This thesis develops Dewey’s theory of inquiry and provides a novel perspective on what realists consider to be Dewey’s most controversial claims: his rejection of the view that inquiry aims at providing an accurate representation of reality, his claim that the object of knowledge is constructed, and his definition of truth in terms of warranted assertibility or fulfilment of the requirements of a problem. My strategy is to draw a gradual and relative distinction between what I (...) call “framed” and “framing” inquiry. While the distinction is not explicitly present in Dewey’s works, it rests on Dewey’s functional distinction between existential and universal propositions. In a framed inquiry, the problem is covered by an existing conceptual framework, which is used to resolve the problem, without being revised. In a framing inquiry, the problem is underdetermined by existing conceptual frameworks, which are created, revised, or expanded. My general argument is that Dewey’s main contribution and controversial claims should be understood in the context of framing inquiry. In Chapter 1, I set the stage for the thesis. I paint the portrait of Dewey as the archetypal anti-realist; I present pragmatism as moving above this debate; and I present the specifically Deweyan brand of pragmatism. In Chapter 2, I introduce the distinction between framed and framing inquiry. In Chapter 3, I argue that realist notions of knowledge as representation, existence as independent facts, truth as correspondence can be cast in terms of framed inquiry, while most realists mistakenly interpret these notions as “unframed.” In the next three chapters, I defend and develop Dewey’s views for framing inquiry. In Chapter 4, I argue that framing inquiry should be construed as articulating rather than representing reality. In Chapter 5, I maintain that Dewey’s view avoids idealism. In Chapter 6, I defend the pragmatist theory of truth as a standard for framing inquiry, by contrast with representational standards. (shrink)

Build confident critical thinkers who can process and articulate complex ideas in relevant, real-life contexts. The inquiry-based approach actively drives independent thought and helps learners connect ideas and frameworks while pushing them above and beyond typical TOK boundaries. This online course book is completely mapped to the 2013 syllabus.

Nicholas Rescher tackles the major questions of philosophical inquiry, pondering the nature of truth and existence. In the authoritative voice and calculated manner that we’ve come to expect from this distinguished philosopher, Rescher argues that the development of knowledge is a practice, pursued by humans because we have a need for its products. This pragmatic approach satisfies our innate urge as humans to make sense of our surroundings. Taking his discussion down to the level of particular details, and (...) addressing such topics as inductive validation, hypostatization fallacies, and counterfactual reasoning, Rescher abandons abstract generalities in favor of concrete specifics. For example, philosophers usually insist that to reason logically from a counterfactual, we must imagine a possible world in which the statement is fact. But Rescher argues that there’s no need to attempt to accept the facts of a world outside our cognition in order to reason from them. He shows us how we can use our own natural system of prioritizing, our own understanding of the fundamental, to resolve the inconsistencies in such statements as, “If the Eiffel Tower were in Manhattan, then it would be in New York State.” In using dozens of real-world examples such as these, and in arguing in his characteristically succinct style, Rescher casts light on a wide variety of concrete issues in the classical theory of knowledge, and reassures us along the way that the inherent limitations on our knowledge are no cause for distress. In pragmatic theory and inquiry, we must accept that the best we can do is good enough, because we only have a certain set of tools and conceptualizations available to us. A unique synthesis, this endeavor into pragmatic epistemology will be of interest to scholars and students of philosophy and cognitive science. (shrink)

