Decision making theory in general, and mental models in particular, associate judgment and choice. Decision choice follows probability estimates and errors in choice derive mainly from errors in judgment. In the studies reported here we use the Monty Hall dilemma to illustrate that judgment and choice do not always go together, and that such a dissociation can lead to better decision-making. Specifically, we demonstrate that in certain decision problems, exceeding working memory limitations can actually improve decision choice. We show across (...) four experiments that increasing the number of choice alternatives forces people to collapse choices together, resulting in better decision-making. While choice performance improves, probability judgments do not change, thus demonstrating an important dissociation between choice and probability judgments. We propose the Collapsing Choice Theory (CCT) which explains how working memory capacity, probability estimation, choice alternatives, judgment, and regret all interact and effect decision quality. (shrink)
Some of the papers in this special issue distribute cognition between what is going on inside individual cognizers' heads and their outside worlds; others distribute cognition among different individual cognizers. Turing's criterion for cognition was individual, autonomous input/output capacity. It is not clear that distributed cognition could pass the Turing Test.
Some of the papers in this Special Issue distribute cognition between what is going on inside individual cognizers' heads and their outside worlds; others distribute cognition among different individual cognizers. Turing's criterion for cognition was for individual, autonomous input/output capacity. It is not clear that distributed cognition could pass the Turing Test.
Dichotomizing perceptions, by those that have an objective reality and those that do not, is rejected. Perceptions are suggested to fall along a multidimensional continuum in which neither end is totally “pure.” At the extreme ends, perceptions neither have an objective reality without some subjectivity, nor, at the other end, even as hallucinations, are they totally dissociated from reality.
Based upon the Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993), we tested a model of dynamic reasoning to predict the effect of time pressure on analytical and experiential processing during decision-making. Forty-six participants were required to make investment decisions under four levels of time pressure. In each decision, participants were presented with experiential cues which were either congruent or incongruent with the analytical information. The congruent/incongruent conditions allowed us to examine how many decisions were based upon the experiential versus the (...) analytical information, and to see if this was affected by the varying degrees of time pressure. As expected, the overall accuracy was reduced with greater time pressure and accuracy was higher when the experiential and analytical cues were congruent than when they were incongruent. Of great interest was the data showing that under high time pressure participants used more experiential cues than at other time pressures. We suggest that the dynamic reasoning paradigm has some future potential for predicting the effects of experiential biases in general, and specifically under time pressure. (shrink)
In this contribution, I examine several key publications on the physiology of emotions from the 1860s to the 1930s. I focus on physiologists who studied the emotions prior to and following William James’s 1884 Mind article, by critically reflecting on the conceptual and practical origins and constituents of the Cannon–Bard thalamic theory of emotions. I offer a historical corrective to several major assumptions in our histories of the scientific study of emotions.
In this contribution, I interrogate the historical-intellectual narrative that dominates the history of the Schachter–Singer two-factor theory of emotion. In the first part, I propose that a social influence model became generalized to a cognitive view. I argue that Schachter and Singer presented a cognitive theory of emotions in enacting inside the laboratory Schachter’s preceding “social influence” model of emotions and that Schachter’s adoption of a cognitive model of emotion was driven by and was necessary for his previous research on (...) social influence. In the second part, I argue that the Schachter–Singer theory is remarkable not because it introduced a cognitive turn in emotion, but because it presented sympathetic nervous system activation as an essential constitutive element of every emotion. (shrink)
In this essay I argue that the integration of the humanities into ?medical humanities? has implicitly medicalized the humanities. This medicalization of the humanities suppresses those dimensions of the humanities that can most significantly contribute to medicine. I present my argument by studying the critical and crucial gap between the humanities as they are presented and taught in the context of medical schools, often as a set of skills, sensitivities, and competencies, and the humanities as they are experienced and lived (...) in the humanities?as an ideological-ethical calling, which saturates and infuses daily life with an ethicizing, politicizing, and ideological critique. It is this core essence of the humanities that is abrogated and annulled in medical humanities. After presenting my argument, I exemplify some of the ways in which my colleagues and I attempt to imbue medical students with the critical and ethicizing outlook and calling of the humanities. (shrink)
In this reply, I focus on the question of whether Cannon’s theory was a “centralized” version of James’s. Due to space limitations, I briefly present six observations that problematize this assertion. One of my guiding principles is that theories acquire their meaning within a particular context. From this historical perspective, and in their historical contexts, the theories were quite distinct.
