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Isaac Levi
Columbia University
  1.  68
    The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.
    This major work challenges some widely held positions in epistemology - those of Peirce and Popper on the one hand and those of Quine and Kuhn on the other.
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  2.  35
    The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed, which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a linguistic entity (...)
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  3. Gambling with Truth.Isaac Levi - 1967 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
  4.  1
    Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
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  5.  57
    Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict.Isaac Levi - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    It is a commonplace that in making decisions agents often have to juggle competing values, and that no choice will maximise satisfaction of them all. However, the prevailing account of these cases assumes that there is always a single ranking of the agent's values, and therefore no unresolvable conflict between them. Isaac Levi denies this assumption, arguing that agents often must choose without having balanced their different values and that to be rational, an act does not have to be optimal, (...)
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  6.  25
    Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Information Due to Loss of Belief.Isaac Levi - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Isaac Levi's new book develops further his pioneering work in formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of belief contraction, or how rationally to relinquish old beliefs. Levi offers the most penetrating analysis to date of this key question in epistemology, offering a completely new solution and explaining its relation to his earlier proposals. He mounts an argument in favor of the thesis that contracting a state of belief by giving up specific beliefs is to be evaluated in terms of the (...)
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  7. On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
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  8.  34
    For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Isaac Levi - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two (...)
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  9.  24
    The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought.Isaac Levi - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays constitutes an important presentation of his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of the opinions of others. The essays elaborate on the idea that principles of rationality are norms that regulate the coherence of our beliefs and values with (...)
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  10.  15
    On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. D. Reidel. pp. 233--261.
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  11.  58
    Direct Inference.Isaac Levi - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):5-29.
  12.  71
    Iteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Isaac Levi - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):49 - 81.
  13.  57
    Subjunctives, Dispositions and Chances.Isaac Levi - 1977 - Synthese 34 (4):423 - 455.
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  14.  8
    Should Bayesians Sometimes Neglect Base Rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342.
  15.  16
    Deductive Cogency in Inductive Inference.Isaac Levi - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):68-77.
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  16. Probability Logic, Logical Probability, and Inductive Support.Isaac Levi - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):97-118.
    This paper seeks to defend the following conclusions: The program advanced by Carnap and other necessarians for probability logic has little to recommend it except for one important point. Credal probability judgments ought to be adapted to changes in evidence or states of full belief in a principled manner in conformity with the inquirer’s confirmational commitments—except when the inquirer has good reason to modify his or her confirmational commitment. Probability logic ought to spell out the constraints on rationally coherent confirmational (...)
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  17.  46
    Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment.Isaac Levi - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409.
    Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey.
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  18.  46
    The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg.Isaac Levi - 1986 - Economics and Philosophy 2 (1):23.
    In The Enterprise of Knowledge, I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented approach (...)
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  19. Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?Isaac Levi - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (11):345-357.
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  20.  36
    Newcomb's Many Problems.Isaac Levi - 1975 - Theory and Decision 6 (2):161-175.
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  21.  9
    The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.Isaac Levi & James M. Joyce - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (7):387.
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  22. Probability Kinematics.Isaac Levi - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (3):197-209.
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  23.  3
    The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing.Isaac Levi - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):721-725.
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  24.  2
    Theory and Evidence.Isaac Levi & Clark Glymour - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (1):124.
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  25.  52
    The Demons of Decision.Isaac Levi - 1987 - The Monist 70 (2):193-211.
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  26. Conflict and Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 1992 - Ethics 102 (4):814-834.
  27.  54
    Two Notions of Epistemic Validity.Horacio Arló Costa & Isaac Levi - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):217 - 262.
    How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in (Ramsey 1990).(RT) If A, then B must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B.
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  28. Contraction: On the Decision-Theoretical Origins of Minimal Change and Entrenchment.Horacio Arló-Costa & Isaac Levi - 2006 - Synthese 152 (1):129 - 154.
    We present a decision-theoretically motivated notion of contraction which, we claim, encodes the principles of minimal change and entrenchment. Contraction is seen as an operation whose goal is to minimize loses of informational value. The operation is also compatible with the principle that in contracting A one should preserve the sentences better entrenched than A (when the belief set contains A). Even when the principle of minimal change and the latter motivation for entrenchment figure prominently among the basic intuitions in (...)