A central theme to be found in Dewey’s writings is his criticism of theories of knowledge proposed throughout the history of Western philosophy. None of the once familiar “isms,” whether it be a variant of empiricism, rationalism, or idealism, escaped Dewey’s scrutiny. And each in its turn proved to be unacceptable to Dewey, because it was found that each rested upon what Dewey referred to as “the philosophical fallacy,” namely “the conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existence,” or the (...) fallacy of selective emphasis. Basically, this fallacy amounted for Dewey to the emphasis of one aspect of scientific inquiry to the exclusion of the rest, and taking the features characteristic of that aspect as paradigmatic for the purpose of accounting for knowledge. Thus, for example, advocates of what Dewey called sensationalism, for whom knowledge was to be explicated in terms of an immediate acquaintance with a perceptual given, emphasized an aspect of scientific inquiry, viz., that inquiry is engaged in only when some given situation is problematic, without regard to the fact that even those features of a problematic situation, which are taken to be given and stable features for purposes of resolving the problem, are so taken only provisionally, depending upon whether the ensuing inquiry is successful in resolving the problem at hand. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2001) 312-314 [Access article in PDF] Shook, John R. Dewey's Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality.The Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2000. Pp. ix + 316. Cloth, $46.00; Paper, $22.95. The current renaissance of American pragmatism, and John Dewey's philosophy in particular, began two decades ago with Richard Rorty's refashioning of Dewey as a postmodernist who (...) renounces the "professional philosophy" of metaphysics and epistemology for the fluidity of conversation in the life and growth of a community. This depiction, though praised for rekindling Dewey's star, has been widely challenged by subsequent commentators. Ralph Sleeper's 1986 The Necessity of Pragmatism persuasively argues that Dewey reconfigures, rather than renounces, the logical and metaphysical grounds of knowledge. Despite an archaic Hegelian vocabulary that misleadingly suggests idealism and antirealism, Sleeper finds Dewey advancing a genuine metaphysics of existence, not merely a conversation about experience: a naturalistic realism of independent existences that enter into and are transformed by human interactions with them.This perspective is shared by most Dewey scholars, including Sandra Rosenthal, Raymond Boisvert, and J. E. Tiles. At least until now. In a profound and provocative exploration of his early philosophy, John R. Shook, presents a compelling case that Dewey's reconstruction of metaphysics and epistemology is deeper than even Sleeper imagined. Dewey did not merely abandon idealism under the influence of William James, as most assume; he transformed it in a original way that, while wholly naturalistic, [End Page 312] is a fusion of idealism and realism that overcomes both the former's "mind-stuff" and the latter's "in-itself reality."Dewey began his philosophical odyssey with the searing desire to eradicate the dualisms of mind versus world, phenomenal versus noumenal, perceptual versus conceptual. Post-Hegelian idealists agreed that this division is ultimately reconciled in the "absolute," though they disagreed about whether the absolute is psychological or cosmological, social or supernatural, knowable or unknowable. From the very beginning, Shook argues, Dewey accepted the psychological path as sketched by James Ward, and also Edward Caird's claim that the absolute must be knowable in some sense. Intriguingly, the missing link between perception and conceptual awareness is Wilhelm Wundt's notion of volition: percepts are neither mechanically attached to concepts nor are they overlaid by Kantian "faculties of mind." Instead, a disruption of perceptual or noncognitive experience generates a desire for reconciliation that calls forth ideas that diagnose the problem and suggest ways to resolve it. Achieved solutions, in turn, forge a background of habitual dispositions that shape interpretations within the noncognitive realm.While still an idealist, then, Shook finds the essential elements of the "method of inquiry" that later anchored Dewey's instrumentalism and pragmatism. Prior to 1890, however, he still construed this as individual "mental activity," and the problem of its relation to God's Absolute Mind remained. Upon relinquishing the supernatural for the social, however, this final obstacle was eliminated. The dispositional background extends beyond the individual to the customs, traditions, and values of a culture—indeed, even the barest notions of "self" and "reality" are inconceivable without reference to such a background. This is Dewey's broad conception of "experience"—a humanistic naturalism with no trace of mind-stuff or subjectivism. In this sense Dewey is a realist, though his affirmation of things-themselves (including things we have not or may never actually discover) avoids the things-in-themselves that is the bane of metaphysical realism. To claim that things exist without an experiential background of how we may find them to exist is at best empty verbiage, and at worst hypnosis by the dervishes of dualism.Scrupulous in research, penetrating in detail, Shook's presentation is so faithful to Dewey that it will undoubtedly draw many of the same criticisms once hurled at the master. Though careful readers will be able to identify "experience" in its broadly social and functional sense, others will be confused by applications as diverse as "mental activity," "soul," "reality," "the history of the... (shrink)

Professor Reichenbach's writings have repeatedly called attention to the important rôle which probability statements play in all inquiry, and he has made amply clear that no philosophy of science can be regarded as adequate which does not square its accounts with the problems of probable inference. Recently he has brought together in convenient form many reflections on the methodology of science familiar to readers of his earlier works, and at the same time he has set himself the task of (...) solving many well-known problems of epistemology in terms of his theory of probability. His latest book is therefore of great interest, both because of the light it throws on Professor Reichenbach's own views and because it reveals the power and limitations of one approach to the problems of science. In particular, while it does not add to the details of his theory of probability worked out elsewhere, the applications Professor Reichenbach now makes of it supply fresh clues for judging its import and adequacy. The object of the present essay, therefore, is to expound a number of his views on probability and epistemology, with a view to examining his conclusions and their relevance to the problems he aims to resolve. The discussion will try to determine whether several features of his present views do not follow from assumptions which he has not sufficiently considered; whether his logical constructions do not create new puzzles; and whether a different starting-point should not be taken if the clarification of scientific concepts and procedures, to which Professor Reichenbach's devotion is as unexcelled as it is well known, is to be successfully conducted. (shrink)

