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JC Beall [70]J. C. Beall [53]J. Beall [10]Jeffrey Beall [6]
Jo Beall [2]Jeffrey Charles Beall [1]J. . . C. Beall [1]
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Jc Beall
University of Notre Dame
  1. Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...)
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  2.  62
    Spandrels of Truth.J. C. Beall - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.
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  3. Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.
    Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...)
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  4. Two Flavors of Curry’s Paradox.Jc Beall & Julien Murzi - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (3):143-165.
    In this paper, we distinguish two versions of Curry's paradox: c-Curry, the standard conditional-Curry paradox, and v-Curry, a validity-involving version of Curry's paradox that isn’t automatically solved by solving c-curry. A unified treatment of curry paradox thus calls for a unified treatment of both c-Curry and v-Curry. If, as is often thought, c-Curry paradox is to be solved via non-classical logic, then v-Curry may require a lesson about the structure—indeed, the substructure—of the validity relation itself.
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  5. Logical Consequence.J. C. Beall, Greg Restall & Gil Sagi - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: 1. If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the rich (...)
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  6. Free of Detachment: Logic, Rationality, and Gluts.Jc Beall - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):410-423.
  7. Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox.J. C. Beall (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    The Liar paradox raises foundational questions about logic, language, and truth (and semantic notions in general). A simple Liar sentence like 'This sentence is false' appears to be both true and false if it is either true or false. For if the sentence is true, then what it says is the case; but what it says is that it is false, hence it must be false. On the other hand, if the statement is false, then it is true, since it (...)
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  8.  4
    Formal Theories of Truth.Jc Beall, Michael Glanzberg & David Ripley - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Three leading philosopher-logicians present a clear and concise overview of formal theories of truth, explaining key logical techniques. Truth is as central topic in philosophy: formal theories study the connections between truth and logic, including the intriguing challenges presented by paradoxes like the Liar.
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  9.  48
    The Simple Argument for Subclassical Logic.Jc Beall - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):30-54.
  10. The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays.Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.) - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    The Law of Non-Contradiction - that no contradiction can be true - has been a seemingly unassailable dogma since the work of Aristotle, in Book G of the Metaphysics. It is an assumption challenged from a variety of angles in this collection of original papers. Twenty-three of the world's leading experts investigate the 'law', considering arguments for and against it and discussing methodological issues that arise whenever we question the legitimacy of logical principles. The result is a balanced inquiry into (...)
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  11. On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality.Jc Beall, Ross T. Brady, J. Michael Dunn, A. P. Hazen, Edwin D. Mares, Robert K. Meyer, Graham Priest, Greg Restall, David Ripley, John Slaney & Richard Sylvan - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):595 - 612.
    One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing (...)
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  12.  44
    There is No Logical Negation: True, False, Both, and Neither.Jc Beall - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1):Article no. 1.
    In this paper I advance and defend a very simple position according to which logic is subclassical but is weaker than the leading subclassical-logic views have it.
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  13.  66
    Multiple-Conclusion Lp and Default Classicality.Jc Beall - 2011 - Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (2):326-336.
    Philosophical applications of familiar paracomplete and paraconsistent logics often rely on an idea of . With respect to the paraconsistent logic LP (the dual of Strong Kleene or K3), such is standardly cashed out via an LP-based nonmonotonic logic due to Priest (1991, 2006a). In this paper, I offer an alternative approach via a monotonic multiple-conclusion version of LP.
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  14.  41
    Off-Topic: A New Interpretation of Weak-Kleene Logic.Jc Beall - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (6).
    This paper offers a new and very simple alternative to Bochvar's well known nonsense -- or meaninglessness -- interpretation of Weak Kleene logic. To help orient discussion I begin by reviewing the familiar Strong Kleene logic and its standard interpretation; I then review Weak Kleene logic and the standard interpretation. While I note a common worry about the Bochvar interpretation my aim is only to give an alternative -- and I think very elegant -- interpretation, not necessarily a replacement.
