Results for 'Invariantism'

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  1. John MacFarlane.Local Invariantism, Dyadic Relation & Fancy Intensions - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge.
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  2. Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):3-26.
    According to Interest-Relative Invariantism, whether an agent knows that p, or possesses other sorts of epistemic properties or relations, is in part determined by the practical costs of being wrong about p. Recent studies in experimental philosophy have tested the claims of IRI. After critically discussing prior studies, we present the results of our own experiments that provide strong support for IRI. We discuss our results in light of complementary findings by other theorists, and address the challenge posed by (...)
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  3. Epistemic Invariantism and Speech Act Contextualism.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):77-95.
    In this essay I show how to reconcile epistemic invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion. My basic proposal is that we can comfortably combine invariantism with the knowledge account of assertion by endorsing contextualism about speech acts. My demonstration takes place against the backdrop of recent contextualist attempts to usurp the knowledge account of assertion, most notably Keith DeRose's influential argument that the knowledge account of assertion spells doom for invariantism and enables contextualism's ascendancy.
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  4. Epistemic Invariantism and Contextualist Intuitions.Alexander Dinges - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):219-232.
    Epistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which (...)
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  5. Skeptical Pragmatic Invariantism: Good, but Not Good Enough.Alexander Dinges - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2577-2593.
    In this paper, I will discuss what I will call “skeptical pragmatic invariantism” as a potential response to the intuitions we have about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. SPI, very roughly, is a form of epistemic invariantism that says the following: The subject in the bank cases doesn’t know that the bank will be open. The knowledge ascription in the low standards case seems appropriate nevertheless because it has a true implicature. The goal of this paper (...)
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  6. The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Keith Derose - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346–350.
    Thomas Blackson does not question that my argument in section 2 of “Assertion, Knowledge and Context” establishes the conclusion that the standards that comprise a truth-condition for “I know that P” vary with context, but does claim that this does not suffice to validly demonstrate the truth of contextualism, because this variance in standards can be handled by what we will here call Subject-Sensitive Invariantism (SSI), and so does not demand a contextualist treatment. According to SSI, the varying standards (...)
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  7. In Defense of Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Brian Kim - 2016 - Episteme 13 (2):233-251.
    Keith DeRose has argued that the two main problems facing subject-sensitive invariantism come from the appropriateness of certain third-person denials of knowledge and the inappropriateness of now you know it, now you don't claims. I argue that proponents of SSI can adequately address both problems. First, I argue that the debate between contextualism and SSI has failed to account for an important pragmatic feature of third-person denials of knowledge. Appealing to these pragmatic features, I show that straightforward third-person denials (...)
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  8. A Defense of Causal Invariantism.Martin Montminy & Andrew Russo - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):49-75.
    Causal contextualism holds that sentences of the form ‘c causes e’ have context-sensitive truth-conditions. We consider four arguments invoked by Jonathan Schaffer in favor of this view. First, he argues that his brand of contextualism helps solve puzzles about transitivity. Second, he contends that how one describes the relata of the causal relation sometimes affects the truth of one’s claim. Third, Schaffer invokes the phenomenon of contrastive focus to conclude that causal statements implicitly designate salient alternatives to the cause and (...)
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  9.  96
    An Invariantist Theory of 'Might' Might Be Right.David Braun - 2012 - Linguistics and Philosophy 35 (6):461-489.
    Invariantism about ‘might’ says that ‘might’ semantically expresses the same modal property in every context. This paper presents and defends a version of invariantism. According to it, ‘might’ semantically expresses the same weak modal property in every context. However, speakers who utter sentences containing ‘might’ typically assert propositions concerning stronger types of modality, including epistemic modality. This theory can explain the phenomena that motivate contextualist theories of epistemic uses of ‘might’, and can be defended from objections of the (...)
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  10. Knowledge Laundering: Testimony and Sensitive Invariantism.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Analysis 65 (2):132–138.
    According to “sensitive invariantism,” the word “know” expresses the same relation in every context of use, but what it takes to stand in this relation to a proposition can vary with the subject’s circumstances. Sensitive invariantism looks like an attractive reconciliation of invariantism and contextualism. However, it is incompatible with a widely-held view about the way knowledge is transmitted through testimony. If both views were true, someone whose evidence for p fell short of what was required for (...)
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  11. What Panpsychists Should Reject: On the Incompatibility of Panpsychism and Organizational Invariantism.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1833-1846.
    Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed, the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the (...)
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  12.  51
    Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge.Masashi Kasaki - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):83-98.