Almost all theories of knowledge and justified belief employ moral concepts and forms of argument borrowed from moral theories, but none of them pay attention to the current renaissance in virtue ethics. This remarkable book is the first attempt to establish a theory of knowledge based on the model of virtue theory in ethics. The book develops the concept of an intellectual virtue, and then shows how the concept can be used to give an account of (...) the major concepts in epistemology, including the concept of knowledge. This highly original work of philosophy for professionals will also provide students with an excellent introduction to epistemology, virtue theory, and the relationship between ethics and epistemology. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of which kinds of knowledge Spinoza himself employs in developing the system of the Ethics. The problem is raised by Professor D. Savan and further discussed by G. H. R. Parkinson. The thesis is (1) that no occurrence of the first kind of knowledge is to be found in the Ethics (against Parkinson), (2) that the main part of the analysis in the Ethics is conducted on the level of the second kind of (...) knowledge (in agreement with Parkinson), and (3) that the third kind of knowledge occurs frequently and plays a most important role in the Ethics (in part against Parkinson). The relation between knowledge and language, the distinction between two types of imagination, or two ways of imagining things, the translation of knowledge of modes of extension into knowledge of the mind, and the relation between the second and third kind of knowledge are main parts of the argument. The third kind of knowledge derives its significance in the Ethics from the definitions and axioms, particularly in Part 1. These definitions and axioms form the basis of the whole system of the Ethics, and at least some of them, it is suggested, belong to the third kind of knowledge. (shrink)

Republics of Knowledge tells the story of how the circulation of knowledge shaped the formation of nation-states in Latin America, and particularly in Argentina, Peru and Chile, during the century after Iberian rule was defeated in the 1820s. Most immediately, the author has sought to provide a cross-disciplinary approach to the history of knowledge, combining the methods of global intellectual history with a new way of thinking about nations as experienced and enacted as well as how they (...) are imagined, and in so doing offer a new interpretation of the history of independent Latin America to illustrate its wider significance in the making of the modern world. By bringing these lines of inquiry together within a transnational framework, Nicola Miller shows how evidence from the pioneering nations of Latin America can invite historians to rethink many of their general theories about how knowledge travels and how a sense of nationhood is created. The book is designed to stimulate debate about the significance of knowledge not only in Latin America but in all modern societies. As Miller explains, Latin America is usually regarded as an exception to general theories, notably of colonialism, nationalism and liberalism; and yet it was in that part of the world, not in Europe, that the Age of Revolution brought the founding of a second wave of modern republics, and it was in Latin America that pioneering attempts were made to apply liberal principles in societies with inherited caste divisions and corporate institutions. It was there that some of the richest debates about the vexed relationship between collective identities and individualism took place. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend that the historiographical category of eclecticism is a correct way to describe the epistemology and the exegetical activity of the Anonymous commentator on Plato’s Theaetetus. In addition, I show that the interpretation of the platonic philosophy presented in this text not only presupposes an eclectic philosophical attitude, but also offers a conscious defense of a positive and philosophically relevant form of eclecticism. By eclecticism, I understand a method of inquiry based on the deliberate use (...) of hypotheses and arguments from different philosophical traditions. My claim is that Anon. intends to lay ground of his way of doing philosophy by attributing it to Plato and the platonic tradition. In doing so, Anon. provides us with a positive understanding of eclecticism as a legitimate methodology of philosophical investigation. (shrink)

Conflicting Values of Inquiry explores how certain non-epistemic values had been turned into epistemic ones, how they had an effect on epistemic content, and how they became ideologies of knowledge playing various roles in inquiry and application throughout early modern Europe.

