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Profile: James Robert Brown (University of Toronto)
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  1. Ulrich Beck, Mark Ritter & Jennifer Brown (1993). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Environmental Values 2 (4):367-368.
     
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  2.  36
    Jessica Brown (2004). Anti-Individualism and Knowledge. MIT Press.
    A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind.
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  3. Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.) (2011). Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    Assertion is a fundamental feature of language. This volume will be the place to look for anyone interested in current work on the topic.
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  4.  45
    Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.) (2012). Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge ascriptions are a central topic of research in both philosophy and science. In this collection of new essays on knowledge ascriptions, world class philosophers offer novel approaches to this long standing topic.
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  5. Jessica Brown (2010). Knowledge and Assertion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.
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  6. Jessica Brown (2008). Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning. Noûs 42 (2):167-189.
  7. Jessica Brown (2006). Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.
    Contextualists such as Cohen and DeRose claim that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions vary contextually, in particular that the strength of epistemic position required for one to be truly ascribed knowledge depends on features of the attributor's context. Contextualists support their view by appeal to our intuitions about when it's correct (or incorrect) to ascribe knowledge. Someone might argue that some of these intuitions merely reflect when it is conversationally appropriate to ascribe knowledge, not when knowledge is truly ascribed, (...)
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  8. Jessica Brown (2012). Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.
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  9. Jason W. Brown (1977). Mind, Brain, and Consciousness the Neuropsychology of Cognition.
     
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  10.  72
    James Robert Brown (1991). The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences. Routledge.
    The book concludes with chapters on the nature of Einstein's work and on the interpretation of quantum mechanics which stand as a test of the author's central ...
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  11. Joanna Burch Brown (2008). Compensation, Climate Change and Duties Between States. In R. C. Hillerbrand & R. Karlsson (eds.), Beyond the Global Village. Environmental Challenges Inspiring Global Citizenship. the Interdisciplinary Press.
     
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  12. Jessica Brown (2008). The Knowledge Norm for Assertion. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):89-103.
  13. John Seely Brown & Paul Duguid (2010). The Social Life of Information. In Craig Hanks (ed.), Technology and Values: Essential Readings. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  14. Jessica Brown (2008). Knowledge and Practical Reason. Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1135-1152.
    It has become recently popular to suggest that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning and that this provides an important constraint on the correct account of knowledge, one which favours subject-sensitive invariantism over contextualism and classic invariantism. I argue that there are putative counterexamples to both directions of the knowledge norm. Even if the knowledge norm can be defended against these counterexamples, I argue that it is a delicate issue whether it is true, one which relies on fine (...)
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  15. Jessica Brown (2013). Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.
    I will ask the conditional question: if folk attributions of "know" are not sensitive to the stakes and/or the salience of error, does this cast doubt on contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI)? I argue that if it should turn out that folk attributions of knowledge are insensitive to such factors, then this undermines contextualism, but not SSI. That is not to say that SSI is invulnerable to empirical work of any kind. Rather, I defend the more modest claim that leading (...)
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  16. Jessica Brown (2013). Knowing-How: Linguistics and Cognitive Science. Analysis 73 (2):220-227.
    Stanley and Williamson have defended the intellectualist thesis that knowing-how is a subspecies of knowing-that by appeal to the syntax and semantics of ascriptions of knowing-how. Critics have objected that this way of defending intellectualism places undue weight on linguistic considerations and fails to give sufficient attention to empirical considerations from the scientific study of the mind. In this paper, I examine and reject Stanley's recent attempt to answer the critics.
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  17.  10
    Scott Barry Kaufman, Colin G. DeYoung, Jeremy R. Gray, Luis Jiménez, Jamie Brown & Nicholas Mackintosh (2010). Implicit Learning as an Ability. Cognition 116 (3):321-340.
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  18.  5
    James Robert Brown (2001). Who Rules in Science?: An Opinionated Guide to the Wars. Harvard University Press.