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  15. Shrieking Against Gluts: The Solution to the 'Just True' Problem.Jc Beall - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):438-445.
    This paper applies what I call the shrieking method (a refined version of an idea with roots in Priest's work) to one of – if not the – issues confronting glut-theoretic approaches to paradox (viz., the problem of ‘just true’ or, what comes to the same, ‘just false’). The paper serves as a challenge to formulate a problem of ‘just true’ that isn't solved by shrieking (as advanced in this paper), if such a problem be thought to exist.
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  16.  11
    Possibilities and Paradox: An Introduction to Modal and Many-Valued Logic.J. C. Beall - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Extensively classroom-tested, Possibilities and Paradox provides an accessible and carefully structured introduction to modal and many-valued logic. The authors cover the basic formal frameworks, enlivening the discussion of these different systems of logic by considering their philosophical motivations and implications. Easily accessible to students with no background in the subject, the text features innovative learning aids in each chapter, including exercises that provide hands-on experience, examples that demonstrate the application of concepts, and guides to further reading.
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  17.  83
    Deflationary Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (eds.) - 2005 - Open Court Press.
    This book is a collection of important writings on deflationism, with a detailed introduction and an exhaustive annotated bibliography. Among philosophers concerned with the theory of truth, deflationist positions have quickly gained ground and have become the most popular. Yet heretofore there has been no single book to which the readers can go for a detailed, overall view of the entire phenomenon of deflationism. This is the only available map of the whole terrain of deflationism. -/- Deflationism is a comparatively (...)
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  18. Relevant Restricted Quantification.J. C. Beall, Ross T. Brady, A. P. Hazen, Graham Priest & Greg Restall - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):587-598.
    The paper reviews a number of approaches for handling restricted quantification in relevant logic, and proposes a novel one. This proceeds by introducing a novel kind of enthymematic conditional.
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  19. A Neglected Qua Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology.Jc Beall & Jared Henderson - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (2):157-172.
    We advance a neglected QUA solution to the fundamental problem of Christology. Our chief aim is to put the view on the theological table, leaving future debate to tell its ultimate fate. After presenting the view we measure it against standard problems that confront extant QUA views and also against objections peculiar to the proposed view.
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  20. Nonclassical Theories of Truth.Jc Beall & David Ripley - 2018 - In Oxford Handbook of Truth.
    This chapter attempts to give a brief overview of nonclassical (-logic) theories of truth. Due to space limitations, we follow a victory-through-sacrifice policy: sacrifice details in exchange for clarity of big-picture ideas. This policy results in our giving all-too-brief treatment to certain topics that have dominated discussion in the non-classical-logic area of truth studies. (This is particularly so of the ‘suitable conditoinal’ issue: §4.3.) Still, we present enough representative ideas that one may fruitfully turn from this essay to the more-detailed (...)
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  21.  4
    Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox.J. C. Beall (ed.) - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Semantic and soritical paradoxes challenge entrenched, fundamental principles about language - principles about truth, denotation, quantification, and, among others, 'tolerance'. Study of the paradoxes helps us determine which logical principles are correct. So it is that they serve not only as a topic of philosophical inquiry but also as a constraint on such inquiry: they often dictate the semantic and logical limits of discourse in general. Sixteen specially written essays by leading figures in the field offer new thoughts and arguments (...)
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  22.  40
    A Simple Approach Towards Recapturing Consistent Theories in Paraconsistent Settings.Jc Beall - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):755-764.
    I believe that, for reasons elaborated elsewhere (Beall, 2009; Priest, 2006a, 2006b), the logic LP (Asenjo, 1966; Asenjo & Tamburino, 1975; Priest, 1979) is roughly right as far as logic goes.1 But logic cannot go everywhere; we need to provide nonlogical axioms to specify our (axiomatic) theories. This is uncontroversial, but it has also been the source of discomfort for LP-based theorists, particularly with respect to true mathematical theories which we take to be consistent. My example, throughout, is arithmetic; but (...)