: According to C. S. Peirce, there are two ways of explaining what a sign means, namely, a definition and a precept. A precept tells the interpreters of a sign what the sign means by prescribing what they have to do in order to find or become acquainted with an object of the sign. A precept for a concept specifies how an interpreter can determine whether the concept is applicable to a given situation or object.Peirce accepted the scholastic definition of (...) truth, according to which a proposition is true if and only if its subject and predicate refer to the same thing, and applied this analysis to complex as well as singular propositions. However, this account does not tell how an interpreter can become acquainted with the objects of the predicate "true," that is, true propositions: it is not a good precept for the concept of truth. On the other hand, the so-called pragmatic conception of truth, truth as the limit or end of inquiry, can be regarded as a precept for truth, or as a general form of such a precept.The requirement that concepts should have precepts attached to them is a version of Peirce's principle of pragmatism. The availability of precepts should make it possible for an interpreter to determine whether a concept is applicable to a given situation, or whether a given proposition is true. Thus the principle of pragmatism is closely related to the principle knowability, according to which any truth should be knowable. Some formulations of the principle of knowability lead to a paradox. The paper discusses several forms of the principle of knowability, and it is argued that the existence of precept for a proposition entails only a relatively weak form of the principle.Keywords: Action. Inquiry. Knowledge. Meaning. Peirce. Pragmatism. Precept.Resumo: Segundo C. S. Peirce, há dois modos de explicar o que um signo significa, a saber, uma definição e um preceito. Um preceito diz aos intérpretes de um signo o que o signo significa, prescrevendo o que eles devem fazer para encontrar ou inteirar-se de um objeto do signo. Um preceito para um conceito especifica como um intérprete pode determinar se o conceito é aplicável a uma dada situação ou a um dado objeto.Peirce aceitou a definição escolástica de verdade, segundo a qual uma proposição é verdadeira se, e somente se, seu sujeito e seu predicado se referirem à mesma coisa, e aplicou essa análise tanto a proposições complexas quanto a singulares. Entretanto, essa visão não informa como um intérprete pode inteirar-se dos objetos do predicado "verdadeiro", ou seja, proposições verdadeiras: não é um bom preceito para o conceito de ver- On a Pragmatic Theory of Meaning and Knowledge dade. De outro lado, a assim chamada concepção pragmática de verdade, a verdade como o limite ou fim da investigação, pode ser vista como um preceito para a verdade, ou como uma forma geral de tal preceito.A exigência de que conceitos tenham preceitos ligados a eles é uma versão do princípio do pragmatismo de Peirce . A disponibilidade de preceitos deve tornar possível que um intérprete determine se um conceito é aplicável a uma dada situação, ou seja, se certa proposição é verdadeira. Portanto, o princípio do pragmatismo está intimamente ligado ao princípio da cognoscibilidade, segundo o qual toda verdade pode ser conhecida. Algumas formulações do princípio da cognoscibilidade levam a um paradoxo. O artigo discute algumas formas não-paradoxais do princípio da cognoscibilidade, defendendo que a existência de um preceito para uma proposição exige apenas uma forma relativamente fraca do princípio.Palavras-chave: Ação. Investigação. Conhecimento. Significação. Peirce. Pragmatismo. Preceito. (shrink)

Epistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of (...) the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology. (shrink)

Key ideas in the work of Michel Foucault are explored and applied to the organized pursuit of knowledge in higher education. His association of power and knowledge accounts for deeply rooted practices in higher education that would need to be mediated or overcome for there to be a revolution in inquiry to occur, such as the one advanced by Nicholas Maxwell. Foucault’s concepts of disciplinary power and bio-power, and how they act to manage the behavior of free (...) citizens, are described. These concepts are then applied to free inquiry, to show how the activity of individual inquirers is managed and how critical inquiry is controlled. The management of inquiry involving four norms, two of them intrinsic to inquiry and the other two extrinsic, is explained. The potential of Foucault’s concept of discursive formations is introduced as a means of reconceiving inquiry to overcome these impediments to a revolution in inquiry. (shrink)

Naomi Scheman argues that the concerns of philosophy emerge not from the universal human condition but from conditions of privilege. Her books represents a powerful challenge to the notion that gender makes no difference in the construction of philosophical reasoning. At the same time, it criticizes the narrow focus of most feminist theorizing and calls for a more inclusive form of inquiry.

Introduction -- Being/becoming material -- Knowledge & class: coming to process -- Truth-telling, inquiry, and affirmative ethics -- Relational inquiry as radical cartography -- Higher education and the governance of things -- Refusal & resistance.