    This eye-opening book reveals how little we've understood about the ongoing pitched battles between the sciences and the humanities--and how much may be at ...
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  19.  61
    William H. Alexander & Joshua W. Brown (2010). Computational Models of Performance Monitoring and Cognitive Control. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):658-677.
    The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) has been the subject of intense interest as a locus of cognitive control. Several computational models have been proposed to account for a range of effects, including error detection, conflict monitoring, error likelihood prediction, and numerous other effects observed with single-unit neurophysiology, fMRI, and lesion studies. Here, we review the state of computational models of cognitive control and offer a new theoretical synthesis of the mPFC as signaling response–outcome predictions. This new synthesis has two interacting (...)
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  20. Yiftach J. H. Fehige & James R. Brown (2010). Thought Experiments. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 25 (1):135-142.
  21. J. Brown (1999). Boghossian on Externalism and Privileged Access. Analysis 59 (1):52-59.
    Boghossian has argued that Putnam's externalism is incompatible with privileged access, i.e., the claim that a subject can have nonempirical knowledge of her thought contents ('What the externalist can know a priori', PAS 1997). Boghossian's argument assumes that Oscar can know a priori that (1) 'water' aims to name a natural kind; and (2) 'water' expresses an atomic concept. However, I show that if Burge's externalism is correct, then these assumptions may well be false. This leaves Boghossian with two options: (...)
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  22. J. Brown (2004). Wright on Transmission Failure. Analysis 64 (1):57-67.
  23. J. Brown (2000). Against Temporal Externalism. Analysis 60 (2):178-188.
  24. J. Brown (1998). Natural Kind Terms and Recognitional Capacities. Mind 107 (426):275-303.
    The main contribution of this paper is a new account of how a community may introduce a term for a natural kind in advance of knowing the correct scientific account of that kind. The account is motivated by the inadequacy of the currently dominant accounts of how a community may do this, namely those proposed by Kripke and by Putman. Their accounts fail to deal satisfactorily with the facts that (1) typically, an item that instantiates one natural kind instantiates several (...)
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  25.  78
    Jessica Brown (2005). Adapt or Die: The Death of Invariantism? Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):263–285.
    Contextualists support their view by appeal to cases which show that whether an attribution of knowledge seems correct depends on attributor factors. Contextualists conclude that the truth-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. Invariantists respond that these cases show only that the warranted assertability-conditions of knowledge attributions depend on the attributor's context. I examine DeRose's recent argument against the possibility of such an invariantist response, an argument which appeals to the knowledge account of assertion and the context-sensitivity of (...)
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  26.  44
    Jeffrey M. Brown (2016). Is Disability a Neutral Condition? Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):188-210.
    The issue of whether biological and psychological properties associated with disability can be harmful, beneficial, or neutral brings up an important philosophical question about how we evaluate disability, and disability’s impact on well-being. The debate is usually characterized as between those who argue disability is intrinsically harmful, and disability rights advocates who argue that disability is just another way of being different, in part, because disability can also provide important benefits. I argue that this debate is a false one, as (...)
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  27.  25
    Jill A. Brown & William R. Forster (2013). CSR and Stakeholder Theory: A Tale of Adam Smith. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 112 (2):301-312.
    This article leverages insights from the body of Adam Smith’s work, including two lesser-known manuscripts—the Theory of Moral Sentiments and Lectures in Jurisprudence —to help answer the question as to how companies should morally prioritize corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives and stakeholder claims. Smith makes philosophical distinctions between justice and beneficence and perfect and imperfect rights, and we leverage those distinctions to speak to contemporary CSR and stakeholder management theories. We address the often-neglected question as to how far a company (...)
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  28. J. Brown (1995). The Incompatibility of Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access. Analysis 55 (3):149-56.