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  23.  73
    Deflationism and Paradox.Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists that their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth. Contributors (...)
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  24.  89
    God of the Gaps: A Neglected Reply to God’s Stone Problem.Jc Beall & A. J. Cotnoir - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):681-689.
    Traditional monotheism has long faced logical puzzles. We argue that such puzzles rest on the assumed logical truth of the Law of Excluded Middle, which we suggest there is little theological reason to accept. By way of illustration we focus on God's alleged stone problem, and present a simple but plausible ‘gappy’ framework for addressing this puzzle. We assume familiarity with the proposed logic but an appendix is offered as a brief review.
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  25. On Truthmakers for Negative Truths.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):264 – 268.
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  26. On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382.
  27.  51
    Complete Symposium on Jc Beall's Christ – A Contradiction: A Defense of Contradictory Christology.Jc Beall, Timothy Pawl, Thomas McCall, A. J. Cotnoir & Sara L. Uckelman - 2019 - Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (1):400-577.
    The fundamental problem of Christology is the apparent contradiction of Christ as recorded at Chalcedon. Christ is human and Christ is divine. Being divine entails being immutable. Being human entails being mutable. Were Christ two different persons there’d be no apparent contradiction. But Chalcedon rules as much out. Were Christ only partly human or only partly divine there’d be no apparent contradiction. But Chalcedon rules as much out. Were the very meaning of ‘mutable’ and/or ‘immutable’ other than what they are, (...)
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  28.  49
    A Note on Freedom From Detachment in the Logic of Paradox.Jc Beall, Thomas Forster & Jeremy Seligman - 2013 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 54 (1):15-20.
    We shed light on an old problem by showing that the logic LP cannot define a binary connective $\odot$ obeying detachment in the sense that every valuation satisfying $\varphi$ and $(\varphi\odot\psi)$ also satisfies $\psi$ , except trivially. We derive this as a corollary of a more general result concerning variable sharing.
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  29.  45
    Lp+, K3+, Fde+, and Their 'Classical Collapse'.Jc Beall - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):742-754.
    This paper is a sequel to Beall (2011), in which I both give and discuss the philosophical import of a result for the propositional (multiple-conclusion) logic LP+. Feedback on such ideas prompted a spelling out of the first-order case. My aim in this paper is to do just that: namely, explicitly record the first-order result(s), including the collapse results for K3+ and FDE+.
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  30. The Liar Paradox.JC Beall & Michael Glanzberg - 2010 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. CSLI Publications.
    The first sentence in this essay is a lie. There is something odd about saying so, as has been known since ancient times. To see why, remember that all lies are untrue. Is the first sentence true? If it is, then it is a lie, and so it is not true. Conversely, suppose that it is not true. As we (viz., the authors) have said it, presumably with the intention of you believing it when it is not true, it is (...)
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  31.  62
    Deflated Truth Pluralism.J. C. Beall - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 323.
  32.  62
    Deflationism: The Basics.Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Open Court. pp. 1--1.
  33.  91
    Fitch's Proof, Verificationism, and the Knower Paradox.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):241 – 247.
    I have argued that without an adequate solution to the knower paradox Fitch's Proof is- or at least ought to be-ineffective against verificationism. Of course, in order to follow my suggestion verificationists must maintain that there is currently no adequate solution to the knower paradox, and that the paradox continues to provide prima facie evidence of inconsistent knowledge. By my lights, any glimpse at the literature on paradoxes offers strong support for the first thesis, and any honest, non-dogmatic reflection on (...)
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  34. Prolegomenon to Future Revenge.J. C. Beall - 2007 - In Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
  35. Is Yablo’s Paradox Non-Circular?J. C. Beall - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):176–87.
  36. Knowability and Possible Epistemic Oddities.J. C. Beall - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. pp. 105--125.
