Results for 'Isaacs, Yoaav, and Jeffrey Sanford Russell Updating Without Evidence.'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Updating Without Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Sometimes you are unreliable at fulfilling your doxastic plans: for example, if you plan to be fully confident in all truths, probably you will end up being fully confident in some falsehoods by mistake. In some cases, there is information that plays the classical role of *evidence*—your beliefs are perfectly discriminating with respect to some possible facts about the world—and there is a standard expected-accuracy-based justification for planning to *conditionalize* on this evidence. This planning-oriented justification extends to some cases where (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.
    Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Hacking (1987) and White (2000) influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse (at least in a suitably idealized setting). This convergence is no accident: we present two theorems (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Infinite Prospects.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & Yoaav Isaacs - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):178-198.
    People with the kind of preferences that give rise to the St. Petersburg paradox are problematic---but not because there is anything wrong with infinite utilities. Rather, such people cannot assign the St. Petersburg gamble any value that any kind of outcome could possibly have. Their preferences also violate an infinitary generalization of Savage's Sure Thing Principle, which we call the *Countable Sure Thing Principle*, as well as an infinitary generalization of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Independence axiom, which we call *Countable (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Divine Hiddenness and Other Evidence.Charity Anderson & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2021 - In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
    Many people do not know or believe there is a God, and many experience a sense of divine absence. Are these (and other) “divine hiddenness” facts evidence against the existence of God? Using Bayesian tools, we investigate *evidential arguments from divine hiddenness*, and respond to two objections to such arguments. The first objection says that the problem of hiddenness is just a special case of the problem of evil, and so if one has responded to the problem of evil then (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Groupthink.Jeffrey Sanford Russell, John Hawthorne & Lara Buchak - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1287-1309.
    How should a group with different opinions (but the same values) make decisions? In a Bayesian setting, the natural question is how to aggregate credences: how to use a single credence function to naturally represent a collection of different credence functions. An extension of the standard Dutch-book arguments that apply to individual decision-makers recommends that group credences should be updated by conditionalization. This imposes a constraint on what aggregation rules can be like. Taking conditionalization as a basic constraint, we gather (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  6. General Dynamic Triviality Theorems.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & John Hawthorne - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):307-339.
    Famous results by David Lewis show that plausible-sounding constraints on the probabilities of conditionals or evaluative claims lead to unacceptable results, by standard probabilistic reasoning. Existing presentations of these results rely on stronger assumptions than they really need. When we strip these arguments down to a minimal core, we can see both how certain replies miss the mark, and also how to devise parallel arguments for other domains, including epistemic “might,” probability claims, claims about comparative value, and so on. A (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  7. The Structure of Gunk: Adventures in the Ontology of Space.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2008 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 248.
    Could space consist entirely of extended regions, without any regions shaped like points, lines, or surfaces? Peter Forrest and Frank Arntzenius have independently raised a paradox of size for space like this, drawing on a construction of Cantor’s. I present a new version of this argument and explore possible lines of response.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  8. On the Probability of Plenitude.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (5):267-292.
    I examine what the mathematical theory of random structures can teach us about the probability of Plenitude, a thesis closely related to David Lewis's modal realism. Given some natural assumptions, Plenitude is reasonably probable a priori, but in principle it can be (and plausibly it has been) empirically disconfirmed—not by any general qualitative evidence, but rather by our de re evidence.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Possible Patterns.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 11.
    “There are no gaps in logical space,” David Lewis writes, giving voice to sentiment shared by many philosophers. But different natural ways of trying to make this sentiment precise turn out to conflict with one another. One is a *pattern* idea: “Any pattern of instantiation is metaphysically possible.” Another is a *cut and paste* idea: “For any objects in any worlds, there exists a world that contains any number of duplicates of all of those objects.” We use resources from model (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  10. Quality and Quantifiers.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):562-577.
    I examine three ‘anti-object’ metaphysical views: nihilism, generalism, and anti-quantificationalism. After setting aside nihilism, I argue that generalists should be anti-quantificationalists. Along the way, I attempt to articulate what a ‘metaphysically perspicuous’ language might even be.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  11. Possible Worlds and the Objective World.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):389-422.