This collection of essays is the product of a conference on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (Apo) held at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2009. The essays address three main questions: (1) “How does the APo model of scientific knowledge, focused as it is on the construction of syllogisms, relate to the scientific accounts Aristotle presents elsewhere, especially in the biological treatises?’ (2) ‘How do the arguments and views presented in the APo relate to other aspects of (...) Aristotle’s philosophy?’ and (3) ‘How do the remarks in the concluding chapter of the APo concerning perception, memory, experience, and the grasp of the universal add up to an explanation of how we come to know first principles?’ The papers by J.G. Lennox, M. Leunissen and R. McKirahan address the first two questions, while those by M. Tuominen and G. Salmieri discuss the well-known passage in Apo II 19. (shrink)

In Meno 80d5-e5, we find two sets of objections concerning the possibility of inquiry in the absence of knowledge: the so-called Meno's paradox and the eristic arguments. This essay first shows that the eristic argument is not simply a restatement of Meno's paradox, but instead an objection of a completely different kind: Meno's paradox concerns not inquiry as such, but rather Socrates' inquiry into virtue as is pursued in the first part of the Meno, whereas the (...) eristic argument indicates a manner in which Meno's paradox can be generalized. This implies that they cannot be resolved by the same argument. It is then argued that the theory of recollection, as presented in Socrates' experiment with the slave, cannot resolve Meno's paradox, its target being only the eristic argument. Only the hypothetical method of inquiry is the effective answer to Meno's paradox. Finally, this essay contends that, contrary to what the text might suggest, Socrates, by introducing the hypothetical method, does not abandon his principle that knowing what something is precedes knowing what something is like. (shrink)

In this article, I propose to integrate indigenous knowledges in the Philosophy for/with Children theory and practice. I make the claim that it is possible to treat indigenous knowledges, not only as topics for philosophical dialogues with children but as presuppositions of the philosophical activity itself within the Community of Inquiry. Such integration is important for at least three (3) reasons: First, recognizing indigenous ways of thinking and seeing the world informs us of other non-dominant forms of knowledges, (...) methods to produce knowledge and criteria to determine knowledge. Second, the dominance of western standards of producing and determining knowledge, especially in non-western societies, needs to be reduced, balanced and informed by local knowledges and experiences. And third, indigenous knowledges reinforce a culturally responsive P4wC that responds to the challenges arising in multicultural and ethnically diverse classrooms. There are two (2) possible intersections where such integration may take place, namely: a) Epistemology, where I claim that the integration of a “presentational epistemology” immanent in indigenous patterns of thinking provides a counterweight to Lipman’s strong adherence to analytic-representational epistemology, and b) Pedagogy, which takes shape in an “indigenized” Community of Inquiry that highlights the values of interconnectedness, situatedness and relationality. (shrink)

Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus Gail Fine. sense that they consider the issues it raises; and they argue, against its conclusion, that inquiry is possible. Like Plato and Aristotle, they also explain what makes inquiry possible; and they do ...

This study takes inquiry as the starting point for epistemological theorising. It uses this idea to develop new and systematic answers to some of the most fundamental questions in epistemology, including about the nature of core epistemic phenomena as well as their value and the extent to which we possess them.

In the work of Charles H. Cooley, sympathy is a central subject matter of sociology and social psychology, a descriptive and explanatory method similar to “interpretive understanding,” and an evaluative method used for social critique and arguments for social reforms. The latter feature of the value-orienting qualitative method of sympathetic introspection is pertinent in light of discussions regarding the development of a critical qualitative methodology. The uniqueness of Cooley's method, when compared to value-neutral approaches in the interpretive tradition, is its (...) theoretically- and methodologically-grounded license for social scientific thinking to cultivate concern for the people it studies, with the following practical implication: arguments for social reforms rooted in a form of knowledge that embeds individuals in the social whole. Further, Cooley's notion of sympathy contributes to the theory of mind debate by theorizing both a philosophical-anthropological and sociological foundation for attributing mental states to others in order to participate in social action. (shrink)

“The inquiry into the foundations of knowledge is a systematic inquiry into the problem of truth. This problem constitutes one of the three main concerns of philosophical analysis, the others being the problem of beauty and the problem of goodness.” Thus Evangelos P. Papanoutsos, Greece’s leading contemporary philosopher, introduces this third book of his “Trilogy of the Mind.” The first two volumes covered aesthetics and ethics; this one is a major work in epistemology. Combining rigorous analysis with (...) thorough-going scholarship, displaying an intimate acquaintance with the physical and humanistic sciences, and drawing on a deep understanding of philosophical method and the history of philosophy, Professor Papanoutsos is held in high esteem by his European colleagues. This translation of his masterpiece will enhance his reputation and influence among readers of English. The themes of The Foundation of Knowledge range over the topics that have been continually challenging to the modern era of philosophers: being and consciousness, experience and reason, common sense and science, and the domains of knowledge, including the nature of philosophical knowledge. Special attention is paid to the analysis of theoretical consciousness, the problems of categorical thinking, the theory of judgment, mathematics and logic, and the limits of historical understanding. (shrink)

