Results for 'Intentions'

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  1. The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.
    Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of...
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  2. Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
    This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.
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  3. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
    What happens to our conception of mind and rational agency when we take seriously future-directed intentions and plans and their roles as inputs into further practical reasoning? The author's initial efforts in responding to this question resulted in a series of papers that he wrote during the early 1980s. In this book, Bratman develops further some of the main themes of these essays and also explores a variety of related ideas and issues. He develops a planning theory of intention. (...)
  4. Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action.Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):119-145.
    Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; (...)
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  5. Intentional Systems.Daniel C. Dennett - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.
  6. Intention as a Model for Belief.Richard Holton - 2014 - In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press.
    This paper argues that a popular account of intentions can be extended to beliefs. Beliefs are stable all-out states that allow for planning and coordination in a way that is tractable for cognitively limited creatures like human beings. Scepticism is expressed that there is really anything like credences as standardly understood.
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  7. Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
    In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipulation or by the addition of further, problematic conditions. We contend that the cooperative aspect of collective intentions is (...)
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  8. Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language.J. Knobe - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):190-194.
    There has been a long-standing dispute in the philosophical literature about the conditions under which a behavior counts as 'intentional.' Much of the debate turns on questions about the use of certain words and phrases in ordinary language. The present paper investigates these questions empirically, using experimental techniques to investigate people's use of the relevant words and phrases. g.
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  9. Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding?Fred Adams & Annie Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):173–181.
    Among philosophers, there are at least two prevalent views about the core concept of intentional action. View I (Adams 1986, 1997; McCann 1986) holds that an agent S intentionally does an action A only if S intends to do A. View II (Bratman 1987; Harman 1976; and Mele 1992) holds that there are cases where S intentionally does A without intending to do A, as long as doing A is foreseen and S is willing to accept A as a consequence (...)
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  10. Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation.Joshua Knobe - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.
    Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not _evaluative _considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis (...)
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  11. Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The 'Panglossian Paradigm' Defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.
    Ethologists and others studying animal behavior in a spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable data - is sketched. The (...)
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  12.  49
    Action, Intention, and Reason.Robert Audi - 2019 - Cornell University Press.
    For the first time, Robert Audi presents in Action, Intention, and Reason a full version of his theory of the nature, explanation, freedom, and rationality of human action. Ove the years Audi has set out in journal articles different aspects of a unified theory of action. This volume offers the unity of a single, seamless book with thirteen self-contained chapters, two of them previously unpublished, and a new overview of action theory and the book's contribution to it. The book is (...)
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  13. Collective Intentions and Actions.John Searle - 1990 - In Philip R. Cohen Jerry Morgan & Martha Pollack (eds.), Intentions in Communication. MIT Press. pp. 401-415.
  14. Motor Intentions: How Intentions and Motor Representations Come Together.Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):231-256.
    What are the most detailed descriptions under which subjects intend to perform bodily actions? According to Pacherie, these descriptions may be found by looking into motor representations—action representations in the brain that determine the movements to be performed. Specifically, for any motor representation guiding an action, its subject has an M-intention representing that action in as much detail. I show that some M-intentions breach the constraints that intentions should meet. I then identify a set of intentions—motor (...)—that represent actions in as much detail as some motor representations while meeting the constraints that intentions should meet. (shrink)
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  15. Shared Intention and Personal Intentions.Margaret Gilbert - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (1):167 - 187.
    This article explores the question: what is it for two or more people to intend to do something in the future? In a technical phrase, what is it for people to share an intention ? Extending and refining earlier work of the author’s, it argues for three criteria of adequacy for an account of shared intention (the disjunction, concurrence, and obligation criteria) and offers an account that satisfies them. According to this account, in technical terms explained in the paper, people (...)
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  16. Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will.Alfred R. Mele - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Each of the following claims has been defended in the scientific literature on free will and consciousness: your brain routinely decides what you will do before you become conscious of its decision; there is only a 100 millisecond window of opportunity for free will, and all it can do is veto conscious decisions, intentions, or urges; intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions; and free will is an illusion. In Effective Intentions Alfred Mele shows that (...)
  17. Intentions and Motor Representations: The Interface Challenge.Myrto Mylopoulos & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):317-336.
    A full account of purposive action must appeal not only to propositional attitude states like beliefs, desires, and intentions, but also to motor representations, i.e., non-propositional states that are thought to represent, among other things, action outcomes as well as detailed kinematic features of bodily movements. This raises the puzzle of how it is that these two distinct types of state successfully coordinate. We examine this so-called “Interface Problem”. First, we clarify and expand on the nature and role of (...)
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  18. Intentional Action: Conscious Experience and Neural Prediction.Patrick Haggard & Sam Clark - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.
    Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that ''I'' am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its internally (...)