    Jennifer Lackey challenges the sufficiency version of the knowledge-action principle, viz., that knowledge that p is sufficient to rationally act on p, by proposing a set of alleged counterexamples. Her aim is not only to attack the knowledge-action principle, but also to undermine an argument for subject-sensitive invariantism. Lackey holds that her examples are counterexamples to the sufficiency version of the knowledge-action principle because (a) S knows the proposition in question, but (b) it is not rational for S to (...)
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  13. Knowledge Across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Peter Baumann - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (2):363-380.
    The possibility of knowledge attributions across contexts (where attributor and subject find themselves in different epistemic contexts) can create serious problems for certain views of knowledge. Amongst such views is subject—sensitive invariantism—the view that knowledge is determined not only by epistemic factors (belief, truth, evidence, etc.) but also by non—epistemic factors (practical interests, etc.). I argue that subject—sensitive invariantism either runs into a contradiction or has to make very implausible assumptions. The problem has been very much neglected but (...)
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  14.  71
    Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, High-Stakes/Low-Stakes Cases, and Presupposition Suspension.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):249-254.
    It is a familiar criticism of Subject-Sensitive Invariantism that the view makes incorrect predictions about cases in which the attributor of knowledge is in a high-stakes situation and the subject of the attribution in a low-stakes situation. In a recent paper in this journal, Brian Kim has argued that the mentioned type of case should be ignored, since the relevant knowledge ascriptions are inappropriate in virtue of violating an epistemic norm of presupposing. I show, pace Kim, that the mentioned (...)
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  15.  30
    The Semantics of Knowledge Attributions: A Defence of Moderate Invariantism.Leonid Tarasov - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Manchester
    This work has four aims: (i) to provide an overview of the current debate about the semantics of knowledge attributions, i.e. sentences of the form ⌜S knows that Φ⌝; (ii) to ground the debate in a single semantic-pragmatic framework; (iii) to identify a methodology for describing the semantics of knowledge attributions; (iv) to go some way towards describing the semantics of knowledge attributions in light of this methodology, and in particular to defend moderate invariantist semantics against its main current rivals. (...)
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  16.  59
    Invariantist ‘Might’ and Modal Meaning Change: A Reply to Braun.Igor Yanovich - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (2):175-180.
    Invariantism proposed by Braun (Linguistics and Philosophy 35(6):461–489, 2012) aims to maintain full identity of semantic content between all uses of ‘might’. I invoke well-known facts regarding diachronic change in meanings of modals to argue that invariantism commits us to implausible duplication of familiar processes of lexical semantic change on the level of “lexical pragmatics”, with no obvious payoff.
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  17.  77
    “Above the Slough of Despond”: Weylean Invariantism and Quantum Physics.Iulian D. Toader - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 61:18-24.
    This paper discusses Weylean invariantism, the view that scientific objectivity requires categoricity, and shows that it may correctly be attributed to Weyl, who took this condition to express a type of theoretical completeness. The condition appears to be satisfied by quantum mechanics, for the Stone-von Neumann theorem can be naturally interpreted as a categoricity result. However, quantum field theory invalidates the theorem due to unitary inequivalence, so either Weylean invariantism is false and should be rejected, or categoricity can (...)
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  18.  57
    Invariantism About 'Can' and 'May' (as Well as 'Might').David Braun - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (2):181-185.
    Braun (Linguistics & Philosophy 35, 461–489, 2012) argued for a non- relativist, invariantist theory of ‘might’. Yanovich (Linguistics & Philosophy, 2013) argues that Braun’s theory is inconsistent with certain facts concerning diachronic meaning changes in ‘might’, ‘can’, and ‘may’. This paper replies to Yanovich’s objection.
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  19.  53
    Assertion, Stakes and Expected Blameworthiness: An Insensitive Invariantist Solution to the Bank Cases.Brandon Yip - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists often cite the knowledge norm of assertion as part of their argument. They claim that the knowledge norms in conjunction with our intuitions about when a subject is properly asserting in low or high stakes contexts provides strong evidence that what counts as knowledge depends on practical factors. In this paper, I present new data to suggest they are mistaken in the way they think about cases involving high and low stakes and I show how (...)
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  20.  67
    Contextualism, Skepticism, and Invariantism.Stephen Jacobson - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (3):375-391.
    Michael Williams e Keith DeRose defendem suas diferentes versões de contextualismo com base em que o contextualismo fornece uma explicação melhor do uso ordinário de termos epistêmicos que competidores invariantistas. Um objetivo deste trabalho é explicar por que seus argumentos não têm sucesso. Um objetivo adicional é mostrar que a disputa entre contextualistas e invariantistas tal como apresentada por Williams e DeRose é uma interpretação limitada da disputa: há importantes posições contextualistas e invariantistas que estão fora do alcance de seus (...)