G.E. Moore, more than either Bertrand Russell or Ludwig Wittgenstein, was chiefly responsible for the rise of the analytic method in twentieth-century philosophy. This selection of his writings shows Moore at his very best. The classic essays are crucial to major philosophical debates that still resonate today. Amongst those included are: * A Defense of Common Sense * Certainty * Sense-Data * External and Internal Relations * Hume's Theory Explained * Is Existence a Predicate? * Proof of an External World (...) In addition, this collection also contains the key early papers in which Moore signals his break with idealism, and three important previously unpublished papers from his later work which illustrate his relationship with Wittgenstein. (shrink)
The increasing frequency and scope of financial crises has made global financial stability one of the major concerns of economic policy and decision makers. Under this highly complex environment, supervision of the financial system has to be thought of as a systemic task, focusing not only on the strength of the institutions but also on the interdependent relations among them, unraveling the structure and dynamic of the system as a whole. In recent years, network science has emerged as a leading (...) tool for the investigation of complex systems. Here we review several applications of network science in finance and economics, and discuss existing challenges and future directions which will substantiate network science as a key tool for financial academics, practitioners, and policy and decision makers. (shrink)
Clinical psychologists' and nonpsychiatric physicians' attitudes and behaviors in sexual and confidentiality boundary violations were examined. The 171 participants' responses were analyzed by profession, sex, and status (student, resident, professional) on semantic differential, boundary violation vignettes, and a version of Pope, Tabachnick, and Keith-Spiegel's (1987) ethical scale. Psychologists rated sexual boundary violation as more unethical than did physicians (p<.001). Rationale (p<.01) and timing (p<.001) influenced ratings. Psychologists reported fewer sexualized behaviors than physicians (p<05). Professional experience (p<.01) and sex (p<.05) were (...) associated with confidence-violating behavior. Overall, 78% of the sample reported attitudes or behaviors associated with boundary violations. The behavior violations were correlated (r=.49). Actual violators rated vignette violators more leniently than did nonviolators (p<.01). (shrink)
Ontological dependence is a relation—or, more accurately, a family of relations—between entities or beings. For there are various ways in which one being may be said to depend upon one or more other beings, in a sense of “depend” that is distinctly metaphysical in character and that may be contrasted, thus, with various causal senses of this word. More specifically, a being may be said to depend, in such a sense, upon one or more other beings for its existence or (...) for its identity. Some varieties of ontological dependence may be analyzed in modal terms—that is, in terms of distinctly metaphysical notions of possibility and necessity—while others seem to demand an analysis in terms of the notion of essence. The latter varieties of ontological dependence may accordingly be called species of essential dependence. Notions of ontological dependence are frequently called upon by metaphysicians in their proposed analyses of other metaphysically important notions, such as the notion of substance. (shrink)
O presente trabalho examina uma perspectiva hermenêutica do político presente no pensamento de Chantal Mouffe, cujo empreendimento se dá com o seu postulado em torno do que denomina por democracia radical e plural e da resultante desse postulado dentro de uma ordem cosmopolita da política e o reflexo do empreendimento dos direitos nesse sentido. A chave de leitura que orienta esta perspectiva advém da concepção do político realizada pela autora, em que o antagonismo é nuclear na formação da identidade plural (...) como forma de radicalização do político no contexto das diferenças entre o Eu e o Outro no plano político global. Aqui, os direitos devem ser considerados não do ponto de vista universal, mas das relações que são e devem ser sempre ressignificadas. Neste sentido, o político assume um caráter plural, inerente a condição mesma do social e se contrapõe ao projeto liberal de caráter universalista, racionalista e individualista, que não alcança as diferenças e com isso impossibilita uma leitura aberta do social enquanto modo de ressignificação do político. Por conseguinte, a possibilidade de sua ressignificação quanto à reinterpretação do social e também dos direitos, a partir das novas posições de sujeitos, está sempre aberta. Esse propósito tem o sentido de refletir o debate democrático em torno da relação entre o sujeito político do ponto de vista da universalidade dos direitos e a importância das diferenças nesta perspectiva. Tem-se em vista a proposta do projeto multipolar de Mouffe na construção das posições de sujeitos no âmbito cosmopolita, que não pode ser encarado de modo universal, mas da compreensão quanto a importância do antagonismo constitutivo das novas identidades. (shrink)
