Berkeley is commonly regarded as an idealist whose system is saved from subjectivism only by the advent of a God more violently ex machina than the God of any other philosopher. I hope to show that this accusation rests on a misunderstanding of his central theory, a misunderstanding which gives God a place both inconsistent with his main premisses and useless in his system. I hope also to display by quotation the real Berkeley, whose theory of God's place and nature (...) is directly supported by argument and consistent with his premisses, and makes a system which, if it is less than a completely coherent philosophy, is more than an episcopal assumption. (shrink)

Professor Flew's vigorous and interesting paper, “The Justification of Punishment,” in PHILOSOPHY for October 1954 discusses my article on Punishment in Mind for April 1939. It merits some rejoinder. Flew's paper ranges far beyond the particular issue of punishment, and much of what is most interesting in it has this wider relevance. I, too, therefore shall use punishment as a peg on which to hang some discussion of the wider problems of ethics.

I propose to consider in this paper some points concerning the part played by reason in non-moral conduct. The place of reason in ethics is a separate issue with which I shall not be directly concerned.

Originally published in 1966, this introduction to moral philosophy examines the philosophical basis of moral problems and considers some of the crucial arguments that attempt to define or dispense with a moral justification of events. Some of the questions discussed are whether moral rules are justified and whether there is any positive evidence that man has free will.

Originally published in 1966, this introduction to moral philosophy examines the philosophical basis of moral problems and considers some of the crucial arguments that attempt to define or dispense with a moral justification of events. Some of the questions discussed are whether moral rules are justified and whether there is any positive evidence that man has free will.

First published in 1948, The State and the Citizen traces the development of the idea of the State as the ultimate source of authority. The author then proceeds to suggest the proper ends and limitation of State action. He analyses the conceptions of State unity and corporate loyalty and ends with a discussion on the relations between States and other associations, and between one State and another. This short and lucid introduction to political philosophy is an essential read for students (...) and scholars of political philosophy, philosophy, and political studies. (shrink)

‘All the difficulties in the theory of forms arise from their separation.’ This recurrent criticism of Aristotle's is, of course, one of the principal obstacles in the way of any reconstruction of the Platonic metaphysic. To begin with, it is flatly denied by Plato himself in the use of such words as μέθεξις, παρoυσία and κoινωνία. It must also be rejected by the orthodox account of the Forms which takes them to be immanent, constitutive principles in the world of everyday (...) life, like a Law of Nature or the Concrete Universal of Hegel. Finally, modern philosophy has made it clear that this view of universals is right and necessary if thought and language are to exist, and it is therefore tempting to attribute it to Plato. (shrink)