    David Lewis holds that a single possible world can provide more than one way things could be. But what are possible worlds good for if they come apart from ways things could be? We can make sense of this if we go in for a metaphysical understanding of what the world is. The world does not include everything that is the case—only the genuine facts. Understood this way, Lewis's “cheap haecceitism” amounts to a kind of metaphysical anti-haecceitism: it says there (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  12. The Logic of Opacity.Andrew Bacon & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):81-114.
    We explore the view that Frege's puzzle is a source of straightforward counterexamples to Leibniz's law. Taking this seriously requires us to revise the classical logic of quantifiers and identity; we work out the options, in the context of higher-order logic. The logics we arrive at provide the resources for a straightforward semantics of attitude reports that is consistent with the Millian thesis that the meaning of a name is just the thing it stands for. We provide models to show (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  13. On Two Arguments for Fanaticism.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - manuscript
    Should we make significant sacrifices to ever-so-slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever-so-slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? *Fanaticism* says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I consider two related recent arguments for Fanaticism: Beckstead and Thomas's argument from *strange dependence on space and time*, and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Temporary Safety Hazards.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):152-174.
    The Epistemic Objection says that certain theories of time imply that it is impossible to know which time is absolutely present. Standard presentations of the Epistemic Objection are elliptical—and some of the most natural premises one might fill in to complete the argument end up leading to radical skepticism. But there is a way of filling in the details which avoids this problem, using epistemic safety. The new version has two interesting upshots. First, while Ross Cameron alleges that the Epistemic (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  15.  24
    Statistical Evidence and Incentives in the Law.John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs & Vishnu Sridharan - 2021 - Wiley: Philosophical Issues 31 (1):128-145.
    Philosophical Issues, Volume 31, Issue 1, Page 128-145, October 2021.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Non-Archimedean Preferences Over Countable Lotteries.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2020 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 88 (May 2020):180-186.
    We prove a representation theorem for preference relations over countably infinite lotteries that satisfy a generalized form of the Independence axiom, without assuming Continuity. The representing space consists of lexicographically ordered transfinite sequences of bounded real numbers. This result is generalized to preference orders on abstract superconvex spaces.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. Qualitative Grounds.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):309-348.
    Suppose that all non-qualitative facts are grounded in qualitative facts. I argue that this view naturally comes with a picture in which trans-world identity is indeterminate. But this in turn leads to either pervasive indeterminacy in the non-qualitative, or else contingency in what facts about modality and possible worlds are determinate.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  18. How Much is at Stake for the Pragmatic Encroacher.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    “Pragmatic encroachers” about knowledge generally advocate two ideas: (1) you can rationally act on what you know; (2) knowledge is harder to achieve when more is at stake. Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne have recently argued that these two ideas may not fit together so well. I extend their argument by working out what “high stakes” would have to mean for the two ideas to line up, using decision theory.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  19. Indefinite Divisibility.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):239-263.
    Some hold that the lesson of Russell’s paradox and its relatives is that mathematical reality does not form a ‘definite totality’ but rather is ‘indefinitely extensible’. There can always be more sets than there ever are. I argue that certain contact puzzles are analogous to Russell’s paradox this way: they similarly motivate a vision of physical reality as iteratively generated. In this picture, the divisions of the continuum into smaller parts are ‘potential’ rather than ‘actual’. Besides the intrinsic (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  20. Actuality for Counterpart Theorists.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):85-134.
    The counterpart theorist has a problem: there is no obvious way to understand talk about actuality in terms of counterparts. Fara and Williamson have charged that this obstacle cannot be overcome. Here I defend the counterpart theorist by offering systematic interpretations of a quantified modal language that includes an actuality operator. Centrally, I disentangle the counterpart relation from a related notion, a ‘representation relation’. The relation of possible things to the actual things they represent is variable, and an adequate account (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  21. Evil and Evidence.Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 7:1-31.
