A superconducting transition temperature as high as 100 K was recently discovered in one monolayer FeSe grown on SrTiO3. The discovery ignited efforts to identify the mechanism for the markedly enhanced Tc from its bulk value of 8 K. There are two main views about the origin of the Tc enhancement: interfacial effects and/or excess electrons with strong electron correlation. Here, we report the observation of superconductivity below 20 K in surface electron-doped bulk FeSe. The doped surface layer possesses all (...) the key spectroscopic aspects of the monolayer FeSe on SrTiO3. Without interfacial effects, the surface layer state has a moderate Tc of 20 K with a smaller gap opening of 4.2 meV. Our results show that excess electrons with strong correlation cannot induce the maximum Tc, which in turn reveals the need for interfacial effects to achieve the highest Tc in one monolayer FeSe on SrTiO3. (shrink)

That style which modern scholars have called “curial” or “clergial” is an elaborate fifteenth-century prose style practiced most notoriously by William Caxton in works published during the last decades of the century. It is often assumed that he learned the style from French courtly models. This view has recently suffered modification through the work of Diane Bornstein, whose study of the Tale of Melibee revealed that Chaucer had an independent grasp of many features of the style almost a hundred years (...) before Caxton used it. Although she was successful in demonstrating the use at an early date of these stylistic features, Bornstein did not question or discuss the sources of Chaucer's evident competence. It could be reasonably assumed, as had been assumed for Caxton, that they lay in French literary texts, since features of the style are present in the source of Melibee, the Livre de Mellibee et de Prudence, and they could be presumed to have occurred also in other literary texts of French origin with which Chaucer was doubtless familiar. (shrink)

In this paper we prove that the equational class generated by bounded BCK-algebras is the variety generated by the class of finite simple bounded BCK-algebras. To obtain these results we prove that every simple algebra in the equational class generated by bounded BCK-algebras is also a relatively simple bounded BCK-algebra. Moreover, we show that every simple bounded BCK-algebra can be embedded into a simple integral commutative bounded residuated lattice. We extend our main results to some richer subreducts of the class (...) of integral commutative bounded residuated lattices and to the involutive case. (© 2007 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim). (shrink)

This paper examines narrativism’s claim that the historical past cannot be known once and for all because it must be continuously re-described from the standpoint of the present. We argue that this claim is based on a non sequitur. We take narrativism’s claim that the past must be re-described continuously from the perspective of the present to be the result of the following train of thought: 1) “all knowledge is conceptually mediated”; 2) “the conceptual framework through which knowledge of reality (...) is mediated changes with every new generation of historians”; therefore (narrativism’s claim) “the historical past changes with every new generation of historians”. The idea of an unchanging past, for the narrativist, requires denying premise 1 (all knowledge is conceptually mediated”) and therefore rests on a problematic commitment to the chimerical notion of the past as it is in-itself, wie es eigentlich gewesen. We argue that the narrativist’s conclusion does not follow unless one adds a further premise, namely 3) “it is not possible to view reality through the categorial framework of historical agents”. If one asserts the possibility of grasping reality through the categorial framework of others, be they contemporary or past agents (as much philosophy of history written in an idealist key does), then one no longer has to accept the narrativist’s inference that since the past cannot be known in-itself or independently of conceptual mediation, then it cannot be known as it always was for the historical agents. Narrativism’s inference that the past cannot be known as it always was does not follow from premises 1 and 2 unless one smuggles in another problematic premise, premise 3. In this paper we defend the claim that the past can be known as it always was (not as it is in-itself) by invoking a different conception of the role of conceptual mediation in historical knowledge, one which assumes the possibility of viewing reality through the categorial framework of others. This notion of the role of conceptual mediation in historical knowledge is prevalent in the idealist tradition but, in the interest of brevity, we will defend this notion of mediacy by specific reference to the idealist philosophy of R.G. Collingwood. (shrink)

The paper discusses regularisation of dualities. A given duality between (concrete) categories, e.g. a variety of algebras and a category of representation spaces, is lifted to a duality between the respective categories of semilattice representations in the category of algebras and the category of spaces. In particular, this gives duality for the regularisation of an irregular variety that has a duality. If the type of the variety includes constants, then the regularisation depends critically on the location or absence of constants (...) within the defining identities. The role of schizophrenic objects is discussed, and a number of applications are given. Among these applications are different forms of regularisation of Priestley, Stone and Pontryagin dualities. (shrink)

A combination of social forces has thrown marriage into question in westernised societies at the end of the millennium. This uncertainty creates space for new ways of thinking about marriage. In this context, we examine the idea of marriage as friendship. We trace its genealogy in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor and then subject it to critical scrutiny using some of Michel de Montaigne’s ideas. We ask how applicable the ideal of higher friendship is (...) to marriage and what might be gained and lost by a synthesis of marriage and friendship. Grounding the discussion in historical sources is valuable because the topic is so little explored in the contemporary philosophical literature. This approach also allows any enduring value in these historical texts to be elicited. (shrink)

