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John P. Burgess [152]John Burgess [17]J. A. Burgess [15]J. P. Burgess [9]
John W. Burgess [5]Jonathan S. Burgess [5]James F. Burgess [4]John A. Burgess [3]

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Profile: John Burgess (Princeton University)
Profile: Jennifer Louise Burgess (University of New England (United States))
  1. Computability and Logic.George Boolos, John Burgess, Richard P. & C. Jeffrey - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
    Computability and Logic has become a classic because of its accessibility to students without a mathematical background and because it covers not simply the staple topics of an intermediate logic course, such as Godel’s incompleteness theorems, but also a large number of optional topics, from Turing’s theory of computability to Ramsey’s theorem. Including a selection of exercises, adjusted for this edition, at the end of each chapter, it offers a new and simpler treatment of the representability of recursive functions, a (...)
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  2. A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics.John P. Burgess & Gideon A. Rosen - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
    Numbers and other mathematical objects are exceptional in having no locations in space or time or relations of cause and effect. This makes it difficult to account for the possibility of the knowledge of such objects, leading many philosophers to embrace nominalism, the doctrine that there are no such objects, and to embark on ambitious projects for interpreting mathematics so as to preserve the subject while eliminating its objects. This book cuts through a host of technicalities that have obscured previous (...)
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  3.  19
    Truth.Alexis G. Burgess & John P. Burgess - 2011 - Princeton University Press.
    This is a concise, advanced introduction to current philosophical debates about truth. A blend of philosophical and technical material, the book is organized around, but not limited to, the tendency known as deflationism, according to which there is not much to say about the nature of truth. In clear language, Burgess and Burgess cover a wide range of issues, including the nature of truth, the status of truth-value gaps, the relationship between truth and meaning, relativism and pluralism about truth, and (...)
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  4.  25
    Fixing Frege.John P. Burgess - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
    This book surveys the assortment of methods put forth for fixing Frege's system, in an attempt to determine just how much of mathematics can be reconstructed in ...
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  5. Against Ethics.John P. Burgess - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):427-439.
    This is the verbatim manuscript of a paper which has circulated underground for close to thirty years, reaching a metethical conclusion close to J. L. Mackie’s by a somewhat different route.
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  6. Mathematics and Bleak House.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Philosophia Mathematica 12 (1):18-36.
    The form of nominalism known as 'mathematical fictionalism' is examined and found wanting, mainly on grounds that go back to an early antinominalist work of Rudolf Carnap that has unfortunately not been paid sufficient attention by more recent writers.
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  7.  44
    Book Review: Stewart Shapiro. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. [REVIEW]John P. Burgess - 1999 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (2):283-291.
  8. E Pluribus Unum: Plural Logic and Set Theory.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Philosophia Mathematica 12 (3):193-221.
    A new axiomatization of set theory, to be called Bernays-Boolos set theory, is introduced. Its background logic is the plural logic of Boolos, and its only positive set-theoretic existence axiom is a reflection principle of Bernays. It is a very simple system of axioms sufficient to obtain the usual axioms of ZFC, plus some large cardinals, and to reduce every question of plural logic to a question of set theory.
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  9.  30
    Occam's Razor and Scientific Method.John Burgess - 1998 - In Matthias Schirn (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematics Today. Clarendon Press. pp. 195--214.
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  10.  59
    Philosophical Logic.John P. Burgess - 2009 - Princeton University Press.
    Classical logic -- Temporal logic -- Modal logic -- Conditional logic -- Relevantistic logic -- Intuitionistic logic.
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  11.  78
    The Truth is Never Simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
    The complexity of the set of truths of arithmetic is determined for various theories of truth deriving from Kripke and from Gupta and Herzberger.
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  12.  49
    Which Modal Logic Is the Right One?John P. Burgess - 1999 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (1):81-93.
    The question, "Which modal logic is the right one for logical necessity?," divides into two questions, one about model-theoretic validity, the other about proof-theoretic demonstrability. The arguments of Halldén and others that the right validity argument is S5, and the right demonstrability logic includes S4, are reviewed, and certain common objections are argued to be fallacious. A new argument, based on work of Supecki and Bryll, is presented for the claim that the right demonstrability logic must be contained in S5, (...)
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  13.  46
    Quick Completeness Proofs for Some Logics of Conditionals.John P. Burgess - 1981 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 22 (1):76-84.
  14.  50
    Quinus ab Omni Nævo Vindicatus.John P. Burgess - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):25-65.
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  15. Quine, Analyticity and Philosophy of Mathematics.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (214):38–55.
    Quine correctly argues that Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions rests on a distinction between analytic and synthetic, which Quine rejects. I argue that Quine needs something like Carnap's distinction to enable him to explain the obviousness of elementary mathematics, while at the same time continuing to maintain as he does that the ultimate ground for holding mathematics to be a body of truths lies in the contribution that mathematics makes to our overall scientific theory of the world. Quine's (...)
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  16. Being Explained Away.John P. Burgess - 2005 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (2):41-56.