    The problem of evil is the most prominent argument against the existence of God. Skeptical theists contend that it is not a good argument. Their reasons for this contention vary widely, involving such notions as CORNEA, epistemic appearances, 'gratuitous' evils, 'levering' evidence, and the representativeness of goods. We aim to dispel some confusions about these notions, in particular by clarifying their roles within a probabilistic epistemology. In addition, we develop new responses to the problem of evil from both the phenomenal (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  22. The Value of Normative Information.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - manuscript
    This paper explores the idea that it is instrumentally valuable to learn normative truths. We consider an argument for "normative hedging" based on this principle, and examine the structure of decision-making under moral uncertainty that arises from it. But it also turns out that the value of normative information is inconsistent with the principle that learning *empirical* truths is instrumentally valuable. We conclude with a brief comment on "metanormative regress.".
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Sleeping Beauty's Evidence.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton M. Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.
    What degrees of belief does Sleeping Beauty's evidence support? That depends.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Misapprehensions About the Fine-Tuning Argument.John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81:133-155.
    The fine-tuning argument purports to show that particular aspects of fundamental physics provide evidence for the existence of God. This argument is legitimate, yet there are numerous doubts about its legitimacy. There are various misgivings about the fine-tuning argument which are based on misunderstandings. In this paper we will go over several major misapprehensions, and explain why they do not undermine the basic cogency of the fine-tuning argument.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  25. A New Prospect for Epistemic Aggregation.Daniel Berntson & Yoaav Isaacs - 2013 - Episteme 10 (3):269-281.
    How should the opinion of a group be related to the opinions of the group members? In this article, we will defend a package of four norms – coherence, locality, anonymity and unanimity. Existing results show that there is no tenable procedure for aggregating outright beliefs or for aggregating credences that meet these criteria. In response, we consider the prospects for aggregating credal pairs – pairs of prior probabilities and evidence. We show that there is a method of aggregating credal (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  26. Updating Beliefs in Light of Uncertain Evidence: Descriptive Assessment of Jeffrey's Rule.Daniel Osherson & Jiaying Zhao - 2010 - Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):288-307.
    Jeffrey (1983) proposed a generalization of conditioning as a means of updating probability distributions when new evidence drives no event to certainty. His rule requires the stability of certain conditional probabilities through time. We tested this assumption (“invariance”) from the psychological point of view. In Experiment 1 participants offered probability estimates for events in Jeffrey’s candlelight example. Two further scenarios were investigated in Experiment 2, one in which invariance seems justified, the other in which it does not. (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  27.  61
    Forming and Updating Object Representations Without Awareness: Evidence From Motion-Induced Blindness.Stephen R. Mitroff & Brian J. Scholl - 2005 - Vision Research 45 (8):961-967.
  28.  11
    Update on Laparoscopic/Robotic Kidney Transplant: A Literature Review.B. He & J. M. Hamdorf - 2013 - Transplant Research and Risk Management 2013.
    Bulang He,1,2 Jeffrey M Hamdorf2 1Liver and Kidney Transplant Unit, Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital, Perth, WA, Australia; 2School of Surgery, The University of Western Australia, Perth, WA, Australia Aims: The aim of this paper was to review the current status of laparoscopic/robotic kidney transplant and evaluate its feasibility and safety in comparison with conventional standard "open" kidney transplant. Methods: An electronic search of PubMed, Embase, and the Cochrane library database was performed to identify the papers between January 1980 and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  43
    Wisdom Updated.Arthur Falk - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (3):389-403.
    Given the personalist's latitudinarian conception of rationality, what is progress toward wisdom? An answer is in C. I. Lewis's concept of the "congruence" of propositions, propositions so related that the antecedent probability of any one of them will be increased if the remainder can be assumed. This effect can be modelled in the probability calculus with due attention to the temporal sequencing of our learning of contingent propositions without ever becoming certain of them, as Jeffrey proposes. A diachronic (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  1
    Social Science as Reading and Performance: A Cultural-Sociological Understanding of Epistemology.Jeffrey Alexander & Isaac Reed - 2009 - European Journal of Social Theory 12 (1):21-41.
