The paper offers an argument against an intuitive reading of the Stone-von Neumann theorem as a categoricity result, thereby pointing out that this theorem does not entail any model-theoretical difference between the theories that validate it and those that don't.

The paper discusses Peano's defense and application of permanence as a principle of practice, and Hahn's further point that, even if it were a principle of logic, permanence would not eliminate all logical ambiguity. Dedicated to the memory of Mic Detlefsen.

This entry reviews Rudolf Carnap's philosophical views on the quantum mechanics of his time. It also offers some thoughts on how Carnap might have reacted to some recent developments in the foundations of quantum mechanics.

This paper provides an algebraic reconstruction of Einstein’s argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics – the one that he thought did not make it into the EPR paper – in order to clarify the assumptions that underlie an understanding of Einstein completeness as categoricity.

A new form of skepticism is described, which holds that objectivity and understanding are incompossible ideals of modern science. This is attributed to Weyl, hence its name: Weylean skepticism. Two general defeat strategies are then proposed, one of which is rejected.

This paper considers Weylean invariantism, i.e., the view that objectivity requires categoricity, and argues that if the Stone-von Neumann theorem can be naturally interpreted as a categoricity result, the view is falsified by quantum field theory.

This paper argues that Weyl's view that scientific objectivity requires that concepts be freely created, i.e., introduced via Hilbert-style axiomatizations, led him to abandon the phenomenological view of objectivity.

This paper argues that Weyl took formalism to prevail over intuitionism with respect to supporting scientific objectivity, rather than grounding classical mathematics, and that this was what he thought was enough for rejecting pure phenomenology as well.

This paper argues that Carnap's project in the Aufbau is best considered as an attempt to determine the conditions for both objectivity and understanding, thus aiming at refuting the skeptical contention that objectivity and understanding are incompossible ideals of science.

This paper argues against the view that the standard explanation of phase transitions in statistical mechanics may be considered a causal explanation, a distortion that can nevertheless successfully represent causal relations.

This paper attempts to motivate the view that instead of rejecting modus ponens as invalid in certain situations, one could preserve its validity by associating such situations with non-normal interpretations of logical connectives.

We argue that, if taken seriously, Kripke's view that a language for science can dispense with a negation operator is to be rejected. Part of the argument is a proof that positive logic, i.e., classical propositional logic without negation, is not categorical.

This paper, written in Romanian, explains why the eutaxiological argument, endorsed by scientists like Newton, Einstein, and Weyl, and recently defended by Richard Swinburne, is not defensible.

This paper argues that Noether's axiomatic method in algebra cannot be assimilated to Weyl's late view on axiomatics, for his acquiescence to a phenomenological epistemology of correctness led Weyl to resist Noether's principle of detachment.

The paper sketches an argument against modal monism, more specifically against the reduction of physical possibility to metaphysical possibility. The argument is based on the non-categoricity of quantum logic.

This paper, written in Romanian, compares fictionalism, nominalism, and neo-Meinongianism as responses to the problem of objectivity in mathematics, and then motivates a fictionalist view of objectivity as invariance.

An introduction to the Synthese topical collection "Humeanisms".

This paper argues that whereas Mach understood thought economy as a principle of practical rationality, Husserl rejected it as a principle of theoretical rationality. The distinction is further supported by their correspondingly different readings of the principle of permanence.

This paper rejects metaphysical realism about structural universals as a basis for mathematical realism about numbers, and argues that one construal of structural universals via non-well-founded sets should be resisted by the mathematical realist.

This paper explains why spacetime singularities do not constitute a breakdown of physical laws, and points out that the difference between the metrics at singularities and those outside of singularities is factual, rather than nomological.

This paper argues that Weyl's criticism of Dedekind’s principle that "In science, what is provable ought not to be believed without proof." challenges not only a logicist norm of belief in mathematics, but also a realist view about whether there is a fact of the matter as to what norms of belief are correct.

A one-page editorial including one-sentence summaries of papers authored by Carsten Held, Elise Crull, Johanna Wolff, Elay Shech, Richard Dawid, and Gábor Hofer-Szabó.

This is a collection of studies by contemporary Romanian philosophers of science. As it happens, it ruffled a lot of feathers, to the extent that the book is largely ignored in Romania, although it does quite well internationally, with some really good citations. Check it out!

This a special issue collecting papers on the philosophy of logic, written by some young Romanian philosophers, on a variety of topics like the grammar of first-order logic and the axiomatization of evolutionary biology.

This special issue includes papers authored by Carsten Held, Elise Crull, Johanna Wolff, Elay Shech, Richard Dawid, and Gábor Hofer-Szabó.

This paper proposes a diagrammatic reconstruction of Carnap's formal method of quasianalysis in the Aufbau and then explains on that basis why Quine's criticism of Carnap's constitution of physical space fails.

This paper analyzes some examples of diagrammatic proofs in elementary mathematics. It suggests that the cognitive features that allow us to understand such proofs are extensions of the cognitive features that allow us to navigate the physical world.

This paper argues that a particular point raised by Schröder – that Frege's logical notation fails to be modelled on arithmetical notation – is based on a misunderstanding, for the modelling was meant as conceptual, rather than notational.