O esquecimento é uma experiência incómoda da quotidianeidade. Marca de temporalidade e de finitude, tem carácter ontológico e alcance ôntico. Manifesta o caminho da verdade do ser à maneira humana e do ser no mundo de tudo quanto há. Heidegger define esse caminho ontológico incontornável como sendo o da metafísica ocidental, hoje culminante na época da técnica. Mas, numa abordagem meta-ontológica, o fenómeno ontológico de poder esquecer constitui uma possibilidade para o existir de cada um, enquanto projecto. O não-esquecimento compulsivo-obsessivo (...) inibe o a-vir, reduzindo-o a interpretações sedimentadas, pre-determinadas por situações hermenêuticas do sido, congeladas num não-passado. A presente abordagem pretende considerar esta duplicidade do possível e do não-possível, radicada no olvido e na abertura afectiva, ao encontro e ao seu novum, assim habilitado. Para tal, parte de um quadro de Klee e de uma narrativa de Borges, para orientar a leitura de textos de Heidegger, desde 1927 a 1945. (shrink)

The notion of Befindlichkeit in Heidegger’s phenomenological way. Heidegger’s phenomenology of Befindlichkeit and the different kinds of affection was initiated still before Being and Time, and developed in its essential features till the end of the 1930’s. The current paper argues that, since its very origins in a philosophical framework, back to the translation of the affectiones in Augustine, the notion of Befindlichkeit sets the beginning of a structural understanding of existence - displayed both at the ontological levei of Grundstimmungen (...) (such as anguish, boredom or reservedness), and at the ontic level of different factual Stimmungen. Any comprehensive analysis of those affections counts on a tripie background with a Wovor, a Worum and the full-fledged exercise (Vollzug) of such and such affective understanding. In Being and Time this analysis is dedicated to fear, in its different nuances. But this phenomenon was already dealt with in Heidegger’s Lectures on Augustine (1921) and will reoccur in the Beiträge (1936-38). A reading of this conceptual evolution will here ground a defense of the phenomenological character of Heidegger’s way of thinking. (shrink)

Partindo do debate de Paris, com Derrida, que se defende ter tido uma importante repercussão no caminho de Gadamer, pretende aclarar-se a noção de boa vontade. Tardiamente surgida e não isenta de certa imprecisão, que se detecta no debate em que ganha relevo, está ausente de Verdade e Método e só chega a explicitar-se posteriormente em relação com a solidaridade. O presente trabalho procura mostrar que antes do conteúdo ético, que chega a assumir, tem inicialmente um sentido pré-ético, que o (...) aproxima do conceito hermenêutico de abertura da compreensão. Finalmente, fenomenologicamente considerado, defende-se que tem a sua raiz na empatia. (shrink)

‘Quiet’ and ‘Disquiet’ are terms which express ways of accounting for time-experience, besides being equally open for a rendering as emotional states. Starting from three existential moods – stress, boredom, and the joy of the present moment – this inquiry aims to put into evidence the structuring features of our existential experience of time itself, both in the daily exercise of our being-in-the-world, and at the level of our being or not being in possession of oneself in such exercise and (...) in its potentially pathological derivates. In this context, which finds its theoretical roots in the Heideggerian analysis of the being-in, quiet and disquiet reveal their paradoxical character in terms of the mutual belonging and tension each of them, respectively, presupposes. At the same time, and with such a basis, we will find the way of understanding ‘quiet’ as a correlate of time as a ‘duration’. (shrink)

In his quest to let language speak, Heidegger explored thoroughly the possibilities of meaning of factical language, in its phenomenological and poietic dimensions. He thereby came to characterize Being and Time as a way, a path which must be followed until it ends. He later understood it as a wandering and, finally, as a dead end (Holzweg). The idea of the walker, in conversation with himself, accompanies this entire journey. The present essay seeks to uncover the main moments of Heidegger’s (...) retrospective and self-interpreting way, based on recent publications of the Gesamtausgabe (in particular GA 82 and 70.1), which he himself wanted to see, generally speaking, as the edition of his Wege, nicht Werke. (shrink)

This paper seeks to understand Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of the time experience in Sein und Zeit, from the formal point of view of the Care-structure, and in the Seminars of Zollikon, where time is described as world-time in its fullness. Aimed is to show that the early anthropological reception of his major work of 1927 by some of his pupils, like Löwith, who detected similarities with Psychoanalysis, is somehow strengthed by Heidegger himself later on, as he comes with Medard Boss (...) to develop Daseynsanalysis as a metaonlogical understanding of humans life in health and pathology. Illness as privation of health will be seen as the failure of inauthentic existence. And the full, ecstatical experience of time will be shown as the proper or authentic one, being-in-the-world as well as within the psychoanalytical session and interpretation. (shrink)

Heidegger’ s Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriff offers what could be called a phenomenology of Phenomenology itself, that is: an investigation of its history. The husserlian discovery of the “categorial intuition” appears as the second moment of this history, after Brentano’s “intentionality” and before Heidegger’s own discovery of the “original sense of the a priori”, which constitutes the third moment. Our paper seeks to understand this sequence as a way to answer the leading question of how it may be possible (...) that “to be a intentional object can have any relationship with the being itself”. Or, to put it in another formulation: how is intentionality itself ontologically possible? (shrink)

A orientação da fenomenologia para uma hermenêutica da facticidade do Dasein permitiu a Heidegger sublinhar a importância primordial do afecto na dinâmica ontológica do cuidado. Mais que uma instância de passividade, no sentido husserliano, a Befindlichkeit vem a ser a forma desperta e activa de ser-no-mundo “sentindo-se”, isto é, enquanto compreensão afectiva tácita ou experiência do existir na quotidianidade e na história. Constitui, por isso, o solo abissal pré-reflexivo do que será a Ontologia Fundamental, o qual só na História do (...) Ser terminará de explicitar-se. Mas é também, ao nível da análise meta-ontológica da existência fáctica, que o estatuto da afectividade se revela plenamente, no quadro de uma possível terapia das perturbações do viver e conviver do Dasein de cada um, contornando a mera dinâmica pulsional pensada por Freud. O nosso percurso procurará atender a estes diferentes pontos, tendo como fio condutor o fenómeno exemplar do temor, nas suas diferentes variantes. (shrink)

En la larga historia de la recepción de la filosofía crítica, Heidegger ocupa un lugar singular: más querecibir, intercepte la mirada y las problemáticas kantianas, que así ganan un contexto de sentido muy preciso pero distinto del suyo originario. Después de deshacer el principal equívoco ligado a la interpretación de este encuentro de miradas, se explicite la decisión hermenéutica heideggeriana y sus consecuencias tedricas más iniportantes.Dic ausgezeichnete Stelle Heideggers bei dei Gescluichte dei Rezeption dar kritischen Philosophie hat sein Cjrund darin, (...) dalA es sich dabei nicht um eme schlichte Rezeption handelt, sondern vid mehr mu das Abfangen cines Denkblicks durch cinen anderen, woznit der Erster in cm Kontext gelangt, das ibm von seiner Urrichtungablenkt. Von ciner “objektiveren” oder gar “subjektiveren” Kantauffassung Heideggers ist es aber nicht dic Rede, da dic hermeneutische Entscheidung Heideggers sich nur allmáhlich ini Gang seines Denkwegsvollzieht und dic eigentliche Auslegungsziele erreicht. (shrink)