  17.  72
    Why I Am Not a Nominalist.John P. Burgess - 1983 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24 (1):93-105.
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  18. The Sorites Paradox and Higher-Order Vagueness.J. A. Burgess - 1990 - Synthese 85 (3):417-474.
    One thousand stones, suitably arranged, might form a heap. If we remove a single stone from a heap of stones we still have a heap; at no point will the removal of just one stone make sufficient difference to transform a heap into something which is not a heap. But, if this is so, we still have a heap, even when we have removed the last stone composing our original structure. So runs the Sorites paradox. Similar paradoxes can be constructed (...)
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  19.  38
    Potential and Foetal Value.J. A. Burgess - 2010 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 27 (2):140-153.
    The argument from potential has been hard to assess because the versions presented by friends and those presented by enemies have born very little resemblance to each other. I here try to improve this situation by attempting to bring both versions into enforced contact. To this end, I sketch a more detailed analysis of the modern concept of potential than any hitherto attempted. As one would expect, arguments from potential couched in terms of that notion are evident non-starters. I then (...)
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  20.  80
    The Unreal Future.John P. Burgess - 1978 - Theoria 44 (3):157-179.
  21.  30
    Decidability for Branching Time.John P. Burgess - 1980 - Studia Logica 39 (2-3):203-218.
    The species of indeterminist tense logic called Peircean by A. N. Prior is proved to be recursively decidable.
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  22. Saul Kripke: Puzzles and Mysteries.John P. Burgess - 2013 - Polity.
     
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  23.  80
    Logic and Time.John P. Burgess - 1979 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (4):566-582.
  24.  69
    Quinus Ab Omni Naevo Vindicatus.John P. Burgess - 1998 - In Ali A. Kazmi (ed.), Meaning and Reference. University of Calgary Press. pp. 25--66.
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  25. Book Review: Text and Psyche: Experiencing Scripture Today. [REVIEW]John P. Burgess - forthcoming - Interpretation 53 (4):430-431.
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  26.  13
    A Remark on Henkin Sentences and Their Contraries.John P. Burgess - 2003 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (3):185-188.
    That the result of flipping quantifiers and negating what comes after, applied to branching-quantifier sentences, is not equivalent to the negation of the original has been known for as long as such sentences have been studied. It is here pointed out that this syntactic operation fails in the strongest possible sense to correspond to any operation on classes of models.
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  27.  12
    Truth and the Absence of Fact.J. P. Burgess - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):602-604.
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  28. On a Derivation of the Necessity of Identity.John P. Burgess - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7):1-19.
    The source, status, and significance of the derivation of the necessity of identity at the beginning of Kripke’s lecture “Identity and Necessity” is discussed from a logical, philosophical, and historical point of view.
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  29.  71
    Vagueness, Epistemicism and Response-Dependence.J. Burgess - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):507 – 524.
  30.  34
    Natural Deduction Rules for a Logic of Vagueness.J. A. Burgess & I. L. Humberstone - 1987 - Erkenntnis 27 (2):197-229.
    Extant semantic theories for languages containing vague expressions violate intuition by delivering the same verdict on two principles of classical propositional logic: the law of noncontradiction and the law of excluded middle. Supervaluational treatments render both valid; many-Valued treatments, Neither. The core of this paper presents a natural deduction system, Sound and complete with respect to a 'mixed' semantics which validates the law of noncontradiction but not the law of excluded middle.
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  31.  77
    Is Genetic Engineering Wrong, Per Se?J. A. Burgess & Adrian Walsh - 1998 - Journal of Value Inquiry 32 (3):393-406.
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  32. Book Review: Reading the Bible with the Dead: What You Can Learn From the History of Exegesis That You Can't Learn From Exegesis Alone. [REVIEW]John P. Burgess - forthcoming - Interpretation 62 (3):332-332.
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  33.  3
    Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects.John P. Burgess & Crispin Wright - 1984 - Philosophical Review 93 (4):638.
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  34.  3
    When Did You First Begin to Feel It?John A. Burgess & S. A. Tawia - 1996 - Locating the Beginnings of Human Consciousness? Bioethics 10 (1):1-26.
    In this paper we attempt to sharpen and to provide an answer to the question of when human beings first become conscious. Since it is relatively uncontentious that a capacity for raw sensation precedes and underpins all more sophisticated mental capacities, our question is tantamount to asking when human beings first have experiences with sensational content. Two interconnected features of our argument are crucial. First, we argue that experiences with sensational content are supervenient on facts about electrical activity in the (...)
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  35. Could a Zygote Be a Human Being?John Burgess - 2010 - Bioethics 24 (2):61-70.
    This paper re-examines the question of whether quirks of early human foetal development tell against the view (conceptionism) that we are human beings at conception. A zygote is capable of splitting to give rise to identical twins. Since the zygote cannot be identical with either human being it will become, it cannot already be a human being. Parallel concerns can be raised about chimeras in which two embryos fuse. I argue first that there are just two ways of dealing with (...)