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  21. Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and Knowledge of Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
    §I schematises the evidence for an understanding of ‘know’ and other terms of epistemic appraisal that embodies contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. §II argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity fully, since both attribute metalinguistic errors to speakers. §III provides an equally charitable anti-sceptical insensitive invariantist explanation of much of the same evidence as the (...)
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  22. The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism, and the New Invariantism.Keith DeRose - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):172–198.
    I present the features of the ordinary use of 'knows' that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and I outline and defend the methodology that takes us from the data to a contextualist conclusion. Along the way, the superiority of contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism is defended, and, in the final section, I answer some objections to contextualism.
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  23. Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315-331.
    Jason Stanley has argued recently that Epistemic Contextualism and Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism are explanatorily on a par with regard to certain data arising from modal and temporal embeddings of ‘knowledge’‐ascriptions. This paper argues against Stanley that EC has a clear advantage over SSI in the discussed field and introduces a new type of linguistic datum strongly suggesting the falsity of SSI.
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  24.  29
    Strict Moderate Invariantism and Knowledge-Denials.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2029-2044.
    Strict moderate invariantism is the ho-hum, ‘obvious’ view about knowledge attributions. It says knowledge attributions are often true and that only traditional epistemic factors like belief, truth, and justification make them true. As commonsensical as strict moderate invariantism is, it is equally natural to withdraw a knowledge attribution when error possibilities are made salient. If strict moderate invariantism is true, these knowledge-denials are often false because the subject does in fact know the proposition. I argue that strict (...)
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  25. Defending Interest-Relative Invariantism.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):591-609.
    I defend interest-relative invariantism from a number of recent attacks. One common thread to my response is that interest-relative invariantism is a muchweaker thesis than is often acknowledged, and a number of the attacks only challenge very specific, and I think implausible, versions of it. Another is that a number of the attacks fail to acknowledge how many things we have independent reason to believe knowledge is sensitive to. Whether there is a defeater for someone's knowledge can be (...)
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  26. Interest-Relative Invariantism[REVIEW]Stephen Schiffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):188 - 195.
    In his important book Knowledge and Practical Interests, Jason Stanley advances a proposal about knowledge and the semantics of knowledge ascriptions which he calls interest-relative invariantism. A theory of knowledge ascriptions of the form ‘A knows that S’ is invariantist.
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  27.  36
    Abstract Concepts, Compositionality, and the Contextualism-Invariantism Debate.Guido Löhr - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):689-710.
    Invariantists argue that the notion of concept in psychology should be reserved for knowledge that is retrieved in a context-insensitive manner. Contextualists argue that concepts are to be understood in terms of context-sensitive ad hoc constructions. I review the central empirical evidence for and against both views and show that their conclusions are based on a common mischaracterization of both theories. When the difference between contextualism and invariantism is properly understood, it becomes apparent that the way the question of (...)
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  28. Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism.Christos Kyriacou - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:27-44.
    I present an argument for a sophisticated version of sceptical invariantism that has so far gone unnoticed: Bifurcated Sceptical Invariantism (BSI). I argue that it can, on the one hand, (dis)solve the Gettier problem, address the dogmatism paradox and, on the other hand, show some due respect to the Moorean methodological incentive of ‘saving epistemic appearances’. A fortiori, BSI promises to reap some other important explanatory fruit that I go on to adduce (e.g. account for concessive knowledge attributions). (...)
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  29. Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism&Quest.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):263-285.
    Contextualists support their view by appeal to cases which show that whether an attribution of knowledge seems correct depends on attributor factors. Contextualists conclude that the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. Invariantists respond that these cases show only that the warranted assertability-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. I examine DeRose's recent argument against the possibility of such an invariantist response, an argument which appeals to the knowledge account of assertion and the context-sensitivity of (...)
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  30. A Comedy of Errors or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Sensibility‐Invariantism About ‘Funny’.Ryan Doerfler - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):493-522.
    In this article, I argue that sensibility‐invariantism about ‘funny’ is defensible, not just as a descriptive hypothesis, but, as a normative position as well. What I aim to do is to make the realist commitments of the sensibility‐invariantist out to be much more tenable than one might initially think them to be. I do so by addressing the two major sources of discontent with sensibility‐invariantism: the observation that discourse about comedy exhibits significant divergence in judgment, and the fact (...)