    In the age of the `return to the empirical' in which the theoretical disputes of an earlier era seem to have fallen silent, we seek to excavate the intellectual conditions for reviving theoretical debate, for it is upon this recovery that deeper understanding of the nature and purpose of empirical social science depends. We argue against the all too frequent turn to ontology, whereby critical realists have sought an epistemological guarantor of sociological validity. We seek, to the contrary, to crystallize (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  31.  96
    Memory and Imagery in Russell's The Analysis of Mind.David Kovacs - 2009 - Prolegomena 8 (2):193-206.
    According to the theory Russell defends in The Analysis of Mind, ‘true memories’ (roughly, memories that are not remembering-hows) are recollections of past events accompanied by a feeling of familiarity. While memory images play a vital role in this account, Russell does not pay much attention to the fact that imagery plays different roles in different sorts of memory. In most cases that Russell considers, memory is based on an image that serves as a datum (imagebased memories), (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148.
    There are narrowest bounds for P(h) when P(e) = y and P(h/e) = x, which bounds collapse to x as y goes to 1. A theorem for these bounds -- bounds for probable modus ponens -- entails a principle for updating on possibly uncertain evidence subject to these bounds that is a generalization of the principle for updating by conditioning on certain evidence. This way of updating on possibly uncertain evidence is appropriate when updating by ’probability (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  33.  5
    Computability and Logic.George S. Boolos, John P. Burgess & Richard C. Jeffrey - 1974 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    Computability and Logic has become a classic because of its accessibility to students without a mathematical background and because it covers not simply the staple topics of an intermediate logic course, such as Godel's incompleteness theorems, but also a large number of optional topics, from Turing's theory of computability to Ramsey's theorem. This 2007 fifth edition has been thoroughly revised by John Burgess. Including a selection of exercises, adjusted for this edition, at the end of each chapter, it offers (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  34. Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning.Richard Bradley - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (2):342-364.
    Richard Jeffrey espoused an antifoundationalist variant of Bayesian thinking that he termed ‘Radical Probabilism’. Radical Probabilism denies both the existence of an ideal, unbiased starting point for our attempts to learn about the world and the dogma of classical Bayesianism that the only justified change of belief is one based on the learning of certainties. Probabilistic judgment is basic and irreducible. Bayesian conditioning is appropriate when interaction with the environment yields new certainty of belief in some proposition but leaves (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  35. Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2018 - Philosophy of Science (2):236-254.
    Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Initial subjectivity, the line goes, is of mere transient significance, giving way to intersubjective agreement eventually. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures that are updated by Jeffrey conditioning. This generalizes a number of different merging results in the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  36.  83
    Jeffrey Conditioning and External Bayesianity.Carl Wagner - 2010 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (2):336-345.
    Suppose that several individuals who have separately assessed prior probability distributions over a set of possible states of the world wish to pool their individual distributions into a single group distribution, while taking into account jointly perceived new evidence. They have the option of first updating their individual priors and then pooling the resulting posteriors or first pooling their priors and then updating the resulting group prior. If the pooling method that they employ is such that they arrive (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  37. Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence.James Hawthorne - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):89-123.
    Jeffrey updating is a natural extension of Bayesian updating to cases where the evidence is uncertain. But, the resulting degrees of belief appear to be sensitive to the order in which the uncertain evidence is acquired, a rather un-Bayesian looking effect. This order dependence results from the way in which basic Jeffrey updating is usually extended to sequences of updates. The usual extension seems very natural, but there are other plausible ways to extend Bayesian (...) that maintain order-independence. I will explore three models of sequential updating, the usual extension and two alternatives. I will show that the alternative updating schemes derive from extensions of the usual rigidity requirement, which is at the heart of Jeffrey updating. Finally, I will establish necessary and sufficient conditions for order-independent updating, and show that extended rigidity is closely related to these conditions. (shrink)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  38. On Where Things Could Be.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):60-80.
    Some philosophers respond to Leibniz’s “shift” argument against absolute space by appealing to antihaecceitism about possible worlds, using David Lewis’s counterpart theory. But separated from Lewis’s distinctive system, it is difficult to understand what this doctrine amounts to or how it bears on the Leibnizian argument. In fact, the best way of making sense of the relevant kind of antihaecceitism concedes the main point of the Leibnizian argument, pressing us to consider alternative spatiotemporal metaphysics.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  39. Composition as Abstraction.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (9):453-470.
