A method of defining semantics of logics based on not necessarily distributive lattices is presented. The key elements of the method are representation theorems for lattices and duality between classes of lattices and classes of some relational systems . We suggest a type of duality referred to as a duality via truth which leads to Kripke-style semantics and three-valued semantics in the style of Allwein-Dunn. We develop two new representation theorems for lattices which, together with the existing theorems by Urquhart (...) and Bimbo-Dunn, constitute a complete, in a sense, representation theory for lattices. As observed by Dunn and Hardegree, variations of Urquhart's duality arise by varying his disjointness assumption on the canonical frame. Four possible assumptions – disjoint, exhaustive, non-disjoint and non-exhaustive – are discussed in the paper. Each of the four corresponding representation theorems is expanded to a duality via truth. Based on these dualities we suggest four corresponding types of semantics for lattice-based logics. We also discuss a new topological representation of lattices. (shrink)

This book provides a synthesis of four versions of program semantic—srelational semantics, predicate transformer semantics, information systems, and domain theory—showing, through an exhaustive case study analysis, that it is possible to do back-and-forth translation from any of these versions of program semantics into any of the others, and demonstrating that while there are many variations of each, in principle they may be thought of as intertranslatable.

In this paper we give an example of intertranslatability between an ontology of individuals (nominalism), an ontology of properties (realism), and an ontology of facts (factualism). We demonstrate that these three ontologies are dual to each other, meaning that each ontology can be translated into, and recaptured from, each of the others. The aiin of the enterprise is to raise the possibility that, at least in some settings, there may be no need for considerations of ontological primacy. Whether the world (...) is made up of things, or properties, or facts, may be no more than a matter of how we look at it. (shrink)