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Isaac Levi
Columbia University
  1.  43
    Making It Explicit.Isaac Levi & Robert B. Brandom - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):145.
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  2.  96
    The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.Isaac Levi - 1980 - MIT Press.
    This major work challenges some widely held positions in epistemology - those of Peirce and Popper on the one hand and those of Quine and Kuhn on the other.
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  3.  58
    The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.Isaac Levi & James M. Joyce - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (7):387.
  4. Gambling with Truth.Isaac Levi - 1967 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
  5.  54
    The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
    Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed, which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a linguistic entity (...)
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  6. On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
  7.  79
    Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict.Isaac Levi - 1990 - Cambridge University Press.
    It is a commonplace that in making decisions agents often have to juggle competing values, and that no choice will maximise satisfaction of them all. However, the prevailing account of these cases assumes that there is always a single ranking of the agent's values, and therefore no unresolvable conflict between them. Isaac Levi denies this assumption, arguing that agents often must choose without having balanced their different values and that to be rational, an act does not have to be optimal, (...)
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  8.  38
    Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Information Due to Loss of Belief.Isaac Levi - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Isaac Levi's new book develops further his pioneering work in formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of belief contraction, or how rationally to relinquish old beliefs. Levi offers the most penetrating analysis to date of this key question in epistemology, offering a completely new solution and explaining its relation to his earlier proposals. He mounts an argument in favor of the thesis that contracting a state of belief by giving up specific beliefs is to be evaluated in terms of the (...)
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  9. Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science.Isaac Levi - 1967 - Synthese 17 (4):444-448.
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  10.  47
    For the Sake of the Argument: Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference and Nonmonotonic Reasoning.Isaac Levi - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made 'for the sake of argument' sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two (...)
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  11.  27
    On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. D. Reidel. pp. 233--261.
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  12.  38
    The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of Thought.Isaac Levi - 1997 - Cambridge University Press.
    Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays constitutes an important presentation of his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of the opinions of others. The essays elaborate on the idea that principles of rationality are norms that regulate the coherence of our beliefs and values with (...)
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  13.  11
    The Matter of Chance.Isaac Levi - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (4):524.
  14. Hard Choices: Decision Making Under Unresolved Conflict.Isaac Levi - 1991 - Mind 100 (2):297-300.
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  15.  84
    Direct Inference.Isaac Levi - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):5-29.
  16.  87
    Iteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Test.Isaac Levi - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):49 - 81.
  17.  81
    Subjunctives, Dispositions and Chances.Isaac Levi - 1977 - Synthese 34 (4):423 - 455.
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  18.  57
    Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment.Isaac Levi - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409.
    Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey.
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  19.  23
    Should Bayesians Sometimes Neglect Base Rates?Isaac Levi - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):342-343.
  20.  27
    Deductive Cogency in Inductive Inference.Isaac Levi - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):68-77.
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  21.  79
    The Demons of Decision.Isaac Levi - 1987 - The Monist 70 (2):193-211.
    For three centuries, philosophers have mounted defenses against the melan genie with an obsessive intensity comparable to the Reaganite determination to squander American wealth on defenses against a Communist threat. And for three centuries, skeptics have argued for the futility of the expenditure of conceptual effort with no more success than critics of the Pentagon have had in stemming the flow of funds to the military and its industrial minions. My own sympathies are with the skeptics. However, their own intense (...)
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  22.  66
    The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg.Isaac Levi - 1986 - Economics and Philosophy 2 (1):23.
    In The Enterprise of Knowledge, I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented approach (...)
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  23.  7
    Epistemology and Inference.Isaac Levi - 1986 - Noûs 20 (3):417.
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  24.  30
    Pragmatism and Inquiry: Selected Essays.Isaac Levi - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    Corrigibilism without solidarity -- Inquiry, deliberation, and method -- Pragmatism and change of view -- Beware of syllogism : statistical reasoning and conjecturing according to Peirce -- Dewey's logic of inquiry -- Wayward naturalism : saving Dewey from himself -- Seeking truth -- The logic of consistency and the logic of truth -- Belief, doubt, and evidentialism -- Induction, abduction, and oracles -- Knowledge as true full belief.
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  25. Probability Kinematics.Isaac Levi - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (3):197-209.
  26.  58
    Information and Inference.Isaac Levi - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):369 - 391.
  27. Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?Isaac Levi - 1960 - Journal of Philosophy 57 (11):345-357.
  28.  55
    Newcomb's Many Problems.Isaac Levi - 1975 - Theory and Decision 6 (2):161-175.
  29.  8
    Theory and Evidence.Isaac Levi - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (1):124.
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  30. Gambling with Truth.Isaac Levi - 1968 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):261-263.
     
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  31. Probability Logic, Logical Probability, and Inductive Support.Isaac Levi - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):97-118.