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  31.  82
    Contextualism, Invariantism and Semantic Blindness.Martin Montminy - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):639-657.
    Epistemic contextualism, many critics argue, entails that ordinary speakers are blind to the fact that knowledge claims have context-sensitive truth conditions. This attribution of blindness, critics add, seriously undermines contextualism. I show that this criticism and, in general, discussions about the error theory entailed by contextualism, greatly underestimates the complexity and diversity of the data about ordinary speakers? inter-contextual judgments, as well as the range of explanatory moves that are open to both invariantists and contextualists concerning such judgments. Contextualism does (...)
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  32. Animal Cognition, Species Invariantism, and Mathematical Realism.Helen De Cruz - 2019 - In Andrew Aberdein & Matthew Inglis (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 39-61.
    What can we infer from numerical cognition about mathematical realism? In this paper, I will consider one aspect of numerical cognition that has received little attention in the literature: the remarkable similarities of numerical cognitive capacities across many animal species. This Invariantism in Numerical Cognition (INC) indicates that mathematics and morality are disanalogous in an important respect: proto-moral beliefs differ substantially between animal species, whereas proto-mathematical beliefs (at least in the animals studied) seem to show more similarities. This makes (...)
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  33.  84
    Classic Invariantism, Relevance and Warranted Assertability Manœvres.Tim Black - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):328–336.
    Jessica Brown effectively contends that Keith DeRose’s latest argument for contextualism fails to rule out contextualism’s chief rival, namely, classic invariantism. Still, even if her position has not been ruled out, the classic invariantist must offer considerations in favor of her position if she is to convince us that it is superior to contextualism. Brown defends classic invariantism with a warranted assertability maneuver that utilizes a linguistic pragmatic principle of relevance. I argue, however, that this maneuver is not (...)
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  34.  20
    Linguistic Intuitions in Context: A Defense of Nonskeptical Pure Invariantism.John Turri - 2014 - In Anthony Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 165-184.
    Epistemic invariantism is the view that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions don’t vary across contexts. Epistemic purism is the view that purely practical factors can’t directly affect the strength of your epistemic position. The combination of purism and invariantism, pure invariantism, is the received view in contemporary epistemology. It has lately been criticized by contextualists, who deny invariantism, and impurists, who deny purism. A central charge against pure invariantism is that it poorly accommodates linguistic (...)
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  35.  30
    Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870.
    I introduce and defend a view about knowledge that I call Moderate Skeptical Invariantism. According to this view, a subject knows p only if she is practically certain that p, where practical certainty is defined as the confidence a rational subject would have to have for her to believe that p and act on p no matter the stakes. I do not provide a definitive case for this view, but I argue that it has several explanatory advantages over alternative (...)
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  36. Defending a Sensitive Neo-Moorean Invariantism.Tim Black - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 8--27.
    I defend a sensitive neo-Moorean invariantism, an epistemological account with the following characteristic features: (a) it reserves a place for a sensitivity condition on knowledge, according to which, very roughly, S’s belief that p counts as knowledge only if S wouldn’t believe that p if p were false; (b) it maintains that the standards for knowledge are comparatively low; and (c) it maintains that the standards for knowledge are invariant (i.e., that they vary neither with the linguistic context of (...)
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  37.  4
    The Problem with Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.Keith Derose - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):346-350.
    Thomas Blackson does not question that my argument in section 2 of “Assertion, Knowledge and Context” establishes the conclusion that the standards that comprise a truth-condition for “I know that P” vary with context, but does claim that this does not suffice to validly demonstrate the truth of contextualism, because this variance in standards can be handled by what we will here call Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and so does not demand a contextualist treatment. According to SSI, the varying standards that (...)
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  38. Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.Christoph9 Kelp - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-244.
    This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regardedas the most promising classical invariantist solution to the (...)
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  39. Comparing Contextualism and Invariantism on the Correctness of Contextualist Intuitions.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):71-100.
    Contextualism is motivated by cases in which the intuitive correctness of a range of phenomena, including knowledge attributions, assertions and reasoning, depends on the attributor's context. Contextualists offer a charitable understanding of these intuitions, interpreting them as reflecting the truth value of the knowledge attributions and the appropriateness of the relevant assertions and reasoning. Here, I investigate a range of different invariantist accounts and examine the extent to which they too can offer a charitable account of the contextualist data.
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  40. Subject Sensitive Invariantism: In Memoriam.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):318–325.
    Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I argue, furthermore, that semantic contextualism and contrastivism can accept this plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I conclude that semantic contextualism and contrastivism are in a dialectical position (...)