Is God's foreknowledge compatible with human freedom? One of the most attractive attempts to reconcile the two is the Ockhamistic view, which subscribes not only to human freedom and divine omniscience, but retains our most fundamental intuitions concerning God and time: that the past is immutable, that God exists and acts in time, and that there is no backward causation. In order to achieve all that, Ockhamists distinguish ‘hard facts’ about the past which cannot possibly be altered from ‘soft facts’ (...) about the past which are alterable, and argue that God's prior beliefs about human actions are soft facts about the past. (shrink)
An important contribution to the foundations of probability theory, statistics and statistical physics has been made by E. T. Jaynes. The recent publication of his collected works provides an appropriate opportunity to attempt an assessment of this contribution.
How could the self be a substance? There are various ways in which it could be, some familiar from the history of philosophy. I shall be rejecting these more familiar substantivalist approaches, but also the non-substantival theories traditionally opposed to them. I believe that the self is indeed a substance—in fact, that it is a simple or noncomposite substance—and, perhaps more remarkably still, that selves are, in a sense, self-creating substances. Of course, if one thinks of the notion of substance (...) as an outmoded relic of prescientific metaphysics—as the notion of some kind of basic and perhaps ineffable stuff —then the suggestion that the self is a substance may appear derisory. Even what we ordinarily call ‘stuffs’—gold and water and butter and the like—are, it seems, more properly conceived of as aggregates of molecules or atoms, while the latter are not appropriately to be thought of as being ‘made’ of any kind of ‘stuff’ at all. But this only goes to show that we need to think in terms of a more sophisticated notion of substance—one which may ultimately be traced back to Aristotle's conception of a ‘primary substance’ in the Categories , and whose heir in modern times is W. E. Johnson's notion of the ‘continuant’. It is the notion, that is, of a concrete individual capable of persisting identically through qualitative change, a subject of alterable predicates that is not itself predicable of any further subject. (shrink)
What is a natural kind ? As we shall see, the concept of a natural kind has a long history. Many of the interesting doctrines can be detected in Aristotle, were revived by Locke and Leibniz, and have again become fashionable in recent years. Equally there has been agreement about certain paradigm examples: the kinds oak, stickleback and gold are natural kinds, and the kinds table, nation and banknote are not. Sadly agreement does not extend much further. It is impossible (...) to discover a single consistent doctrine in the literature, and different discussions focus on different doctrines without writers or readers being aware of the fact. In this paper I shall attempt to find a defensible distinction between natural and non-natural kinds. (shrink)
In this philosophy classic, which was first published in 1951, E. R. Dodds takes on the traditional view of Greek culture as a triumph of rationalism. Using the analytical tools of modern anthropology and psychology, Dodds asks, "Why should we attribute to the ancient Greeks an immunity from 'primitive' modes of thought which we do not find in any society open to our direct observation?" Praised by reviewers as "an event in modern Greek scholarship" and "a book which it would (...) be difficult to over-praise," _The Greeks and the Irrational _was Volume 25 of the Sather Classical Lectures series. (shrink)
The Concept “hope,”, appears in two of Heraclitus’s fragments. This essay offers an attentive reading of these fragments and examines the role of hope in Heraclitus’s thinking. The essay is divided into two parts. The first part examines the meaning of the Greek notion for hope,, by looking into archaic and classical sources, particularly the myth about the origin of hope in Hesiod’s Works and Days. Based upon the renewed understanding of the concept, the second part of the essay examines (...) Heraclitus’s use of the concept of hope and demonstrates the central role of hope in Heraclitus’s thinking. (shrink)