    In this paper, I defend McKinsey's argument (Analysis 1991) that Burge's antiindividualist position is incompatible with privileged access, viz. the claim that each subject can know his own thought contents just by reflection and without having undertaken an empirical investigation. I argue that Burge thinks that there are certain necessary conditions for a subject to have thoughts involving certain sorts of concepts; these conditions are appropriately different for thoughts involving natural kind concepts and thoughts involving non-natural kind concepts. I use (...)
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  29.  79
    Jessica Brown (2013). Intuitions, Evidence and Hopefulness. Synthese 190 (12):2021-2046.
    Experimental philosophers have recently conducted surveys of folk judgements about a range of phenomena of interest to philosophy including knowledge, reference, and free will. Some experimental philosophers take these results to undermine the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence. I consider several different replies to the suggestion that these results undermine philosophical appeal to intuition, both piecemeal replies which raise concerns about particular surveys, and more general replies. The general replies include the suggestions that the surveys consider the (...)
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  30. James R. Brown (2008). The Community of Science®. In Martin Carrier, Don Howard & Janet A. Kourany (eds.), The Challenge of the Social and the Pressure of Practice: Science and Values Revisited. University of Pittsburgh Press.
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  31.  5
    Toby Schonfeld, Joseph S. Brown, N. Jean Amoura & Bruce Gordon (2011). “You Don't Know Me, But …”: Access to Patient Data and Subject Recruitment in Human Subjects Research. American Journal of Bioethics 11 (11):31-38.
    The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 11, Page 31-38, November 2011.
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  32.  61
    James Robert Brown (1999). Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures. Routledge.
    Philosophy of Mathematics is clear and engaging, and student friendly The book discusses the great philosophers and the importance of mathematics to their thought. Among topics discussed in the book are the mathematical image, platonism, picture-proofs, applied mathematics, Hilbert and Godel, knots and notation definitions, picture-proofs and Wittgenstein, computation, proof and conjecture.
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  33. Jessica Brown (2011). Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Philosophical Evidence. Dialectica 65 (4):493-516.
    What is the nature of the evidence provided by thought experiments in philosophy? For instance, what evidence is provided by the Gettier thought experiment against the JTB theory of knowledge? According to one view, it provides as evidence only a certain psychological proposition, e.g. that it seems to one that the subject in the Gettier case lacks knowledge. On an alternative, nonpsychological view, the Gettier thought experiment provides as evidence the nonpsychological proposition that the subject in the Gettier case lacks (...)
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  34.  29
    Joshua D. K. Brown (forthcoming). Natural Objects. Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-18.
    This paper introduces a framework for thinking about ontological questions—in particular, the Special Composition Question—and shows how the framework might help support something like an account of restricted composition. The framework takes the form of an account of natural objects, in analogy with David Lewis’s account of natural properties. Objects, like properties, come in various metaphysical grades, from the fundamental, fully objective, perfectly natural objects to the nomologically otiose, maximally gerrymandered, perfectly non-natural objects. The perfectly natural objects, I argue, are (...)
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  35.  33
    James Robert Brown (1989). The Rational and the Social. Routledge.
    THE SOCIOLOGICAL TURN The problem we are concerned with is just this: How should we understand science? Are we to account for scientific knowledge (or ...
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  36. Andrei Pleşu & James Christian Brown (2004). Alexandru Dragomir. Studia Phaenomenologica 4 (3-4):65-72.
    The article conveys the portrait of a man for whom understanding was a matter of the highest spiritual intimacy, a man who continuously disregarded his possible engagement in the public life as a philosopher, finally a man whom we find, in the twilight of his life, concerned with the intricate tension between the “muteness” of philosophy (as being able “only” to double life by means of rational discourse) and religion. Alexandru Dragomir’s portrait is portrayed in comparison to another important Romanian (...)
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  37.  77
    J. R. Brown (2003). Science and Constructive Mathematics. Analysis 63 (1):48-51.
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  38. Jessica Brown (2013). Infallibilism, Evidence and Pragmatics. Analysis 73 (4):626-635.