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  41.  93
    Contextualism, Hawthorne's Invariantism and Third-Person Cases.Anthony Brueckner - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):315–318.
    Keith DeRose discusses 'third-person cases', which appear to raise problems for John Hawthorne's invariantist approach to knowledge-attributions. I argue that there is a prima facie problem for invariantism stemming from third-person cases that is even worse than DeRose's. Then I show that in the end, contrary to appearances, third-person cases do not threaten invariantism.
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  42. Contextualism and Interest-Relative Invariantism.E. I. Coffman - 2012 - In Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Continuum. pp. 199.
    Classical Invariantism (CI): The truth-value of a given knowledge-ascribing (-denying) sentence is (a) invariant across conversational contexts and (b) independent of how important it is to the subject (S) that the relevant proposition (P) be true.
     
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  43.  61
    The Pitfalls of Interest-Relative Invariantism.David Coss - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):253-261.
    In this paper, I present and extend Neta’s : 180–187 2007) counter-example against interest-relative invariantism. I first outline IRI, briefly explaining the content of the view and illustrating how it diverges from more classical approaches to epistemology. I then distinguish between two forms the view can take: a strong and a moderate formulation. After this, I argue that Neta’s counter-example only succeeds at undermining the strongest variant, leaving the weaker counterpart unscathed. After all of this is accomplished, I extend (...)
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  44. Moral Responsibility Invariantism.Brandon Warmke - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):179-200.
    Moral responsibility invariantism is the view that there is a single set of conditions for being morally responsible for an action (or omission or consequence of an act or omission) that applies in all cases. I defend this view against some recent arguments by Joshua Knobe and John Doris.
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  45.  52
    The Sound of the Concerto. Against the Invariantist Approach to Musical Ontology.Stefano Predelli - 2006 - British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2):144-162.
    According to a popular approach to the ontology of music, the identity conditions for a musical work include the specification of properties of sound, which constrain the class of its correct performances. This essay argues that the resulting invariantist view of the work–performance relation is inadequate and defends a contextualist alternative.
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  46.  24
    Interest-Relative Invariantism and Indifference Problems.David Coss - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (2):227-240.
    Interest-relative invariantism is the view that practical interests encroach upon knowledge. In other words, the more that is at stake for S, the harder it is for her true belief to be an instance of knowledge. Russell and Doris argue that IRI theorists are committed to indifference being knowledge-making feature of IRI, where knowledge comes easier for subjects the less they care. In this paper, I explain why indifference cases are problematic and which assumptions about IRI generate them. I (...)
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  47.  70
    Pragmatic Invariantism and External World Skepticism.Eric Thompson - 2010 - Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (1):35-42.
    Simply stated, Pragmatic Invariantism is the view that the practical interests of a person can influence whether that person’s true belief constitutes knowledge. My primary objective in this article is to show that Pragmatic Invariantism entails external world skepticism. Toward this end, I’ll first introduce a basic version of Pragmatic Invariantism (PI). Then I’ll introduce a sample skeptical hypothesis (SK) to the framework. From this I will show that it is extremely important that the phenomenally equivalent skeptical (...)
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  48.  4
    Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism.Christoph9 Kelp - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):221-244.
    This paper revisits a puzzle that arises for theories of knowledge according to which one can know on the basis of merely inductive grounds. No matter how strong such theories require inductive grounds to be if a belief based on them is to qualify as knowledge, there are certain beliefs that are based on even stronger inductive grounds, while, intuitively, they do not qualify as knowledge. This paper discusses what is often regardedas the most promising classical invariantist solution to the (...)
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  49.  58
    Interest-Relative Invariantism and Knowledge From Ignorance.Federico Luzzi - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1):31-42.
    The principle of Counter-Closure embodies the widespread view that when a proposition is believed solely as the conclusion of single-premise deduction, it can be known only if the premise is also known. I raise a problem for the compatibility of Jason Stanley's Interest-Relative Invariantism (IRI) with Counter-Closure. I explore the landscape of options that might help Stanley resolve this tension and argue that a trilemma confronts Stanley: he must either (i) renounce a key intuition that lies at the foundation (...)
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  50.  38
    A Defense of Moderate Invariantism.Leo W. Iacono - unknown
    This dissertation is a defense of moderate invariantism, the traditional epistemological position combining the following three theses: invariantism, according to which the word ‘know’ expresses the same content in every context of use; intellectualism, according to which whether one knows a certain proposition does not depend on one’s practical interests; and antiskepticism, according to which we really do know much of what we ordinarily take ourselves to know. Moderate invariantism needs defending because of seemingly powerful arguments for (...)
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