17 found
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  1. History as a Coordination Device.Rossella Argenziano & Itzhak Gilboa - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (4):501-512.
    Coordination games often have multiple equilibria. The selection of equilibrium raises the question of belief formation: how do players generate beliefs about the behavior of other players? This article takes the view that the answer lies in history, that is, in the outcomes of similar coordination games played in the past, possibly by other players. We analyze a simple model in which a large population plays a game that exhibits strategic complementarities. We assume a dynamic process that faces different populations (...)
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  2.  53
    Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage's Axioms Are Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Rationality. [REVIEW]Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):11-31.
    Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a “Grand State Space”, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing (...)
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  3.  25
    Is It Always Rational to Satisfy Savage's Axioms?Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):285-296.
    This note argues that, under some circumstances, it is more rational not to behave in accordance with a Bayesian prior than to do so. The starting point is that in the absence of information, choosing a prior is arbitrary. If the prior is to have meaningful implications, it is more rational to admit that one does not have sufficient information to generate a prior than to pretend that one does. This suggests a view of rationality that requires a compromise between (...)
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  4.  31
    Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage’s Axioms Are Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Rationality.Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):11-31.
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  5.  6
    Rationality and the Bayesian Paradigm.Itzhak Gilboa - 2015 - Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (3):312-334.
    It is argued that, contrary to a rather prevalent view within economic theory, rationality does not imply Bayesianism. The note begins by defining these terms and justifying the choice of these definitions, proceeds to survey the main justification for this prevalent view, and concludes by highlighting its weaknesses.
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  6.  98
    The Predictive Role of Counterfactuals.Alfredo Di Tillio, Itzhak Gilboa & Larry Samuelson - 2013 - Theory and Decision 74 (2):167-182.
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  7.  1
    Rational Choice.Itzhak Gilboa - 2010 - MIT Press.
    A nontechnical, concise, and rigorous introduction to the rational choice paradigm,focusing on basic insights applicable in fields ranging from economics to philosophy.
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  8.  55
    On the Definition of Objective Probabilities by Empirical Similarity.Itzhak Gilboa, Offer Lieberman & David Schmeidler - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):79 - 95.
    We suggest to define objective probabilities by similarity-weighted empirical frequencies, where more similar cases get a higher weight in the computation of frequencies. This formula is justified intuitively and axiomatically, but raises the question, which similarity function should be used? We propose to estimate the similarity function from the data, and thus obtain objective probabilities. We compare this definition to others, and attempt to delineate the scope of situations in which objective probabilities can be used.
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  9.  38
    Subjective Distributions.Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (4):345-357.
    A decision maker has to choose one of several random variables whose distributions are not known. As a Bayesian, she behaves as if she knew the distributions. In this paper we suggest an axiomatic derivation of these (subjective) distributions, which is more economical than the derivations by de Finetti or Savage. Whereas the latter derive the whole joint distribution of all the available random variables, our approach derives only the marginal distributions. Correspondingly, the preference questionnaire needed in our case is (...)
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  10.  33
    Making Statements and Approval Voting.Enriqueta Aragones, Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Weiss - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (4):461-472.
    We assume that people have a need to make statements, and construct a model in which this need is the sole determinant of voting behavior. In this model, an individual selects a ballot that makes as close a statement as possible to her ideal point, where abstaining from voting is a possible (null) statement. We show that in such a model, a political system that adopts approval voting may be expected to enjoy a significantly higher rate of participation in elections (...)
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    Can Free Choice Be Known.Itzhak Gilboa - 1999 - In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press. pp. 163--174.
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  12.  4
    The World in the Model: How Economists Work and Think, by Mary S. Morgan, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, 435 Pp.A World of Models: Review of Mary S. Morgan, The World in the Model: How Economists Work and Think. [REVIEW]Itzhak Gilboa - 2015 - Journal of Economic Methodology 22 (2):235-240.
  13.  3
    On the Definition of Objective Probabilities by Empirical Similarity.Itzhak Gilboa, Offer Lieberman & David Schmeidler - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):79-95.
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  14.  7
    Why the Empty Shells Were Not Fired: A Semi-Bibliographical Note.Itzhak Gilboa - 2011 - Episteme 8 (3):301-308.
    This note documents Aumann's reason for omitting the “empty shells” argument for the common prior assumption from the final version of “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality.” It then continues to discuss the argument and concludes that rational entities cannot learn their own identity; if they do not know it a priori, they never will.
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  15. Cognitive Processes and Economic Behaviour.Marcello Basili, Nicola Dimitri & Itzhak Gilboa (eds.) - 2015 - Routledge.
    In recent years the understanding of the cognitive foundations of economic behavior has become increasingly important. This volume contains contributions from such leading scholars as Adam Brandenburger, Michael Bacharach and Patrick Suppes. It will be of great interest to academics and researchers involved in the field of economics and psychology as well as those interested in political economy more generally.
     
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  16. A Theory of Case-Based Decisions.Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Gilboa and Schmeidler provide a paradigm for modelling decision making under uncertainty. Unlike the classical theory of expected utility maximization, case-based decision theory does not assume that decision makers know the possible 'states of the world' or the outcomes, let alone the decision matrix attaching outcomes to act-state pairs. Case-based decision theory suggests that people make decisions by analogies to past cases: they tend to choose acts that performed well in the past in similar situations, and to avoid acts that (...)
     
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  17. Rational Choice.Itzhak Gilboa - 2012 - MIT Press.
    This book offers a rigorous, concise, and nontechnical introduction to some of the fundamental insights of rational choice theory. It draws on formal theories of microeconomics, decision making, games, and social choice, and on ideas developed in philosophy, psychology, and sociology. Itzhak Gilboa argues that economic theory has provided a set of powerful models and broad insights that have changed the way we think about everyday life. He focuses on basic insights of the rational choice paradigm--the general conceptualization rather than (...)
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