    This paper seeks to defend the following conclusions: The program advanced by Carnap and other necessarians for probability logic has little to recommend it except for one important point. Credal probability judgments ought to be adapted to changes in evidence or states of full belief in a principled manner in conformity with the inquirer’s confirmational commitments—except when the inquirer has good reason to modify his or her confirmational commitment. Probability logic ought to spell out the constraints on rationally coherent confirmational (...)
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  32.  74
    Two Notions of Epistemic Validity.Horacio Arló Costa & Isaac Levi - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):217 - 262.
    How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in (Ramsey 1990).(RT) If A, then B must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B.
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  33.  19
    Money Pumps and Diachronic Books.Isaac Levi - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S235-S247.
    The idea that rational agents should have acyclic preferences and should obey conditionalization has been defended on the grounds that otherwise an agent is threatened with becoming a “money pump.” This essay argues that such arguments fail to prove their claims.
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  34.  62
    Chance.Isaac Levi - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (2):117-149.
  35.  84
    Jaakko Hintikka.Isaac Levi - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):37 - 41.
  36.  45
    On the Seriousness of Mistakes.Isaac Levi - 1962 - Philosophy of Science 29 (1):47-65.
    Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense--i.e., in a sense which reduces "accepting P" to "acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O". In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is (...)
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  37.  54
    List and Pettit.Isaac Levi - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):237 - 242.
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  38.  15
    Newcomb's Many Problems.Isaac Levi - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Theory and Decision. D. Reidel. pp. 369--383.
  39. Contraction: On the Decision-Theoretical Origins of Minimal Change and Entrenchment.Horacio Arló-Costa & Isaac Levi - 2006 - Synthese 152 (1):129 - 154.
    We present a decision-theoretically motivated notion of contraction which, we claim, encodes the principles of minimal change and entrenchment. Contraction is seen as an operation whose goal is to minimize loses of informational value. The operation is also compatible with the principle that in contracting A one should preserve the sentences better entrenched than A (when the belief set contains A). Even when the principle of minimal change and the latter motivation for entrenchment figure prominently among the basic intuitions in (...)
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  40.  75
    Money Pumps and Diachronic Books.Isaac Levi - 2002 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S235-S247.
    The idea that rational agents should have acyclic preferences and should obey conditionalization has been defended on the grounds that otherwise an agent is threatened with becoming a “money pump.” This essay argues that such arguments fail to prove their claims.
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  41.  81
    Corroboration and Rules of Acceptance.Isaac Levi - 1962 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 13 (52):307-313.
  42. Conflict and Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 1992 - Ethics 102 (4):814-834.
  43.  74
    Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science.Isaac Levi - 1967 - MIT Press.
    This comprehensive discussion of the problem of rational belief develops the subject on the pattern of Bayesian decision theory. The analogy with decision theory introduces philosophical issues not usually encountered in logical studies and suggests some promising new approaches to old problems."We owe Professor Levi a debt of gratitude for producing a book of such excellence. His own approach to inductive inference is not only original and profound, it also clarifies and transforms the work of his predecessors. In short, the (...)
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  44.  13
    Decisions and Revisions: Philosophical Essays on Knowledge and Value.Isaac Levi - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a collection of Isaac Levi's philosophical papers. Over the period represented by the work here, Professor Levi has developed an interrelated set of views, in the tradition of Peirce and Dewey, on epistemology and the philosophy of science and social science. This focus has been on the problem of induction and the growth of knowledge, the foundations of probability and the theory of rational decision-making. His most important essays in these areas are assembled here, with an introduction setting (...)
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  45.  48
    A Note on Newcombmania.Isaac Levi - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (6):337-342.
  46.  88
    Desire-as-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference.Horacio Costa, John Collins & Isaac Levi - 1995 - Analysis 55 (1):2-5.
    The anti- Humean proposal of constructing desire as belief about what would be good must be abandoned on pain of triviality. Our central result shows that if an agent's belief- desire state is represented by Jeffrey's expected value theory enriched with the Desire as Belief Thesis (DAB), then, provided that three pairwise inconsistent propositions receive non- zero probability, the agent must view with indifference any proposition whose probability is greater than zero. Unlike previous results against DAB our Opinionation or Indifference (...)
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  47. Pareto Unanimity and Consensus.Isaac Levi - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (9):481-492.
  48.  35
    Contracting From Epistemic Hell is Routine.Isaac Levi - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):141-164.
    I respond to Erik Olsson's critique of my account of contraction from inconsistent belief states, by admitting that such contraction cannot be rationalized as a deliberate decision problem. It can, however, be rationalized as a routine designed prior to inadvertent expansion into inconsistency when the deliberating agent embraces a consistent point of view.
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  49.  5
    Why Indeterminate Probability is Rational.Isaac Levi - 2009 - Journal of Applied Logic 7 (4):364-376.
  50. Confirmational Conditionalization.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Journal of Philosophy 75 (12):730-737.
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