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  36.  18
    When Did You First Begin to Feel It? — Locating the Beginning of Human Consciousness.J. A. Burgess & S. A. Tawia - 1996 - Bioethics 10 (1):1-26.
    In this paper we attempt to sharpen and to provide an answer to the question of when human beings first become conscious. Since it is relatively uncontentious that a capacity for raw sensation precedes and underpins all more sophisticated mental capacities, our question is tantamount to asking when human beings first have experiences with sensational content. Two interconnected features of our argument are crucial. First, we argue that experiences with sensational content are supervenient on facts about electrical activity in the (...)
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  37.  1
    No Requirement of Relevance.John P. Burgess - 2005 - In Stewart Shapiro (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford University Press. pp. 727--750.
    There are schools of logicians who claim that an argument is not valid unless the conclusion is relevant to the premises. In particular, relevance logicians reject the classical theses that anything follows from a contradiction and that a logical truth follows from everything. This chapter critically evaluates several different motivations for relevance logic, and several systems of relevance logic, finding them all wanting.
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  38.  51
    Dummett's Case for Intuitionism.John P. Burgess - 1984 - History and Philosophy of Logic 5 (2):177-194.
    Dummett's case against platonism rests on arguments concerning the acquisition and manifestation of knowledge of meaning. Dummett's arguments are here criticized from a viewpoint less Davidsonian than Chomskian. Dummett's case against formalism is obscure because in its prescriptive considerations are not clearly separated from descriptive. Dummett's implicit value judgments are here made explicit and questioned. ?Combat Revisionism!? Chairman Mao.
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  39.  8
    Is There a Problem About the Deflationary Theory of Truth?John P. Burgess - 2003 - In Leon Horsten & Volker Halbach (eds.), Principles of Truth. De Gruyter. pp. 37-56.
  40.  31
    Synthetic Mechanics.John P. Burgess - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (4):379 - 395.
  41.  87
    Book Review: The Word of God for the People of God: An Entryway to the Theological Interpretation of Scripture. [REVIEW]John P. Burgess - forthcoming - Interpretation 65 (3):328-329.
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  42. Can Truth Out?Johnw Burgess - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
  43.  74
    The Great Slippery-Slope Argument.J. A. Burgess - 1993 - Journal of Medical Ethics 19 (3):169-174.
    Whenever some form of beneficent killing--for example, voluntary euthanasia--is advocated, the proposal is greeted with a flood of slippery-slope arguments warning of the dangers of a Nazi-style slide into genocide. This paper is an attempt systematically to evaluate arguments of this kind. Although there are slippery-slope arguments that are sound and convincing, typical formulations of the Nazi-invoking argument are found to be seriously deficient both in logical rigour and in the social history and psychology required as a scholarly underpinning. As (...)
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  44. Vague Identity: Evans Misrepresented.J. A. Burgess - 1989 - Analysis 49 (3):112 - 119.
    In 'Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood' David Lewis defends Gareth Evans against a widespread misunderstanding of an argument that appeared in his article 'Can There be Vague Objects?'. Lewis takes himself to be 'defending Evans' and not just correcting a mistake; witness his remark that, 'As misunderstood, Evans is a pitiful figure: a "technical philosopher" out of control of his technicalities, taken in by a fallacious proof of an absurd conclusion'. Let me say at the outset that I take Lewis to (...)
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  45. Putting Structuralism in its Place.John P. Burgess - unknown
    One textbook may introduce the real numbers in Cantor’s way, and another in Dedekind’s, and the mathematical community as a whole will be completely indifferent to the choice between the two. This sort of phenomenon was famously called to the attention of philosophers by Paul Benacerraf. It will be argued that structuralism in philosophy of mathematics is a mistake, a generalization of Benacerraf’s observation in the wrong direction, resulting from philosophers’ preoccupation with ontology.
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  46.  23
    Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):573-577.
  47. Which Modal Models Are the Right Ones (for Logical Necessity)?John P. Burgess - 2003 - Theoria 18 (2):145-158.
    Recently it has become almost the received wisdom in certain quarters that Kripke models are appropriate only for something like metaphysical modalities, and not for logical modalities. Here the line of thought leading to Kripke models, and reasons why they are no less appropriate for logical than for other modalities, are explained. It is also indicated where the fallacy in the argument leading to the contrary conclusion lies. The lessons learned are then applied to the question of the status of (...)
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  48.  89
    When is Circularity in Definitions Benign?J. A. Burgess - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):214–233.
    I aim to show how and why some definitions can be benignly circular. According to Lloyd Humberstone, a definition that is analytically circular need not be inferentially circular and so might serve to illuminate the application-conditions for a concept. I begin by tidying up some problems with Humberstone's account. I then show that circular definitions of a kind commonly thought to be benign have inferentially circular truth-conditions and so are malign by Humberstone's test. But his test is too demanding. The (...)
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  49.  14
    Axioms for Tense Logic. I. ``Since'' and ``Until''.John P. Burgess - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23 (4):367-374.
  50.  18
    A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):565-570.
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