Results for 'J. David Abernethy'

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  1. Individual Members 2010.Martın Abadi, Yoshihiro Abe, Andreas Abel, Francine F. Abeles, Andrew Aberdein, J. David Abernethy, Kuanysh Abeshev, Nate Ackerman, Winfred P. Adams & Miloš Adzic - 2010 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 16 (4).
  2. Individual Members 2009.Martın Abadi, Yoshihiro Abe, Andreas Abel, Francine F. Abeles, Andrew Aberdein, J. David Abernethy, Nate Ackerman, Bryant Adams, Winifred P. Adams & Klaus T. Aehlig - 2009 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 15 (4).
  3.  49
    Individual Members 2008.Martın Abadi, Yoshihiro Abe, Andreas Abel, Francine F. Abeles, Andrew Aberdein, J. David Abernethy, Bryant Adams, Klaus T. Aehlig, Fritz Aeschbach & Henry Louis Africk - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (4).
  4.  41
    Willing the Law J. David Velleman.J. David Velleman - 2004 - In Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 27.
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  5.  74
    XIV. Don't Worry, Feel Guilty*: J. David Velleman.J. David Velleman - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:235-248.
    One can feel guilty without thinking that one actually is guilty of moral wrongdoing. For example, one can feel guilty about eating an ice cream or skipping aerobics, even if one doesn't take a moralistic view of self-indulgence. And one can feel guilty about things that aren't one's doing at all, as in the case of survivor's guilt about being spared some catastrophe suffered by others. Guilt without perceived wrongdoing may of course be irrational, but I think it is sometimes (...)
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  6. Practical Reflection.J. David Velleman - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):33-61.
    “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, _Practical Reflection_ develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the (...)
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  7. The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
  8. Narrative Explanation.J. David Velleman - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):1-25.
    A story does more than recount events; it recounts events in a way that renders them intelligible, thus conveying not just information but also understanding. We might therefore be tempted to describe narrative as a genre of explanation. When the police invite a suspect to “tell his story,” they are asking him to explain the blood on his shirt or his absence from home on the night of the murder; and whether he is judged to have a “good story” will (...)
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  9. How We Get Along.J. David Velleman - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    In How We Get Along, philosopher David Velleman compares our social interactions to the interactions among improvisational actors on stage. He argues that we play ourselves - not artificially but authentically, by doing what would make sense coming from us as we really are. And, like improvisational actors, we deal with one another in dual capacities: both as characters within the social drama and as players contributing to the shared performance. In this conception of social intercourse, Velleman finds rational (...)
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  10. Love as a Moral Emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
  11. Foundations for Moral Relativism.J. David Velleman - 2013 - OpenBook Publishers.
    In Foundations for Moral Relativism, J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”. The five self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as online avatars and (...)
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  12. What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.
    What happens when someone acts? A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent's body. I think that the standard story is flawed in several respects. The flaw (...)
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  13. Self to Self.J. David Velleman - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (1):39 - 76.
    Images of myself being Napoleon can scarcely merely be images of the physical figure of Napoleon.... They will rather be images of, for instance, the desolation at Austerlitz as viewed by me vaguely aware of my short stature and my cockaded hat, my hand in my tunic.
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  14.  94
    Self to Self: Selected Essays.J. David Velleman - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
    Self to Self brings together essays on personal identity, autonomy, and moral emotions by the distinguished philosopher J. David Velleman. Although each of the essays was written as an independent piece, they are unified by an overarching thesis, that there is no single entity denoted by 'the self', as well as by themes from Kantian ethics, psychoanalytic theory, social psychology, and Velleman's work in the philosophy of action. Two of the essays were selected by the editors of Philosophers' Annual (...)
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  15.  38
    The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):263-275.
  16. How To Share An Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally shared, these accounts fail to (...)
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  17. Well‐Being And Time.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):48-77.
  18. Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):277-284.
  19. What Good is a Will?J. David Velleman - 2007 - In Anton Leist & Holger Baumann (eds.), Action in Context. de Gruyter/Mouton.
    As a philosopher of action, I might be expected to believe that the will is a good thing. Actually, I believe that the will is a great thing - awesome, in fact. But I'm not thereby committed to its being something good. When I say that the will is awesome, I mean literally that it is a proper object of awe, a response that restrains us from abusing the will and moves us rather to use it respectfully, in a way (...)
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  20. A Right of Self‐Termination?J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (3):606-628.
  21.  78
    On Being Me: A Personal Invitation to Philosophy.J. David Velleman - 2020 - Princeton University Press.
    A moral philosopher’s meditations on some of life’s most important questions We’ve all had to puzzle over such profound matters as birth, death, regret, free will, agency, and love. How might philosophy help us think through these vital concerns? In On Being Me, renowned moral philosopher J. David Velleman presents a concise, accessible, and intimate exploration into subjects that we care deeply about, offering compelling insights into what it means to be human. Each of Velleman’s short, personal chapters begins (...)
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  22. How to Endure.J. David Velleman & Thomas Hofweber - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):37 - 57.
    The terms `endurance' and `perdurance' are commonly thought to denote distinct ways for an object to persist, but it is surprisingly hard to say what these are. The common approach, defining them in terms of temporal parts, is mistaken, because it does not lead to two coherent philosophical alternatives: endurance so understood becomes conceptually incoherent, while perdurance becomes not just true but a conceptual truth. Instead, we propose a different way to articulate the distinction, in terms of identity rather than (...)
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  23.  21
    Narrative Explanation.J. David Velleman - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):1-25.