     
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  37.  52
    Logic: The Basics (2nd Edition).Jc Beall & Shay A. Logan - 2017 - Routledge.
    Logic: the Basics is an accessible introduction to the core philosophy topic of standard logic. Focussing on traditional Classical Logic the book deals with topics such as mathematical preliminaries, propositional logic, monadic quantified logic, polyadic quantified logic, and English and standard ‘symbolic transitions’. With exercises and sample answers throughout this thoroughly revised new edition not only comprehensively covers the core topics at introductory level but also gives the reader an idea of how they can take their knowledge further and the (...)
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  38.  38
    Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles.J. Beall - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (3):478-481.
  39.  39
    Is Yablo’s Paradox Non-Circular?J. Beall - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):176-87.
  40. Heaps of Gluts and Hyde-Ing the Sorites.JC Beall & Mark Colyvan - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):401--408.
    JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]
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  41. Defending Logical Pluralism.J. C. Beall & Greg Restall - 2001 - In Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches. Stanmore: Hermes. pp. 1-22.
    We are pluralists about logical consequence [1]. We hold that there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity. Our pluralism starts with our analysis of consequence. This analysis of consequence is not idiosyncratic. We agree with Richard Jeffrey, and with many other philosophers of logic about how logical consequence is to be defined. To quote Jeffrey.
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  42. Analetheism and Dialetheism.J. Beall & D. Ripley - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):30-35.
  43. Why Priest's Reassurance is Not Reassuring.Jc Beall - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):517-525.
    In the service of paraconsistent (indeed, ‘dialetheic’) theories, Graham Priest has long advanced a non-monotonic logic (viz., MiLP) as our ‘universal logic’ (at least for standard connectives), one that enjoys the familiar logic LP (for ‘logic of paradox’) as its monotonic core (Priest, G. In Contradiction , 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. First printed by Martinus Nijhoff in 1987: Chs. 16 and 19). In this article, I show that MiLP faces a dilemma: either it is (plainly) unsuitable as a (...)
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  44.  42
    Finding Tolerance Without Gluts.Jc Beall - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):791-811.
    Weber, Colyvan, and Priest have advanced glutty approaches to the sorites, on which the truth about the penumbral region of a soritical series is inconsistent. The major benefit of a glut-based approach is maintaining the truth of all sorites premisses while none the less avoiding, in a principled fashion, the absurdity of the sorites conclusion. I agree that this is a major virtue of the target glutty approach; however, I think that it can be had without gluts. If correct, this (...)
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  45.  35
    Trivializing Sentences and the Promise of Semantic Completeness.J. Beall - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):573-584.
    This paper challenges defenders/advocates of the semantic-completeness route towards gluts to explain, in simple and plausible terms, why the ‘trivializer paradox’, framed in terms of closure relatives on theories, fails to undermine their argument.
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  46.  11
    On Contradictory Christology: A Reply to Uckelman’s ‘Contradictions, Impossibility, and Triviality’.Jc Beall - 2019 - Journal of Analytic Theology 7 (1):560-577.
  47. True and False–as If. Ch. 12 of G. Priest, Jc Beall and B. Armour-Garb.Jc Beall - 2004 - In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction : New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
     
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  48.  98
    From Full Blooded Platonism to Really Full Blooded Platonism.Jc Beall - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (3):322-325.
    Mark Balaguer argues for full blooded platonism (FBP), and argues that FBP alone can solve Benacerraf's familiar epistemic challenge. I note that if FBP really can solve Benacerraf's epistemic challenge, then FBP is not alone in its capacity so to solve; RFBP—really full blooded platonism—can do the trick just as well, where RFBP differs from FBP by allowing entities from inconsistent mathematics. I also argue briefly that there is positive reason for endorsing RFBP.
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  49.  93
    True, False and Paranormal.Jc Beall - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):102–114.
  50.  19
    True, False and Paranormal.J. Beall - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):102-114.
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