Contents: Matti SINTONEN: From the Science of Logic to the Logic of Science. I: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES. Zev BECHLER: Hintikka on Plenitude in Aristotle. Marja-Liisa KAKKURI-KNUUTTILA: What Can the Sciences of Man Learn from Aristotle? Martin KUSCH: Theories of Questions in German-Speaking Philosophy Around the Turn of the Century. Nils-Eric SAHLIN: 'HE IS NO GOOD FOR MY WORK': On the Philosophical Relations between Ramsey and Wittgenstein. II: FORMAL TOOLS: INDUCTION, OBSERVATION AND IDENTIFIABILITY. Theo A.F. KUIPERS: The Carnap-Hintikka Programme in Inductive Logic. (...) Isaac LEVI: Caution and Nonmonotonic Inference. Ilkka NIINILUOTO: Inductive Logic, Atomism, and Observational Error. Arto MUTANEN: Theory of Identifiability. III: QUESTIONS IN INQUIRY: THE INTERROGATIVE MODEL. Sylvain BROMBERGER: Natural Kinds and Questions. Scott A. KLEINER: The Structure of Inquiry in Developmental Biology. Andrzej WISNIEWSKI: Some Foundational Concepts of Erotetic Semantics. Jan WOLE??N??SKI: Science and Games. IV: GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE: EXPLANATION AND DISCOVERY. Matti SINTONEN: Explanation: The Fifth Decade. Erik WEBER: Scientific Explanation and the Interrogative Model of Inquiry. George GEBHARD: Scientific Discovery, Induction, and the Multi-Level Character of Scientific Inquiry. Mika KIIKERI: On the Logical Structure of Learning Models. V: JAAKKO HINTIKKA: REPLIES. VI: ABSTRACTS. (shrink)

Though fields such as art history, the history of philosophy, and intellectual history have been around for a long time, the author's interest is in the history of what scholars in all of these fields are doing in common. This book looks beyond the humanities to the practice of disciplined inquiry more generally, bringing together the history of the humanities and the sciences under the guise of a unified search for patterns.

Keith Hossack's thesis is that knowledge is a conceptually primitive and metaphysically fundamental relation between a mind and a fact. He argues that in terms of the simple relation of knowledge we can analyze central notions of epistemology, of semantics, of modality and a priori knowledge, of psychology, and of linguistics. He does so in a framework that includes a fairly rich faculty psychology and that stresses causation: knowledge can be caused by belief, but because (...) class='Hi'>knowledge is simple, it is not any kind of belief. He regards his enterprise as metaphysics, and he proceeds in a rather grand manner. The beginning of his Preface might remind one of the opening paragraphs of Leibniz's The Monadology.If knowledge is a simple relation between minds and facts, then we want to know a bit about facts. Hossack takes facts to consist in universals being instantiated among things. He favours a view of universals as respects in which things resemble each other, but his theory is at least officially silent about which universals exist, leaving that as a matter for scientific inquiry. But he takes metaphysics to be a science. Here he is being coy, and it is worth making out how. Hossack uses multigrade relations; these are relations of no fixed polyadicity that for any natural number n may be instantiated by n things. Vectors are bearers of such relations. The relation among working men of uniting to form a union is a multigrade relation, and the founders of the International Workers of the World are a vector bearing this relation. (shrink)

This book is an attempt to understand a significant part of the complex thought of Charles Sanders Peirce, especially in those areas which interested him most: scientific method and related philosophical questions. It is organized primarily from Peirce's own writings, taking chronological settings into account where appropriate, and pointing out the close connections of several major themes in Peirce's work which show the rich diversity of his thought and its systematic unity. Following an introductory sketch of Peirce the thinking and (...) writer is a study of the spirit and phases of scientific inquiry, and a consideration of its relevance to certain outstanding philosophical views which Peirce held. This double approach is necessary because his views on scientific method are interlaces with a profound and elaborate philosophy of the cosmos. Peirce's thought is unusually close-knit, and his difficulty as a writer lies in his inability to achieve a partial focus without bringing into view numerous connections and relations with the whole picture of reality. Peirce received some of the esteem he deserves when the publication of his Collected Papers began more than thirty-five years ago. Some reviewers and critics, however, have attempted to fit Peirce into their own molds in justification of a particular position; others have disinterestedly sought to present him in completely detached fashion. Here, the author has attempted to understand Peirce as Peirce intended himself to be understood, and has presented what he believes Perice's philosophy of scientific method to be. He singles out for praise Peirce's Greek insistence on the primacy of theoretical knowledge and his almost Teilhardian synthesis of evolutionary themes. Primarily philosophical, this volume analyzes Peirce's thought using a theory of knowledge and metaphysics rather than formal logic. (shrink)

