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  1. How We Hurt The Ones We Love.Ingrid V. Albrecht - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
    Paradoxically, the practical necessity of love seems to combine the personal character of psychological necessity with the inescapable and authoritative quality of moral necessity. Traditionally, philosophers have avoided this paradox by treating love as an amalgam of impersonal evaluative judgments and affective responses. On my account, love participates in a different form of practical necessity, one characterized by a non-moral yet normative type of expectation. This expectation is best understood as a kind of second-personal address that does not support derivative (...)
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    Graveside and Other Asymmetrical Promises.Ingrid V. Albrecht - 2018 - Social Theory and Practice 44 (4):469-483.
    People who make graveside promises consider themselves bound by them, which raises the question of whether a promise can morally obligate a promisor directly to a promisee who cannot acknowledge the promise. I show that it can by using the theoretical framework provided by “transaction accounts” of promising. Paradigmatically, these accounts maintain that the creation of a promissory obligation requires that the promisee consent to the promise. I extend these accounts to capture promises made by proxy and self-promises, and conclude (...)
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    Graveside and Other Asymmetrical Promises in Advance.Ingrid V. Albrecht - forthcoming - Social Theory and Practice.
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    Rules of Disengagement: A Kantian Account of the Relationship Between Former Friends.Ingrid V. Albrecht - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
    The category of “former friend” is familiar, yet the nature of this relationship type remains underexplored. Aristotle, for example, poses but does not answer the question of what constitute appropriate relations between former friends. To elucidate post-friendship expectations, I promote an account of friendship according to which some of our most significant friendships participate in a type of intimacy characterized by having normative standing to interpret each other in a constitutive manner, which I call the “co-interpretation view” of friendship. Unchecked (...)
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