling the family to consent to or decline the diagnostic process of brain death, but not to choose the definition of death, it upholds the current legal definition of death. (shrink)
This paper examines the practice of informedconsent in Hong Kong by drawing on structured interviews conducted with eleven physicians, three patients, and four family members primarily at a well-established public hospital in Hong Kong. The findings of this study show that the Hong Kong approach to medical decision-making lies somewhere between that of America on the one hand, and mainland China on the other. It is argued that the practice of medical decision-making in Hong Kong can be (...) modeled by a moderate familism that is directed towards achieving the best interests of the patient (1) as understood by the physician, (2) in consultation with the family, (3) under the prima facie presumption that consent is not required for disclosure of information to the family, (4) while aiming at an eventual albeit frequently partial and vague disclosure to the patient. (shrink)
Libertarian paternalism's notion of ?nudging? refers to steering individual decision making so as to make choosers better off without breaching their free choice. If successful, this may offer an ideal synthesis between the duty to respect patient autonomy and that of beneficence, which at times favors paternalistic influence. A growing body of literature attempts to assess the merits of nudging in health care. However, this literature deals almost exclusively with health policy, while the question of the potential benefit of nudging (...) for the practice of informedconsent has escaped systematic analysis. This article focuses on this question. While it concedes that nudging could amount to improper exploitation of cognitive weaknesses, it defends the practice of nudging in a wide range of other conditions. The conclusion is that, when ethically legitimate, nudging offers an important new paradigm for informedconsent, with a special potential to overcome the classical dilemma between paternalistic beneficence and respect for autonomy. (shrink)
Genomic research and biobanking present several ethical, social and cultural challenges, particularly when conducted in settings with limited scientific research capacity. One of these challenges is determining the model of consent that should support the sharing of human biological samples and data in the context of international collaborative research. In this paper, we report on the views of key research stakeholders in Ghana on what should count as good ethical practice when seeking consent for genomic research and biobanking (...) in Africa. This study was part of a multi-country qualitative case study conducted in three African countries: Ghana, Uganda and Zambia under the auspices of the Human Heredity and Health in Africa initiative. Our study suggests that while participants are willing to give consent for their samples and associated data to be used for future research purposes, they expect to receive feedback about the progress of the research and about the kinds of research being undertaken on their samples and data. These expectations need to be anticipated and discussed during the consent process which should be seen as part of an ongoing communication process throughout the research process. (shrink)