“Eric Voegelin's Philosophy of Myth” is an introduction to the eminent political philosopher's theory of the nature and function of myth in pre-modern cultures, particularly in ancient Greece and Mesopotamia. For Voegelin archaic myths and symbols provide grounds or foundations for a broad range of phenomena, from individual objects and events to the entire cosmos. They convey a sense of wholeness and interconnectedness through a type of analogical thinking. The concepts of ‘compactness’ and ‘differentiation’ are essential components in his overall (...) theory. The former designates the unity of the symbol and the symbolized, the latter their separation into immanent and transcendent poles in the reflections of Greek philosophers and of Jewish and Christian thinkers. Both compact and differentiated accounts employ the symbols of the Beginning and Beyond, viz. the originating source of all things and their transcendent goal. Voegelin's treatment of the mythical and philosophical styles of truth is not limited to the distant past. Throughout history individual myths or symbols lose their transformative power, but, he asserts, they are regenerated or replaced by new ones discovered by great souls who have experiential access to the underlying realities. (shrink)
It is difficult to imagine a major philosopher more in need of introduction than Plotinus, nor one whose thought is so deeply resistant to summary treatment. O'Meara succeeds by awakening the beginner's interest in his subject and reminding the specialist why it is so fascinating. First we are familiarized with the details of Plotinus's life, the diverse influences upon him, stylistic features of his writings, and remarks on his philosophical method. One hundred pages are devoted to exploring Plotinus's philosophical views, (...) beginning with his complex account of soul's relation to body and the intelligible world's relation to the sensible. O'Meara carefully articulates Plotinus's immaterialism, his comprehensive scheme of hierarchical ontological dependence, and the dense dialectical context within which he seeks to solve difficulties in Plato's positions by responding to Aristotelian and Stoic objections. Chapter 4 tackles Plotinus's very difficult views on knowledge. He severely devalues knowledge of the external world, arguing that it is only a deficient form of self-knowledge. True knowledge pertains to the divine intellect, which is self-reflexive and identical with its "objects." O'Meara rightly wonders whether Plotinus's epistemological stance amounts to a retreat and indeed whether he eliminates knowledge altogether, at least in the contemporary sense. But if--from the Plotinian perspective--pure thought is nonpropositional, it is puzzling why O'Meara believes it is not intuitive, not "a form of knowing that is an alternative... to science and logic" ; in his view, it is the "goal" of the latter. It might, however, be the goal of scientific knowledge precisely by being an alternative to it. (shrink)