The problem of good, for all its fundamental importance, has been studied systematically only occasionally in the history of philosophy. The Greeks were concerned with it and so too are the moderns, but it was almost disregarded during the ages of faith. Apparently it is only in periods of moral transition, when there is widespread rejection of traditional standards, that people begin to ask: What, after all, is goodness? What does it mean to call something good? An Enquiry into Goodness (...) is part of the modern discussion of the problem. Its author served for a period with the British Intelligence Corps in Israel where, we are told, “his interest in ethical problems was first aroused by the irreconcilability of conflicting claims.” Professor Sparshott is an Oxford graduate, but his book is, in some respects, pleasantly uncharacteristic of the Oxford Moralist school. In controversial matters he looks for guidance not merely to the moderns, but to the ancients and even the medievals. The definition of good which he proposes is not far removed from the traditional Aristotelian–Thomist one. This is the first time that this concept, or any approximation of it, has been treated seriously by an English moralist. It is, apparently, the first time it has received extensive analysis anywhere. Scholastic textbooks seem to regard its validity as self–evident and content themselves usually with a bald assertion and a confirmatory quotation from St. Thomas. This attitude may have been excusable in the past; in the context of a Christian morality the Aristotelian concept is, I suppose, unquestionable. But it is highly unsatisfactory at present when so many moralists speak from a purely humanist standpoint. (shrink)

This impeccable publication, the second of a four-volume History of Philosophy under the editorship of M Gilson, impressively inaugurates a series which should liberally endow undergraduate studies and the educated English-speaking public. More succinct and in some respects more decisive than Fr Copleston’s two-volume treatment, more developed than Hirschberger’s genial outline, more systematically philosophical than Dom Knowles’ biographico-historical survey, Dr Maurer’s exposition can stand comparison with Gilson’s own specialist History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages to which he modestly (...) claims to offer an introduction, ‘and beyond all histories to the works of the medieval philosophers themselves’. He concentrates a masterful attention upon the key Christian thinkers from Augustine to Suarez, presenting a rich sweep of some twelve centuries from the patristic thought of the fourth century through the Scholastic era to the late Renaissance scholastics of the sixteenth century. This mature survey, emphasising sympathetic presentation rather than critical evaluation of each philosopher, is fitted succinctly and lucidly into less than 400 pages, reinforced by some 40 pages of select notes and followed by a scholarly bibliography and systematic index. The text is limpedly written, based squarely upon the original sources in the light of the best contemporary scholarship with a bias towards the well-known Gilson thesis, and pleasantly illuminated by the personal research judgment of the author. (shrink)

Scientists and laypeople alike use the sense of understanding that an explanation conveys as a cue to good or correct explanation. Although the occurrence of this sense or feeling of understanding is neither necessary nor sufficient for good explanation, it does drive judgments of the plausibility and, ultimately, the acceptability, of an explanation. This paper presents evidence that the sense of understanding is in part the routine consequence of two well-documented biases in cognitive psychology: overconfidence and hindsight. In light of (...) the prevalence of counterfeit understanding in the history of science, I argue that many forms of cognitive achievement do not involve a sense of understanding, and that only the truth or accuracy of an explanation make the sense of understanding a valid cue to genuine understanding. (shrink)

At some distance from a high-rate source in an elastic half-space, the dominant wave motion at the free surface is a Rayleigh surface wave. The calculation of surface waves generated by a concentrated force in a half-space is a basic problem in elastodynamics. By straightforward manipulations, the result can be used to obtain surface waves for other kinds of wave-generating body-force arrangements. For example, appropriate combinations of double-forces (or dipoles) can be used to represent the surface loading due to laser (...) irradiation, or due to acoustic emission from the opening of a sub-surface crack or from sliding over a fault surface. The surface wave motion is usually obtained by the application of integral transform techniques and the subsequent extraction of the surface waves as the contributions from poles in the integral for the inverse transform. In this paper, we use a much simpler approach based on the elastodynamic reciprocity theorem. We consider a transversely isotropic solid whose axis of symmetry is normal to the surface of the half-space. Surface wave pulses generated by a single force, by irradiation from a laser source, and by opening of a crack, have been determined. (shrink)

Philosophers agree that scientific explanations aim to produce understanding, and that good ones succeed in this aim. But few seriously consider what understanding is, or what the cues are when we have it. If it is a psychological state or process, describing its specific nature is the job of psychological theorizing. This article examines the role of understanding in scientific explanation. It warns that the seductive, phenomenological sense of understanding is often, but mistakenly, viewed as a cue of genuine understanding. (...) The article closes with a discussion of several new paths of research that tie the psychology of scientific explanation to cognate notions of learning, testimony, and understanding. (shrink)

There is now a considerable literature on Michel Foucault but this is the first monograph which explicitly addresses his influence and impact upon education. Personal autonomy has been seen as a major aim, if not the aim of liberal education. But if Foucault is correct that personal autonomy and the notion of the autonomous person are myths, then the pursuit of such an aim by educationalists is misguided. The author develops this critique of personal autonomy and liberal education from the (...) writings of Foucault, and also considers Foucault's own educational practices. The author, James Marshall, who lives in New Zealand, has already written several articles for academic journals on Foucault. (shrink)