    A story does more than recount events; it recounts events in a way that renders them intelligible, thus conveying not just information but also understanding. We might therefore be tempted to describe narrative as a genre of explanation. When the police invite a suspect to “tell his story,” they are asking him to explain the blood on his shirt or his absence from home on the night of the murder; and whether he is judged to have a “good story” will (...)
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  24. Family History.J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (3):357-378.
    Abstract I argue that meaning in life is importantly influenced by bioloical ties. More specifically, I maintain that knowing one's relatives and especially one's parents provides a kind of self-knowledge that is of irreplaceable value in the life-task of identity formation. These claims lead me to the conclusion that it is immoral to create children with the intention that they be alienated from their bioloical relatives?for example, by donor conception.
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  25. The Self as Narrator.J. David Velleman - 2005 - In Joel Anderson & John Christman (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  26. On the Aim of Belief.J. David Velleman - manuscript
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  27. The Genesis of Shame.J. David Velleman - 2001 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (1):27-52.
  28. Beyond Price.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Ethics 118 (2):191-212.
  29. Against the Right to Die.J. David Velleman - 1992 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (6):665-681.
    How a "right to die" may become a "coercive option".
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  30. Practical Reflection.J. David Velleman - 1991 - Ethics 102 (1):117-128.
     
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  31. The Way of the Wanton.J. David Velleman - 2008 - In Catriona Mackenzie & Kim Atkins (eds.), Practical Identity and Narrative Agency. Routledge.
    Harry Frankfurt's philosophy of action as a prolegomenon to the Zhuangzi.
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  32.  4
    7. What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press. pp. 188-210.
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  33.  60
    The Study of Animal Metacognition.J. David Smith - 2009 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (9):389-396.
  34.  14
    How to Share an Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29-50.
    Existing accounts of shared intention do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally shared, these accounts fail to (...)
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  35. A Rational Superego.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):529 - 558.
    Just when philosophers of science thought they had buried Freud for the last time, he has quietly reappeared in the writings of moral philosophers. Two analytic ethicists, Samuel Scheffler and John Deigh, have independently applied Freud’s theory of the superego to the problem of moral motivation. Scheffler and Deigh concur in thinking that although Freudian theory doesn’t entirely solve the problem, it can nevertheless contribute to a solution.
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  36. Motivation by Ideal.J. David Velleman - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (2):89-103.
    I offer an account of how ideals motivate us. My account suggests that although emulating an ideal is often rational, it can lead us to do irrational things.
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  37. The Identity Problem.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):221 - 244.
  38.  25
    The Uncertain Response in the Bottlenosed Dolphin ( Tursiops Truncatus ).J. David Smith, Jonathan Schull, Jared Strote, Kelli McGee, Roian Egnor & Linda Erb - 1995 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 124 (4):391.
  39. Deciding How to Decide.J. David Velleman - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. pp. 29--52.
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  40.  41
    I. The Identity Problem.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):221-244.
  41. Epistemic Freedom.J. David Velleman - 1989 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1):73-97.
    Epistemic freedom is the freedom to affirm anyone of several incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong. We sometimes have this freedom, strange as it seems, and our having it sheds some light on the topic of free will and determinism. This paper sketches a potential explanation for our feeling of freedom. The freedom that I postulate is not causal but epistemic (in a sense that I shall define), and the result is that it is quite compatible with determinism. I (...)
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  42.  72
    Brandt's Definition of "Good".J. David Velleman - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):353-371.
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  43. The Voice of Conscience.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):57–76.
    I reconstruct Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as an argument that deduces what the voice of conscience must say from how it must sound - that is, from the authority that is metaphorically attributed to conscience in the form of a resounding voice. The idea of imagining the CI as the voice of conscience comes from Freud; and the present reconstruction is part of a larger project that aims to reconcile Kant's moral psychology with Freud's theory of moral (...)
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  44. From Self Psychology to Moral Philosophy.J. David Velleman - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:349-377.
    I have therefore decided to venture out of the philosophical armchair in order to examine the empirical evidence, as gathered by psychologists aiming to prove or disprove motivational conjectures like mine. By and large, this evidence is indirect in relation to my account of agency, since it is drawn from cases in which the relevant motive has been forced into the open by the manipulations of an experimenter. The resulting evidence doesn’t tend to show the mechanism of agency humming along (...)
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  45.  34
    The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman J. - 1996 - Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
  46.  3
    Overall Similarity in Adults' Classification: The Child in All of Us.J. David Smith & Deborah G. Kemler - 1984 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 113 (1):137-159.
  47. Is Motivation Internal to Value?J. David Velleman - 1998 - In C. Fehige & U. Wessels (eds.), Preferences. Walter de Gruyter.
    The view that something's being good for a person depends on his capacity to care about it – sometimes called internalism about a person’s good – is here derived from the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'. In the course of this derivation, the limits of internalism are discussed, and a distinction is drawn between two senses of the phrase "a person's good".
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  48. Doables.J. David Velleman - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations (1):1-16.
    Just as our scientific inquiries are framed by our prior conception of what can be observed ? that is, of observables ? so our practical deliberations are framed by our prior conception of what can be done, that is, of doables. And doables are socially constructed, with the result that they vary between societies. I explore how doables are constructed and conclude with some remarks about the implications for moral relativism.
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  49. II. The Gift of Life.J. David Velleman - 2008 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 36 (3):245-266.
  50. Précis of The Possibility of Practical Reason.J. David Velleman - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):225 - 238.
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