    According to one contemporary formulation of infallibilism, probability 1 infallibilism, if a subject knows that p, then the probability of p on her evidence is 1. To avoid an implausible scepticism about knowledge, probability 1 infallibilism needs to allow that, in a wide range of cases, a proposition can be evidence for itself. However, such infallibilism needs to explain why it is typically infelicitous to cite p as evidence for p itself. I argue that probability 1 infallibilism has no explanation (...)
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  39. J. Brown (2000). Critical Reasoning, Understanding and Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):659-676.
    Following Burge, many anti-individualists suppose that a subject can possess a concept even if she incompletely understands it. While agreeing that this is possible, I argue that there is a limit on the extent to which a subject can incompletely understand the set of concepts she thinks with. This limit derives from our conception of our ability to reflectively evaluate our own thoughts or, as Burge puts it, our ability to engage in critical reasoning. The paper extends Burge’s own work (...)
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  40. Jonathon D. Brown, Keith A. Dutton & Kathleen E. Cook (2001). From the Top Down: Self-Esteem and Self-Evaluation. Cognition and Emotion 15 (5):615-631.
  41.  68
    Jessica Brown (2012). Practial Reasoning, Decision Theory and Anti-Intellectualism. Episteme 9 (1):1-20.
    In this paper, I focus on the most important form of argument for anti-intellectualism, one that exploits alleged connections between knowledge and practical reasoning. I first focus on a form of this argument which exploits a universal principle, Sufficiency, connecting knowledge and practical reasoning. In the face of putative counterexamples to Sufficiency, a number of authors have attempted to reformulate the argument with a weaker principle. However, I argue that the weaker principles suggested are also problematic. I conclude that, so (...)
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  42. James Robert Brown (2004). Why Empiricism Won't Work. In C. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science.
    A defence of a priori knowledge of nature via thought experiments. The article is part of a pair, the counter-view argued by John Norton.
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  43.  2
    John Brown (1960). Evidence for a Selective Process During Perception of Tachistoscopically Presented Stimuli. Journal of Experimental Psychology 59 (3):176.
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  44.  6
    Jeffrey M. Brown (2016). Equality of Opportunity, Disability, and Stigma. Social Philosophy Today 32:175-181.
  45.  2
    Vivek Soundararajan & Jill A. Brown (forthcoming). Voluntary Governance Mechanisms in Global Supply Chains: Beyond CSR to a Stakeholder Utility Perspective. Journal of Business Ethics.
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  46. James Robert Brown (2004). Why Thought Experiments Transcend Experience. In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. pp. 23-43.
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  47.  22
    Joshua D. K. Brown (2015). Chemical Atomism: A Case Study in Confirmation and Ontology. Synthese 192 (2):453-485.
    Quine, taking the molecular constitution of matter as a paradigmatic example, offers an account of the relation between theory confirmation and ontology. Elsewhere, he deploys a similar ontological methodology to argue for the existence of mathematical objects. Penelope Maddy considers the atomic/molecular theory in more historical detail. She argues that the actual ontological practices of science display a positivistic demand for “direct observation,” and that fulfillment of this demand allows us to distinguish molecules and other physical objects from mathematical abstracta. (...)
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  48. James Brown (1977). Moral Theory and the Ought--Can Principle. Mind 86 (342):206-223.
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  49.  51
    James Robert Brown (1986). Thought Experiments Since the Scientific Revolution. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (1):1 – 15.
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  50.  91
    Jessica Brown (2005). Comparing Contextualism and Invariantism on the Correctness of Contextualist Intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):71-100.
    Contextualism is motivated by cases in which the intuitive correctness of a range of phenomena, including knowledge attributions, assertions and reasoning, depends on the attributor's context. Contextualists offer a charitable understanding of these intuitions, interpreting them as reflecting the truth value of the knowledge attributions and the appropriateness of the relevant assertions and reasoning. Here, I investigate a range of different invariantist accounts and examine the extent to which they too can offer a charitable account of the contextualist data.
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