In this book, T. L. Short corrects widespread misconceptions of Peirce's theory of signs and demonstrates its relevance to contemporary analytic philosophy of language, mind and science. Peirce's theory of mind, naturalistic but nonreductive, bears on debates of Fodor and Millikan, among others. His theory of inquiry avoids foundationalism and subjectivism, while his account of reference anticipated views of Kripke and Putnam. Peirce's realism falls between 'internal' and 'metaphysical' realism and is more satisfactory than either. His (...) pragmatism is not verificationism; rather, it identifies meaning with potential growth of knowledge. Short distinguishes Peirce's mature theory of signs from his better-known but paradoxical early theory. He develops the mature theory systematically on the basis of Peirce's phenomenological categories and concept of final causation. The latter is distinguished from recent and similar views, such as Brandon's, and is shown to be grounded in forms of explanation adopted in modern science. (shrink)

The ontological turn in the humanities and social sciences has prompted some scholars of education to shift their focus of inquiry away from questions of epistemology (i.e., knowledge) to metaphysical matters related to being and the nature of existence. In this paper, I turn to ontology and make an argument for integrating and explicitly teaching theories of immanence in teacher education courses. I argue that integrating and explicitly teaching theories of immanence in teacher education courses can radically reorient (...) students’ thinking, being, and doing, which can fundamentally change how they are able to see, perceive, and make sense of events that unfold in their classrooms. Using vignettes of two encounters at an Italian preschool, I think with theory (Jackson and Mazzei 2012; St. Pierre, 2008, Ringrose and Renolds 2014) to demonstrate how philosophies of immanence reorient thought and produce “a lively new ontology” in which “the world’s radical aliveness comes to light” (Barad 2007, p. 33). The theoretical concepts I use include political theorist Jane Bennett’s (2010) concept of thing power, along with physicist Karen Barad’s (2007) concepts of entanglement and intra-action. (shrink)

Paisley Livingston here addresses contemporary controversies over the role of "theory" within the humanistic disciplines. In the process, he suggests ways in which significant modern texts in the philosophy of science relate to the study of literature. Livingston first surveys prevalent views of theory, and then proposes an alternative: theory, an indispensable element in the study of literature, should be understood as a Cogently argued and informed in its judgments, this book points the way to a fuller (...) understanding of the special contribution that literary knowledge may make within the human sciences. (shrink)

Paisley Livingston here addresses contemporary controversies over the role of "theory" within the humanistic disciplines. In the process, he suggests ways in which significant modern texts in the philosophy of science relate to the study of literature. Livingston first surveys prevalent views of theory, and then proposes an alternative: theory, an indispensable element in the study of literature, should be understood as a Cogently argued and informed in its judgments, this book points the way to a fuller (...) understanding of the special contribution that literary knowledge may make within the human sciences. (shrink)

The first two chapters of this book describe an inquiry into whether the elements of human knowledge may be arranged in an order which is not determined by personal opinion and which is capable of being verified independently by different people. It concludes that this is possible and describes a theory which may serve the purpose. The third chapter is a commentary, intended to supply a background to the theory, to compare the authors present views with (...) those of other persons, and to suggest applications of the work to practical problems. (shrink)

This interesting and challenging book addresses the apparent gap between the empiricist account of the origin of ideas and the theory of knowledge in the Essay concerning Human Understanding. Matthew Priselac makes an impressive argument that they are complementary parts of a coherent program. It consists of a naturalistic interpretation on which the Essay's main aim is to provide the kind of understanding of the mind, knowledge, and probability afforded by modern methods of natural scientific inquiry.On (...) this view, the Essay advances a hypothesis intended to explain the epistemic phenomena of everyday life, that is, what we take ourselves to know rather than hold as probable. It describes a process by which the... (shrink)