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  29.  9
    Newcomb's Many Problems.Isaac Levi - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Theory and Decision. D. Reidel. pp. 369--383.
  30. Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict.Isaac Levi - 1991 - Mind 100 (2):297-300.
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  31. Pareto Unanimity and Consensus.Isaac Levi - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (9):481-492.
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  32.  31
    On the Seriousness of Mistakes.Isaac Levi - 1962 - Philosophy of Science 29 (1):47-65.
    Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense--i.e., in a sense which reduces "accepting P" to "acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O". In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is (...)
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  33.  2
    The Covenant of Reason.Isaac Levi - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):244-246.
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  34.  52
    Chance.Isaac Levi - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (2):117-149.
  35. Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science.Isaac Levi - 1967 - Synthese 17 (4):444-448.
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  36. Confirmational Conditionalization.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (12):730-737.
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  37.  34
    A Note on Newcombmania.Isaac Levi - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (6):337-342.
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  38.  28
    Contracting From Epistemic Hell is Routine.Isaac Levi - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):141-164.
    I respond to Erik Olsson's critique of my account of contraction from inconsistent belief states, by admitting that such contraction cannot be rationalized as a deliberate decision problem. It can, however, be rationalized as a routine designed prior to inadvertent expansion into inconsistency when the deliberating agent embraces a consistent point of view.
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  39.  48
    Jaakko Hintikka.Isaac Levi - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):37 - 41.
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  40.  41
    List and Pettit.Isaac Levi - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):237 - 242.
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  41.  2
    The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry.Alan Hajek & Isaac Levi - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):166.
  42.  48
    Information and Inference.Isaac Levi - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):369 - 391.
  43. Kyburg on Random Designators.Isaac Levi - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):635-642.
  44.  83
    Ignorance, Probability and Rational Choice.Isaac Levi - 1982 - Synthese 53 (3):387-417.
  45.  17
    The Logic of Consistency and the Logic of Truth.Isaac Levi - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):461–482.
    In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey's intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an orthodox Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. The relations between Ramsey's thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce are discussed.
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  46.  20
    Value Commitments, Value Conflict, and the Separability of Belief and Value.Isaac Levi - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):509-533.
    Leeds (1990) levels an objection against the criterion of rational choice I have proposed (Levi 1997, Ch. 6; 1980; 1986), pointing out that the criterion is sensitive to the way possible consequences are partitioned. Seidenfeld, Kadane and Schervish (1989) call into question the defense of the cross product rule by appeal to Pareto Unanimity Principles that I had invoked in my 1986. I offer clarifications of my proposals showing that the difference between my views and those of my critics concerns (...)
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  47.  49
    Contraction and Informational Value.Isaac Levi - unknown
    According to the approach made famous by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (1985), revision is a transformation K*h of a potential belief state K by adding h yielding another potential belief state.1 This AGM revision transformation is a composition of two other transformations: contraction and expansion. K*h = [K-~h]+h. This is the expansion by adding h of the contraction K-~h of K by removing ~h.
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  48.  60
    Money Pumps and Diachronic Books.Isaac Levi - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S235-S247.
    The idea that rational agents should have acyclic preferences and should obey conditionalization has been defended on the grounds that otherwise an agent is threatened with becoming a “money pump.” This essay argues that such arguments fail to prove their claims.
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  49.  21
    Pragmatism and Inquiry: Selected Essays.Isaac Levi - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Corrigibilism without solidarity -- Inquiry, deliberation, and method -- Pragmatism and change of view -- Beware of syllogism : statistical reasoning and conjecturing according to Peirce -- Dewey's logic of inquiry -- Wayward naturalism : saving Dewey from himself -- Seeking truth -- The logic of consistency and the logic of truth -- Belief, doubt, and evidentialism -- Induction, abduction, and oracles -- Knowledge as true full belief.
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  50. Identity and Conflict.Isaac Levi - 2007 - Social Research: An International Quarterly 74 (1):25-50.
    A sketch of a way of characterizing multidimensional value commitments and the way they can come into conflict derived from my book Hard Choices is presented and applied to the question of how to characterize the relevance of identity to value commitments and conflict. The views of A.K. Sen and A. Bilgrami are examined in the light of these ideas.
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