Commentary with Hindi supercommentary on Mimamsasutra of Jaimini, work on the fundamentals of the Mīmāṃsā school in Hindu philosophy.

Supercommentary on Tattvacintāmaṇi, classical work on Navya Nyaya philosophy by Gaṅgeśa, active 13th century and its commentaries Didhiti by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and Tattvacintāmaṇidīdhitiprakāśa by Bhavānanda Siddhāntavāgīśa with complete text.

Exhaustive work on Vīraśaivism; includes commentary in Kannada.

Commentary on Yon tan rin po cheʼi mdzod text of ʼJigs-med-gliṅ-pa Raṅ-byuṅ-rdo-rje, 1729 or 30-1798, dealing on Rdzogs-chen doctrine of Rñiṅ-ma-pa sect.

Exegetical notes on the explanation of philosophical positions (siddhānta) of the Vaibhāsika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism with Hinduism based on the Dkon-mchog ʾJigs-med-dbaṅ-po's text.

Notes based on the Grub paʼi mthaʼ rnam par bźag pa rin po cheʼi ʼphreṅ ba of Dkon-mchog ʼJigs-med-dbaṅ-po on philosophical positions (sidhānta) of Buddhism with Hinduism.

Basic course of study of elementary Buddhist logic and dialectical studies.

Selected works of author's predominantly on Buddhist dialectical studies and mind training (Blo-sbyoṅ).

Collection of works on Buddhist ethics and philosophy.

Exegesis on comparative philosophical positions (siddhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism.

Critical study on philosophical positions (sidhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism with Hinduism.

Original Tibet text with Hindi version on comparative philosophical positions (siddhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism.

Concise explanation of the philosophical positions (sidhānta) of the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārya, and Mādhyamika schools of Buddhism with Hinduism.

Commentary on Sakya Pandita's Tshad ma rigs gter; includes root text.

Buddhist canonical treatise on moral ethics.

Corpus of Nyingmapa doctrines, commentaries on Buddhist canonical texts, and philosophy etc.

Commentary on Grub paʼi mthaʼi rnam par bzhag pa rin po cheʼi ʼphreng ba text authored by ʼJam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa II Dkon-mchog ʼJigs-med-dbang-po,1728-1791.

U članku su predstavljeni osnovni podaci o životu Fritza Jahra , njemačkog učitelja i teologa koji je po prvi put u povijesti, u članku iz 1927., koristio termin ‘bio-etika’ i predložio koncept nove discipline temeljene na »bioetičkom imperativu« – reviziji Kantova kategoričkog imperativa, proširenog na životinje i biljke. Iako su doduše neki podaci o Jahrovim publikacijama već poznati , Jahrova biografska pozadina je još uvijek potpuno neistražena. Ovaj rad ukratko istražuje i kronologiju otkrića Jahrovog djela , pomičući datum i mjesto (...) zasnivanja bioetike za otprilike pola stoljeća unatrag i s jednog kontinenta na drugi. (shrink)

Literal explanation of the ʼJam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa Ṅag-dbaṅ-brtson-ʼgrus's text Grub mthaʼi rnam par bźag pa ʼkhrul spoṅ gdoṅ lṅaʼi sgra dbyaṅs kun mkhyen lam bzaṅ gsal baʼi rin chen sgron me, deals on comparative study of the philosophical systems (siddhānta) of Buddhism and Hinduism.

A semantics for quantified modal logic is presented that is based on Kleene's notion of realizability. This semantics generalizes Flagg's 1985 construction of a model of a modal version of Church's Thesis and first-order arithmetic. While the bulk of the paper is devoted to developing the details of the semantics, to illustrate the scope of this approach, we show that the construction produces (i) a model of a modal version of Church's Thesis and a variant of a modal set theory (...) due to Goodman and Scedrov, (ii) a model of a modal version of Troelstra's generalized continuity principle together with a fragment of second-order arithmetic, and (iii) a model based on Scott's graph model (for the untyped lambda calculus) which witnesses the failure of the stability of non-identity. (shrink)

Views on Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophical positions (siddhānta).

In this paper, I analyse Martha Nussbaum?s view of how we should treat non-human animals, which she links to her capabilities approach. This approach offers a conception of justice or, as Nussbaum puts it, a collection of fundamental rights that specify some of the necessary elements for a just society. In addition to justice for human beings, this approach includes animal rights. The basis for the discussion consists of two elements that justify the claim that every animal deserves to live (...) a life that is characteristic of a member of its species. The first element is dignity, and the second is sympathetic imagination. The intention of Nussbaum?s approach is to represent an improvement on the social contract tradition, by offering a more encompassing theory of justice. In her view, the capabilities approach, contrary to the theories of social contract, has principled resources that allow it to include, among else, non-human-animals in the domain of justice. However, the contribution of my paper consists in showing the problems I observe in Nussbaum?s theory. These problems are related to the insufficient definition of basic concepts and to the fact that in Nussbaum?s theory, non-human animals remain, across various situations, only a means of serving human needs. The consequence is that non-human animals are not included in the domain of justice which, after all, is Nussbaum?s fundamental ambition. (shrink)

This paper concerns the character of argumentation in inner dialogue, i.e. dialogue that an individual keeps to herself in her own mind. The problem of inner dialogue research is the methodological difficulty connected with its externalization. In the text, the activity of crisis diary-writing is suggested as a way of naturally externalizing inner decision-making. By adopting a pragma-dialectic approach to argumentation, the text attempts to characterize crisis diary-writing as an argumentative activity type. The argumentative characterization of crisis diary-writing involves identifying (...) the institutional point and implemented genre as well as distinguishing the empirical counterparts of the four stages of critical discussion. For illustration, the paper draws its examples from Anne Frank’s Diary. As a result of the characterization achieved in the paper, it is concluded that crisis diary-writing is a conventionalized deliberative activity type preconditioned by implicit norms governing the conduct of argumentation. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Russell’s account of memory in both the acquaintance and the neutral monist periods, more specifically, the years from 1910 until 1927, with emphasis on The Problems of Philosophy, Theory of Knowledge, and The Analysis of Mind. I argue that memory is central for understanding how knowledge works, which is the main reason it remained in the focus of Russell’s analysis even after the gradual shift to neutral monism. I propose that memory played a not insignificant (...) role in that shift. While this paper aims to show that Russell’s theory of memory in the acquaintance period faced serious difficulties—mainly related to the commitment to direct realism—I argue that there is a consistent similarity and continuity between the theory of memory in the acquaintance period and that in the neutral monist period. Russell considered a similar type of memory to be paradigmatic and epistemically primary in both periods—a consideration, dictated, no doubt, by his commitment to the principles of Occam’s razor and psychological plausibility. (shrink)

Revision of the author's thesis (Ph. D.--Kāśī Hindu Viśvavidyālaya, 1994) under title: Śaktiviśishṭādvaita Vedānta, eka samīkshātmka anuśīlana.

Philosophy of Cārvāka, classical Indian materialist.