    The existence of mereological sums can be derived from an abstraction principle in a way analogous to numbers. I draw lessons for the thesis that “composition is innocent” from neo-Fregeanism in the philosophy of mathematics.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. Solving a Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.Cian Dorr, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2021 - Mind 130 (520):1159–82.
    David Builes presents a paradox concerning how confident you should be that any given member of an infinite collection of fair coins landed heads, conditional on the information that they were all flipped and only finitely many of them landed heads. We argue that if you should have any conditional credence at all, it should be 1/2.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41.  75
    Duty and Knowledge.Yoaav Isaacs - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):95-110.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  42. Probability Logic, Logical Probability, and Inductive Support.Isaac Levi - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):97-118.
    This paper seeks to defend the following conclusions: The program advanced by Carnap and other necessarians for probability logic has little to recommend it except for one important point. Credal probability judgments ought to be adapted to changes in evidence or states of full belief in a principled manner in conformity with the inquirer’s confirmational commitments—except when the inquirer has good reason to modify his or her confirmational commitment. Probability logic ought to spell out the constraints on rationally coherent confirmational (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43.  68
    The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion.Jeffrey Schloss & Michael J. Murray (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    Over the last two decades, scientific accounts of religion have received a great deal of scholarly and popular attention both because of their intrinsic interest and because they are widely as constituting a threat to the religion they analyse. The Believing Primate aims to describe and discuss these scientific accounts as well as to assess their implications. The volume begins with essays by leading scientists in the field, describing these accounts and discussing evidence in their favour. Philosophical and theological reflections (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  44.  82
    The Fallacy of Calibrationism.Yoaav Isaacs - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):247-260.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  45.  20
    Weighted Averaging, Jeffrey Conditioning and Invariance.Denis Bonnay & Mikaël Cozic - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):21-39.
    Jeffrey conditioning tells an agent how to update her priors so as to grant a given probability to a particular event. Weighted averaging tells an agent how to update her priors on the basis of testimonial evidence, by changing to a weighted arithmetic mean of her priors and another agent’s priors. We show that, in their respective settings, these two seemingly so different updating rules are axiomatized by essentially the same invariance condition. As a by-product, this sheds new (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  46.  84
    Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and Dominance.John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):515-532.
    Ginger Schultheis offers a novel and interesting argument against epistemic permissivism. While we think that her argument is ultimately uncompelling, we think its faults are instructive. We explore the relationship between epistemic permissivism, Margin-for-Error principles, and an epistemological version of Dominance reasoning.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  47.  46
    Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind.
  48.  75
    Description and the Problem of Priors.Jeffrey A. Barrett - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1343-1353.
    Belief-revision models of knowledge describe how to update one’s degrees of belief associated with hypotheses as one considers new evidence, but they typically do not say how probabilities become associated with meaningful hypotheses in the first place. Here we consider a variety of Skyrms–Lewis signaling game (Lewis in Convention. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969; Skyrms in Signals evolution, learning, & information. Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) where simple descriptive language and predictive practice and associated basic expectations coevolve. Rather than (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  49.  88
    The problems of transformative experience.Yoaav Isaacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1065-1084.
    Laurie Paul has recently argued that transformative experiences pose a problem for decision theory. According to Paul, agents facing transformative experiences do not possess the states required for decision theory to formulate its prescriptions. Agents facing transformative experiences are impoverished relative to their decision problems, and decision theory doesn’t know what to do with impoverished agents. Richard Pettigrew takes Paul’s challenge seriously. He grants that decision theory cannot handle decision problems involving transformative experiences. To deal with the problems posed by (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50.  74
    Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind:fzab031.
    We offer a new motivation for imprecise probabilities. We argue that there are propositions to which precise probability cannot be assigned, but to which imprecise probability can be assigned. In such cases the alternative to imprecise probability is not precise probability, but no probability at all. And an imprecise probability is substantially better than no probability at all. Our argument is based on the mathematical phenomenon of non-measurable sets. Non-measurable propositions cannot receive precise probabilities, but there is a natural way (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1000