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  19.  46
    Intentions and Intentionality: Foundations of Social Cognition.Bertram F. Malle, Louis J. Moses & Dare A. Baldwin (eds.) - 2001 - MIT Press.
    Highlights the roles of intention and intentionality in social cognition.
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  20. Intentional Joint Agency: Shared Intention Lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of (...)
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  21.  5
    Intention is Choice with Commitment.Philip R. Cohen & Hector J. Levesque - 1990 - Artificial Intelligence 42 (2-3):213-261.
    This paper explores principles governing the rational balance among an agent's beliefs, goals, actions, and intentions. Such principles provide specifications for artificial agents, and approximate a theory of human action (as philosophers use the term). By making explicit the conditions under which an agent can drop his goals, i.e., by specifying how the agent is committed to his goals, the formalism captures a number of important properties of intention. Specifically, the formalism provides analyses for Bratman's three characteristic functional roles (...)
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  22. Intention, Expectation, and Promissory Obligation.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2016 - Ethics 127 (1):88-115.
    Accepting a promise is normatively significant in that it helps to secure promissory obligation. But what is it for B to accept A’s promise to φ? It is in part for B to intend A’s φ-ing. Thinking of acceptance in this way allows us to appeal to the distinctive role of intentions in practical reasoning and action to better understand the agency exercised by the promisee. The proposal also accounts for rational constraints on acceptance, and the so-called directedness of (...)
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  23. Acting Intentionally and the Side-Effect Effect: 'Theory of Mind' and Moral Judgment.Joshua Knobe, Adam Cohen & Alan Leslie - 2006 - Psychological Science 17:421-427.
    The concept of acting intentionally is an important nexus where ‘theory of mind’ and moral judgment meet. Preschool children’s judgments of intentional action show a valence-driven asymmetry. Children say that a foreseen but disavowed side-effect is brought about 'on purpose' when the side-effect itself is morally bad but not when it is morally good. This is the first demonstration in preschoolers that moral judgment influences judgments of ‘on-purpose’ (as opposed to purpose influencing moral judgment). Judgments of intentional action are usually (...)
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  24. Intention and Uncertainty.H. P. Grice - 1971 - Proceedings of the British Academy 57:263-279.
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  25. Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
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  26. The Intention/Volition Debate.Frederick Adams & Alfred R. Mele - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):323-337.
    People intend to do things, try to do things, and do things. Do they also will to do things? More precisely, if people will to do things and their willing bears upon what they do, is willing, or volition, something distinct from intending and trying? This question is central to the intention/volition debate, a debate about the ingredients of the best theory of the nature and explanation of human action. A variety of competing conceptions of volition, intention, and trying have (...)
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  27. Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.
    Philosophical orthodoxy identifies weakness of will with akrasia: the weak willed person is someone who intentionally acts against their better judgement. It is argued that this is a mistake. Weakness of will consists in a quite different failing, namely an over-ready revision of one's intentions. Building on the work of Bratman, an account of such over-ready revision is given. A number of examples are then adduced showing how weakness of will, so understood, differs from akrasia.
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  28. Intentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies.Hugh J. McCann - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.
    Recent empirical work calls into question the so-called Simple View that an agent who A’s intentionally intends to A. In experimental studies, ordinary speakers frequently assent to claims that, in certain cases, agents who knowingly behave wrongly intentionally bring about the harm they do; yet the speakers tend to deny that it was the intention of those agents to cause the harm. This paper reports two additional studies that at first appear to support the original ones, but argues that in (...)
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  29. Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.
    How come we can represent Bigfoot even though Bigfoot does not exist, given that representing something involves bearing a relation to it and we cannot bear relations to what does not exist? This is the problem of intentional inexistence. This paper develops a two-step solution to this problem, involving an adverbial account of conscious representation, or phenomenal intentionality, and the thesis that all representation derives from conscious representation. The solution is correspondingly two-part: we can consciously represent Bigfoot because consciously representing (...)
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  30. Intentions: The Dynamic Hierarchical Model Revisited.Elisabeth Pacherie & Myrto Mylopoulos - 2019 - WIREs Cognitive Science 10 (2):e1481.
    Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the (...)
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  31. The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
    Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the (...)
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  32.  95
    Intentional Binding and the Sense of Agency: A Review.James W. Moore & Sukhvinder S. Obhi - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):546-561.
    It is nearly 10 years since Patrick Haggard and colleagues first reported the ‘intentional binding’ effect . The intentional binding effect refers to the subjective compression of the temporal interval between a voluntary action and its external sensory consequence. Since the first report, considerable interest has been generated and a fascinating array of studies has accumulated. Much of the interest in intentional binding comes from the promise to shed light on human agency. In this review we survey studies on intentional (...)
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  33. Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism.Philip Clark - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327.