A traditional line of inquiry in epistemology tried to analyze the concept of knowledge into its constituent components. In virtue of understanding these alleged more basic concepts, such as truth, justification, and belief, it was hoped that a complete and informative theory of knowledge would emerge. According to the revolutionary approach advocated here, one which originates in Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits, better success can be achieved by reversing this conceptual analysis structure by taking (...) knowledge as the fundamental explanatory tool in epistemological theorizing. I defend the view that this knowledge-theoretic approach exceeds the explanatory value of its conceptual analysis competitor in the sense that the best explanations of epistemologically significant phenomena are appropriately expressed in terms of knowledge per se. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Changing Theories of Undergraduate Theatre Studies, 1945–1980Anne Berkeley (bio)IntroductionThe history of theatre study in American undergraduate education is a story of prodigious quantitative success. Although it took two centuries to secure the right to perform plays at American colleges, it took only eighty years for the curriculum to grow from a few isolated courses at the turn of the twentieth century to well over 14,000 in the 1970s.1 By (...) far the steepest growth occurred during the unprecedented expansion of higher education between 1945 and 1979. But academic theatre's meteoric rise after the war years conceals more problematic qualitative achievements. Throughout its ascendancy, vexing questions persisted concerning the quality, standards, and evaluation of theatre programs. In academic journals and books, theorists explored with alacrity broad opportunities for educational theatre in the university. But they also bickered constantly about objectives and practices and their role in academe, ultimately providing a decidedly ambivalent assessment of accomplishment.According to Oscar G. Brockett, the fundamental questions are, What place, if any, should theatre have in a university? and, For what are students being educated?2 This study traces answers to these questions given by scholars and educators between 1945 and 1979.3 It explores the connections between the scholarship about theatre studies and the programs that developed, what scholars and educators wanted it to become, and what it became in the context of liberal arts education. These years are important because they are the golden age of higher education, a time of unprecedented expansion. Following World War II the G.I. Bill greatly increased student enrollment, and academic and research programs surged. At this time, the [End Page 57] university's governing interests were established by the politics of the Cold War, and the desire to surpass the Soviet Union at everything motivated the expansion of higher education.4 The National Defense Education Act of 1958 and the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 (legislation made possible by a prosperous economy) injected vast financial resources into program development, and federal programs such as the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) and the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) were established.An earlier study of theatre curriculum between, roughly, the Civil War and the Second World War provides a useful background against which to interpret the data for this later period.5 From the earlier study we learn that academic theatre suffered from religious hostility for two centuries but that by the end of the nineteenth century there were extracurricular dramatic clubs and productions. The emergence of the modern research university brought with it the expansion and diversification of knowledge, the differentiation of the colonial college's general curriculum into discrete disciplines, and the departmentalization of the curriculum. As principles and aims for liberal arts education, and the bachelor of arts degree, began to take shape, reconstruction of the curriculum included the introduction of departments of speech and literature, which included dramatic curricula.6 Academic theatre first began in classical and later modern language departments as a way of teaching literature in another language; later speech and English departments added courses in oral interpretation and playwriting.After George Pierce Baker opened the theatre department at Yale in 1925, theatre became an autonomous field of study in increasing numbers of universities. During this early period several developments took place: curriculum for theatrical studies developed out of extra-curricular theatre, theatre was identified and justified as a humanistic study, the seeds were planted for the university's eventual role in nonprofit and professional regional theatres, and the study of theatre as a legitimate academic discipline was developed. During this period, too, most theorists argued that theatre was one of the liberal arts and should be taught as part of the humanities. Late in the period there developed a small but increasingly vocal group of scholars and teachers who began to argue that theatre departments should teach technical skills of theatrical performance as well as humanistic inquiry. Thus was born the so-called craft or culture dichotomy: should educational theatre emphasize the crafts of performance or the humanism that prevailed in general (unspecialized) liberal study?The Forties and Fifties: The Curriculum Diversifies... (shrink)

Why engage in inquiry? According to many philosophers, the goal of inquiring into some question is to come to know its answer. While this view holds considerable appeal, this paper argues that it stands in tension with another highly attractive thesis: knowledge does not require absolute certainty. Forced to choose between these two theses, I argue that we should reject the idea that inquiry aims at knowledge. I go on to develop an alternative view, according to (...) which inquiry aims at maximizing the epistemic value of our credences. This alternative view makes room for knowledge that falls shy of certainty, and it coheres nicely with a rich body of work in epistemic decision theory. I proceed to highlight the implications of this replacement for some important topics in epistemology, including the dogmatism paradox, the nature of interrogative attitudes, and the norm of practical reasoning. (shrink)