    Cognitivists about intention hold that intending to do something entails believing you will do it. Non-cognitivists hold that intentions are conative states with no cognitive component. I argue that both of these claims are true. Intending entails the presence of a belief, even though the intention is not even partly the belief. The result is a form of what Sarah Paul calls Non-Inferential Weak Cognitivism, a view that, as she notes, has no prominent defenders.
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  34. Intentional Omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.
    It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
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  35. Conditional Intentions.Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):700 - 741.
    In this paper, I will discuss the various ways in which intentions can be said to be conditional, with particular attention to the internal conditions on the intentions’ content. I will first consider what it takes to carry out a conditional intention. I will then discuss how the distinctive norms of intention apply to conditional intentions and whether conditional intentions are a weaker sort of commitments than the unconditional ones. This discussion will lead to the idea (...)
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  36. Collective Intentional Behavior From the Standpoint of Semantics.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
    This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with (...)
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  37. Intentional Action First.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.
    The paper motivates a novel research programme in the philosophy of action parallel to the ‘Knowledge First’ programme in epistemology. It is argued that much of the grounds for abandoning the quest for a reductive analysis of knowledge in favour of the Knowledge First alternative is mirrored in the case of intentional action, inviting the hypothesis that intentional action is also, like knowledge, metaphysically basic. The paper goes on to demonstrate the sort of explanatory contribution that intentional action can make (...)
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  38. Intentional Action and Moral Considerations: Still Pragmatic.F. Adams & A. Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):268-276.
  39. Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition.Patrick Haggard - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):290-295.
  40. Intention as Action Under Development: Why Intention is Not a Mental State.Devlin Russell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):742-761.
    This paper constructs a theory according to which an intention is not a mental state but an action at a certain developmental stage. I model intention on organic life, and thus intention stands to action as tadpole stands to frog. I then argue for this theory by showing how it overcomes three problems: intending while merely preparing, not taking any steps, and the action is impossible. The problems vanish when we see that not all actions are mature. Just as some (...)
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  41.  56
    Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
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  42. We-Intentions Revisited.Raimo Tuomela - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
    This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the author’s earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted (...)
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  43. Believing Intentionally.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2673-2694.
    According to William Alston, we lack voluntary control over our propositional attitudes because we cannot believe intentionally, and we cannot believe intentionally because our will is not causally connected to belief formation. Against Alston, I argue that we can believe intentionally because our will is causally connected to belief formation. My defense of this claim is based on examples in which agents have reasons for and against believing p, deliberate on what attitude to take towards p, and subsequently acquire an (...)
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  44. Shared Intentions, Public Reason, and Political Autonomy.Blain Neufeld - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):776-804.
    John Rawls claims that public reasoning is the reasoning of ‘equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’. Drawing on an amended version of Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intentions, I flesh out this claim by developing the ‘civic people’ account of public reason. Citizens realize ‘full’ political autonomy as members of a civic people. Full political autonomy, though, cannot be realised by citizens in societies governed by a ‘constrained (...)
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  45. The Intentional Structure of Moods.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19:1-19.
    Moods are sometimes claimed to constitute an exception to the rule that mental phenomena are intentional (in the sense of representing something). In reaction, some philosophers have argued that moods are in fact intentional, but exhibit a special and unusual kind of intentionality: they represent the world as a whole, or everything indiscriminately, rather than some more specific object(s). In this paper, I present a problem for extant versions of this idea, then propose a revision that solves the problem but (...)
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  46.  14
    Intentional Action in Ordinary Language: Core Concept or Pragmatic Understanding?F. Adams & A. Steadman - 2004 - Analysis 64 (2):173-181.
  47. Intentional Action Without Knowledge.Romy Vekony, Alfred Mele & David Rose - 2020 - Synthese 197:1-13.
    In order to be doing something intentionally, must one know that one is doing it? Some philosophers have answered yes. Our aim is to test a version of this knowledge thesis, what we call the Knowledge/Awareness Thesis, or KAT. KAT states that an agent is doing something intentionally only if he knows that he is doing it or is aware that he is doing it. Here, using vignettes featuring skilled action and vignettes featuring habitual action, we provide evidence that, in (...)
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  48. Intentional Action.Alfred R. Mele & Paul K. Moser - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):39-68.
    We shall formulate an analysis of the ordinary notion of intentional action that clarifies a commonsense distinction between intentional and nonintentional action. Our analysis will build on some typically neglected considerations about relations between lucky action and intentional action. It will highlight the often- overlooked role of evidential considerations in intentional action, thus identifying the key role of certain epistemological considerations in action theory. We shall also explain why some vagueness is indispensable in a characterization of intentional action as ordinarily (...)
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  49. Vindicating Intentional Realism: A Review of Jerry Fodor's "Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind". [REVIEW]Frances Egan - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59-61.
     
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  50. Intention and Convention in Speech Acts.Peter F. Strawson - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (4):439-460.
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